双边市场异业合作网络平台的定价策略

本文以网络平台异业合作为背景,在Hotelling模型框架下,基于双边用户都是部分多归属的假定,结合平台采取异业合作可以提高用户固有收益这一前提,分析了产品和服务的差异化程度、拥挤效应及组间网络外部性强度对网络平台定价策略的影响。结果显示,双边用户的组间网络外部性强度不同时,随着拥挤效应的增强或产品和服务的差异化程度的提高,无论是在位平台还是采取异业合作的新进入平台,都会对一边用户提高,而对另一边用户降低收取的交易费;组间网络外部性强度相同时,平台对双边用户收取的交易费相同,且只与用户固有收益及交易量有关。研究表明,新进入市场的网络平台不应采取传统双边市场中常用的价格战策略来争夺市场份额,而应积极采取异业合作,通过提供优质优价的产品和服务来同在位平台竞争。     

网络平台企业合作的定价机制研究——基于多归属情形

本研究以近期日益增长的网络平台企业间的合作为背景,在双边平台均为部分多归属的假定下,结合产业间平台企业合作会使不同平台用户的固有收益出现差异这一基本特征,建立双边用户多归属的双寡头竞争模型,分析平台企业参与合作与不合作这两种状态对企业定价的影响,并深入探讨交叉网络外部性、平台差异性及边际成本对平台企业均衡定价策略的影响。研究表明在双边用户都是多归属的情况下,无论合作平台还是非合作平台对双边用户的定价存在严格的对称关系,属于对称均衡。此外,研究也证明交叉网络外部性、平台差异性及边际成本对合作平台与非合作平台产生的影响存在差异。     

央行数字货币与第三方支付是否是竞争与取代关系?——基于双边市场理论视角

中国央行数字货币主要用于国内零售支付需求,与第三方支付既相似、互补又存在差异,而各方对央行数字货币与第三方支付的竞争与取代问题看法不一.基于双边市场理论,从支付竞争的视角对上述问题进行分析.结果表明,央行发行数字货币会加剧支付市场竞争,引起第三方支付利润降低和平台过多收集隐私数据问题;当两种支付工具存在明显差异时,无论央行数字货币处于发展初期或发展稳定期,央行数字货币都不会取代第三方支付,并且二者在用户方面的竞争主要由支付平台的内在价值和支付服务质量决定.另外,通过分析央行数字货币补贴竞争策略对支付竞争的影响,发现当前的补贴竞争策略是有效的,并且在一定条件下,单边补贴策略是央行数字货币推广的一种优势策略.研究不仅丰富了双边市场理论,也为支付市场反垄断执法和央行数字货币的推广流通提供理论依据与实践启发.     

基于网络外部性下双边平台延伸服务最优定价

在考虑交叉网络外部性的前提下,探讨平台提供延伸服务对平台定价策略的影响,结论表明,提供延伸服务可以增加平台利润,而具体的定价策略又分为两种情形,第一:在双边平台形成初期,用户规模较小,平台采取不对称定价,标准取决于延伸服务的互补强度:如果互补强度较小时,平台对卖方采取免费策略,如果互补强度较大时,平台则直接对卖方采取高价策略,此时平台利润最高;第二:当双边平台逐渐成熟之后,用户达到一定规模,平台直接对双边用户采取较高定价,此时平台利润最高.     

网络外部性条件下差异化双边平台买者参与问题

双边平台存在的基础是参与的用户,因此用户的分配是双边市场上各利益主体最关心的问题。为研究用户分配问题,本文在具有差异性的竞争双边市场上,建立了两阶段的双边平台竞争模型。第一阶段使用Rubinstein讨价还价模型对卖者的参与人数进行分配,利用讨价还价顺序描述卖者进入的先后顺序;第二阶段分别在平台利润最大化和社会福利最大化两种情况下,刻画买者对平台的规模偏好,并求均衡的市场份额。通过此模型分析竞争性平台差异化的情况下,网络外部性系数对平台均衡市场份额以及市场利益相关者利得的影响。研究表明:在考虑平台利润最大化的情况下,买者参与人数受卖者规模与网络外部性系数的影响,平台规模并非越大越好;在考虑社会福利最大化的情况下,买者的网络外部性系数与买者参与人数不相关,但与总社会福利正相关。     

双边市场视角下操作系统平台定价策略研究

越来越多有影响力开源操作系统平台的兴起(如Linux),对传统的专有操作系统平台(如微软的Windows)形成巨大的冲击。本文借用双边市场理论框架探讨专有操作系统平台在面对开源操作系统平台竞争时的定价策略问题。主要结论如下:1专有操作系统平台对平台用户收费和向应用软件开发商补贴的定价结构是由平台用户和应用软件开发商之间两类交叉网络外部性相对强弱决定的;2用户使用开源操作系统平台相对于专有操作系统平台需承担的额外费用(如较高的学习成本和维护费用)和获得的额外好处(如可个性化和较好的稳定性)均会间接影响专有操作系统平台的定价策略;3与专有操作系统平台独占市场的情形对比发现,两种市场结构下专有操作系统平台的定价结构可能存在差异,并且这种差异依赖于平台用户使用开源操作系统平台与使用专有操作系统平台相比额外需承担费用和额外获得好处的差距。     

市场势力、排他性交易与平台竞争

2019年以来,关于排他性交易的经济效应和规制政策都存在较大争议.在Armstrong等理论模型基础上,构建并分析市场势力差异化情形下的平台排他性交易模型,旨在为双边平台排他性交易竞争效应提供合理的经济学解释以及反垄断政策依据.研究表明:1)当市场势力较强的平台实施排他性交易时,排他性激励能强化该平台对双边用户的定价优势,扩大其商家用户规模,进而增加其与市场势力较弱的平台间的利润差距.2)当市场势力较弱的平台实施排他性交易时,排他性激励能弥补其与市场势力较强平台在对双边用户议价能力与用户规模上的差距,超过一定阈值时,可反超市场势力较强平台的利润.最后,结合研究结论和平台经济发展实践,为平台治理和反垄断规制提出政策建议.     

网络借贷平台双边用户交叉网络外部性研究:来自中国P2P网络借贷行业的经验证据

本文基于双边市场理论对网络借贷平台进行模型研究和实证检验,采用格兰杰因果检验方法对典型网络借贷平台样本进行了实证分析,研究结果表明借款人和出借人之间存在交叉网络外部性;且相比出借人而言,借款人是"鸡与蛋"问题的关键点。进而,本文构建了关于网络借贷行业的竞争性双边市场模型。我们发现的证据表明,出借人会寻求高利率的投资标的,借款人会寻求低利率的资金。同时,网络借贷平台上双边用户的数量与用户规模、撮合利率、交易量、借款期限等有关。本文的研究结果意味着,网络借贷平台发展的关键在于拓展借款人市场和平台交易规模,从而提升双边用户的外部性。     

生产率差异与企业对外直接投资进入模式选择

基于企业异质性视角,借鉴演化博弈理论探究企业通过OFDI“走出去”时的跨国并购方和标的方在全要素生产率上的差异对企业OFDI进入策略选择的影响机制。利用Hotelling模型构造资本密集型企业与劳动密集型企业OFDI进入策略选择博弈模型,讨论两类企业OFDI进入方式决策在并购双方生产率差异变化之下的变迁机理。研究发现:当并购方和被并购方生产率差异较小时,市场达到两类企业都倾向于跨国并购策略的演化稳定状态;当并购双方生产率差异较大时,企业的生产要素密集度及其结构对其OFDI进入模式决策具有重要的作用,知识或技术密集度较高的资本密集型企业与综合实力强势的部分劳动密集型企业采取跨国并购战略,而另一部分劳动密集型企业选择绿地新建方式进入国际市场。即企业OFDI进入策略选择因其所属的行业生产要素密集度及其结构不同而具有差异性。研究结论在一定程度上弥补了现有研究的不足,为以后的研究工作提供一定的理论参考。     

基于双边市场理论的金融超市竞争定价策略研究

基于双边市场理论,重点分析金融超市在双寡头垄断情形下的竞争定价策略。即在在一般定价模型的基础上,构建起加入金融超市双边用户交易次数为歧视标准的价格歧视竞争模型。并且围绕金融超市追求长期利益和短期利益两种不同动机,对采取该策略均衡时最终用户的均衡进入价格、金融超市利润和市场份额进行比较分析。最后,给出金融超市实施价格歧视策略的对策和建议。     

Estimation of chaotic parameter regimes via generalized competitive mode approach

A procedure, we call it generalized competitive mode (GCM), is proposed to estimate the parameter regimes of chaos in nonlinear systems by implementing a mathematical version of mode competition. The idea is that for a system to be chaotic there must exist at least two GCMs in the system. The Lorenz system and a thin plate in flow-induced vibrations system are analyzed to find chaotic regimes by this procedure.     

On bounds for the mode and median of the generalized hyperbolic and related distributions

Except for certain parameter values, a closed form formula for the mode of the generalized hyperbolic (GH) distribution is not available. In this paper, we exploit results from the literature on modified Bessel functions and their ratios to obtain simple but tight two-sided inequalities for the mode of the GH distribution for general parameter values. As a special case, we deduce tight two-sided inequalities for the mode of the variance-gamma (VG) distribution, and through a similar approach we also obtain tight two-sided inequalities for the mode of the McKay Type I distribution. The analogous problem for the median is more challenging, but we conjecture some monotonicity results for the median of the VG and McKay Type I distributions, from we which we conjecture some tight two-sided inequalities for their medians. Numerical experiments support these conjectures and also lead us to a conjectured tight lower bound for the median of the GH distribution.     

广告盈利模式下网购平台间的竞争对其质量管控力度的影响

当前网购市场中的假冒伪劣现象备受社会关注,作为网购供应链的核心主体,网购平台企业应承担相应质量管控义务。既有文献对平台企业的质量管控进行了有益的探索,文章在此基础之上,探讨广告收入为网购平台主要营收来源时,两个不同规模平台企业间的竞争对其质量管控力度的影响。在双边市场理论框架下,通过构建博弈模型得到如下结果:随着网购平台之间竞争程度的增加,或随着网购平台之间广告宣传替代性的增强,或随着进驻网购平台在线商家数量的增多,每个平台企业均会提高质量管控力度;两个平台企业的质量管控力度随着在线消费者对广告厌恶度的增加均呈倒U型变化趋势。     

双边市场下商家和电子商务平台的演化博弈分析

互联网平台经济中存在的“二选一”和“多选一”现象引起了国内外社会各界的广泛关注,在此现实情境下,本文作了具体参数设置和相应假设,构建了双边市场下商家和电子商务平台关于排他性竞争行为的演化博弈模型,得到商家和电子商务平台在不同条件下的演化稳定均衡策略,并讨论了参数变化对演化稳定均衡策略的影响。最后,通过数值算例分析对系统演化稳定均衡结果进行了验证。研究结果对商家和电子商务平台企业的管理决策,以及政府监管部门对互联网经济下不正当竞争行为的有效监管有着一定启示意义。     

Number of Jumps in Two-Sided First-Exit Problems for a Compound Poisson Process

In this paper, we study the joint Laplace transform and probability generating functions of two pairs of random variables: (1) the two-sided first-exit time and the number of claims by this time; (2) the two-sided smooth exit-recovery time and its associated number of claims. The joint transforms are expressed in terms of the so-called doubly-killed scale function that is defined in this paper. We also find explicit expressions for the joint density function of the two-sided first-exit time and the number of claims by this time. Numerical examples are presented for exponential claims.     

A two-sided Arnoldi algorithm with stopping criterion and MIMO selection procedure

In this paper we introduce a two-sided Arnoldi method for the reduction of high order linear systems and we propose useful extensions, first of all a stopping criterion to find a suitable order for the reduced model and secondly, a selection procedure to significantly improve the performance in the multi-input multi-output (MIMO) case. One application is in micro-electro-mechanical systems (MEMS). We consider a thermo-electric micro thruster model, and a comparison between the commonly used Arnoldi algorithm and the two-sided Arnoldi is performed.     

The blocking lemma and group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts

This paper considers a general class of two-sided many-to-one matching markets, so-called matching markets with contracts. We study the blocking lemma and group incentive compatibility for this class of matching markets. We first show that the blocking lemma for matching with contracts holds if hospitals’ choice functions satisfy substitutes and the law of aggregate demand. The blocking lemma for one-to-one matching (Gale and Sotomayor, 1985) and that for many-to-one matching (Martínez et al., 2010) are special cases of this result. Then, as an immediate consequence of the blocking lemma, we show that the doctor-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for doctors if hospitals’ choice functions satisfy substitutes and the law of aggregate demand. Hatfield and Kojima (2009) originally obtain this result by skillfully using the strategy-proofness of the doctor-optimal stable mechanism. In this paper we provide a different proof for the group incentive compatibility by applying the blocking lemma.     

Optimal parking of idle elevators under myopic and state-dependent policies

In this paper we discuss the problem of optimally parking single and multiple idle elevators under light-traffic conditions. The problem is analyzed from the point of view of the elevator owner whose objective is to minimize the expected total cost of parking and dispatching the elevator (which includes the cost incurred for waiting passengers). We first consider the case of a single elevator and analyze a (commonly used but suboptimal) state-independent myopic policy that always positions the idle elevator at the same floor. Building on the results obtained for the myopic policy, we then show that the optimal non-myopic (state-dependent) policy calls for dispatching the idle elevator to the state-dependent median of a weight distribution. Next, we consider the more difficult case of two elevators and develop an expression for the expected dispatching distance function. We show that the objective function for the myopic policy is non-convex. The non-myopic policy is found to be dependent on the state of the two idle elevators. We compute the optimal state-dependent policy for two elevators using the results developed for the myopic policy. Next, we examine the case of multiple elevators and provide a general recursive formula to find the expected dispatching distance functions. Finally, we generalize the previous models by incorporating a fixed cost for parking the idle elevators that results in a two-sided optimal policy with different regions. Every policy that we introduce and analyze is illustrated by an example. The paper concludes with a short summary and suggestions for future research.     

Continuum percolation for Cox point processes

We investigate continuum percolation for Cox point processes, that is, Poisson point processes driven by random intensity measures. First, we derive sufficient conditions for the existence of non-trivial sub- and super-critical percolation regimes based on the notion of stabilization. Second, we give asymptotic expressions for the percolation probability in large-radius, high-density and coupled regimes. In some regimes, we find universality, whereas in others, a sensitive dependence on the underlying random intensity measure survives.     

A general impossibility theorem and its application to individual rights

In this paper, we generalize Green and Laffont’s (1979) impossibility theorem to the following form: in quasi-linear environments, when the set of each agent’s types is sufficiently rich, we cannot find mechanisms that allow bounded deviations from the decisive efficiency, incentive compatibility and budget-balance at the same time. Hence, it is impossible to find an incentive compatible mechanism with minimum social welfare losses. Furthermore, we discuss the compatibility problems between incentive and individual rights in a quasi-linear environment (see Sen, 1970a,b; Deb et al., 1997). Specifically, some new impossibility results are established.