基于不同情景的群体性突发事件随机演化博弈模型

针对群体性突发事件在不确定环境下的演化问题,基于演化博弈理论研究了群体性突发事件中强势群体与弱势群体策略选择的演化过程,依据复制动态方程得到了两个群体的行为演化规律。考虑到群体性突发事件演化过程中的随机扰动,引入高斯白噪声来反映群体性突发事件演化过程中受到的随机干扰,建立了不确定环境下群体性突发事件的随机演化博弈模型,分析了弱势群体与强势群体行为策略的稳定性。运用随机Taylor展开理论和It^o型随机微分方程对模型进行了求解,并对模型进行情景仿真模拟,研究结果表明:在不确定环境下,受随机因素的干扰影响,当采取抗争策略成本较大时,随着白噪声强度减小,弱势群体会较快妥协,采取合作策略;当采取强硬策略获取额外收益较大时,随着白噪声强度增大,强势群体更倾向于采取强硬策略。结合不同情景仿真结果,为群体性突发事件"情景-应对"提供相关决策建议。     

一个求解多目标群体决策问题的交互规划方法

本文引进决策个体偏爱强度函数和决策群体偏爱强度函数概念,分别给出了决策个体和决策群体的偏爱排序规则.由此,借助于各决策个体提供的权衡比信息,构造了一个求解多目标群体决策问题的交互规划方法.1.引言群体决策,就是联结决策群体中各决策个体的偏爱结构,对供选方案集作出群体偏爱结构判断,进行选优或偏爱排序的过程.     

多属性群决策算法及一致性分析研究

在多属性群决策中 ,集结群体意见之前必须先对群体的决策数据进行一致性分析 ,以确保群体作出的决策符合客观实际 .提出了群决策的三种三维层次模型 ;用欧几里得距离 ( Euclidean Distance)表示个人决策中方案的评价值 ;然后设置一致性指标值α,作为群体数据一致性的判断依据 ;提出了满足一致性基础上的一种群决策方法 ;最后用实例说明了算法的使用步骤 .     

商业信用下两阶段可变腐败率商品库存决策问题研究

研究了零售企业在商业信用条件下的两阶段易腐商品库存决策问题.第一阶段产品连续腐败且腐败率是已知的常数;在过了确定的货架时间后,剩余产品必须采用技术手段改变状态从而进入第二阶段,而且此时商品没有腐败.供应商允许零售商延期支付货款,而零售商的决策是订货周期长度,并使得自身总成本最小化.通过建立该问题的数学模型,结合解析分析证明了一些理论结果,从而确定每种情况下的最优解,并给出了求解步骤以解得零售商的最优决策.最后结合数值算例说明了所得结论及两阶段策略对于企业的贡献.     

社会融合背景下新生代农民工利益抗争过程中的策略选择研究——基于博弈论的视角

本文从农民工群体与企业利益抗争过程中的策略选择入手,通过决策树和序贯博弈理论与数值仿真的方法,探讨了农民工群体依法维权的相对成本与企业失信的相对违法成本在不同的系统参数下对于农民工利益抗争过程中的策略选择的影响,并探究不同系统参数下农民工群体的均衡策略,提出均衡状态下,系统参数之间应满足的条件关系表达式。研究表明:依法维权的成本过高虽然对农民工群体的策略选择有影响,但并不是导致农民工群体更倾向于选择亲群体性行为的根本原因。提高企业失信违法成本并不会有效的避免农民工群体利益受损,减少农民工群体选择亲群体性行为。亲群体性行为其真正的原因在于体制内维权困难。政府应该减少依法维权的成本,同时应尽量减少群众的“闹大”意识,加强群众依法维权的法律意识。     

群决策中成员意见的分歧特征及判断准则研究

群决策过程中各成员的评价在决策初始存在分歧,对这些分歧进行一致性分析是群决策过程的一个关键步骤,不剔除与群体意见偏离较远的决策者的评价信息就进行群体意见集结,可能会得出不符合客观实际的结论;讨论了群决策中成员意见的分歧特征,提出了成员评价的集中性和相似性概念;定义了群决策过程中判断个人意见是否与群体意见一致的判断准则,即集中性指标和相似性指标.     

考虑非合作行为的社会网络大群体共识决策模型

在社会网络环境下的大群体决策问题当中,决策专家之间的社会网络关系对决策过程和结果的影响至关重要.文章创新地提出一种考虑决策专家社会网络关系和非合作行为的大群体共识决策模型,有效促进大群体共识的达成.首先,根据决策专家的偏好信息和社会网络关系,改进经典Louvain社区发现算法,对大决策群体进行社区划分.其次,运用社会网络分析方法确定决策专家个体和社区的权重.随后,根据决策专家的偏离程度对决策专家非合作行为进行识别,并考虑社会网络关系的影响对非合作行为进行管理,以此构建共识决策模型.最后,通过案例分析来验证所建立共识决策模型的可行性和有效性.文章构建的共识决策模型,不仅在大群体社区划分过程中,创新性地同时考虑决策专家的偏好信息和社会网络关系的影响,并且在非合作行为管理过程中,也考虑到了社会网络关系对非合作行为决策专家偏好调整的影响,使其更适应社会网络决策环境.     

基于隶属度分布函数的多粒度语言群决策一致性测度

研究多粒度语言群决策中群体意见一致性问题.根据群体决策中多粒度语言的基本特征,提出一种基于隶属度分布函数的一致性测度计算方法.并且与基于二元语义的决策的一致性测度计算方法进行了比较,通过算例计算分析,说明了该方法的可行性和有效性.     

基于随机模型的群体性突发事件舆情演化研究

舆情的演化传播一旦偏离了理性轨道,就会导致群体性突发事件的爆发,研究舆情演化的规律对于预防和控制群体性突发事件具有重要意义.群体突发事件的发生发展与舆情的传播是相互作用的,在分析二者之间作用关系的基础上,根据纯跳马氏过程的定义,建立了一种舆情演化的随机模型,进一步由非齐次马氏过程特征给出了模型的一种易于求解的简化模型.通过随机模型与简化模型的耦合偏差得到群体性突发事件舆情演化的一系列性质,并得到了舆情演化的最终聚集态势点,为政府及时掌握舆情演化的状态趋势,预防和控制突发事件的发生提供了理论支持.最后,通过算例分析验证了舆情演化模型的有效性和实用性.     

群体决策的偏差度分析

本文引进群体决策的决策个体和决策群体关于两方案的偏差度，以及群体偏差映射的概念．在建立相应的偏差公理的基础上，研究了群体决策偏差分析的基本理论．同时，还给出一个利用偏差度进行群体排序的方法．     

Robust Group Synchronization via Cycle-Edge Message Passing

We propose a general framework for solving the group synchronization problem, where we focus on the setting of adversarial or uniform corruption and sufficiently small noise. Specifically, we apply a novel message passing procedure that uses cycle consistency information in order to estimate the corruption levels of group ratios and consequently solve the synchronization problem in our setting. We first explain why the group cycle consistency information is essential for effectively solving group synchronization problems. We then establish exact recovery and linear convergence guarantees for the proposed message passing procedure under a deterministic setting with adversarial corruption. These guarantees hold as long as the ratio of corrupted cycles per edge is bounded by a reasonable constant. We also establish the stability of the proposed procedure to sub-Gaussian noise. We further establish exact recovery with high probability under a common uniform corruption model.

     

Organized vs. Competitive Corruption

We study bureaucratic corruption in a model in which a constituency sets required levels for a given set of activities. Each activity is carried out by an external provider and its realization is supervised by a bureaucrat. Bureaucrats are supposed to act on behalf of the constituency, but they can allow providers to deliver lower activity levels than contracted in exchange for a bribe. Given this, the constituency sets the optimal activity levels weighing off the value of activity levels, their costs, as well as the possibility for the bureaucrats to be corrupt. We use this setup to study the impact on equilibrium corruption of the degree of decentralization of corruption. To do this we compute equilibrium corruption in two different settings: (1) Each bureaucrat acts in such a way as to maximize his own individual utility (competitive corruption); (2) An illegal syndicate oversees the corruption decisions of the population of bureaucrats in such a way as to maximize total proceeds from corruption (organized corruption). We show that the illegal syndicate acts in such a way as to restrain the total number of corrupt transactions and corruption is lower when it is organized than when it is competitive.     

腐败水平与反腐措施的随机动态模型分析

腐败经济理论主要从微观和宏观两个层面展开.在现有文献中,有关腐败的规模大小、衡量指标、变动状况、对社会经济的影响等宏观层面的研究较多,对腐败影响因素的分析则相对较少,且分析模型多为静态或确定性动态模型.而腐败问题研究的根本目的是为了反腐,对影响腐败因素的正确认识是制定切实有效反腐措施的基本前提.为此,本文建立了一个关于腐败水平的随机动态模型,分析了腐败水平的影响因素,并根据模型中参数变量对腐败水平影响的分析给出了相应的反腐措施.本文认为,个体为腐败行为所承受的精神压力程度不同时,反腐所采取的措施特别是提高政府开支,所产生的反腐效果是很不一样的,但加强法制惩罚力度的措施总是最有效的.     

财政腐败的宏观经济分析:一个理论框架

建立了一个考虑税收腐败和公共支出腐败的经济增长模型,从理论上探讨财政腐败行为及其影响.主要结论归纳:第一,财政腐败降低私人资本的回报率,使厂商的生产力下降,就整体而言阻碍了经济增长.第二,最优税率可能大于或小于Barro的最优税率,取决于征税效率和寻租引发的行政成本,第三,两种类型的公共支出隐含着不同程度的腐败机会,以...     

贪污量化的内生随机增长模型

从现实来看,贪污不是一种个人行为,是由于制度上的漏洞(如监管不严等)而产生的.本文假设贪污与廉政均衡模型服从通常的决策规则,试从量化的指标入手,分析了增大个体收入风险,加大惩贪震摄力、扩大公共开支的均衡关系及其对渎职、贪污行为的影响力.最后,给出关于抑制贪污依其影响力大小的措施的不同结论.     

Corrupt organizations: modeling educators’ misconduct with cellular automata

Misconduct in education is a serious problem internationally. Corruption and other forms of misconduct may be modeled in large educational organizations with strong vertical and horizontal ties with the help of cellular automata. This paper offers a theoretical framework and a methodology based on cellular automata to study corruption in large educational organizations, including school districts and state and private university and college systems. Cellular automaton allows making forecasts, assessments, and predictions about the scope and scale of corruption within organizations. Starting with different cases or combinations of behavior on the workplace and working environment as initial conditions, the process of cellular automation simulates behavior of educators and results in images that depict likely future developments in educators’ misconduct within educational organizations. The results of simulations reflect patterns of academic, financial, and administrative misconduct that may be found in academia.     

生产性公共开支、贪污和内生经济增长:一种新的考虑

在一个连续时间的随机内生增长模型中,我们扩展讨论了在预防性储蓄存在时,个人贪污和反贪污行为对经济增长的影响.在我们的框架下,只要适当地调整政策参数,可以得到福利最优和增长最快一致的贪污水平.同时,我们分析了个人决策与社会计划者决策下经济增长的关系,得到了一些有意义的结论.     

Corruption and its detection: a graph-theoretic approach

We consider a corruption network where agents, both internal or external to the network, use connections and bribes to obtain goods or services outside the formal procedures. We develop a graph-theoretic model for the system and present sufficient conditions for detectability of the corruption status of at least one agent. Where detectability is not possible, we determine the topology of the network and all the possible corruption statuses of the agents. Further we provide, if we have information on the corruption status of a single agent, an algorithm that identifies the corruption status of every other agent in the network. Our results provide tools for detecting corrupt agents in organizations such as revenue authorities, municipalities, police, vehicle inspection departments, financial institutions and firms, while allowing the system to operate in normal mode.     

Who controls the controller? A dynamical model of corruption

The aim of this article is to give at least a partial answer to the question made in the title. Several works analyze the evolution of the corruption in different societies. Most of such papers show the necessity of several controls displayed by a central authority to deter the expansion of the corruption. However there is not much literature that addresses the issue of who controls the controller. This article aims to approach an answer to this question. Indeed, as it is well known, in democratic societies an important role should be played by citizens. We show that politically active citizens can prevent the spread of corruption. More precisely, we introduce a game between government and officials where both can choose between a corrupt or honest behavior. Citizens have a political influence that results in the prospects of a corrupt and a non-corrupt government be re-elected or not. This results in an index of intolerance to corruption. We build an evolutionary version of the game by means of the replicator dynamics and we analyze and fully characterize the possible trajectories of the system according to the index of intolerance to corruption and other relevant quantities of the model.     

A game theoretical analysis of the impact of income inequality and ethnic diversity on fiscal corruption

In this paper, we construct a theoretical game model with incomplete information to analyze the tax revenues of a multiethnic country, when fiscal corruption is widespread. Our proposal is that income inequality between ethnic groups causes differences leading to prejudice and discrimination among ethnic groups themselves and, as a consequence, this affects the control of corruption and evasion. Hence, the amount of tax revenues is proven to be dependent on the relevance of the income distribution between the ethnic groups.