基于关联网络DEA的供应链协调程度评价

本文给出了一种供应链网络协调程度的评价方法。研究思路是:首先,关联网络DEA能求出供应链网络上各个决策单元的DEA效率。其次,假设供应链网络实现了协调,那么网络上所有企业的DEA效率应该都为1。因此可以用供应链网络的实际DEA效率与协调状态(即所有决策单元DEA效率均为1)的差距,来评价供应链网络的协调程度。基于这一思路,本文研究了一个由3个供应商、2个制造商和3个零售商组成的供应链网络的协调评价问题,构建了基于关联网络DEA的类方差协调评价模型,实现了对供应链效率和协调性的同时测量,并通过数值算例验证了方法的实用性和有效性。     

The efficiency of joint decision making in buyer-supplier relationships

This paper examines the effectiveness of joint decision making within 87 pairs of buyer-supplier relationships in manufacturing. Joint decision making is an important attribute of a more cooperative supply chain relationship that may ultimately result in a better performance. Efficiency is modeled as a multiple criteria problem using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Inputs of five kinds of joint decision making activity are examined relative to two measures of output based on the assessment of the buying firm. Three contingent constructs (product customization and innovation, media richness of the communication between buyer and supplier, and continuity in the relationship) are then examined for their impact on the relative performance of each pair. The implications for the management of supply chain relationships and benchmarking of best practice are then discussed.     

指派问题在供应商选优决策中的应用

通常供应链中供应商选优问题为多指标决策问题,本将此问题视为指派问题。指派问题中的关键是确定“效率”矩阵,本充分利用供应商单排序结果,评价指标权重以及供应商指标评价值构造了“效率”矩阵,建立了供应商综合选优指派问题模型,案例试算表明该方法合理、有效,为多指标方案决策提供了又一种可行的决策方法。     

Mean–variance analysis of a single supplier and retailer supply chain under a returns policy

In the literature, most of the supply chain coordinating policies target at improving the supply chain’s efficiency in terms of expected cost reduction or expected profit improvement. However, optimizing the expected performance alone cannot guarantee that the realized performance measure will fall within a small neighborhood of its expected value when the corresponding variance is high. Moreover, it ignores the risk aversion of supply chain members which may affect the achievability of channel coordination. As a result, we carry out in this paper a mean–variance (MV) analysis of supply chains under a returns policy. We first propose an MV formulation for a single supplier single retailer supply chain with a newsvendor type of product. The objective of each supply chain decision maker is to maximize the expected profit such that the standard deviation of profit is under the decision maker’s control. We study both the cases with centralized and decentralized supply chains. We illustrate how a returns policy can be applied for managing the supply chains to address the issues such as channel coordination and risk control. Extensive numerical studies are conducted and managerial findings are proposed.     

Supply chain performance evaluation with data envelopment analysis and balanced scorecard approach

One of the most complicated decision making problems for managers is the evaluation of supply chain (SC) performance which involves various criteria. Though vast studies have been recorded on supply chain efficiency evaluation via balanced scorecard (BSC) approach, these studies do not focus on the relationships between the four perspectives of BSC approach. The present paper is an attempt focusing on these relationships, especially the returnable ones. To do so, at first, all relationships between the four perspectives of BSC were determined and then the DEMATEL approach was employed to obtain a network structure. This network structure was then used to create a network DEA model. Since it was not possible to calculate the efficiency evaluation score by BSC, the data envelopment analysis (DEA) model was used for such an evaluation. Moreover, after reviewing different tools to evaluate the performance of supply chain, a new approach, relying on network DEA with BSC approach, was generated. Finally, this model was applied in the Iranian food industry to evaluate its supply chains efficiency and the results proved the high efficiency of the model designed. The findings could be used in various evaluation processes in different industries.     

损失规避环境下供应链回扣联合促销决策研究

在由单一供应商和单一损失规避零售商组成的二阶段供应链中,基于Stackelberg博弈模型,研究零售商回扣与订单联合决策以及供应商渠道销量回扣决策,试图揭示分散决策供应链回扣联合促销机制。研究表明,给定供应商实施渠道销量回扣促销,零售商回扣与损失规避呈正向变动关系,而零售商渠道传导率与损失规避的关系依赖于产品获利情况,渠道销量回扣能提高零售商回扣与零售商期望效用;而供应商实施渠道销量回扣促销的意愿与批发价有关,只有当批发价大于某一阈值时,才能促使供应商和零售商实现回扣联合促销;但供应商实施渠道销量回扣总是能提高供应链效率。     

随机需求下供应链商业信用契约协调

研究一个供应商和一个零售商构成的两级供应链面对随机需求时的商业信用契约协调问题。通过分析商业信用对供应商与零售商各自目标利润及供应链的总利润的影响,建立了商业信用契约协调模型,推导了最优信用期和最优订货量,指出通过信用策略可以使双方实现对利润的合理分配与协调。最后通过数值算例说明了所得结论。     

Consignment contracting: Who should control inventory in the supply chain?

Consignment is a popular form of business arrangement where supplier retains ownership of the inventory and gets paid from the retailer based on actual units sold. The popularity of such an arrangement has come with some continued debates on who should control the supply chain inventory, the supplier or retailer. This paper aims at shedding light on these debated issues. We consider a single period supply chain model where a supplier contracts with a retailer. Market demand for the product is price-sensitive and uncertain. The supplier decides his consignment price charged to the retailer for each unit sold, and the retailer then chooses her retail price for selling the product. We study and compare two different consignment arrangements: The first allows the retailer to choose the supply chain inventory, together with her retail price, and is labeled as a Retailer Managed Consignment Inventory (RMCI) program; and the second calls for the supplier to decide the inventory, together with his consignment price, and is labeled as a Vendor Managed Consignment Inventory (VMCI) program. We show that with an RMCI program, the supply chain loses at least 26.4% of its first-best (expected) profit, while with VMCI, it loses just or no more than 26.4% of the first-best profit. Second, we demonstrate that both programs lead to an equal split of the corresponding channel profit between the supplier and the retailer. These results indicate that it is beneficial both to the supplier and to the retailer when delegating the inventory decision to the supplier rather than to the retailer in the channel.     

基于契约和关系治理的供应链质量控制机制设计

本文考虑制造商和供应商共同努力改进产品质量的情况,研究在一个制造商处于领导地位的二级供应链中,如何通过有效的治理机制设计,提高产品质量水平,协调供应链。文章以理想的协同情况为基准,分析了两种治理机制下的质量努力程度,比较了正式契约治理与契约和关系混合治理对供应链效率的影响。结果表明,关系和契约混合治理在有效范围内能够将制造商和供应商紧密地联系起来,通过共同的质量努力获得比正式契约治理下更大的利润,实现供应链协调。     

Production capacity buildup and double marginalization mitigation in a dynamic supply chain

The paper investigates the extent to which capacity investment considerations interact with the double marginalization effect in a simple supply chain governed by a wholesale price contract. To do so, a non-cooperative differential game model is formulated to study the pricing and capacity investment decisions in a supply chain, which consists of a supplier and a manufacturer. In such a game, there are different decision rules—open-loop, closed-loop, feedback—that are available to the supply chain participants, depending on the observability of the current state of the supply chain. While closed-loop and feedback equilibrium strategies involve the observability of other chain member’s production capacity, open-loop equilibrium strategies do not have such requirement. We examine how the supplier and the manufacturer determine, with the different decision rules, their production capacities and pricing policies to maximize their profits over an infinite planning horizon, and determine how the observability of other supply chain’s members’ production capacity affects the magnitude of the double marginalization effect. Our study suggests that the observability of other chain member’s current production capacity entails a lower production efficiency that results in a greater double marginalization effect. This allows us to conclude that observability of other chain member’s current production capacity is associated with a greater double marginalization effect.