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1.
研究了三方相互威慑讨价还价问题,从合作博弈的角度建立了三方相互威慑讨价还价模型.并且通过对均衡存在性和冲突可能性的分析,给出了三方相互威慑问题冲突发生的条件以及存在均衡状态时的均衡解.最后通过实验验证了本文分析的正确性.  相似文献   

2.
在传统的合作博弈求解中,通常假设联盟收益确定或者局中人对联盟收益取值意见一致.现实中,联盟收益往往不确定,局中人对联盟收益取值意见不一致,且联盟分配方案的达成通常是局中人基于个体理性与判断进行多轮谈判,互相影响、相互妥协、最终趋同的结果.针对这种情况,本文首先对联盟收益不确定时局中人的收益进行描述,建立合作博弈的扩展模型,再考虑局中人的理性互动与策略博弈,借鉴群智能的建模思想和求解思路,利用多目标粒子群扩展算法对模型进行求解.本文对于联盟收益不确定时合作博弈的求解提供了新的思路与方法.  相似文献   

3.
鉴于第三方支付平台交易的参与者在策略选择时存在着不可分辨现象和博弈,而目前粗糙博弈论的研究仍缺少系统化的理论成果。本文首先对照经典博弈论的概念,给出了粗糙博弈论的定义,然后创立了求解n人非合作完全信息静态粗糙博弈论的混合策略均衡解的算法,最后建立了第三方支付平台交易的粗糙博弈模型,并给出模型的均衡解。应用实例表明模型和算法是有效可行的,比较符合当前第三方支付平台交易的实际状况和参与人的关系现状,模型的求解结果能够指导博弈各方更好地确定自己的策略。粗糙博弈论及非合作完全信息静态粗糙博弈论的混合策略均衡解的算法研究,给第三方支付平台交易的管理者提供了科学有益的借鉴。  相似文献   

4.
一种不完全信息相互威慑讨价还价模型   总被引:5,自引:0,他引:5  
理性威慑理论将相互威慑看作是一种讨价还价过程,但鲁宾斯坦经典讨价还价模型无法直接用于相互威慑讨价还价研究。本文将不完全信息引入相互威慑讨价还价之中,探讨了相互威慑中博弈方单边不完全信息和双边不完全信息条件下的威慑可信性与冲突可能性。  相似文献   

5.
袁柳洋  段炼 《数学杂志》2023,(4):297-306
本文研究了非合作-合作双型博弈模型求解的问题.首先利用于α-CIS值,求解非合作-合作双型博弈中的合作博弈阶段,再对非合作博弈阶段求其纯策略纳什均衡,获得了基于α-CIS值的双型博弈的一种新的求解方法.推广了原始双型博弈模型的求解方法并证明其可行性.  相似文献   

6.
针对农地流转市场存在双边信息不对称议价的现实,基于Rubinstein讨价还价博弈刻画了农地流转双方的议价过程,根据子博弈精炼纳什均衡得到了均衡流转价格,最后利用有关数据进行了算例分析.研究发现:均衡流转价格与流入方议价能力负相关、与流出方议价能力正相关;在流出方先出价的不完全信息讨价还价博弈中,当流出方对流入方的策略空间了解的越准确,或者流入方对流出方的策略空间了解的越少时,均衡交易价格越高;另外,流转双方的心理预期价格越高,均衡交易价格也越高.将流转双方的讨价还价过程、信息结构、破裂点纳入到农地流转价格的研究,既兼顾了流出方和流入方的利益,为双方谈判和议价提供了理论上的指导,也为农地流转价格的研究提供了新的视角.  相似文献   

7.
建立了一个"讨价还价"的双边适应性预期模型,并利用这个模型的二元常系数线性差分方程组,揭示"纳什讨价还价解"的形成路径.对于不是"纳什讨价还价解"的一般讨价还价的成交结果,同样可以运用这样一个模型来揭示.基于这个模型,当买、卖双方希望成交,各方的出价通过逐次调整会最终收敛到同一个常数,因此能够从理论上保证讨价还价最终成交.双方当中有一方不肯让价而成交的情形,可以作为这个模型退化成为单边适应性预期模型的情形.举例计算说明了一个讨价还价问题的收敛过程与结果.  相似文献   

8.
当前针对生态旅游这类问题的研究主要采用非合作博弈中的"囚徒困境"模型.介于外部环境的复杂性和模糊性,以及需要从长远角度来考察各利益相关者的行为,利用更符合实际情况的区间数来表示各利益相关者的收益及成本,并认为各利益相关者均为有限理性,构建了利益相关者的区间数演化博弈模型,再利用各利益相关者的区间数复制动态方程求解出纳什均衡,并用微分方程稳定性理论对其均衡结果进行稳定性分析.结果表明:三方最终策略的选择受博弈初始支付矩阵及关键参数的影响;提高旅游企业不保护环境行为的最低罚款;降低当地政府的最高监督成本和居民告发旅游企业不保护环境行为所承担的最高成本等策略,可实现博弈三方利益共赢.  相似文献   

9.
腐败的三方动态博弈模型及其治理对策   总被引:11,自引:1,他引:10  
本建立了腐败问题的三方动态博弈模型,并求出博弈模型的均衡解模型,根据均衡解,提出了治理腐败问题的对策。  相似文献   

10.
三级供应链合作利润博弈模型及经济性分析   总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2  
基于分销渠道结构建立了三级供应链合作利润博弈模型,运用Stackelberg博弈求解,分析了各方及渠道利润随合作关系系数的变化情况,并对各成本的外部性进行解析.  相似文献   

11.
The generalized Cauchy problem with data on three surfaces is under consideration for a quasilinear analytic system of the third order. Under some simplifying assumption, we find necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of a solution in the form of triple series in the powers of the independent variables. We obtain convenient sufficient conditions under which the data of the generalized Cauchy problem has a unique locally analytic solution. We give counterexamples demonstrating that in the case we study it is impossible to state necessary and sufficient conditions for analytic solvability of the generalized Cauchy problem. We also show that the analytic solution can fail to exist even if the generalized Cauchy problem with data on three surfaces has a formal solution since the series converge only at a sole point, the origin.  相似文献   

12.
Nash's bargaining solution for dynamic,N-player problems is considered. Computational methods for finding solution candidates to bargaining problems are presented and some sufficient conditions for bargaining solutions are established. The theory and computation are illustrated by a resource management example.  相似文献   

13.
We study two-person, multiple-issue bargaining problems and identify four procedures by which the bargaining may take place. Drawing on some logic from non-cooperative game theory, we propose axioms which relate the outcomes of the procedures. We also promote a weak monotonicity axiom on solutions, called issue-by-issue monotonicity, which is geared toward multiple-issue bargaining. Our main result concerns the relationship between a sequential bargaining procedure — with the rule that agreements are implemented only after all issues are resolved — and global bargaining (in which all issues are negotiated simultaneously). If a bargaining solution predicts the same outcome with these two procedures, then we say that it satisfiesagenda independence. We prove that a solution satisfies axioms of efficiency, symmetry, scale invariance, issue-by-issue monotonicity, and agenda independence if and only if it is the Nash solution. This result provides new intuition for Nash's independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom. Among other results, we show that a solution is invariant to all four of the procedures and satisfies efficiency and symmetry if and only if it is the utilitarian solution with equal weights. We comment on the results of other authors who address multiple-issue bargaining.  相似文献   

14.
多目标协商模型的标量化方法   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
多目标协商问题是协商理论的一个新的研究领域.本文讨论了由Bronisz和Krus提出的多目标协商模型和Bronisz-Krus-协商解概念,构造了由Bronisz-Krus多目标协商模型诱导的单目标协商模型并对其提出了一套公理系统和引入了Raiffa-协商解概念,讨论了诱导结局空间的性质,给出了Bronisz-Krus多目标协商模型与其诱导的单目标协商模型在某种意义下的等价性,即Bronisz-Krus-协商解与Raiffa-协商解可以互相确定,并给出了这种相互确定的关系式.  相似文献   

15.
Recently, the concept of classical bargaining set given by Aumann and Maschler in 1964 has been extended to fuzzy bargaining set. In this paper, we give a modification to correct some weakness of this extension. We also extend the concept of the Mas-Colell's bargaining set (the other major type of bargaining sets) to its corresponding fuzzy bargaining set. Our main effort is to prove existence theorems for these two types of fuzzy bargaining sets. We will also give necessary and sufficient conditions for these bargaining sets to coincide with the Aubin Core in a continuous superadditive cooperative fuzzy game which has a crisp maximal coalition of maximum excess at each payoff vector. We show that both Aumann-Maschler and Mas-Colell fuzzy bargaining sets of a continuous convex cooperative fuzzy game coincide with its Aubin core.  相似文献   

16.
In this note we provide a characterization of a subclass of bargaining problems for which the Nash solution has the property of disagreement point monotonicity. While the original d-monotonicity axiom and its stronger notion, strong d-monotonicity, were introduced and discussed by Thomson (J Econ Theory, 42: 50–58, 1987), this paper introduces local strong d-monotonicity and derives a necessary and sufficient condition for the Nash solution to be locally strongly d-monotonic. This characterization is given by using the sensitivity matrix of the Nash bargaining solution w.r.t. the disagreement point d. Moverover, we present a sufficient condition for the Nash solution to be strong d-monotonic.  相似文献   

17.
Nash's two-person bargaining model consists of two stages: threat strategies and utility demands are chosen in the first and second stages respectively. Here players commit to play the threat strategies chosen in the first stage for the case where disagreement occurs in the second stage. Whether a player commits or not to play a threat strategy, however, is voluntary in principle. This leads to some possible extensions of Nash's model so that players' commitment choices are taken into account. In this paper, we consider three extensions. In the two person case, these three extensions give essentially the same result as that given by Nash. This is not the case for more than two players; the result depends upon an extension. In one extension, Nash's result always holds for more than two players. In the other two extensions, however, we give a three person example where not all players choose commitments in equilibrium.  相似文献   

18.
We consider an n-person economy in which efficiency is independent of distribution but the cardinal properties of the agents’ utility functions may preclude transferable utility (a property we call “Almost TU”). Holding the disagreement point fixed, we show that Almost TU is a necessary and sufficient condition for all agents to either benefit jointly or suffer jointly with any change in production possibilities under well-behaved generalized utilitarian bargaining solutions (of which the Nash bargaining and the utilitarian solutions are special cases). We apply the result to policy analysis and to incentive compatibility.  相似文献   

19.
We consider an n-person economy in which efficiency is independent of distribution but the cardinal properties of the agents’ utility functions may preclude transferable utility (a property we call “Almost TU”). Holding the disagreement point fixed, we show that Almost TU is a necessary and sufficient condition for all agents to either benefit jointly or suffer jointly with any change in production possibilities under well-behaved generalized utilitarian bargaining solutions (of which the Nash bargaining and the utilitarian solutions are special cases). We apply the result to policy analysis and to incentive compatibility.  相似文献   

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