老旧住宅加装电梯住户间费用分摊补偿研究

协调高低楼层住户利益,制定公平合理的费用分摊补偿比例是破解老旧住宅加装电梯难题的关键.本文基于投票博弈,建立了费用分摊模型和损失补偿模型,给出了老旧住宅加装电梯住户间费用分摊补偿比例的确定方法,并进行实证分析,最终结果表明:在不同投票权数要求下,各楼层住户费用分摊补偿比例有明显差异;在投票权数一定情况下,随着居住楼层的升高,住户的费用分摊比例逐渐上升.因此,结合老旧小区具体情况,合理确定投票权数,对加装电梯项目推进具有重要作用.     

基于信息熵的高楼层电梯费用分摊问题的研究

运用信息熵理论建立了高楼层电梯费用分摊比例的数学模型.并以某小区为例把该分配方案与平均值分配方法、Shapley值分配方法进行比较,结果表明,该方法更合理、有效,更能够得到物业和业主的认可和接受,同时解决了一直以来困扰政府和物业的一个难题.     

隐私保护下Shapley值算法研究

Shapley值法严格按照每个参与合作的参与者所做的边际贡献来分配收益.体现了某种程度上的公平性与合理性.但是该分配方案在确定每个参与者的利益过程中,需要共享各个参与者的成本和利润数据,极易引起参与者敏感信息的泄露.应用Paillier同态加密机制来对Shapley值法进行了深入研究,研究最终目的是确保在确定合作联盟收益分配方案的同时,每个参与者的隐私信息受到保护.     

基于演化博弈视角的植物品种权价值链合作伙伴行为协调机制研究

本文提出了植物品种权价值链合作伙伴行为协调的概念,应用演化博弈的双种群理论,研究了植物品种权价值链合作伙伴行为协调的博弈演化过程及影响因素。研究表明,协调演化方向受协调成本、协调收益、超额收益分配比例、成本分摊比例、单独合作收益、背叛收益和奖惩金额等因素的影响。提高协调收益和单方面合作收益,降低协调成本和背叛收益,保持合作双方支付的成本与双方合作超额收益的分配正相关,建立合理的超额收益分配机制,加强外部监管和惩罚力度,将会促进植物品种权价值链合作伙伴行为向全面协调的方向演化。     

具有超图合作结构的赋权Position值

具有超图交流结构的可转移效用合作对策,也称为超图对策,它由一个三元组(N,v,H)所组成,其中(N,H)是一个可转移效用对策(简称TU-对策),而(N,H)是一个超图(超网络)。在超图对策中,除Myerson值(Myerson)外,Position值(Meessen)是另一个重要的分配规则。该模型要求把超图结构中每条超边Shapley的值平均分配给它所包含的点,而不考虑每个点的交流能力或合作水平。本文引入超图结构中点的度值来度量每条超边中每个点的交流能力或合作水平,并结合Haeringer提出用于推广Shapley值的权重系统,并由此定义了具有超图合作结构的赋权Position值。我们证明了具有超图合作结构的赋权Position值可以由“分支有效性”、“冗余超边性”、“超边可分解性”、“拟可加性”、“弱积极性”和“弱能转换”六个性质所唯一确定,并且发现参与者获得的支付随其度值的增加而增加,参与者分摊的成本随其度值的增加而降低。     

需求为三角模糊数的联合订货模型及其成本分摊方法

研究需求不确定的多销售商企业联合订购同种产品的库存管理问题.首先,构建允许缺货的需求用三角模糊数表示的联合订货EOQ模型,解得各销售商的三角模糊数订货量及各联盟的订货周期和三角模糊数平均成本.其次,根据定义的类联盟单调性条件,提出计算三角模糊数合作博弈的三角模糊数比例剩余分配值的一种方法,利用该方法得出三角模糊数比例剩余分配值的下界值、平均值和上界值可分别直接由相关联盟值三角模糊数的下界值、平均值和上界值计算得到,证明了三角模糊数比例剩余分配值满足的一些重要性质.最后,将三角模糊数比例剩余分配值用于分摊联合订货成本,用一个数值算例说明所提出的模型和成本分摊方法的有效性及实用性.研究工作可为解决复杂库存管理问题提供新途径与新方法.     

联盟收益不确定下合作博弈的多目标粒子群扩展算法求解

在传统的合作博弈求解中,通常假设联盟收益确定或者局中人对联盟收益取值意见一致.现实中,联盟收益往往不确定,局中人对联盟收益取值意见不一致,且联盟分配方案的达成通常是局中人基于个体理性与判断进行多轮谈判,互相影响、相互妥协、最终趋同的结果.针对这种情况,本文首先对联盟收益不确定时局中人的收益进行描述,建立合作博弈的扩展模型,再考虑局中人的理性互动与策略博弈,借鉴群智能的建模思想和求解思路,利用多目标粒子群扩展算法对模型进行求解.本文对于联盟收益不确定时合作博弈的求解提供了新的思路与方法.     

具有风险因素的多联盟部分合作对策

多联盟部分合作对策是指对策中的局中人通过引入合作函数,彼此合作或采取单独行动来对非合作对策规则进行更改,形成具有多联盟结构的扩展型部分合作对策.本文克服多联盟部分合作对策中不同局中人联盟单调递增约束,局中人加入联盟后可以退出加入到其他联盟中;同时考虑风险因素的影响,采用专家打分法和网络分析法(ANP)重新确定联盟局中人各自所占的权重,对多联盟部分合作对策中构造的合作子对策的联盟收益分配方式进行改进,从而建立具有风险因素的多联盟部分合作对策模型,并利用逆推归纳法得到对策解的算法.最后通过实例说明所建模型及结论的合理性,体现实际经济管理过程中结盟的变化和风险的影响.     

多人合作费用分摊的多目标规划解法

考虑核心是空集的情况，针对核心法的适用范围和局限性，建立了一种多人合作费用分摊的多目标规划模型，给出了求解费用分摊方案的两阶段算法。最后通过一个实例说明了该方法的可行性。     

图上合作博弈和图的边密度

1977年, Myerson建立了以图作为合作结构的可转移效用博弈模型(也称图博弈), 并提出了一个分配规则, 也即"Myerson 值", 它推广了著名的Shapley值. 该模型假定每个连通集合(通过边直接或间接内部相连的参与者集合)才能形成可行的合作联盟而取得相应的收益, 而不考虑连通集合的具体结构. 引入图的局部边密度来度量每个连通集合中各成员之间联系的紧密程度, 即以该连通集合的导出子图的边密度来作为他们的收益系数, 并由此定义了具有边密度的Myerson值, 证明了具有边密度的Myerson值可以由"边密度分支有效性"和"公平性"来唯一确定.     

On some families of cooperative fuzzy games

In a fuzzy cooperative game the players may choose to partially participate in a coalition. A fuzzy coalition consists of a group of participating players along with their participation level. The characteristic function of a fuzzy game specifies the worth of each such coalition. This paper introduces well-known properties of classical cooperative games to the theory of fuzzy games, and studies their interrelations. It deals with convex games, exact games, games with a large core, extendable games and games with a stable core.     

Some New Results on Key Distribution Patterns and Broadcast Encryption

This paper concerns methods by which a trusted authority can distribute keys and/or broadcast a message over a network, so that each member of a privileged subset of users can compute a specified key or decrypt the broadcast message. Moreover, this is done in such a way that no coalition is able to recover any information on a key or broadcast message they are not supposed to know. The problems are studied using the tools of information theory, so the security provided is unconditional (i.e., not based on any computational assumption).In a recent paper st95a, Stinson described a method of constructing key predistribution schemes by combining Mitchell-Piper key distribution patterns with resilient functions; and also presented a construction method for broadcast encryption schemes that combines Fiat-Naor key predistribution schemes with ideal secret sharing schemes. In this paper, we further pursue these two themes, providing several nice applications of these techniques by using combinatorial structures such as orthogonal arrays, perpendicular arrays, Steiner systems and universal hash families.     

Common pool resources with support

We examine the role of support for coalition stability in common pool resource games such as fisheries games. Some players may not want to join a coalition that jointly manages a resource. Still, because they benefit from spillovers, they may want to support the coalition with a transfer payment to set incentives for others to join. We find that the impact of support on equilibria of this game is limited to games with three or five players. Recommendations for Resource Managers

• Coalitions may be able to effectively manage common pool resources such as fisheries but such coalitions are often not stable due to free-rider incentives.
• We explore the impact of a transfer scheme that can improve this coalition stability which would lead to larger and more effective coalitions.
• Our results show that this new transfer scheme works only for cases where the number of players is small.

     

On Some Methods for Unconditionally Secure Key Distribution and Broadcast Encryption

This paper provides an exposition of methods by which a trusted authority can distribute keys and/or broadcast a message over a network, so that each member of a privileged subset of users can compute a specified key or decrypt the broadcast message. Moreover, this is done in such a way that no coalition is able to recover any information on a key or broadcast message they are not supposed to know. The problems are studied using the tools of information theory, so the security provided is unconditional (i.e., not based on any computational assumption).We begin by surveying some useful schemes for key distribution that have been presented in the literature, giving background and examples (but not too many proofs). In particular, we look more closely at the attractive concept of key distribution patterns, and present a new method for making these schemes more efficient through the use of resilient functions. Then we present a general approach to the construction of broadcast schemes that combines key predistribution schemes with secret sharing schemes. We discuss the Fiat-Naor Broadcast Scheme, as well as other, new schemes that can be constructed using this approach.     

直觉模糊联盟合作博弈的非线性规划模型

本文研究联盟是直觉模糊集的合作博弈。首先,给出直觉模糊联盟的定义,并根据Choquet积分的直觉模糊形式,得到直觉模糊联盟合作博弈的区间值特征函数,进一步证明直觉模糊联盟合作博弈的区间值特征函数具有超可加性、凸性、弱超可加性. 其次根据区间数的闵可夫斯基距离、区间数的排序及损失函数的定义,建立直觉模糊联盟合作博弈的非线性规划模型,并对其求解得到最优分配. 最后给出一个具体的事例说明本文所建立的模型的合理性和有效性。     

A simple expression for the nucleolus in a special case

We present a simple algorithm for calculating the nucleolus of a game whenever (a) the characteristic function is non-positive, ie. a “cost” function, and (b) the players can be ordered by “size” in such a way that the cost of any coalition is equal to the cost of the largest player in that coalition. The cumulative nucleolus is approximately equal to the convex envelope of this cost function. A numerical and geometric illustration is given for a game based upon Birmingham airport runway costs, where there are over 13,000 players (aircraft movements) of 11 distinct (aircraft) types.     

Coalition formation in the presence of continuing conflict

This paper studies endogenous coalition formation in a rivalry environment where continuing conflict exists. A group of heterogeneous players compete for a prize with the probability of winning for a player depending on his strength as well as the distribution of strengths among his rivals. Players can pool their strengths together to increase their probabilities of winning as a group through coalition formation. The players in the winning coalition will compete further until one individual winner is left. We show that in any equilibrium there are only two coalitions in the initial stage of the contest. In the case of three players, the equilibrium often has a coalition of the two weaker players against the strongest. The equilibrium coalition structure with four players mainly takes one of the two forms: a coalition of the three weaker players against the strongest or a coalition of the weakest and strongest players against a coalition of the remaining two. Our findings imply that the rivalry with the possibility of coalition formation in our model exhibits a pattern of two-sidedness and a balance of power. We further study the impact of binding agreements by coalition members on equilibrium coalition structures. Our analysis sheds some light on problems of temporary cooperation among individuals who are rivals by nature.     

Monotonicity and dummy free property for multi-choice cooperative games

Given a coalition of ann-person cooperative game in characteristic function form, we can associate a zero-one vector whose non-zero coordinates identify the players in the given coalition. The cooperative game with this identification is just a map on such vectors. By allowing each coordinate to take finitely many values we can define multi-choice cooperative games. In such multi-choice games we can also define Shapley value axiomatically. We show that this multi-choice Shapley value is dummy free of actions, dummy free of players, non-decreasing for non-decreasing multi-choice games, and strictly increasing for strictly increasing cooperative games. Some of these properties are closely related to some properties of independent exponentially distributed random variables. An advantage of multi-choice formulation is that it allows to model strategic behavior of players within the context of cooperation.Partially funded by the NSF grant DMS-9024408     

The electoral system for the Italian Senate: an analogy with deterministic chaos?

The electoral system adopted for the allocation of seats in the Italian Senate utilizes a complex mechanism of awards at a regional level with the aim of strengthening, when necessary, the winning coalition and so improve overall government stability. The results presented here demonstrate that in a significant number of cases, the effect of the mechanism is opposite to that desired, to wit, weakening the resultant government by awarding more seats to the minority coalition. Indeed the award to the minority can even be such that the minority coalition becomes the majority and wins the election. The application of the award mechanism is strongly unpredictable as it depends crucially on the precise number of seats independently obtained in each region, and that each adjustment thereof can be positive, zero or negative; a characteristic that closely resembles the behaviour of a chaotic dynamical system whose trajectory, although purely deterministic, depends on infinitely precise details and is therefore unpredictable. To perform the systematic numerical analysis of the award effectiveness, we introduce characteristic polynomials, one for each electoral district, which carry information about all possible outcomes and award applications. Their product yields a polynomial containing the dependence of the result at national level on each of the regional awards.