Evaluation of thresholds for power mean-based and other divisor methods of apportionment

For divisor methods of apportionment with concave up or concave down rounding functions, we prove explicit formulas for the threshold values—the lower and upper bounds for the percentage of population that are necessary and sufficient for a state to receive a particular number of seats. Among the rounding functions with fixed concavity are those based on power means, which include the methods of Adams, Dean, Hill–Huntington, Webster, and Jefferson. The thresholds for Dean’s and Hill–Huntington’s methods had not been evaluated previously. We use the formulas to analyze the behavior of the thresholds for divisor methods with fixed concavity, and compute and compare threshold values for Hill–Huntington’s method (used to apportion the US House of Representatives).     

Probability Distribution Functions of Succession Quotas in the Case of Markov Dependent Trials

The exact probability distribution functions (pdf's) of the sooner andlater waiting time random variables (rv's) for the succession quota problemare derived presently in the case of Markov dependent trials. This is doneby means of combinatorial arguments. The probability generating functions(pgf's) of these rv's are then obtained by means of enumerating generatingfunctions (enumerators). Obvious modifications of the proofs provideanalogous results for the occurrence of frequency quotas and such a resultis established regarding the pdf of a frequency and succession quotas rv.Longest success and failure runs are also considered and their jointcumulative distribution function (cdf) is obtained.     

Asymptotic bias of some election methods

Consider an election where N seats are distributed among parties with proportions p ₁,…,p _m of the votes. We study, for the common divisor and quota methods, the asymptotic distribution, and in particular the mean, of the seat excess of a party, i.e. the difference between the number of seats given to the party and the (real) number Np _i that yields exact proportionality. Our approach is to keep p ₁,…,p _m fixed and let N→∞, with N random in a suitable way. In particular, we give formulas showing the bias favouring large or small parties for the different election methods.     

Apportionment methods and the Liu–Layland problem

The Liu–Layland periodic scheduling problem can be solved by the house monotone quota methods of apportionment. This paper shows that staying within the quota is necessary for any apportionment divisor method to solve this problem. As a consequence no divisor method, or equivalently no population monotone method, solves the Liu–Layland problem.     

Individual transferable vessel quotas and efficient restructuring of the primary harvesting sector

Over the last three decades most of the world's fisheries have been subject to management programs that have tried to limit the use of key fishing inputs. Inevitably, these restrictions have proven ineffective at preventing rent dissipation and stock depletion. More noteworthy is that fishers have subverted the intentions of these restrictions by adjusting the primary harvesting technology. This has led to an inefficient industrial structure characterized by capital stuffing on the part of each vessel, excess employment, an inefficient mix of vessels in the fleet, and too many vessels altogether.A promising means of encouraging more efficient primary harvesting is the individual transferable vessel quota that allocates a given catch to each vessel, thereby giving an incentive to catch the quota at least cost. This paper examines efficiency gains and potential industry restructuring from the introduction of an ITVQ into a fishery that was previously subject to input restrictions.Using data from the British Columbia salmon fishery, this paper estimates restricted cost functions for each of four different vessel types and simulates the operations of a market for ITVQs. The demand for quota comes from individual vessels and is found by differentiating the cost function with respect to the shadow price of quota. The market for quota is in equilibrium when the total demand for quota is equal to the fixed supply of quota set by the government. This implicitly defines the equilibrium quota rental price. Results show that the ITVQ could generate unit rental prices for quota between 31 and 93 cents per pound (18–53% of the average landed price).Using this simulated price, each vessel's costminimizing strategy is defined and both low cost vessels (those that will buy quota) and high cost vessels (those that will sell quota and exit the fishery) are identified. Quota trades between the two groups result in efficiency gains. These include reduced capital stuffing, exit of less efficient vessel types, attainment of economies of scale, and an efficient composition of vessel types in the fleet. In aggregate these gains lead to an estimate of annual resource rent that is approximately equal to one third of the value of the catch.     

History of Greek mathematics: A survey of recent research

This survey reviews research in four areas of the history of Greek mathematics: (1) methods in Greek mathematics (the axiomatic method, the method of analysis, and geometric algebra); (2) proportion and the theory of irrationals (controversies over the origins of the theory of incommensurables); (3) Archimedes (aspects of controversies over his life and works); and (4) Greek mathematical methods (including discussion of Ptolemy's work, connections between Greek and Indian mathematics, the significance of Greek mathematical papyri, Arabic texts, and even archaeological investigations of scientific instruments).     

Some Paradoxes in Special Relativity and the Resolutions

The special theory of relativity is the foundation of modern physics, but its unusual postulate of invariant vacuum speed of light results in a number of plausible paradoxes. This situation leads to radical criticisms and suspicions against the theory of relativity. In this paper, from the perspective that the relativity is nothing but a geometry, we give a uniform resolution to some famous and typical paradoxes such as the ladder paradox, the Ehrenfest’s rotational disc paradox. The discussion shows that all the paradoxes are caused by misinterpretation of concepts. We misused the global simultaneity and the principle of relativity. As a geometry of Minkowski space-time, special relativity can never result in a logical contradiction.     

Thresholds of the Divisor Methods

We give an algorithm which permits calculating the maximum and minimum vote shares that allow a party to obtain h seats, that is, the threshold of exclusion and the threshold of representation. These have already been studied for some methods (such as d'Hondt or Sainte-Laguë), and are here generalized to any divisor method, and to any number of seats. The thresholds depend on the size of the constituency, the number of parties running in the constituency, and the divisor method used. Finally, we give some consequences, including a characterization of the d'Hondt method.     

The Square of Opposition and the Paradoxes

Can an appeal to the difference between contrary and contradictory statements, generated by a non-uniform behaviour of negation, deal adequately with paradoxical cases like the sorites or the liar? This paper offers a negative answer to the question. This is done by considering alternative ways of trying to construe and justify in a useful way (in this context) the distinction between contraries and contradictories by appealing to the behaviour of negation only. There are mainly two ways to try to do so: i) by considering differences in the scope of negation, ii) by considering the possibility that negation is semantically ambiguous. Both alternatives are shown to be inapt to handle the problematic cases. In each case, it is shown that the available alternatives for motivating or grounding the distinction, in a way useful to deal with the paradoxes, are either inapplicable, or produce new versions of the paradoxes, or both. Work supported by SFRH/BPD/16678/2004 (FCT), project “On Content” POCI/FIL/55562/2004 (FCT) and project “LOGOS grupo de logica, lenguage y cognicion” HUM 2006-08236 (MEC).     

Parametric vs. divisor methods of apportionment

This paper formulates a new criterion that distinguishes the set of parametric methods within the set of all the divisor methods of apportionment. The criterion—that a method transfer seats as it “should”—asks that as population (or the votes of parties in a PR system) is shifted more and more from one state to another state (from one party to another party) at some point the first state (or party) is apportioned one less seat, the second state (or party) one more seat, and the remaining apportionments are as they were. It goes on to examine several properties of parametric methods.     

Error minimization methods in biproportional apportionment

One of the most active research lines in the area of electoral systems to date deals with the Biproportional Apportionment Problem, which arises in those proportional systems where seats must be allocated to parties within territorial constituencies. A matrix of the vote counts of the parties within the constituencies is given, and one has to convert the vote matrix into an integer matrix of seats ??as proportional as possible?? to it, subject to the constraints that each constituency be granted its pre-specified number of seats, each party be allotted the total number of seats it is entitled to on the basis of its national vote count, and a zero-vote zero-seat condition be satisfied. The matrix of seats must simultaneously meet the integrality and the proportionality requirement, and this not infrequently gives rise to self-contradictory procedures in the electoral laws of some countries. Here we discuss a class of methods for Biproportional Apportionment characterized by an ??error minimization?? approach. If the integrality requirement is relaxed, fractional seat allocations (target shares) can be obtained so as to achieve proportionality at least in theory. In order to restore integrality, one then looks for integral apportionments that are as close as possible to the ideal ones in a suitable metric. This leads to the formulation of constrained optimization problems called ??best approximation problems?? which are solvable in polynomial time through the use of network flow techniques. These error minimization methods can be viewed as an alternative to the classical axiomatic approach introduced by Balinski and Demange (in Math Oper Res 14:700?C719, 1989a; Math Program 45:193?C210, 1989b). We provide an empirical comparison between these two approaches with a real example from the Italian Elections and a theoretical discussion about the axioms that are not necessarily satisfied by the error minimization methods.     

A Bishop surface with a vanishing Bishop invariant

We give a solution to the equivalence problem for Bishop surfaces with the Bishop invariant λ=0. As a consequence, we answer, in the negative, a problem that Moser asked in 1985 after his work with Webster in 1983 and his own work in 1985. This will be done in two major steps: We first derive the formal normal form for such surfaces. We then show that two real analytic Bishop surfaces with λ=0 are holomorphically equivalent if and only if they have the same formal normal form (up to a trivial rotation). Our normal form is constructed by an induction procedure through a completely new weighting system from what is used in the literature. Our convergence proof is done through a new hyperbolic geometry associated with the surface. As an immediate consequence of the work in this paper, we will see that the modular space of Bishop surfaces with the Bishop invariant vanishing and with the Moser invariant s<∞ is of infinite dimension. This phenomenon is strikingly different from the celebrated theory of Moser–Webster for elliptic Bishop surfaces with non-vanishing Bishop invariants where the surfaces only have two and one half invariants. Notice also that there are many real analytic hyperbolic Bishop surfaces, which have the same Moser–Webster formal normal form but are not holomorphically equivalent to each other as shown by Moser–Webster and Gong. Hence, Bishop surfaces with the Bishop invariant λ=0 behave very differently from hyperbolic Bishop surfaces and elliptic Bishop surfaces with non-vanishing Bishop invariants.     

自助选座系统资源分配效率评价与优化

针对图书馆占座和座位分配问题,评价并改进图书馆的自助选座系统。以某高校图书馆为研究对象,在多目标约束条件下构建了实现座位资源使用均衡化的多目标灰狼算法(MOGWO)优化模型,提出采用泰尔系数衡量不同区域的座位热度差异,并设计自助选座系统的预约功能,从而更加人性化地约束读者的选座行为。采用某高校图书馆的高频记录数据证实了模型及算法的有效性,并提出可操作性建议,为提升图书馆管理效率提供决策参考。     

Remarks on the role of conditional probability in data exploration

A careful discussion of the concept of conditional event leads to a sensible use of frequency data as conditional probabilities: as a by-product, the well-known ‘paradoxes’ arising from the so-called confounding effect are avoided.     

一个公平分配席位的新方案

提出了公平累加分配席位的方法,并证明了该方法在一定条件下满足公平分摊原则和席位单调性原则.并进一步指出该方法具备更多的公平性质.     

基于Huffman树的公平席位分配方法

提出一种基于Huffman树的公平席位分配方法.该方法能同时满足姜启源教授在2003年提出的两条理想化原则.     

$$L^1$$ penalization of volumetric dose objectives in optimal control of PDEs

This work is concerned with a class of PDE-constrained optimization problems that are motivated by an application in radiotherapy treatment planning. Here the primary design objective is to minimize the volume where a functional of the state violates a prescribed level, but prescribing these levels in the form of pointwise state constraints leads to infeasible problems. We therefore propose an alternative approach based on \(L^1\) penalization of the violation that is also applicable when state constraints are infeasible. We establish well-posedness of the corresponding optimal control problem, derive first-order optimality conditions, discuss convergence of minimizers as the penalty parameter tends to infinity, and present a semismooth Newton method for their efficient numerical solution. The performance of this method for a model problem is illustrated and contrasted with an alternative approach based on (regularized) state constraints.     

Dynamic cruise ship revenue management

Recently, it has been recognized that revenue management of cruise ships is different from that of airlines or hotels. Among the main differences is the presence of multiple capacity constraints in cruise ships, i.e., the number of cabins in different categories and the number of lifeboat seats, versus a single constraint in airlines and hotels (i.e., number of seats or rooms). We develop a discrete-time dynamic capacity control model for a cruise ship characterized by multiple constraints on cabin and lifeboat capacities. Customers (families) arrive sequentially according to a stochastic process and request one cabin of a certain category and one or more lifeboat seats. The cruise ship revenue manager decides which requests to accept based on the remaining cabin and lifeboat capacities at the time of an arrival as well as the type of the arrival. We show that the opportunity cost of accepting a customer is not always monotone in the reservation levels or time. This non-monotone behavior implies that “conventional” booking limits or critical time periods capacity control policies are not optimal. We provide analysis and insights justifying the non-monotone behavior in our cruise ship context. In the absence of monotonicity, and with the optimal solution requiring heavy storage for “large” (industry-size) problems, we develop several heuristics and thoroughly test their performance, via simulation, against the optimal solution, well-crafted upper bounds, and a first-come first-served lower bound. Our heuristics are based on rolling-up the multi-dimensional state space into one or two dimensions and solving the resulting dynamic program (DP). This is a strength of our approach since our DP-based heuristics are easy to understand, solve and analyze. We find that single-dimensional heuristics based on decoupling the cabins and lifeboat problems perform quite well in most cases.     

Paradoxes in conditional probability

It is shown that paradoxes arise in conditional probability calculations, due to incomplete specification of the problem at hand. This is illustrated with the Borel and the Kac-Slepian type paradoxes. These are significant in applications including Bayesian inference. Also Rényi's axiomatic setup does not resolve them. An open problem on calculation of conditional probabilities in the continuous case is noted.     

The give-up problem for blocked regional lists with multi-winners

The current electoral law for the Italian Parliament prescribes blocked, linearly ordered lists of candidates for each party within each constituency. The peculiarity of the Italian electoral system is that a party can present the same candidate in different constituencies. There are several seats at stake in each constituency; these seats are allocated to the parties proportionally to the total number of votes they get. If the blocked list mechanism-which assigns the seats obtained by a party in a constituency to the first candidates of the corresponding ordered list-causes some candidates to win in more than one constituency, they may retain only one of the seats, giving up all the remaining ones. Thus, the problem arises for a party to find a suitable “schedule of give-ups” that produces the final set of winners for that party. In order to do this, we assume that such decision is centralized and based on some models of global (inter-regional) preferences over the set of candidates. In this paper, we introduce two classes of models to formulate the “give-up problem”, i.e., utility and ordinal models, and we show that for both of them some natural formulations of the problem can be efficiently solved by network flows techniques.