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1.
We introduce a new class of totally balanced cooperative TU games, namely p-additive games. It is inspired by the class of inventory games that arises from inventory situations with temporary discounts (Toledo Ph.D. thesis, Universidad Miguel Hernández de Elche, 2002) and contains the class of inventory cost games (Meca et al. Math. Methods Oper. Res. 57:481–493, 2003). It is shown that every p-additive game and its corresponding subgames have a nonempty core. We also focus on studying the character of concave or convex and monotone p-additive games. In addition, the modified SOC-rule is proposed as a solution for p-additive games. This solution is suitable for p-additive games, since it is a core-allocation which can be reached through a population monotonic allocation scheme. Moreover, two characterizations of the modified SOC-rule are provided. This work was partially supported by the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science and Generalitat Valenciana (grants MTM2005-09184-C02-02, ACOMP06/040, CSD2006-00032). Authors acknowledge valuable comments made by the Editor and the referee.  相似文献   

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In this note we deal with inventory games as defined in Meca et al. (Math. Methods Oper. Res. 57:483–491, 2003). In that context we introduce the property of immunity to coalitional manipulation, and demonstrate that the SOC-rule (Share the Ordering Cost) is the unique allocation rule for inventory games which satisfies this property. The authors acknowledge the financial support of Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia, FEDER and Xunta de Galicia through projects SEJ2005-07637-C02-02 and PGIDIT06PXIC207038PN.  相似文献   

4.
Consider a set N of n (> 1) stores with single-item and single-period nondeterministic demands like in a classic newsvendor setting with holding and penalty costs only. Assume a risk-pooling single-warehouse centralized inventory ordering option. Allocation of costs in the centralized inventory ordering corresponds to modelling it as a cooperative cost game whose players are the stores. It has been shown that when holding and penalty costs are identical for all subsets of stores, the game based on optimal expected costs has a non empty core (Hartman et al. 2000, Games Econ Behav 31:26–49; Muller et al. 2002, Games Econ Behav 38:118–126). In this paper we examine a related inventory centralization game based on demand realizations that has, in general, an empty core even with identical penalty and holding costs (Hartman and Dror 2005, IIE Trans Scheduling Logistics 37:93–107). We propose a repeated cost allocation scheme for dynamic realization games based on allocation processes introduced by Lehrer (2002a, Int J Game Theor 31:341–351). We prove that the cost subsequences of the dynamic realization game process, based on Lehrer’s rules, converge almost surely to either a least square value or the core of the expected game. We extend the above results to more general dynamic cost games and relax the independence hypothesis of the sequence of players’ demands at different stages.  相似文献   

5.
In this paper we propose a new method to associate a coalitional game with each strategic game. The method is based on the lower value of finite two-player zero-sum games. We axiomatically characterize this new method, as well as the method that was described in Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). As an intermediate step, we provide axiomatic characterizations of the value and the lower value of matrix games and finite two-player zero-sum games, respectively.The authors acknowledge the financial support of Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnologia, FEDER andXunta de Galicia through projects BEC2002-04102-C02-02 and PGIDIT03PXIC20701PN.We wish to thank Professor William Thomson as well as an anonymous referee for useful comments.  相似文献   

6.
In this paper we consider finitely repeated games in which players can unilaterally commit to behave in an absentminded way in some stages of the repeated game. We prove that the standard conditions for folk theorems can be substantially relaxed when players are able to make this kind of compromises, both in the Nash and in the subgame perfect case. We also analyze the relation of our model with the repeated games with unilateral commitments studied, for instance, in García-Jurado et al. (Int. Game Theory Rev. 2:129–139, 2000). Authors acknowledge the financial support of Ministerio de Educaci ón y Ciencia, FEDER and Fundación Séneca de la Región de Murcia through projects SEJ2005-07637-C02-02, ECO2008-03484-C02-02, MTM2005-09184-C02-02, MTM2008-06778-C02-01 and 08716/PI/08.  相似文献   

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In this paper, we consider constrained noncooperative N-person stochastic games with discounted cost criteria. The state space is assumed to be countable and the action sets are compact metric spaces. We present three main results. The first concerns the sensitivity or approximation of constrained games. The second shows the existence of Nash equilibria for constrained games with a finite state space (and compact actions space), and, finally, in the third one we extend that existence result to a class of constrained games which can be “approximated” by constrained games with finitely many states and compact action spaces. Our results are illustrated with two examples on queueing systems, which clearly show some important differences between constrained and unconstrained games.Mathematics Subject Classification (2000): Primary: 91A15. 91A10; Secondary: 90C40  相似文献   

8.
In Bolger [1993], an efficient value was obtained for a class of games called games with n players and r alternatives. In these games, each of the n players must choose one and only one of the r alternatives. This value can be used to determine a player’s “a priori” value in such a game. In this paper, we show that the value has a consistency property similar to the “consistency” for TU games in Hart/Mas-Colell [1989] and we present a set of axioms (including consistency) which characterizes this value.  The games considered in this paper differ from the multi-choice games considered by Hsiao and Raghavan [1993]. They consider games in which the actions of the players are ordered in the sense that, if i >j, then action i carries more “weight” than action j.  These games also differ from partition function games in that the worth of a coalition depends not only on the partitioning of the players but also on the action chosen by each subset of the partition. Received: April 1994/final version: June 1999  相似文献   

9.
The aim of this contribution is an overview on Potential Games. This class of games is special, in fact we can investigate their properties by a unique function: the potential function. We consider several types of potential games: exact, ordinal, bayesian and hierarchical. Some results are generalized to multicriteria decisions.   相似文献   

10.
In this paper we analyze biased Maker‐Breaker games and Avoider‐Enforcer games, both played on the edge set of a random board . In Maker‐Breaker games there are two players, denoted by Maker and Breaker. In each round, Maker claims one previously unclaimed edge of G and Breaker responds by claiming b previously unclaimed edges. We consider the Hamiltonicity game, the perfect matching game and the k‐vertex‐connectivity game, where Maker's goal is to build a graph which possesses the relevant property. Avoider‐Enforcer games are the reverse analogue of Maker‐Breaker games with a slight modification, where the two players claim at least 1 and at least b previously unclaimed edges per move, respectively, and Avoider aims to avoid building a graph which possesses the relevant property. Maker‐Breaker games are known to be “bias‐monotone”, that is, if Maker wins the (1,b) game, he also wins the game. Therefore, it makes sense to define the critical bias of a game, b *, to be the “breaking point” of the game. That is, Maker wins the (1,b) game whenever and loses otherwise. An analogous definition of the critical bias exists for Avoider‐Enforcer games: here, the critical bias of a game b * is such that Avoider wins the (1,b) game for every , and loses otherwise. We prove that, for every is typically such that the critical bias for all the aforementioned Maker‐Breaker games is asymptotically . We also prove that in the case , the critical bias is . These results settle a conjecture of Stojakovi? and Szabó. For Avoider‐Enforcer games, we prove that for , the critical bias for all the aforementioned games is . © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Random Struct. Alg., 46,651–676, 2015  相似文献   

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