三层供应链上需求信息不对称下Newsboy型协作问题

本文主要研究单产品在单周期内由供应商、制造商、零售商组成的三层供应链上的协作订购问题,即在随机需求下供应商、制造商、零售商以利润最大化为目的的最优协作订购问题。在需求信息不对称下,零售商充分了解需求信息。在协作订购时面临四种策略,给出了在这四种策略下的四种利润模型及零售商在这四种策略下的最优订购量并比较它们的大小,最后通过需求服从正态分布的实例验证了供应商一制造商一零售商在采用数量折扣和返回措施三者完全合作时供应链上的利润最大。     

可替代产品环境下基于数量折扣的供应链协调研究

研究一个供应商和一个零售商基于数量折扣的两种可替代产品供应链协调问题,建立以供应商为主导的可替代产品数量折扣Stackelberg博弈模型,并将数量折扣模型与一体化和非一体化情形作对比,分析产品折扣率和替代率的变化对供应链的影响.研究结果表明虽然整个供应链利润随折扣率和产品可替代程度的增加而增加,但只是增加了处于主导地位供应商的利润,降低了零售商的利润;在实际运营中,供应商需要考虑销售返利或其它转移支付手段将利润一部分转移给零售商来实现基于数量折扣的供应链协调.     

基于不对称需求信息的数量折扣设计

通过建立数量折扣设计优化模型,利用委托代理理论分别分析了完全和不完全需求信息条件下,商品供应商如何为一群异质的零售商制定价格政策,实现其中望利润的最大化.在完全需求信息条件下,单一价格就能使供应商实现利润最大化;而在需求信息为不对称条件下,逆向选择使单一价格失效,此时,数量折扣是一种能够有效增加零售商订货量的激励方式.     

需求依赖努力水平的农产品供应链期权契约优化

针对供应商和零售商组成的农产品供应链,研究市场需求受到努力水平影响的农产品供应链协调问题.由于双重边际效应,分散式供应链中的最优生产数量低于集中式供应链的情况,零售商努力水平也相对较低.引入期权契约时,在零售商主导期权契约的供应链中,研究得到零售商的最优初始订货量和最优期权价格,以及供应商的最优生产数量,实现供应链协调.数值分析证实了期权契约有助于提高零售商的努力水平以及整个供应链的利润.     

竞争环境下多个损失规避零售商的 预先订购折扣合约研究

在展望理论框架下,考虑由多个存在竞争的损失规避型零售商和一个风险中性的供应商组成的供应链预先订购折扣合约问题,研究了供应商和零售商在预先订购折扣合约下的决策行为,研究表明,供应商通过预先订购折扣合约可以协调整个供应链.最后通过算例,分别得到了供应商和零售商在预先订购折扣合约下的最优决策行为以及能使得供应链达到协调的供应商的决策行为.     

基于顾客策略行为的两周期供应链动态定价,契约协调与利润分配机制

构建考虑顾客策略行为的两周期供应链博弈模型,分析分散式和集中式决策下,供应链成员的最优决策及顾客策略行为强度对各成员企业决策和利润的影响,研究两部定价契约和数量折扣契约的协调问题,提出一个基于成员议价能力的利润分配机制,并探讨顾客策略行为和成员议价能力对最优补偿金额的影响.主要结论为:1)顾客策略性越强,对供应链成员和总利润的负效应越大,且存在一个阈值,超过此阈值后,供应链各成员利润和总利润均降至最低限,但供应商利润总是高于零售商;2)两部定价契约和数量折扣契约能实现上述供应链的协调,但总有一参与方独占整个供应链的利润;3)基于成员议价能力的利润分配机制下,最优补偿金额与补偿提供方的议价能力负相关,顾客策略行为将导致补偿金额的降低.     

随机需求下有产能约束的技术创新策略研究

在随机需求和技术变革的环境下,基于有产能约束的单供应商-单零售商的供应链结构,研究供应商分销价格决策和技术创新策略以及零售商订货决策。建立了三阶段Stackelberg博弈模型,通过逆推方法求得了供应商最优分销价格和技术创新策略以及零售商最优订货量,深入探讨了供应商产能、新技术出现概率以及市场需求期望与波动分别对供应商、零售商和供应链整体利润的影响。结果表明当供应商产能不足时进行技术创新会提高供应商和供应链的利润,但零售商因间接承担供应商技术创新的投资成本而利润下降;当供应商产能过剩时进行技术创新则会降低供应商及供应链的利润,而零售商的利润增加。新技术出现概率增加会提高供应链各成员的利润;提高市场需求期望并减小市场波动对供应商及供应链有利,但可能会降低零售商的利润。     

供应商资金约束的绿色供应链融资策略研究

在含有单一资金约束供应商和单一零售商的二级供应链中,研究了供应商绿色产品的投入和融资策略,对比分析了银行信贷单一融资渠道和零售商提前支付部分货款与银行信贷的混合融资渠道下,供应商和零售商的运营和融资决策.研究表明,银行信贷单一融资渠道更能激励供应商提高产品的绿色水平和零售商的订购量;而当给定合适的批发价折扣率,零售商提前支付下的混合融资渠道可以实现零供双方的Pareto最优利润,并且,随着生产成本的增加,相对零售商而言,混合融资为供应商创造了更多利润.     

零售商主导型绿色供应链激励机制设计

以往有关绿色供应链激励机制的研究主要是围绕制造商为核心企业展开.而2014年12月颁布的《企业绿色采购指南(试行)》强调了采购商(或零售商)在绿色供应链当中所起的作用.以零售商(而不是供应商)作为核心企业,建立供应商-零售商绿色供应链博弈模型,用以研究零售商的激励制度设计以及绿色产品需求如何影响绿色供应链.分别求解供应商不进行绿色工艺研发、供应商单独进行绿色工艺研发的供应链均衡解,并且设计了转移支付激励机制.研究表明:1)供应商和零售商不一定都有激励提高产品绿色度,但在特定条件下,他们都有动力提高产品绿色度;2)如果供应商和零售商都有动力提高产品绿色度,那么供应商主导型的绿色供应链比零售商主导型的供应链在为整个供应链创造利润方面更佳;3)零售商主导型的绿色供应链可找到最优转移支付比例使得供应链整体利润最大化,且转移支付激励手段有效.     

考虑零售商退出风险的供应链鲁棒模型分析

新产品市场需求信息的缺失以及供应链初构建时的不稳定性导致了零售商退出的高风险,而退出必然给供应链各成员带来巨大的损失,因此供应链需要及时制定应对策略.文章以存在零售商退出风险的新产品供应链为研究对象,运用Scarf在1958年提出的部分信息下的鲁棒决策方法,分析了二级供应链双方的博弈过程,并求得了最优解存在的条件与其表达式.通过理论推演与仿真分析发现:零售商退出风险对供应商和零售商的最优决策和利润造成冲击,同时发现,受冲击的程度与退出标准密切相关,建议零售商在可承受的因低销量带来的利润损失之内,应适当降低退出标准.     

Wholesale-price contract of supply chain with information gathering

This paper investigates a wholesale-price contract of supply chain under the endogenous information structure. This supply chain consists of one supplier and one retailer during the selling season. The retailer does not know his selling cost but can spend resources to acquire information. The supplier offers a contract, which induces the retailer to gather information and generate more production orders with beta costs. We find that there exists an upper bound of the information gathering cost such that the supplier induces the retailer to gather information. The increasing cost of information gathering may decrease the order quantity and wholesale price. Moreover, the cost beta has an impact on the expected profits of the two parties. With the increasing cost of information gathering, the supplier’s expected profit is reduced, while that of the retailer becomes ambiguous in terms of the distribution function and the interval of selling cost information. Finally, a numerical example is presented to explain the main results.     

Heuristics for sourcing from multiple suppliers with alternative quantity discounts

In this paper, we analyze the impact of supplier pricing schemes and supplier capacity limitations on the optimal sourcing policy for a single firm. We consider the situation where the total quantity to be procured for a single period is known by the firm and communicated to the supplier set. In response to this communication, each supplier quotes a price and a capacity limit in terms of a maximum quantity that can be supplied to the buyer. Based on this information, the buyer makes a quantity allocation decision among the suppliers and corresponding to this decision is the choice of a subset of suppliers who will receive an order. Based on industry observations, a variety of supplier pricing schemes from the constituent group of suppliers are analyzed, including linear discounts, incremental units discounts, and all units discounts. Given the complexity of the optimization problem for certain types of pricing schemes, heuristic solution methodologies are developed to identify a quantity allocation decision for the firm. Through an extensive computational comparison, we find that these heuristics generate near-optimal solutions very quickly. Data from a major office products retailer is used to illustrate the resulting sourcing strategies given different pricing schemes and capacity limitations of suppliers in this industry. We find for the case of capacity constrained suppliers, the optimal quantity allocations for two complex pricing schemes (linear discount, and incremental units discount) are such that at most one selected supplier will receive an order quantity that is less than its capacity.     

On explicit solutions of a two-echelon supply chain coordination game

A contracting game under asymmetric information specific to two-echelon supply chain coordination between a retailer of unknown type and a supplier is studied. When the parameter which is private information to the retailer (holding cost) is known up to an interval of uncertainty, a uniform discrete approximation for retailer types leads to closed-form solutions where the joint (coordinated) optimal order quantity for a modified holding cost plays a major role. Furthermore, the closed-form solutions result in increasing information rent for higher types under easy-to-verify conditions involving strict lower limits on the total holding costs of retailer and supplier and the difference between uncoordinated optimal costs of consecutive retailer types.     

Sourcing under incomplete information and negative capacity-cost correlation

We study a sourcing problem where a buyer reserves capacity from a set of suppliers. The suppliers have finite capacity and their unit production cost is a decreasing function of their capacity, implying scale economies. The capacity of each supplier and therefore the cost is his private information. The buyer and other suppliers only know the probability distribution of the supplier’s capacity. The buyer’s demand is random and she has to decide how much capacity to reserve in advance from a subset of suppliers and how much to source from marketplace. In this study we determine the buyer’s optimum reservation quantity and the size of the supply base. We find the presence of such capacity cost correlation leads to supply base reduction.     

Controlling for supplier switching in the presence of real options and asymmetric information

Applying a real option approach, this paper examines how asymmetric information alters key variables of a firm’s supplier switching process, such as the timing of contracting (hurried versus delayed contracting), transfer payments, set-up, switching, and abandonment decisions. In a symmetric information setting, delayed contracting is unambiguously beneficial. Abandoning the once established relation with the entrant supplier is never an issue. In contrast, under asymmetric information hurried contracting with potentially abandoning the relation can be beneficial. Consistent with adverse selection models, we find that under delayed contracting, in equilibrium, the firm switches less frequently to the entrant supplier (switching inertia). Surprisingly, we also find that under hurried contracting the firm switches more frequently to the entrant supplier (switching acceleration) and may abandon the relation. Finally, we study how these key variables of the supplier switching process change when also the incumbent supplier has private information (two-sided asymmetric information case).     

Supplier switching decisions

In order to maximize profit, a buying firm should continuously search for and access sources which offer more favorable prices. While the literature is replete with works on the formation and development of buyer–supplier relationships, there is surprisingly only scarce research on the termination of such relationships and supplier switching. Using the concept of switching costs in a principal-agent framework, we at first analyze whether a firm switches the entire or a partial quantity to an alternative supplier when there is either symmetric or asymmetric information about the alternative supplier’s cost structure. Information asymmetry results in inert supplier switching decisions. Subsequently, we extend our model and take competitive reactions of the incumbent supplier and economies of scale effects into consideration. We find conditions under which ‘no’, ‘partial’ and ‘complete’ switching occurs, which depend on the buying firm’s beliefs about the alternative supplier’s unit costs, switching costs, the price offered by the incumbent supplier, and refinements of the price offered by the incumbent supplier due to competitive reactions and economies of scale. Broader implications for supplier relationship management and sourcing strategy decisions are also provided.     

Analysis of supply contracts with minimum total order quantity commitments and non-stationary demands

In this paper we address a buyer–supplier arrangement of particular importance: total order quantity commitment (TOQC). Under the TOQC contract that has been negotiated between the buyer and the supplier, the former agrees to an obligation to procure a certain quantity of an item from the latter over the predetermined period of time (additional quantity can be obtained maybe at a different price). The optimal inventory replenishment policy is shown to be dual order-up-to levels under a given TOQC, and the optimal TOQC is also demonstrated to be mathematically straightforward to obtain.     

考虑闲置产能分享参与者利益的平台定价研究

信息技术的快速发展,使得闲置产能的分享逐渐成为生产领域重要的产能利用模式。为研究闲置产能分享时平台的最优定价问题,在平台向供给者收取交易费而对需求者不收费的条件下,首先,建立商业平台和公益平台的基础模型,并对两类平台进行分析和对比;然后,在基础模型之上构建以一定权重考虑其他参与者利益的平台X的定价模型,探讨权重对最优交易费、供需双方的数量以及平台最优利润的影响;最后,用数值例子验证文中重要定理以及权重对供需双方效用产生的影响。研究结果表明:(1)商业平台收取的最优交易费和获得的最优利润均高于公益平台;(2)考虑其他参与者利益的平台X收取的最优交易费和获得的最优利润、需求者(免费方)的数量和效用均随着权重的增加而增加,而供给者(被收费方)的数量及其效用则随着权重的增加而减少。研究结果为平台运营商和企业的行为决策提供理论参考依据。     

Coordination mechanism for capacity reservation by considering production time,production rate and order quantity

In this paper we study the coordination of a dyadic supply chain producing a high-tech product by contracts. The product has a short life cycle and the buyer faces stochastic demands during the selling period. We consider the production time, which causes the inventory costs on supplier’s side. As the supplier builds production capacity in advance, the production rate is limited to the capacity created during the production time. In addition, we take into account the inventory cost and operational cost for the buyer. We examine the model under both full information and partial information updating situations, and propose a coordinating contract for each case. Our analysis includes the study of members’ decisions under both forced and voluntary compliance regimes. Numerical results are presented to provide more insights into the models developed and the mechanisms proposed.