Relevance and Relationalism

This paper will provide support for relationalism; the claim that the identity of objects is constituted by the totality of their relations to other things in the world. I will consider how Kit Fine’s criticisms of essentialism within modal logic not only highlight the inability of modal logic to account for essential properties but also arouse suspicion surrounding the possibility of nonrelational properties. I will claim that Fine’s criticisms, together with concerns surrounding Hempel’s paradox, show that it is not possible to provide a satisfactory account of certain properties in abstraction from their place within a wider context. Next, we will shift attention to natural kinds and consider the notion that relevance plays in metaphysical accounts of identity, by examining Peter Geach’s notion of relative identity. I will argue that the intensional relation between subject and object must be included in a satisfactory account of metaphysical identity.     

Dispositions, Laws, and Categories

After a short sketch of Lowe’s account of his four basic categories, I discuss his theory of formal ontological relations and how Lowe wants to account for dispositional predications. I argue that on the ontic level Lowe is a pan-categoricalist, while he is a language dualist and an exemplification dualist with regard to the dispositional/categorical distinction. I argue that Lowe does not present an adequate account of disposition. From an Aristotelian point of view, Lowe conflates dispositional predication with hôs epi to poly statements about what is normally or mostly the case.     

Immense Multiple Realization

In his latest book Physicalism, or Something near Enough, Jaegwon Kim argues that his version of functional reductionism is the most promising way for saving mental causation. I argue, on the other hand, that there is an internal tension in his position: Functional reductionism does not save mental causation if Kim’s own supervenience argument is sound. My line of reasoning has the following steps: (1) I discuss the supervenience argument and I explain how it motivates Kim’s functional reductionism; (2) I present what I call immense multiple realization, which says that macro-properties are immensely multiply realized in determinate micro-based properties; (3) on that background I argue that functional reductionism leads to a specified kind of irrealism for mental properties. Assuming that such irrealism is part of Kim’s view, which Kim himself seems to acknowledge, I argue that Kim’s position gets the counterfactual dependencies between macro-causal relata wrong. Consequently, his position does not give a conservative account of mental causation. I end the paper by discussing some alternative moves that Kim seems to find viable in his latest book. I argue on the assumption that the supervenience argument is sound, so the discussion provides further reasons to critically reevaluate that argument because it generalizes in deeply problematic ways.     

Epistemic Conditions on “Ought”: E=K as a Case Study

In The Norm of Belief, John Gibbons claims that there is a “natural reaction” to the general idea that one can be normatively required to Ø when that requirement is in some sense outside of one’s first person perspective or inaccessible to one. The reaction amounts to the claim that this is not possible. Whether this is a natural or intuitive idea or not, it is difficult to articulate exactly why we might think it is correct. To do so, we need a view about the relationship between agents’ capacities to accord with normative requirements and the conditions under which those normative requirements obtain. I offer an account of the epistemic dimension of this relationship. The goal is to provide enough of a story about the natural reaction to make accounting for it look like an important desideratum for any theory of the nature of normative requirements—whether these are moral or epistemic. To focus the discussion, I use Timothy Williamson’s knowledge-first view of evidence as an example of a view in epistemology that generates the natural reaction. One upshot of the discussion, then, is a detailed account of what is troubling about Williamson’s influential but controversial view of evidence.     

Contextualist theories of knowledge

Contextualist theories of knowledge offer a semantic hypothesis to explain the observed contextual variation in what people say they know, and the difficulty people have resolving skeptical paradoxes. Subject or speaker relative versions make the truth conditions of “S knows that p” depend on the standards of either the knower’s context (Hawthorne and Stanley) or those of the speaker’s context (Cohen and DeRose). Speaker contextualism avoids objections to subject contextualism, but is implausible in light of evidence that “know” does not behave like an indexical. I deepen and extend these criticisms in light of recent defenses by contextualists (including Ludlow). Another difficulty is that whether certain standards are salient or intended does not entail that they are the proper standards. A normative form of contextualism on which the truth of a knowledge claim depends on the proper standards for the context is more promising, but still unsatisfactory whether the view is speaker or subject relative. I defend alternative explanations for the observed linguistic and psychological data: a pragmatic account for some cases and a cognitive account for others.¹ I presented this paper at the 2004 Bled Conference on Contextualism, sponsored by Mirabor and Northern Illinois Universities.     

Analyticity and the Deviant Logician: Williamson’s Argument from Disagreement

One way to discredit the suggestion that a statement is true just in virtue of its meaning is to observe that its truth is the subject of genuine disagreement. By appealing to the case of the unorthodox philosopher, Timothy Williamson has recast this response as an argument foreclosing any appeal to analyticity. Reconciling Quine’s epistemological holism with his treatment of the ‘deviant logician’, I show that we may discharge the demands of charitable interpretation even while attributing trivial semantic error to Williamson’s philosophers. Williamson’s effort to generalize the argument from disagreement therefore fails.     

Generalism without foundations

This paper is a defence of a holistic version of the generalist view of moral reasoning based on prima facie principles. In Section 1 I summarise Dancy’s arguments for particularism. Then I argue that particularism goes against strong intuitions regarding reasoning in general (Section 2), fails to account for the asymmetry of reasons (Section 3) and to make sense of compunction and moral imbecility (Section 4). I conclude (Section 5) that a holistic generalism is the right view of moral reasoning. Then I discuss Dancy’s objections to it. I argue that Dancy’s appeal to default reasons is philosophically equivalent to a holistic version of generalism, and hence incompatible with particularism (Section 6) and that his resistance to accept holistic generalism is the result of a foundationalist view of reasoning (Section 7). As an alternative to foundationalism I defend an Aristotelian dialectical view of moral reasoning.     

Dynamic structural percolation model of loss distribution for cyber risk of small and medium-sized enterprises for tree-based LAN topology

Cyber risk due to breach can be seen as a risk of a financial loss due to breach of an institution’s IT infrastructure by unauthorized parties and exploiting, taking possession of, or disclosing data assets, thus creating financial and/or reputation damage. In this paper, as a primary contribution to the existing body of actuarial literature, we propose a structural model of aggregate loss distribution for cyber risk of small and medium-sized enterprises under the assumption of a tree-based LAN topology. Up to our knowledge, there exist no theoretical models of an aggregate loss distribution for cyber risk in this setting. To achieve our goal, we contextualize the problem in the probabilistic graph-theoretical framework using percolation models. We assume that the IT network topology is represented by a random graph allowing for heterogeneous loss topology and providing instructive numerical examples.     

A Bowley solution with limited ceded risk for a monopolistic reinsurer

Borch (1969) advocated that the study of optimal reinsurance design should take into consideration the conflicting interests of both an insurer and a reinsurer. Motivated by this and exploiting a Bowley solution (or Stackelberg equilibrium game), this paper proposes a two-step model that tackles an optimal risk transfer problem between the insurer and the reinsurer. From the insurer’s perspective, the first step of the model provisionally derives an optimal reinsurance policy for a given reinsurance premium while reflecting the reinsurer’s risk appetite. The reinsurer’s risk appetite is controlled by imposing upper limits on the first two moments of the coverage. Through a comparative analysis, the effect of the insurer’s initial wealth on the demand for reinsurance is then examined, when the insurer’s risk aversion and prudence are taken into account. Based on the insurer’s provisional strategy, the second step of the model determines the monopoly premium that maximizes the reinsurer’s expected profit while still satisfying the insurer’s incentive condition. Numerical examples are provided to illustrate our Bowley solution.     

Bidders and dispenser: manipulative hypergames in a multinational context

The object of this paper is to present an introduction to the basic ideas of Hypergame Analysis, and to illustrate these by building some models of a particular type of situation.Hypergame Analysis is an extension of the Game-theoretic framework, the purpose of which is to enable one to model situations in which the various parties are not well-informed of each other's preferences and strategies. we take as a basic structure not a single game, but a linked set of ‘perceived’ games: this, in essence, is what constitutes a Hypergame. Misperceptions may arise accidentally or be deliberately induced. Thus, a player may be acting ‘rationally’ relative to the game he perceives, but this game itself may have been ‘set up’ to suit the interests of some other party.The technique is used to explore situations in which several parties (the ‘bidders’) negotiate competitively with another (the ‘dispenser’) who is able to accept whichever bidder's offer is most advantageous to him. In particular, the ability of the dispenser to ‘play off’ one bidder against another is examined. This is related to an account of the siting of new plant by a Multi-National Corporation. Some general implications are suggested: especially, it is argued that to have a reasonable chance of producing adequate forecasts in such difficult situations, modelling techniques must embody at least this degree of conceptual complexity.     

The Role of the Visual System in Emotion Perception

Looking at a person’s expression is a good way of telling what she feels—what emotions she has. Why is that? Is it because we see her emotion, or is it because we infer her mental state from her expression? My claim is that there is a sense in which we do see the person’s emotion. I first argue that expressions are physical events that carry information about the emotions that produce them. I then examine evidence suggesting that specific brain areas and structures are involved in the process that extracts such information and makes it available in the content of visual experience. I consider only what happens in early stages of visual processing and make no claim about the role of simulation and empathy.     

A High Token Indicativity Account of Knowledge

In this paper, I provide a probabilistic account of factual knowledge, based on the notion of chance, which is a function of an event (or a fact — I will use ‘fact’ to cover both) given a prior history. This account has some affinity with my chance account of token causation, but it neither relies on it nor presupposes it. Here, I concentrate on the core cases of perceptual knowledge and of knowledge by memory (based on perception). (The account can be extended to the other modes of knowledge, but not in this paper.) The analysis of knowledge presented below is externalist. The underlying intuition guiding the treatment of knowledge in this paper is that knowledge boils down to high token discriminative indicativeness. Type indicativeness or type discriminability are neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge: the token aspect comes out in the strong dependence on the specific circumstances and chances of the case. The main condition of the first section, the indicativity condition (KI), properly refined, yields pertinent (token) indicativity as a main constituent. Very roughly, it involves the chance of the content clause p being higher given the subject's believing that p than otherwise. The discriminability condition in question (section 3) captures the sense of discriminability appropriate for knowledge and yield the indicativity condition: it is an extension of the indicativity condition KI. Roughly, the subject’s ability to discriminate the object in front of her being red from its being green is captured by holding fixed, in the indicativity condition, the condition “the object in front of her is red or green.” A major element in the analysis is the so-called Contrast Class, which governs the scope of discriminability. This is the class of features that have to be taken into account in the discriminability condition, and it is characterized by two constraints. Very roughly, according to the first constraint, for a feature to be in the contrast class, it must not represent a sub-type of (the feature specified by) the predicate in the content clause. According to the second constraint, which is a central condition with many implications, the chance that the object specified in the content clause has a feature represented in the contrast class must not under the circumstances be too low. This constraint, within the framework of the discriminability condition, brings out a major constitutive aspect of knowledge: knowledge amounts to a limited vulnerability to mistakes of the belief in question under the circumstances at hand. The contrast class plays a major role in my treatment of skepticism. The second constraint on the Contrast Class together with the VHP condition below bring out precisely the way in which perceptual knowledge is fallible.     

Spinoza on Having a False Idea

Naturalism pervades Spinoza’s doctrines of The Ethics, but the contours of it often bewilder us. In this light, I consider the account of falsity, or having a false idea, as presented by Spinoza in Proposition thirty_five of the Second Part, its demonstration, and the subsequent note. Based on my interpretation I argue for the claim that his account has coherence and makes sense. Further, I examine the significance of what Spinoza says about falsity for comprehension of his philosophy overall, especially as regards its contrasts with the philosophy of Descartes.     

On Not Counting the Cost: Ad Hocness and Disconfirmation

I offer an account of ad hocness that explains why the adoption of an ad hoc auxiliary is accompanied by the disconfirmation of a hypothesis H. H must be conjoined with an auxiliary (or set of auxiliaries) a′, which is improbable antecedently given H, while ~H does not have this disability. This account renders it unnecessary to require, for identifying (bad) ad hocness, that either a′ or H have a posterior probability less than or equal to 0.5; there are also other reasons for abandoning that condition. I distinguish between formal ad hocness, which is bad in the probabilistic sense that it results in disconfirmation of H, and argumentative ad hocness, which actually involves bad reasoning on the part of a subject. The latter is what I call “not counting the cost.” This distinction allows us to see why the 0.5 condition appeared attractive in the first place. The concept of not counting the cost also has implications for other areas of research, including both a Bayesian concept of unfalsifiability and the classic epistemological question of the problem of the external world.     

Achieving ‘Desirable and Feasible’ Change: An Application of Soft Systems Methodology

Rational intervention in human affairs, if it is to constitute not only action but also research, so that future interventions may be made more effective, needs a well-defined methodological framework. Soft systems methodology (S.S.M.) provides one such framework. S.S.M. is doubly systemic: it is itself a learning system, and within that system it uses systems models, models of human activity systems. It accepts that such models are not models of parts of the real world, only models of ways of perceiving the real world, that is to say, models relevant to debate about ‘reality’ (one man's ‘terrorism’ is another's ‘freedom fighting’).S.S.M. is here illustrated by means of an account of a systems study of change in the information function of a sophisticated science-based company. The study is described from the point of view of a professional analyst who was helping a team of three managers carry out the study. The course of the study is described, and a separate commentary relates its activity to the seven stages of S.S.M. The study involved three cycles round stages 2–3–4–5 of S.S.M., the stages in which models of relevant human activity systems are built and compared with the real world in order to construct a rich debate about changes whose introduction in the problem situation world be both (systemically) desirable and (culturally) feasible.     

Extended crystal PDE’S stability,II: The extended crystal MHD-PDE’S

This paper is the second part of a work devoted to the algebraic topological characterization of PDE’s stability, and its relationship with an important class of PDE’s called extended crystals PDE’s in the sense introduced in [A. Prástaro, Extended crystal PDE’s (submitted for publication)]. In fact, their integral bordism groups can be considered as extensions of subgroups of crystallographic groups. This allows us to identify a characteristic class that measures the obstruction to the existence of global solutions. In part I [A. Prástaro, Extended crystal PDE’s stability, I: The general theory, Math. Comput. Modelling, 49 (9–10) (2009) 1759–1780] we identified criteria to recognize PDE’s that are stable (in extended Ulam sense) and in their regular smooth solutions, finite time instabilities do not occur (stable extended crystal PDE’s). Here, we study in some detail, a new PDE encoding anisotropic incompressible magnetohydrodynamics. Stable extended crystal MHD-PDE’s are obtained, where in their smooth solutions, instabilities do not occur in finite time. These results are considered first for systems without a body energy source, and later, by also introducing a contribution from an energy source, in order to take into account nuclear energy production. A condition in order that solutions satisfy the second principle of thermodynamics is given.     

An Informational Theory of Counterfactuals

Backtracking counterfactuals are problem cases for the standard, similarity based, theories of counterfactuals e.g., Lewis (Noûs13.4, 455–476, 1979). These theories usually need to employ extra-assumptions to deal with those cases (e.g., Lewis’ “standard resolution of vagueness”). Hiddleston (Noûs 39(4), 632–657, 2005) proposes a causal theory of counterfactuals that, supposedly, deals well with backtracking. The main advantage of the causal theory is that it provides a unified account for backtracking and non-backtracking counterfactuals (no extra-assumption is needed). In this paper, I present a backtracking counterfactual that is a problem case for Hiddleston’s account. Then I propose an informational theory of counterfactuals, which deals well with this problem case while maintaining the main advantage of Hiddleston’s account (the unified account for backtracking and non-backtracking counterfactuals). In addition, the informational theory offers a general theory of backtracking that provides clues for the semantics and epistemology of counterfactuals. I propose that backtracking is reasonable when the (possibly non-actual) state of affairs expressed in the antecedent of a counterfactual transmits less information about an event in the past than the actual state of affairs.     

Stable Algebraic Topology and Stable Topological Algebra

Algebraic topology is a young subject, and its foundations arenot yet firmly in place. I shall give some history, examplesand modern developments in that part of the subject called stablealgebraic topology, or stable homotopy theory. This is by farthe most calculationally accessible part of algebraic topology,although it is also the least intuitively grounded in visualizablegeometric objects. It has a great many applications to othersubjects such as algebraic geometry and geometric topology.Time will not allow me to say as much as I would like aboutthat. Rather, I shall emphasize some foundational issues thathave been central to this part of algebraic topology since theearly 1960s, but that have been satisfactorily resolved onlyin the last few years. 1991 Mathematics Subject Classification55P42, 55N20.     

Searle freed of every flaw

Strong Al presupposes (1) that Super-Searle (henceforth ‘Searle’) comes to know that the symbols he manipulates are meaningful, and (2) that there cannot be two or more semantical interpretations for the system of symbols that Searle manipulates such that the set of rules constitutes a language comprehension program for each interpretation. In this paper, I show that Strong Al is false and that presupposition #1 is false, on the assumption that presupposition #2 is true. The main argument of the paper constructs a second program, isomorphic to Searle’s, to show that if someone, say Dan, runs this isomorphic program, he cannot possibly come to know what its mentioned symbols mean because they do not mean anything to anybody. Since Dan and Searle do exactly the same thing, except that the symbols they manipulate are different, neither Dan nor Searle can possibly know whether the symbols they manipulate are meaningful (let alone what they mean, if they are meaningful). The remainder of the paper responds to an anticipated Strong Al rejoinder, which, I believe, is a necessary extension of Strong Al.