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We consider a complete-information multilateral bargaining game in which a single buyer negotiates with two heterogeneous sellers selling perfect complementary units. While bilateral negotiations take place through a sequence of offers and counteroffers, the bargaining order is exogenously given. We solve for the conditions under which (a) the buyer prefers to negotiate with the lower-valuation seller first and (b) efficient (inefficient) outcomes emerge for the two bargaining orders. We find that the buyer prefers to negotiate with the lower-valuation seller first whenever the players are relatively impatient or the sellers are sufficiently heterogeneous. We show that there exists a unique efficient outcome when the buyer negotiates first with the lower-valuation seller and the sellers are sufficiently heterogeneous; however, significant delay in reaching agreements may arise when they are not. In case the buyer bargains with the higher-valuation seller first, an inefficient outcome is shown to exist even when players are extremely impatient. 相似文献
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Younghwan In 《International Journal of Game Theory》2006,34(1):79-90
We extend the results of van Damme et al. (1990) and Muthoo (1991) to two bilateral multi-issue bargaining)procedures with complete information and endogenous agenda, where each issue is associated with a finite set of alternatives. We show that in the first procedure (issue-by-issue bargaining), the stationary subgame perfect equilibria alone may support a large multiplicity of inefficient agreements. Confronting a recent study, the results for the second procedure imply that it is not necessary to appeal to “strictly controversial” issues in a bargaining problem in order to find multiplicity and delay in agreements 相似文献
4.
Multicriteria games describe strategic interactions in which players, having more than one criterion to take into account,
don’t have an a-priori opinion on the relative importance of all these criteria. Roemer (Econ. Bull. 3:1–13, 2005) introduces an organizational interpretation of the concept of equilibrium: each player can be viewed as running a bargaining
game among criteria. In this paper, we analyze the bargaining problem within each player by considering the Kalai-Smorodinsky
bargaining solution (see Kalai and Smorodinsky in Econometrica 43:513–518, 1975). We provide existence results for the so called Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution equilibria for a general class of disagreement points which properly includes the one considered by Roemer (Econ. Bull. 3:1–13, 2005). Moreover we look at the refinement power of this equilibrium concept and show that it is an effective selection device even when combined with classical refinement
concepts based on stability with respect to perturbations; in particular, we consider the extension to multicriteria games
of the Selten’s trembling hand perfect equilibrium concept (see Selten in Int. J. Game Theory 4:25–55, 1975) and prove that perfect Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution equilibria exist and properly refine both the perfect equilibria
and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution equilibria. 相似文献
5.
The “Nash program” initiated by Nash (Econometrica 21:128–140, 1953) is a research agenda aiming at representing every axiomatically
determined cooperative solution to a game as a Nash outcome of a reasonable noncooperative bargaining game. The L-Nash solution
first defined by Forgó (Interactive Decisions. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 229. Springer, Berlin,
pp 1–15, 1983) is obtained as the limiting point of the Nash bargaining solution when the disagreement point goes to negative
infinity in a fixed direction. In Forgó and Szidarovszky (Eur J Oper Res 147:108–116, 2003), the L-Nash solution was related
to the solution of multiciteria decision making and two different axiomatizations of the L-Nash solution were also given in
this context. In this paper, finite bounds are established for the penalty of disagreement in certain special two-person bargaining
problems, making it possible to apply all the implementation models designed for Nash bargaining problems with a finite disagreement
point to obtain the L-Nash solution as well. For another set of problems where this method does not work, a version of Rubinstein’s
alternative offer game (Econometrica 50:97–109, 1982) is shown to asymptotically implement the L-Nash solution. If penalty
is internalized as a decision variable of one of the players, then a modification of Howard’s game (J Econ Theory 56:142–159,
1992) also implements the L-Nash solution. 相似文献
6.
Diane J. Reyniers 《International Journal of Game Theory》2000,29(2):165-176
In this paper we consider the effect of the `impatience ratio' I (of the worker discount factor to the firm discount factor)
on the preferences of the players between two bargaining schemes in an asymmetric information wage bargaining context. The
firm has private information about the worker's value and the worker makes wage demands. In the contact bargaining scheme,
a wage demand which is accepted in one period is binding for all future periods (and hence the bargaining ends after acceptance
of a wage demand). In the repeated bargaining scheme, the parties continue to bargain irrespective of whether the worker has
been hired or not, and any accepted wage demand is only valid for the period in which it was accepted. We establish the following
results under the assumption that the worker's value is uniformly distributed on an interval: When the firm is more patient
than the worker (I<1) both parties prefer contract bargaining, and when the worker is more patient than the firm (I >1) both prefer repeated bargaining. For any value of I, the preferred type of bargaining gives the lower unemployment.
The work of Bae has already shown that when players are equally patient (I=1) the players are indifferent between the two schemes, regardless of the distribution of the worker's value. This paper
shows that Bae's indifference result (Bae, 1991) cannot be extended to unequally patient players.
Received: December 1996/Final version: October 1998 相似文献
7.
We study a bargaining procedure of coalition formation in the class of hedonic games, where players’ preferences depend solely
on the coalition they belong to. We provide an example of nonexistence of a pure strategy stationary perfect equilibrium,
and a necessary and sufficient condition for existence. We show that when the game is totally stable (the game and all its
restrictions have a nonempty core), there always exists a no-delay equilibrium generating core outcomes. Other equilibria
exhibiting delay or resulting in unstable outcomes can also exist. If the core of the hedonic game and its restrictions always
consist of a single point, we show that the bargaining game admits a unique stationary perfect equilibrium, resulting in the
immediate formation of the core coalition structure. 相似文献
8.
Shinsuke Kambe 《International Journal of Game Theory》2009,38(4):499-520
We study in what circumstance players alternate offers in bilateral bargaining. To examine this question, we suppose that
players choose whether to take the initiative in each period. The player who tries to take the initiative is able to make
an offer only when the other player does not. The probability that a player tries to take the initiative is referred to as
the frequency of initiative taking. We assume that this is conditioned on mutually observable states and is, once chosen,
unchangeable. When players make their frequency of initiative taking dependent on the identity of the latest proposer, the
players alternate their offers (possibly with some stochastic delay). In contrast, when players always use the same frequency
of initiative taking, or when players only distinguish odd-numbered from even-numbered periods for the frequency of initiative
taking, both players constantly try to take the initiative. Consequently, an impasse arises. 相似文献
9.
Zafer Akin 《International Journal of Game Theory》2007,36(2):275-299
This paper studies an alternating-offers bargaining game between possibly time-inconsistent players. The time inconsistency
is modeled by quasi-hyperbolic discounting and the “naive backwards induction” solution concept is used in order to obtain
the results. Both naive agents who remain naive and those who learn about their own preferences are considered. Offers of
the players who are naive or partially naive are never accepted by any type of player in either no learning or gradual learning
cases. The game between a naive or partially naive player who never learns and a time-consistent agent ends in an immediate
agreement if the time-consistent agent is the proposer. A one period delay occurs if the time-consistent agent is the responder.
The more naive the player is, the higher the share received. In addition, two naive agents who never learn disagree perpetually.
When naive and partially naive agents play against exponential or sophisticated agents and they are able to learn their types
over time, there exists a critical date before which there is no agreement. Therefore, the existence of time-inconsistent
players who can learn their types as they play the game can be a new explanation for delays in bargaining. The relationship
among the degree of naivete, impatience level and bargaining delay is also characterized. Specifically, for sufficiently high
discount factors, agreement is always delayed. On the other hand, if the naive agent has sufficiently firm initial beliefs
(slow learning or high degree of naivete), agents agree immediately. 相似文献
10.
Tamás Solymosi 《International Journal of Game Theory》2002,31(1):1-11
It is well known that in three-person transferable-utility cooperative games the bargaining set ℳi
1 and the core coincide for any coalition structure, provided the latter solution is not empty. In contrast, five-person totally-balanced
games are discussed in the literature in which the bargaining set ℳi
1 (for the grand coalition) is larger then the core. This paper answers the equivalence question in the remaining four-person
case. We prove that in any four-person game and for arbitrary coalition structure, whenever the core is not empty, it coincides
with the bargaining set ℳi
1. Our discussion employs a generalization of balancedness to games with coalition structures.
Received: August 2001/Revised version: April 2002 相似文献