带有网络外部性的动态寡头垄断定价

给出了带有网络外部性的两阶段寡头垄断定价模型,并用博弈论方法求解.通过与带有网络外部性的完全垄断定价模型的比较,得出重要结论:在网络外部性足够大的情况下,①寡头竞争情况下与完全垄断下情况一样,“科斯假设”将得到克服,均衡定价将呈现先低后高的情况.②对于完全垄断厂商来说,网络外部性k的增加能够增加其利润,但对于寡头竞争的企业来说,正好相反,k的增加将导致其利润的下降.     

下游差异Cournot厂商的提成许可策略与创新激励

不同的上游市场结构对下游厂商的许可策略、创新激励产生不同的影响.文章分别基于上游原料供应商为独占垄断、双头垄断以及完全竞争的假设,结合提成许可策略,比较分析了下游产品市场差异Cournot厂商的创新激励.结果表明：上游厂商的市场势力越强,下游厂商的显著创新激励越低,但显著创新的提成许可激励却越高.这一结果为厂商与政府的创新管理提供了理论依据.     

三级供应链企业间交叉持股时均衡定价及市场绩效研究

本文构建三级供应链企业间纵向交叉持股时的Stackelberg定价博弈模型,采用逆推归纳法推演出供应链各厂商交叉持股时的均衡定价及其利润公式,分析了交叉持股对三级供应链均衡市场价格、厂商利润、消费者剩余和经济福利的影响。研究结果表明,较之无交叉持股,仅下游厂商对上游厂商单向持股,对供应链的绩效没有影响;而适当增大上游厂商对下游厂商持股,限制下游厂商对上游厂商持股,能有效降低市场价格,提高供应链及各厂商的利润,增加消费者剩余,改善经济福利,实现供应链各厂商与消费者的共赢。     

减排技术视域下碳交易对企业市场势力的影响研究

碳交易促进减排技术进步须以技术进步增进寡头垄断企业市场势力为前提。论文以斯塔克博格(Stackberg)模型为基础，研究了减排技术是否成熟两种情况下，碳交易对寡头垄断企业产量及市场势力的影响。结果表明，尽管无论碳减排技术是否成熟，寡头企业初始碳排放系数相对大小都是影响企业产量及市场势力的关键变量，但是对企业产量及市场势力的影响迥异。在减排技术不成熟时，追随企业与领导企业初始碳排放系数的比值越大，碳交易越有利于领导企业增强市场势力，碳交易拉大企业间市场势力的差异；减排技术成熟时，追随企业与领导初始碳排放系数的比值越大，碳交易越有利于追随企业增强市场势力，碳交易缩小企业间市场势力的差异。在实施碳交易的过程中，须高度重视行业的竞争格局与减排的效率差异，防止行业进一步走向垄断。     

非线性定价下的双头垄断企业行为分析

本采用了泰勒尔的消费基本效用函数模型,从消费剩余效用最优化的角度分析了双头垄断企业的市场行为,得出了如下结论：企业非线性定价条件下,任何类型的消费都存在一个最优消费数量,双头垄断竞争有助于扩展市场,提高产品质量,降低产品价格,但双头垄断在非线性定价下的最终市场均衡是达到完全垄断,而政府管制和赤可以防止完全垄断的形成,等等。     

基于合作博弈的买方抗衡势力市场绩效与卖方工艺创新强度分析

设计了由一个上游企业和两个下游企业所构成的产业链纵向关系模型,建立了纵向一体化、纵向分离且下游企业均无买方抗衡势力、以及单个下游企业具有买方抗衡势力三种情况下上游企业的工艺创新强度计算模型,分析了下游企业存在买方抗衡势力时市场中均衡的批发价格、零售价格、企业利润以及社会福利的变化,给出了相应的结论,同时也说明了“加尔布雷斯假说”在本文的结构下没有得到验证。     

安全因子优化与协调模型研究

在需求和供应都不确定的情形下 ,通过模型研究对两阶供应链的安全因子优化与协调作了一些有益的探讨 .本文引入了有效库存水平的概念 ,以反映上游缺货对下游库存的影响 ,在基准库存水平补货模式下构造了的供需双方的库存模型 ,且对安全因子进行整体优化以降低供应链的库存成本 .     

基于税率因素的中间产品转移定价研究

在中间产品转移定价过程中引进税率因素.在中间产品价格采用成本加成定价法的条件下,分别基于下游企业对上游企业的单位成本具有完全信息和不完全信息两种情况,对厂商的中间产品定价方法进行了研究,得出具有完全信息的企业总利润大于不具有完全信息的企业总利润的结论.并在此基础上通过变化的成本加成率建立了减少上游企业提供不真实单位成本导致利润损失的模型.     

基于多Agent的Supply-Hub库存策略建模与仿真研究北大核心

Supply-Hub是一种能较好地解决装配式供应链协同运作问题的供应链运作模式,其库存参数设置对于平衡上游供应商与下游制造商之间的利益,吸弓l供应商加入Supply-Hub非常关键.建立了由两个供应不同零部件的供应商向制造商补货时的供应商多周期成本模型,采用多Agent仿真方法,研究了三种情形下(s,S)库存策略参数的变动对供应商及制造商的影响,以期为Supply-Hub运营商合理确定库存策略参数提供一定参考.     

基于多Agent的Supply-Hub库存策略建模与仿真研究

Supply-Hub是一种能较好地解决装配式供应链协同运作问题的供应链运作模式,其库存参数设置对于平衡上游供应商与下游制造商之间的利益,吸弓l供应商加入Supply-Hub非常关键.建立了由两个供应不同零部件的供应商向制造商补货时的供应商多周期成本模型,采用多Agent仿真方法,研究了三种情形下(s,S)库存策略参数的变动对供应商及制造商的影响,以期为Supply-Hub运营商合理确定库存策略参数提供一定参考.     

The effect of vertical integration on consumer price in the presence of inventory costs

This paper investigates the effect on consumer price of a vertical merger between a monopolist manufacturer and his retailer, when inventory costs are taken into consideration. We find that the traditional result (lower prices) remains true only when inventory costs are sufficiently small. The direction of the price change also depends on the market size.     

Single versus multiple supplier sourcing strategies

Successful supply chain management necessitates an effective sourcing strategy to combat uncertainties in both supply and demand. In particular, supply disruption results in excessive downtime of production resources, upstream and downstream supply chain repercussions, and eventually a loss in the market value of the firm. In this paper we analyze single period, single product sourcing decisions under demand uncertainty. Our approach integrates product prices, supplier costs, supplier capacities, historical supplier reliabilities and firm specific inventory costs. A unique feature of our approach is the integration of a firm specific supplier diversification function. We also extend our analysis to examine the impact of minimum supplier order quantities. Our results indicate that single sourcing is a dominant strategy only when supplier capacities are large relative to the product demand and when the firm does not obtain diversification benefits. In other cases, we find that multiple sourcing is an optimal sourcing strategy. We also characterize a non-intuitive trade-off between supplier minimum order quantities, costs, and supplier reliabilities. Finally, we examine the robustness of our results through an extensive numerical analysis of the key parameters of our model.     

The impact of dynamic pricing on the economic order decision

This paper analyzes the impact of dynamic pricing on the single product economic order decision of a monopolist retailer. Items are procured from an external supplier according to the economic order quantity (EOQ) model and are sold to customers on a single market without competition following the simple monopolist pricing problem. Coordinated decision making of optimal pricing and ordering is influenced by operating costs – including ordering and inventory holding costs – and the demand rate obtained from a price response function. The retailer is allowed to vary the selling price, either in a fixed number of discrete points in time or continuously. While constant and continuous pricing have received much attention in the literature, problems with a limited number of price changes are rather rare. This paper illustrates the benefit of dynamically changing prices to achieve operational efficiency in the EOQ model, that is to trigger high demand rates when inventories are high. We provide structural properties of the optimal time instants when the price should be changed. Taking into account costs for changes in price, it provides numerical guidance on number, timing, and size of price changes during an order cycle. Numerical examples show that the benefits of dynamic pricing in an EOQ framework can be achieved with only a few price changes and that products being unprofitable under static pricing may become profitable under dynamic pricing.     

Vertical integration with endogenous contract leadership: Stability and fair profit allocation

This paper studies vertical integration in serial supply chains with a wholesale price contract. We consider a business environment where the contracting leader may be endogenously changed before and after forming the integration. A cooperative game is formulated to normatively analyze the stable and fair profit allocations under the grand coalition in such an environment. Our main result demonstrates that vertical integration is stable when all members are pessimistic in the sense that they are sure that they will not become the contracting leader if they deviate from the grand coalition. We find that in this case, the grand coalition’s profit must be allocated more to the retailer and the members with higher costs. Nevertheless, we also show the conditions under which the upstream manufacturer can have strong power as in traditional supply chains.     

牛鞭效应弱化与反牛鞭效应强化在完美信息下联合作用的博弈

在供应链运作过程中,同时存在牛鞭效应与反牛鞭效,若仅考虑到供应链的成本、需求偏差等问题,这种存在会因有限理性的驱使使得牛鞭效应弱化与反牛鞭效应强化.因此,认为供应链的上下游在周期内会表现出牛鞭效应弱化与反牛鞭效应强化的联合作用,联合作用使得单个企业达到低平均库存成本,也意味着供应链的整体库存最低且整体市场需求偏差最低,间接地、自动地从整体上消除牛鞭效应或反牛鞭效应,使得整条供应链不管是短期的还是长期来看是最佳的,若是长期,还会给供应链企业带来显著的战略优势.     

基于技术创新的资金约束供应链融资策略分析

新兴技术进入竞争市场时,供应链成员往往存在资金约束,为了尽早占据市场份额、获得更高的利润流,上下游企业有意愿进行供应链的内外部融资。文章对上游企业存在资金约束、下游核心企业资金充裕的供应链融资策略进行决策分析。研究表明:上下游的融资策略会使上游企业得到帕累托改进,且随上游企业自有资金的增大,下游企业的利率阈值逐渐减小;存在最优融资利率使得下游企业的期望利润达到最大。在上下游企业财务不透明的前提下,存在下游企业的融资利率区间使上游企业有隐藏真实资金状况以期获得更低融资利率的动机,文章基于博弈论的信息甄别模型给出了相应的激励合同对上游企业的期望利润进行修正,诱使上游企业提供真实的资金状况。     

Coordination mechanisms for inventory control in three-echelon serial and distribution systems

This paper is concerned with the coordination of inventory control in three-echelon serial and distribution systems under decentralized control. All installations in these supply chains track echelon inventories. Under decentralized control the installations will decide upon base stock levels that minimize their own inventory costs. In general these levels do not coincide with the optimal base stock levels in the global optimum of the chain under centralized control. Hence, the total cost under decentralized control is larger than under centralized control. To remove this cost inefficiency, two simple coordination mechanisms are presented: one for serial systems and one for distribution systems. Both mechanisms are initiated by the most downstream installation(s). The upstream installation increases its base stock level while the downstream installation compensates the upstream one for the increase of costs and provides it with a part of its gain from coordination. It is shown that both coordination mechanisms result in the global optimum of the chain being the unique Nash equilibrium of the corresponding strategic game. Furthermore, all installations agree upon the use of these mechanisms because they result in lower costs per installation. The practical implementation of these mechanisms is discussed.     

Optimal overlapping and functional interaction in product development

Overlapping of development stages and interaction between different functions are regarded as important strategies for reducing development lead time. However, overlapping typically requires additional costs for rework and functional interaction increases communication time. This paper presents an analytical model to improve project performance by balancing the positive and negative effects of overlapping and functional interaction. We first investigate the progress of downstream development, which is essential to derive the optimal overlapping policies. We find that the downstream progress increases over time when the upstream evolution is fast or linear, but it is indefinite when the upstream evolution is slow. Then, we present optimal overlapping policies taking into account the complexity of downstream progress. The impact of different project properties, such as the dependency between development stages and the opportunity cost of time, on overlapping policies is discussed. Finally, we derive the optimal functional interaction strategy when the optimal overlapping is followed. The methodology is illustrated with a case study at a handset design company.     

Vertical separation as a defense against strong suppliers

We provide a simple model to investigate decisions about vertical separation. The key feature of this model is that more than one input is required for the final product of the downstream monopolist. We show that as the bargaining powers of independent complementary input suppliers grow larger, the downstream monopolist tends to separate from its input units. The results are related to a visible difference between the vertical structures of Japanese and US auto assemblers.