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1.
Consignment is a popular form of business arrangement where supplier retains ownership of the inventory and gets paid from the retailer based on actual units sold. The popularity of such an arrangement has come with some continued debates on who should control the supply chain inventory, the supplier or retailer. This paper aims at shedding light on these debated issues. We consider a single period supply chain model where a supplier contracts with a retailer. Market demand for the product is price-sensitive and uncertain. The supplier decides his consignment price charged to the retailer for each unit sold, and the retailer then chooses her retail price for selling the product. We study and compare two different consignment arrangements: The first allows the retailer to choose the supply chain inventory, together with her retail price, and is labeled as a Retailer Managed Consignment Inventory (RMCI) program; and the second calls for the supplier to decide the inventory, together with his consignment price, and is labeled as a Vendor Managed Consignment Inventory (VMCI) program. We show that with an RMCI program, the supply chain loses at least 26.4% of its first-best (expected) profit, while with VMCI, it loses just or no more than 26.4% of the first-best profit. Second, we demonstrate that both programs lead to an equal split of the corresponding channel profit between the supplier and the retailer. These results indicate that it is beneficial both to the supplier and to the retailer when delegating the inventory decision to the supplier rather than to the retailer in the channel.  相似文献   

2.
In this paper, we consider revenue management for a service supply chain with one supplier and one retailer. The supplier has a limited capacity of a perishable product and both the supplier and the retailer face customers. Each customer may choose to buy a product from either the supplier or the retailer by considering prices and the cost associated with switching. For the centralized model, the supplier determines the selling prices for both herself and the retailer, and the retailer simply collects a commission fee for each product sold. We derive monotone properties for the revenue functions and pricing strategies. Further, we show that the commission fee increases the retailer’s price while decreasing the supplier’s and leads to efficiency loss of the chain. For the decentralized decision-making model, the supplier and the retailer compete in price over time. Two models are considered. In the first, the retailer buys products from the supplier before the selling season and in the second the retailer shares products with the supplier in retailing. For both models, we discuss the existence of the equilibrium and characterize the optimal decisions. Numerical results are presented to illustrate properties of the models and to compare the supply chain performance between the centralized and the decentralized models.  相似文献   

3.
This paper considers a two-echelon supply chain where a supplier sells a single product through a retailer, who faces an inventory-dependent demand. The supplier hopes to incentive the retailer to order more items by offering trade credit. The retailer places the ordered items on the display shelf (DS) with limited space and stocks the remaining items (if any) that exceed the shelf capacity in his/her backroom/warehouse (BW). From the supplier’s perspective, we focus mainly on under which conditions the supplier should offer trade credit and how he/she should design such trade credit policy and corresponding ordering policy to obtain much more benefits. From the retailer’s perspective, we discuss whether the retailer needs BW and exactly how many items need to be stocked in BW when the supplier offers trade credit. We formulate a “supplier-Stackelberg” game model, from which we obtain the conditions under which the presented simple trade credit policy not only increases the overall chain profit but also each member’s profit. We also show that the trade credit policy is always more beneficial to the retailer than to the supplier if it is offered.  相似文献   

4.
在由一个供应商和一个销售商组成的单期两级供应链中,处于主导地位的销售商以其卖场所具有的销售能力参与供应链合作,并从销售的每一个产品中获取既定收益。同时,销售商还向供应商出售建立在产品销售量保障基础上的看跌期权,以激励供应商参与供应链合作。论文对上述情形的销售商出售看跌期权的供应链合作问题进行了研究,通过建模与优化分析,证明了在销售商提供看跌期权的供应链合作中,供应商存在唯一的最优生产批量和看跌期权采购量,以及销售商存在最优的从每一单位产品销售中获取的既定收益。论文还揭示了销售商提供看跌期权,虽然无法实现供应链协调,但可以实现供应链参与企业所获得的收益与其所承担的风险相匹配。最后,论文论证了在销售商出售看跌期权机制下,供应链存在收益损失较小的理想合作区域。  相似文献   

5.
本文针对一个供应商和零售商组成的供应链系统,主要研究零售商如何设计提前订货折扣来吸引顾客提前订货;而供应商如何根据市场需求的不确定性,设计零售商提前订货资金的付款时间等问题。在供应商-Stackelberg框架下,以期望利润为目标,建立了相应的决策模型。通过对模型的分析求解,给出了不同市场环境下供应商要求零售商支付提前订货资金的策略。最后,用算例验证了模型和理论分析的可行性。  相似文献   

6.
This paper considers a two-echelon supply chain, where one supplier sells through a retailer a product with a stable market demand. We focus on how the supplier induces the retailer through trade credit to order more to reduce his/her own inventory-related cost. Under a ‘supplier-Stackelberg’ setting, we provide the supplier with the method of determining two trade credit scenarios: unconditional and conditional trade credit. We show that the unconditional trade credit scenario is always beneficial to the retailer but harmful to the supplier in most situations, while the conditional trade credit scenario is always beneficial to both parties. In addition, we specify the conditions under which the provision of unconditional trade credit is beneficial to the supplier. The three insights obtained in this paper are the following: (i) When the retailer’s per-unit opportunity cost is less than his/her per-unit opportunity gain, unconditional trade credit can induce the retailer to order less instead of more. (ii) If the supplier offers the retailer unconditional trade credit, the length of trade credit offered will have an upper bound. (iii) A well-designed conditional trade credit policy can realize a win-win outcome but also enables the supplier to occupy all the savings in the channel's cost incurred by trade credit, but any unconditional trade credit policy does not.  相似文献   

7.
林强  徐晴 《运筹与管理》2018,27(6):172-183
本文研究零售商占主导、供应商自有资金有限的二级供应链如何通过契约实现协调的问题。在预付款融资的基础上加入期权契约方法,构建用于预付款融资的期权契约模型,并求解出该模型下所能协调供应链的契约参数与此时零售商供应商双方的最优决策系统。研究表明当供应商自有资金大于等于某临界值时通过预付款融资下的期权契约可实现供应链协调。若小于则无法通过该契约协调,并且供应商自有资金约束越大,零售商最优订购数量越多,同时供应商的最优生产数量随着自有资金的减少而减少,供应链的参与者及整个供应链的利润也随着供应商自有资金的减少单调递减;另外,相比于无融资下的期权契约,预付款模式能提高零售商、供应商以及整个供应链的收益。  相似文献   

8.
This paper shows how a multimarket incumbent can use low pre-entry prices for entry deterrence. We consider an incumbent who operates in two independent markets and has private information about his production cost. In one of the markets, there is a potential entrant offering a differentiated product. The most reasonable perfect Bayesian equilibrium is either the least-cost separating equilibrium or the pooling equilibrium where both types of incumbents set the low-cost monopoly prices. This equilibrium may involve a downward distortion in the pre-entry prices of both markets. Our model has interesting implications for antitrust regulation as well as for international trade policy. First, predatory tests based on a single market are inadequate for a multimarket incumbent. Second, a lower price in a foreign market is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the existence of entry deterrence in a foreign market.  相似文献   

9.
This paper considers the problem of designing a returns policy in a supply chain from a supplier's perspective. The supply chain considered here is assumed to have one supplier and one retailer who serves a random demand of a product with a short life cycle. The retailer can return all the unsold products to the supplier with a partial refund. We found that if the retailer behaviour is rational, that is, ordering the optimal quantity to maximize its expected profit, then both retailer and supplier could benefit from the returns policy. Furthermore, we established that the optimal buyback price is independent of the mean of the random demand, but the variance of the demand has a significant impact on setting the optimal buyback price. The higher the variance the higher the optimal buyback price and the larger the profit gain of both parties. Numerical studies are employed to help understand the benefits of returns policies for the supplier, the retailer, and the whole supply chain.  相似文献   

10.
以一个制造商和一个零售商的供应链为研究对象,制造商生产两种互补产品,零售商可选择分开或捆绑两种销售策略。考虑互补品的负交叉弹性和广告外部性的特点,构建基于溢出效应的需求模型,运用博弈论的方法,求解零售商采取分开和捆绑两种销售策略时的均衡结果。通过比较不同销售策略下的均衡结果及利润关系,探讨在分散式和集中式两种情况下,零售商的最优广告投入和捆绑销售的联合决策问题。最后,通过数值算例,讨论产品互补程度和广告成本系数对决策结果的影响。研究结果表明,无论是在分散式还是集中式决策下,当产品互补程度较高或广告成本系数低时,分开销售是占优策略而广告费用较高;当产品互补程度较低且广告成本系数高时,捆绑销售是占优策略且广告费用较低。  相似文献   

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