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1.
协调供应链系统使其具有抗突发事件性的研究是供应链管理的核心议题之一。为了分析突发事件下需求信息不对称时的供应链协调问题,考虑由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的供应链,在随机市场需求下,首先分析了数量折扣契约对供应链的协调作用;然后探讨了突发事件导致市场需求发生变化且变化后的需求信息是不对称信息时数量折扣契约对供应链的协调作用,研究表明:基准的数量折扣契约对突发事件下的供应链不再发挥协调作用,为此,给出了供应链应对突发事件的最优应对策略,并调整了原来的数量折扣契约使其具有抗突发事件性。最后,应用一个算例对比加以说明。  相似文献   

2.
在供应链管理的文献中,许多工作研究供应商如何使用激励手段,如数量折扣,去影响零售商的订货行为以增加供应商的利润(与整个供应链的利润).多种形式的激励策略模型已有许多,但通常有一个关键的假设,即,供应商关于零售商的成本结构具有完全信息.本文研究了在非对称信息下供应商的最优数量折扣决策问题,得到了最优策略,并与完全信息的情形进行了比较.  相似文献   

3.
不同情形下供应链优化决策模型的比较分析   总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2  
本文提出三种不同情形(制造商与零售商追求各自利润最大化,并且没有价格折扣策略;制造商与零售商共同追求总利润最大化,不实施价格折扣策略;制造商与零售商共同追求总利润最大化,并实施价格折扣策略)下供应链价格和库存补充策略的优化决策模型,并通过具体数例进行比较分析,结果表明,供应链合作并实施价格折扣策略时的供应链总利润最高,而供应链双方利润分配系数的变化对基于供应链总利润最大化的供应链优化决策没有影响.  相似文献   

4.
制造商数量折扣策略和零售商广告投入博弈分析   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
张廷龙  梁樑 《运筹与管理》2009,18(3):99-104
广告投入不仅会提高需求期望也会对需求方差产生影响,方差可能不变、与期望同比增大、增速大于期望.针对一个制造商和一个零售商组成的两层供应链系统,研究制造商如何利用目标数量折扣机理来激励零售商的广告投入和订货协调,以改善供应链的渠道效率.  相似文献   

5.
针对由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的两层供应链,其中制造商拥有网络直销渠道和传统零售渠道组成的多渠道问题,运用stackelberg博弈分别进行了制造商和零售商需求信息不对称时二者集中控制和分散控制时的最优定价分析,结果表明分散控制会降低供应链的总体效率,继而为了提高多渠道供应链的效率,通过数量折扣模型对多渠道供应链进行协调定价,最后进行了算例验证及有效性分析,结果表明数量折扣模型能使多渠道供应链中的制造商和传统零售商达到双赢,它是合理有效的。  相似文献   

6.
研究公平关切下由一个制造商和一个主导零售商构成供应链的决策及协调问题,当零售商公平关切时,分析了制造商和主导零售商的最优决策以及供应链系统的协调策略。研究表明在零售商主导的供应链系统中,无论零售商是否公平关切,批发价格契约均不能协调供应链系统。零售商的最优零售价格以及最大效用值,在一定条件下,与其公平关切系数无关。零售商公平关切下,收益共享契约和数量折扣契约均可以协调供应链系统,且协调条件均仅与零售商的渠道能力有关,而与其公平关切系数无关。  相似文献   

7.
供需关系贯穿供应链的整个过程;然而,如何促使非一体化供应链协调问题在实践中是非常重要的.因此,供需双方订货批量的研究是供应链管理的一个重要内容之一.本文以订单方式为背景,针对供应链环境下单个供应商和多个订货商在非合作情况下的订货模型进行讨论,并在此基础上给出了一个改进后的线性价格折扣策略,该策略同时考虑了增量折扣和减量折扣两种情况,同时给出了供需上双方订货的S tackelberg博弈模型.数字实验结果表明该折扣模型对于改善供应链运作协调是相当有效的.  相似文献   

8.
模糊随机需求报童问题的Stackelberg-Nash均衡策略   总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2  
针对模糊随机需求下的分布控制型报童问题,建立了无数量折扣和有数量折扣情况下的利润最大化两层规划模型,并结合模糊随机模拟技术和遗传算法设计了模型求解的混合智能算法.解决了上层制造商制定包括折扣区间和折扣价格的最优数量折扣策略,以及下层多零售商确定各自的最优订货量的Stackelberg-Nash均衡策略问题.  相似文献   

9.
对VMI模式下的两层供应链,在考虑制造商的生产成本信息对称和不对称两种情形下,运用委托-代理理论设计了基于可转移效用-折扣策略的VMI协调机制,有效地改善了分散式供应链结构下由激励不一致、信息不对称等因素引起的供应链效率低下问题,以达到在提高供应链渠道效益的同时,实现制造商和零售商收益的pareto改进.  相似文献   

10.
为了实现供应链合作伙伴的双赢和多赢,在由一个制造商和两个批发商组成的供应链中,以制定最优共同补货周期策略为核心,制造商作为盟主指定共同补货周期和折扣率,批发商作为成员企业按共同补货同期的整数倍进行补货.制造商采用一致价格折扣的方式弥补批发商成本的增加.考虑到需求的可变性和是否实行共同补货周期策略,建立了制造商、批发商和整个供应链系统的利润优化模型并进行了模拟.结果表明共同补货周期策略可以实现多方收益的帕累托改进,供应链三方协作追求整体收益,可以实现"共赢".  相似文献   

11.
In this paper, we study quantity discount pricing policies in a channel of one manufacturer and one retailer. The paper assumes that the channel faces a stochastic price-sensitive demand but the retailer can privately observe the realization of an uncertain demand parameter. The problem is analyzed as a Stackelberg game in which the manufacturer declares quantity discount pricing schemes to the retailer and then the retailer follows by selecting the retail price and associated quantity. Proposed in the paper are four quantity-discount pricing policies: “regular quantity discount”; “fixed percentage discount”; “incremental volume discount” and “fixed marginal-profit-rate discount”. Optimal solutions are derived, and numerical examples are presented to illustrate the efficiency of each discount policy.  相似文献   

12.
We use a game theoretical approach to study pricing and advertisement decisions in a manufacturer–retailer supply chain when price discounts are offered by both the manufacturer and retailer. When the manufacturer is the leader of the game, we obtained Stackelberg equilibrium with manufacturer’s local allowance, national brand name investment, manufacturer’s preferred price discount, retailer’s price discount, and local advertising expense. For the special case of two-stage equilibrium when the manufacturer’s price discount is exogenous, we found that the retailer is willing to increase local advertising expense if the manufacturer increases local advertising allowance and provides deeper price discount, or if the manufacturer decreases its brand name investment. When both the manufacturer and retailer have power, Nash equilibrium in a competition game is obtained. The comparison between the Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg equilibrium shows that the manufacturer always prefers Stackelberg equilibrium, but there is no definitive conclusion for the retailer. The bargaining power can be used to determine the profit sharing between the manufacturer and the retailer. Once the profit sharing is determined, we suggest a simple contract to help the manufacturer and retailer obtain their desired profit sharing.  相似文献   

13.
有最低回收量约束的逆向供应链定价策略分析   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
对由一个制造商和一个回收商组成的二级逆向供应链系统,研究了在对制造商有最低回收量约束情形下的制造商和回收商的定价策略问题,得到了系统的斯坦克尔伯格均衡策略和联合定价策略,并通过数值计算进行了比较分析.  相似文献   

14.
This paper develops two coordination models of a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer, one dominant retailer and multiple fringe retailers to investigate how to coordinate the supply chain after demand disruption. We consider two coordination schedules, linear quantity discount schedule and Groves wholesale price schedule. We find that, under the linear quantity discount schedule, the manufacturer only needs to adjust the maximum variable wholesale price after demand disruption. For each case of the disrupted amount of demand, the higher the market share of the dominant retailer, the lower its average wholesale price and the subsidy will be under the linear quantity discount schedule, while the higher its fraction of the supply chain’s profit will be under Groves wholesale price schedule. When the increased amount of demand is very large and production cost is sufficiently low, linear quantity discount schedule is better for the manufacturer. However, when the production cost is sufficiently large, Groves wholesale price schedule is always better. We also find that the disrupted amount of demand largely affects the allocation of the supply chain’s profit.  相似文献   

15.
不对称信息下逆向供应链定价分析与对策   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
以博弈论为研究方法,对由零售商和制造商组成的逆向供应链的定价问题进行研究,通过分析在回收成本信息对称和信息不对称情况下逆向供应链中制造商和零售商的定价策略,得出了在信息不对称情况下,制造商承担更大的风险。因此制造商需要防范回收成本信息不对称带来的风险,文章进一步给出了制造商的信息甄别合同,通过合同制造商可以降低由回收成本信息不对称带来的风险。  相似文献   

16.
We consider a two-stage supply chain with one supplier and one manufacturer. The manufacturer faces a Poisson demand process where the arrival rate depends on the selling price, the announced delivery time, and the delivery reliability defined as the probability of satisfying the announced delivery time. Such a demand model generalizes the works in the literature by simultaneously considering the above three demand sensitivity factors. The main purpose of this paper is to study the equilibrium decisions in the supply chain with an all-unit quantity discount contract. We consider four scenarios regarding whether the leadtime standard, the delivery reliability standard, and the manufacturer’s capacity are endogenous, and whether the manufacturer’s production cost is its private information. We find that an all-unit quantity discount scheme can coordinate the supply chain for most cases. Managerial insights are observed regarding the impact of the three demand sensitivity factors. For example, the breakpoint in an optimal quantity discount contract always increases with the delivery reliability sensitivity under an exogenous delivery reliability, but may decrease under an endogenous delivery reliability; with asymmetric information, a higher variance of the manufacturer’s unit production costs leads to a lower unit wholesale price for the low-cost manufacturer.  相似文献   

17.
This study generalised the traditional quantity discount problem with return contracts, in which a manufacturer promises to refund some fraction of the retailer's wholesale price if an item is returned, as a two-stage game. In the first stage the manufacturer and retailer determine the inventory level cooperatively. In the second stage, the manufacturer bargains with the retailer for quantity discount and return schemes to maintain channel efficiency. A menu of discount–return combinations is proposed for the manufacturer to make inventory decisions. The model developed will demonstrate that the return policy can be considered as mirror images of quantity discount strategy. That is, options with more generous return privileges are coupled with higher wholesale prices, whereas the lowest wholesale price comes with very strict limits on returns and a restocking fee for any returned goods.  相似文献   

18.
This paper explores the coordination between a supplier and a buyer within a decentralized supply chain, through the use of quantity discounts in a game theoretic model. Within this model, the players face inventory and pricing decisions. We propose both cooperative and non-cooperative approaches considering that the product traded experiences a price sensitive demand. In the first case, we study the dynamics of the game from the supplier's side as the leader in the negotiation obtaining a Stackelberg equilibrium, and then show how the payoff of this player could still improve from this point. In the second case, a cooperative model is formulated, where decisions are taken simultaneously, emulating a centralized firm, showing the benefits of the cooperation between the players. We further formulate a pricing game, where the buyer is allowed to set different prices to the final customer as a reaction to the supplier's discount decisions. For the latter we investigate the difference between feasibility of implementing a retail discount given a current coordination mechanism and without it. Finally the implications of transportation costs are analyzed in the quantity discount schedule. Our findings are illustrated with a numerical example showing the difference in the players’ payoff in each case and the optimal strategies, comparing in each case our results with existing work.  相似文献   

19.
This paper develops a volume discount scheme to coordinate Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) supply chains with multiple heterogeneous retailers, in which the supply chain is modelled as a Stackelberg game with price sensitive demand. The paper proposes a method to construct a volume discount price scheme and shows that, any volume discount can be represented as a piecewise constant function of demand. We provide the game formulations of VMI supply chains and develop algorithms to solve this type of game problems, including finding the optimal volume discount scheme. Through a numerical study comparing the results of applying a volume discount strategy with the profits from a single wholesale price strategy, we show that the volume discount pricing strategies can be used to improve profits for all participants in the VMI supply chain in comparison with single price strategies.  相似文献   

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