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1.
基于产品分工的发展及供应链成员风险偏好不同的特性,构建了由多个风险规避的零部件供应商和一个组装商构成的两阶段组装供应链模型.首先,发现在各供应商均采用批发价格契约向组装商提供零部件情况下,各供应商的最优产量均小于集中决策下的最优产量;其次,引入期权契约机制对组装供应链进行了协调;最后,通过数值算例验证了期权契约协调机制的有效性.  相似文献   

2.
由多个供应商和一个装配商组成的装配系统中,装配商组装的最终产品需要由供应商提供零部件,不同供应商提供的零部件是互补的。供应商与装配商之间采用批发价格合同,由供应商决定批发价格而装配商决定订货量。供应商的资金是有限的,可能影响其供货能力以及装配系统的效率。供应商可以向银行借款或者由下游装配商提供预付款以缓解其资金约束的不利影响。针对银行贷款的情形,分析了装配系统的均衡订货量与批发价格,并通过图示直观地描述了资金约束对均衡订货量的影响。在装配商提供预付款时,若预付比例为外生变量,则供应商之间的博弈存在存策略纳什均衡,装配系统的绩效与预付比例以及供应商的资金有关;若预付比例是供应商的决策变量,则预付款可有效解决供应商的资金约束,相比于银行贷款,预付款的融资模式可使装配商和装配系统取得更高的利润。  相似文献   

3.
Gurnani and Gerchak [H. Gurnani, Y. Gerchak, Coordination in decentralized assembly systems with uncertain component yields, European Journal of Operational Research 176 (2007) 1559–1576] study coordination of a decentralized assembly system in which the demand of the assembler is deterministic and the component yields are random. They present incentive alignment control mechanisms under which system coordination is achieved. In this note, we extend Gurnani and Gerchak’s model to the case of positive salvage value and n asymmetric suppliers, and show that the shortage penalty contract which can coordinate Gurnani and Gerchak’s model no longer coordinates the extended model. Furthermore, we present a new kind of contract, surplus subsidy contract, to coordinate the extended model and prove that the profit of the supply chain under coordination can be arbitrarily divided between the component suppliers and the assembler.  相似文献   

4.
The last few decades have witnessed a huge growth of outsourcing in industry where the downstream firm assigns its production tasks to different upstream suppliers. This makes the supply chain structure more complicated and gives rise to some relevant operational questions. This paper focuses on a supply chain structure that consists of one assembler and two suppliers, and both suppliers’ production yields are stochastic. The assembler delegates the quantity decisions to the suppliers, and the two suppliers choose their production quantities either simultaneously or sequentially. We compare the suppliers’ equilibrium production strategies under these two scenarios. Our results show that the decision sequence can exert significant influences on the firm’s and channel’s equilibrium payoffs. At any given wholesale price, both suppliers produce more components under sequential moves than under simultaneous moves, and this results in higher payoffs for the suppliers, the assembler and the entire supply chain. The supplier’s profit increases if he can make the decision later under sequential moves. From the channel’s perspective, it is more beneficial for the supplier with a higher production cost to make the decision first. The assembler is able to extract more surplus by endogenously setting the wholesale price. However, this may make the suppliers worse off under sequential moves than under simultaneous moves.  相似文献   

5.
This paper investigates the impact of two time-based payment contracts in an assembly system that consists of one assembler and two suppliers, in which both suppliers’ production times are stochastic. The assembler initially chooses the contract type (delay payment contract vs on-time payment contract) and the buffer time, and two suppliers have to simultaneously determine their production lead times. We find that in equilibrium, both suppliers cut down their production lead times under the delay payment contract, and this makes them worse off than that under the on-time payment contract. Differently, the delay payment contract is the assembler’s dominant option. This is because by setting the buffer time, the assembler can significantly mitigate the possible delay risk caused by the suppliers’ decentralization under the delay payment contract. It also shows that the entire supply chain achieves the same service level under either the centralized condition or the decentralized condition, regardless of the applied payment contract type. Note that these results are robustness when we extend the model into the system containing N (N\(>\) 2) independent suppliers.  相似文献   

6.
Sourcing components in a complex global supplier network may lead to a high degree of supply uncertainty. Events, such as unexpected production defects or insufficient supplier capacity, can cause unexpected shortages of required components and halt the assembly of final products. Accordingly, the assembly enterprises must effectively manage various supply uncertainties in their component ordering decisions to avoid such component shortfalls. These issues have guided this research to investigate the optimal ordering strategies of an assembler facing the following two types of supply uncertainty: the uncertain production capacity of a standard component (component 1) and the random production yield of a core component (component 2). The assembler makes the component ordering decisions before these supply uncertainties are realized. We characterize the optimal ordering decision and find that the assembler should order components 1 and 2 according to a fixed ratio, which only depends on the random yield of component 2 and the production cost of component 1, but not on the uncertain capacity of component 1. A case study is presented to further explore the intertwined effects of these two uncertainties in an assembly system. Finally, the model is extended to consider a secondary option of buying additional component 1 s after observing some or all of the supply uncertainties, and this secondary option endows the firm with different capabilities in counteracting the supply uncertainties.  相似文献   

7.
针对传统的基于数量参考标准的奖励惩罚契约无法适应当下“多品种,小批量”的需求特点实现供应链协调,本文建立公平偏好情况下,以供应商提供产品的质量水平为参考标准的奖励惩罚契约模型,探讨其对供应链协调的影响。假设在由单个供应商和单个零售商组成的两级供应链系统中零售商具有公平偏好,分别就供应链内各参与主体渠道力量相等和渠道力量不相等这两种情形进行分析。研究发现零售商对自身收益和对公平的关注程度相同时,供应商和零售商会自愿的按照契约进行合作,取得均衡结果,实现供应链协调,且各参与主体渠道力量的不同会对供应链的整体利润产生显著影响。最后使用算例验证了结论。  相似文献   

8.
针对两类供应风险(不确定产能与随机产出率)下装配制造商的零部件订购决策这一难题,运用随机非线性规划方法,以装配商期望利润最大化为目标,建立零部件订购决策的多维优化模型,刻画了确定需求下的最优订购量,并对其进行了灵敏性分析。最后,通过数值算例验证了模型结论并进一步探讨不同类供应风险的影响,为装配商的零部件订购决策和风险管理提供有益的管理启示。  相似文献   

9.
This paper considers a multiple-supplier, single manufacturer assembly supply chain where the suppliers produce components of a short life-cycle product which is assembled by the manufacturer. In this single-period problem the suppliers determine their production quantities and the manufacturer chooses the retail price. We assume that the manufacturer faces a random price-dependent demand in either additive or multiplicative form. For each case, we analyze both simultaneous-move and leader–follower games to respectively determine the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria, and find the globally-optimal solution that maximizes the system-wide expected profit. Then, we introduce appropriate buy-back and lost-sales cost-sharing contracts to coordinate this assembly supply chain, so that when all the suppliers and the manufacturer adopt their equilibrium solutions, the system-wide expected profit is maximized.  相似文献   

10.
This paper develops an adverse selection model for a two-stage supply chain with one supplier, one retailer, and a potential outside entrant supplier who makes a partially substitutable product. The work is different from most research on entry deterrence that only considers a single-stage model. Our main interest is to investigate how the incumbent supplier can strategically maximize her profit by a wholesale pricing policy when facing the potential entrant. We focus on a model where the entrant supplier will sell her product through the same incumbent retailer. We derive the optimal decisions for each player and study the comparative statics of the equilibrium. To investigate how the supply chain structure may affect the deterrence strategy of the incumbent supplier, we also consider three alternative models with different channel structures, when both suppliers sell their products directly, when the entrant has another independent retailer, and when the entrant sells her product directly. Through the comparison, we find that the existence of the common downstream retailer often enhances the deterring motivation of the incumbent supplier.  相似文献   

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