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1.
关于经理人激励效果的模型研究   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
用一个激励效果衡量模型研究了企业管理中的人力资源激励管理,把激励手段分为激励效果因素和保健效果因素,指出了经理人激励管理中的关键因素并给出了基于模型分析的激励策略指导.  相似文献   

2.
针对我国建筑智能机器人发展动力不足问题,梳理总结当前相关激励政策,展开对建筑智能机器人激励机制的分析探讨.基于演化博弈理论,对政府部门激励政策强度确定与建筑企业研发应用智能机器人策略选择的互动行为及稳定状态进行了分析,并根据建筑企业算例,对不同状态下的双方策略选择进行了讨论.结合演化博弈结果得出结论:要使建筑智能机器人的发展达到最优稳定状态,政府须在加大政策激励力度、丰富激励形式的同时,减少宏观调控与推广成本,使建筑企业在其策略影响下研发应用智能机器人的利润提升,增加其主动选择研发应用智能机器人的积极性.研究可为政府合理确定相关激励政策强度提供理论依据,从而推动建筑业智能机器人提质增效发展.  相似文献   

3.
为了解决异质产品双渠道系统失调问题,构建了异质产品双渠道模型,设计了基于双边激励的双渠道冲突协调机制.研究发现,无协调机制下的系统处于失调状态,引入单边激励策略(消费者返利)能够较好的改善系统的运作情况,但是系统仍难以实现Pareto最优.在此基础上构建了双边激励协调机制,机制中的正向激励策略促进了系统总利润的增长,逆向激励中的转移支付能够公平地分配协调产生的系统利润,进而充分协调异质产品双渠道系统.  相似文献   

4.
不同的上游市场结构对下游厂商的许可策略、创新激励产生不同的影响.文章分别基于上游原料供应商为独占垄断、双头垄断以及完全竞争的假设,结合提成许可策略,比较分析了下游产品市场差异Cournot厂商的创新激励.结果表明:上游厂商的市场势力越强,下游厂商的显著创新激励越低,但显著创新的提成许可激励却越高.这一结果为厂商与政府的创新管理提供了理论依据.  相似文献   

5.
用奇异性理论讨论了常数激励对1/2内共振系统周期解局部分岔的影响.研究表明,常数激励项能否产生影响关键取决于低频振子中是否存在某些非线性项.常数激励,一方面起主分岔参数的作用,另一方面,与系统巾某些非线性项的系数一起确定分岔解基本类型、影响开折参数.在非退化条件下,可不考虑三次非线性项的影响.  相似文献   

6.
基于委托代理理论研究了阶梯激励合约下的代理人行为,并从委托人角度探讨了最优合约设计的问题。在一般市场需求分布和代理人效用函数下,代理人的效用可能是其努力水平的双峰函数,且存在一个阈值使得当合约绩效奖励超过该阈值时,代理人的努力水平“跳跃式”增加。通过比较阶梯激励合约与其他两类激励合约发现,当代理人是风险厌恶型且代理人的产出完全依赖于其努力水平,委托人总是更偏好阶梯激励合约。  相似文献   

7.
为了从综合评价的角度解决管理中的激励问题,本文提出一种需求导向的双激励临界点型评价方法,其最大的特色在于评价需求者和被评价对象的需求是方法构建的重要导向,并采用对被评价对象的不同指标分别激励的做法。在考虑被评价对象的需求时,通过判断各指标对被评价对象排序的影响情况,确定被评价对象各指标的优劣类型进而确定对应指标的激励方式和激励量。在考虑评价需求者的需求时,首先通过设置各指标的双激励临界点确定被评价对象各指标的激励方式,然后计算各指标的激励系数,进而确定各被评价对象的激励量。最后通过一个算例对方法的应用进行了说明。  相似文献   

8.
本文给出了参数激励作用下两自由度非线性振动系统,在1∶2内共振条件下主参数激励低阶模态的非线性响应·采用多尺度法得到其振幅和相位的调制方程,分析发现平凡解通过树枝分岔产生耦合模态解,采用Melnikov方法研究全局分岔行为,确定了产生Smale马蹄型混沌的参数值  相似文献   

9.
李萍  曹璟 《经济数学》2007,24(3):224-228
在存款保险市场中,道德风险的产生增加了存款保险机构运行成本.本文运用相关知识建立了双方的博弈模型,讨论了均衡状态下双方的最优博弈策略,并在此基础上建立促使银行选择风险小的投资的激励模型.  相似文献   

10.
基于公平偏好理论的互惠公平,从创新顾客的互惠偏好程度、激励契约类型与激励效果的关系入手,构建创新顾客参与企业创新活动的激励模型。通过模型求解和分析,探讨激励契约的外部性和互惠关系对于激励效果的影响;此外,进一步分析如何联合经济激励和心理激励,降低企业获得创新顾客高努力投入的成本;最后,通过仿真实验,验证模型分析结果。研究发现:当创新顾客之间出现互惠关系时,最优激励契约取决于创新顾客心理偏好与风险态度之间的相互作用:当创新顾客的风险规避程度较低时,最优激励契约为相对绩效契约;当创新顾客的风险规避程度较高时,最优激励契约为团队报酬契约。  相似文献   

11.
We consider two overlapping generations that want to coordinate their strategies of working, consuming and controlling pollution. Since the cooperative solution is not an equilibrium, and hence is not a self-enforcing contract, a mechanism is required to sustain it. We show how incentive strategies, and the resulting incentive equilibrium, could provide such a mechanism. We also derive the conditions that ensure the credibility of these strategies.  相似文献   

12.
This paper shows how a manufacturer may use an incentive contract with a distributor under a VMI arrangement to gain market share. The manufacturer promises a distributor lower inventory levels in exchange for efforts by the distributor to convert potential lost sales due to stockouts to backorders. Data gathered from a third party provider of information services are then used to illustrate that this incentive arrangement may, at least implicitly, be employed in industry. Our data estimations show that when a manufacturer and distributor are operating under a VMI arrangement, lower inventory at the distributor is associated with a higher conversion rate of lost sales stockouts to backorders.  相似文献   

13.
The agent’s private information contributes greatly to a person to make principal decision in the supply of a chain coordination. Therefore, it is a great issue for him to design an effective incentive mechanism in order to get the true information from the agent in his principle making. Assuming that the demand depend upon an agent’s effort level and the fuzzy market condition, the author in this paper researches and analyzes the principle-agent problem under fuzzy information asymmetry condition by using the theory of principal-agent as well as incentive mechanism.  相似文献   

14.
在委托-代理关系中.代理人的私人信息对委托人的决策会产生重要影响.因此,为了获取代理人的真实信息.设计一个有效的激励机制是委托人的核心问题.本文基于需求依赖于代理人的努力水平和模糊市场条件的假设,利用委托一代理相关理论,探讨了模糊报童问题的激励机制问题.首先讨论了委托人最优产量的确定问题.然后分别给出了可观测和不可观测两种努力水平下的最优激励机制,最后分析了模糊市场条件对委托一代理双方利益的影响.  相似文献   

15.
本文运用信息经济学里的委托-代理人理论,研究了银行保险中银行对其代理保险的员工激励问题, 建立了将主观绩效评价和客观绩效评价相结合的激励模型,其中主观绩效评价因涉及多因素多层次的模糊评价因素,采用二级模糊综合评判的方法。并将此模型运用于上海地区的银行保险激励的实际问题。  相似文献   

16.
Relationships between an assembler and a vendor in a supply chain are investigated in two-period models when the assembler wants to reduce response time by incentive systems. The assembler may offer myopic or farsighted incentive contracts to the vendor, under short-term or long-term relationships. Incentive schemes, effort levels, and expected payoffs under different perspectives and relationships are examined. We find that a farsighted assembler provides the vendor with a higher incentive than a myopic assembler in the first period. A long (short)-term relationship is preferred if the value of farsightedness under a long-term relationship is greater (less) than the switching option value under a short-term relationship. We propose several sufficient conditions regarding which perspectives and relationships are preferred.  相似文献   

17.
Information is crucial for decision makers. The more and the better information one possesses, the more qualified a decision one is able to make. In a framework with partial information about the expected returns of n stocks, the effect of having either non-anticipative or anticipative private information is studied. Optimal consumption and investment strategies for investors exhibiting constant relative risk aversion are derived analytically and an economically intuitive condition for an investor to be indifferent between the two types of private information is given. Moreover, a detailed numerical study including the value of private information is carried out to obtain a better economic understanding of the interplay between partial and private information. One novel result is that intertemporal consumption motives decrease the incentive of an investor to acquire private information.  相似文献   

18.
This paper considers the auctioning of an indivisible project among several suppliers who hold private information about their own efficiency type. Both quality and price need to be determined. Different from scoring auctions, we present a new method, i.e., contingent payment auction mechanism (CPAM), which can effectively deal with the optimal procurement strategy in multidimensional procurement auctions. CPAM can implement the optimal mechanism for the buyer and is thus optimal among all possible procurement strategies. CPAM implies that the buyer should first design and announce a contingent payment function that specifies a payment for each possible quality level before the bidding begins. Compared to scoring auctions, CPAM has some advantages. It does not require a special form of scoring rule and can be generalized in a more broad auction formats. Furthermore, it can help us to solve the ex post moral hazard problem. We consider two kinds of CPAM. For the CPAM I is sensitive to different auction formats, we come up with CPAM II which can improve the performance of CPAM I. Broadly speaking, CPAM integrates the idea of dimension reduction from scoring auction into that of incentive contract design from contract theory to solve the problem of ex post moral hazard.  相似文献   

19.
We investigate an automobile supply chain where a manufacturer and a retailer serve heterogeneous consumers with electric vehicles (EVs) under a government’s price-discount incentive scheme that involves a price discount rate and a subsidy ceiling. We show that the subsidy ceiling is more effective in influencing the optimal wholesale pricing decision of the manufacturer with a higher unit production cost. However, the discount rate is more effective for the manufacturer with a lower unit production cost. Moreover, the expected sales are increasing in the discount rate but may be decreasing in the subsidy ceiling. Analytic results indicate that an effective incentive scheme should include both a discount rate and a subsidy ceiling. We also derive the necessary condition for the most effective discount rate and subsidy ceiling that maximize the expected sales of EVs, and obtain a unique discount rate and subsidy ceiling that most effectively improve the manufacturer’s incentive for EV production.  相似文献   

20.
激励机制对于经营者和股东的协调作用   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
朱祎莉  柴俊 《经济数学》2003,20(2):41-45
摘要由于股东分散使得股东和经营者之间获得信息不对称 ,由此产生了股东和经营者之间的矛盾 .本文提出可以通过赠股或奖金期权的形式建立模型进行协调并用库恩 -塔克定理进行简化 .  相似文献   

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