Coordination of cooperative cost-reduction efforts in a supply chain partnership

We study cooperative cost reduction in a decentralized supply chain with a single manufacturer and multiple suppliers. The manufacturer assembles components that are procured from the suppliers to produce a final product. Both the manufacturer and the suppliers invest in reducing the unit production costs of the components. We see that neither of the two well-known conventional contracts, the wholesale price contract and the cost-plus pricing contract, generally coordinates the supply chain, i.e., under both of these types of contract, the individual optimal cost-reduction efforts of players deviate from the centralized system-optimal solution. However, this result is not surprising because these contracts encourage either only the manufacturer or only the suppliers alone to invest in cost reduction.     

A multi-objective approach to supply chain visibility and risk

This paper investigates the twin effects of supply chain visibility (SCV) and supply chain risk (SCR) on supply chain performance. Operationally, SCV has been linked to the capability of sharing timely and accurate information on exogenous demand, quantity and location of inventory, transport related cost, and other logistics activities throughout an entire supply chain. Similarly, SCR can be viewed as the likelihood that an adverse event has occurred during a certain epoch within a supply chain and the associated consequences of that event which affects supply chain performance. Given the multi-faceted attributes of the decision making process which involves many stages, objectives, and stakeholders, it beckons research into this aspect of the supply chain to utilize a fuzzy multi-objective decision making approach to model SCV and SCR from an operational perspective. Hence, our model incorporates the objectives of SCV maximization, SCR minimization, and cost minimization under the constraints of budget, customer demand, production capacity, and supply availability. A numerical example is used to demonstrate the applicability of the model. Our results suggest that decision makers tend to mitigate SCR first then enhance SCV.     

Mesoscopic supply chain simulation

This paper reviews and compares existing approaches for supply chain modeling and simulation and applies the mesoscopic modeling and simulation approach using the simulation software MesoSim, an own development. A simplified real-world supply chain example is modeled with discrete event, mesoscopic and system dynamics simulation. The objective of the study is to compare the process of model creation and its validity using each approach. The study examines advantages of the mesoscopic approach for the simulation. Major benefits of the mesoscopic approach are that modeling efforts are balanced with the necessary level of detail and facilitate quick and simple model creation and simulation.     

Managing the order pipeline to reduce supply chain volatility

The bullwhip effect in particular, and supply chain volatility in general, has been the subject of much analytical and empirical investigation by researchers. One goal of this work has been to determine supply chain designs and policies that minimize volatility. Using a system dynamics approach, we use three distinct supply chain volatility metrics to compare the ability of two alternative pipeline inventory management policies to respond to a demand shock. The results indicate that no one policy dominates on all three metrics of supply chain volatility. A simplistic static pipeline policy minimizes the bullwhip effect and lessens the likelihood of on-hand inventory oscillations, while a more sophisticated dynamic pipeline policy may converge more rapidly to the new equilibrium. In addition, simulation results suggest that the dynamic policy provides better customer service through fewer stockouts and backorders.     

Coordinating order quantity decisions in the supply chain contract under random demand

In this paper, we are concerned with the coordinating quantity decision problem in a supply chain contract. The supply chain contract is composed of one manufacturer and one retailer to meet the random demand of a single product with a short lifecycle. Our analysis show that the retailer expects to obtain higher profit under proper ordering policies, which can also maximize the expected profit of the supply chain. The manufacturer may induce the retailer to order the coordinated quantity by adjusting the unit return price. As a result, the supply chain is expected to achieve the optimal expected profit.     

Supply chains in the presence of store brands

Increased competition from store brands is forcing manufacturers to re-evaluate their strategies in regard to pricing and contracting with trade intermediaries. We analyze a supply chain in which a retailer accepts (with the appropriate contractual agreements) a national brand for resale and then determines whether to introduce a store brand, how to price the store brand, and what quantities of the product(s) to order. We show that when the national brand’s cost per unit quality (CPUQ) is larger than the store brand’s CPUQ, then the retailer seeks to introduce the store brand (SB) and the national brand (NB) manufacturer/supplier is unable to deter him from doing so. We find that the efficiency loss in the decentralized supply chain becomes smaller when a store brand is introduced. Recognizing the inadequacy of standard contracts in coordinating this supply chain, we propose a simple minimum order quantity contract that can coordinate this supply chain.     

Price competition with integrated and decentralized supply chains

We consider price competition with a linear demand function and compare two cases. In the first case each distribution channel is vertically integrated, while in the second, decentralised, case the manufacturers and retailers act independently. We explore the effect of varying the level of price competition on the profits of the industry participants and demonstrate the important role played by the spread of underlying market shares. The coefficient of variation of these market shares determines whether decentralised supply chains can outperform integrated supply chains with an appropriate level of competition.     

Development of a three-echelon SC model to optimize coordination costs

The purpose of this study is to suggest a conceptual framework for aligning the strategic issues and the structural issues of supply chain management, and also to disclose the effect of E-business application on such an alignment. The number of suppliers, number of tiers, the level of SC integration, order penetration point, lead time, and safety stock are defined as supply chain structural issues, and the characteristics of traded products and buyer–supplier relationship are set as key strategic issues for efficient construction of supply chain structure. E-business application is designed as a moderate variable for the alignment between the strategic issues and the structural issues of supply chain management. Such effort suggests a conceptual framework required for developing an advisable set of E-business application strategies for the efficiency improvement of overall supply chain management. The empirical research model proposed in this work may be used to establish an E-supply chain progression paradigm and a new dimensional manufacturing strategy framework in the E-business era.     

Coordination in a two-stage capacitated supply chain with multiple suppliers

The aim of this paper is to coordinate the inventory policies in a decentralized supply chain with stochastic demand by means of contracts. The system considered is a decentralized two-stage supply chain consisting of multiple independent suppliers and a manufacturer with limited production capacities. The suppliers operate on a make-to-stock basis and apply base stock policy to manage their inventories. On the other hand, the manufacturer employs a make-to-order strategy. Under the necessary assumptions, each supplier is modeled as an M/M/1 make-to-stock queue; and the manufacturer is modeled as a GI/M/1 queue after deriving an approximate distribution for the interarrival times of the manufacturer. Once the supply chain is modeled as a queuing system, centralized and decentralized models are developed. Comparison of the optimal solutions to these models reveals that the supply chain needs coordination. Three different transfer payment contracts are examined in this paper. These are the backorder and holding cost subsidy contracts, the transfer payment contract based on Pareto improvement, and the cost sharing contract. Each contract is evaluated according to its coordination ability and whether it is Pareto improving or not. The results indicate that all three contracts can coordinate the supply chain. However, when the Pareto improvement is taken into account, the cost sharing contract seems to be the one that will be preferred by all parties.     

Markdown money contracts for perishable goods with clearance pricing

It is common in practice that retailers liquidate unsold perishable goods via clearance pricing. Markdown money is frequently used between manufacturers and retailers in such a supply chain setting. It is a form of rebate from a manufacturer to subsidize a retailer’s clearance pricing after the regular season. Two forms of markdown money are percent markdown money, in which the markdown money is limited to only a certain percentage of the retail price markdown, and quantity markdown money, which is essentially a buyback contract or returns policy with a rebate credit paid to the retailer for each unsold unit after the regular season. We show both forms of markdown money contracts can coordinate the supply chain and we discuss their strengths and limitations.