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In the classical model of games with transferable utility one assumes that each subgroup of players can form and cooperate
to obtain its value. However, we can think that in some situations this assumption is not realistic, that is, not all coalitions
are feasible. This suggests that it is necessary to raise the whole question of generalizing the concept of transferable utility
game, and therefore to introduce new solution concepts. In this paper we define games on matroids and extend theτ-value as a compromise value for these games.
This work has been partially supported by the Spanish Ministery of Science and Technology under grant SEC2000-1243. 相似文献
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Emilio Calvo Esther Gutiérrez Juan Carlos Santos 《International Journal of Game Theory》2000,29(2):177-188
We consider multichoice NTU games, i.e., cooperative NTU games in which players can participate in the game with several
levels of activity. For these games, we define and characterize axiomatically the multichoice consistent value, which is a generalization of the consistent NTU value for NTU games and of the multichoice value for multichoice TU games.
Moreover, we show that this value coincides with the consistent NTU value of a replicated NTU game and we provide a probabilistic
interpretation.
Received: May 1998/Final version: January 2000 相似文献
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河流水资源分配问题可以抽象为图限制下合作对策解的模型.基于图限制下合作对策的Solidarity值对参与者的收益分配进行分析,构造了Solidarity值的结构,给出了该值的分支有效性等四个性质,并利用这四个性质刻画了Solidarity值的唯一性.最后通过一个简单的实例,证明了河流水资源分配问题中,基于Solidarity值的收益分配比Myerson值更优. 相似文献
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Bas van Velzen 《Operations Research Letters》2004,32(6):565-573
In this paper, we study cooperative cost games arising from domination problems on graphs. We introduce three games to model the cost allocation problem and we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the balancedness of all three games. 相似文献
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Daniel Granot 《Mathematical Programming》1986,34(2):212-222
We introduce a generalized linear production model whose attractive feature being that the resources held by any subset of producersS is not restricted to be the vector sum of the resources held by the members ofS. We provide sufficient conditions for the non-emptiness of the core of the associated generalized linear production game, and show that if the core of the game is not empty then a solution in it can be produced from a dual optimal solution to the associated linear programming problem. Our generalized linear production model is a proper generalization of the linear production model introduced by Owen, and it can be used to analyze cooperative games which cannot be studied in the ordinary linear production model framework. We use the generalized model to show that the cooperative game induced by a network optimization problem in which players are the nodes of the network has a non-empty core. We further employ our model to prove the non-emptiness of the core of two other classes of cooperative games, which were not previously studied in the literature, and we also use our generalized model to provide an alternative proof for the non-emptiness of the core of the class of minimum cost spanning tree games. Thus, it appears that the generalized linear production model is a unifying model which can be used to explain the non-emptiness of the core of cooperative games generated by various, seemingly different, optimization models.This research was partially done while the author was visiting the Graduate School of Business Administration at Tel-Aviv University. The research was partially supported by Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council Canada Grant A4181 and by SSHRC leave fellowship 451-83-0030.Dedicated to George B. Dantzig. 相似文献
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J. M. Bilbao J. R. Fernández N. Jiménez J. J. López 《Annals of Operations Research》2008,158(1):99-115
The aim of the present paper is to study a one-point solution concept for bicooperative games. For these games introduced
by Bilbao (Cooperative Games on Combinatorial Structures, 2000) , we define a one-point solution called the Shapley value, since this value can be interpreted in a similar way to the classical
Shapley value for cooperative games. The main result of the paper is an axiomatic characterization of this value. 相似文献