一种n人静态博弈纯策略纳什均衡存在性判别法

本首先给出了n人静态博弈纯策略纳什均衡存在的充要条件。然后给出n人静态博弈纯策略纳什均衡存在性的一种判别方法。最后在判别纯策略纳什均衡存在的条件下，给出判定该静态博弈存在多少纯策略纳什均衡以及哪些纯策略组合是纯策略纳什均衡(解)的方法。     

一类博弈排序问题的纳什均衡存在性证明

研究机器带有激活费用的博弈排序问题. 机器集由两类组成: 一类是速度为1、 激活费用为B的k_1台同型机; 另一类是速度为a(>1)、激活费用为aB的k_2台同型机, 其中k_1与k_2是任意正整数. 工件作为``局中人", 其目的是极小化自身的费用, 工件的费用是由其所在机器的负载和其所承担的激活费用组成, 其中工件承担的激活费用与工件的加工时间成正比. 针对不同的情况, 设计不同的算法, 并证明各算法得到的排序都是纳什均衡.     

两阶段主从博弈均衡解的存在性

首先给出带参数的纳什均衡问题Γ(x),在此基础上给出了具有带参数的纳什均衡约束的两阶段主从博弈问题G.可以证明带参数的纳什均衡点是存在的,即无论领导者选择何种策略,跟随者的最佳回应集都是非空的.最后推出了关于两阶段主从博弈均衡点的存在性定理.     

流域水资源分配纳什均衡实现过程的进化博弈分析

由于有限理性，流域不同地区在水资源数量与质量分配上就不像完全理性情况下分析的那样，一开始就能找到最好的对策来直接实现纳什均衡。本运用进化博弈理论，说明有限理性的流域不同地区能够通过不断地学习、协调，逐步地提高自己的理性程度并相应地调整对策，来达到一个具有一致性的水资源数量与质量分配的纳什均衡。本的结论可为流域管理机构制定相应的水资源管理政策提供理论依据。     

多主从群体博弈中合作均衡的存在性

基于Scarf,Kajii关于n-人非合作博弈中的合作均衡存在性定理,越来越多的研究表明,对非合作博弈的合作均衡研究是有必要的.本文综合Sandholm的群体博弈模型以及Yang和Ju证明的多主从博弈的合作均衡存在性定理,旨在详细研究多主从群体博弈的合作均衡.首先,在多主从群体博弈中引入合作均衡的概念,并通过Kajii...     

纯交换系统均衡存在性与拓朴学

本文对纯交换经济系统中均衡的存在性，介绍了一种应用拓扑学的证明方法，它包含了对更一般均衡模型存在性论证的基本特色。     

有理插值问题存在性的一个判别准则

１引言我们知道,多项式Ｌａｇｒａｎｇｅ插值是适定的［１,２］,但有理插值函数却未必存在［８,３］．并且到目前为止,也没有类似于多项式Ｌａｇｒａｎｇｅ插值的能够揭示插值结构的显式插值公式．不过有理插值已有许多算法,比如Ｓｔｏｅｒ算法,Ｔｈｉｅｌｅ倒差商算法,Ｓａｌｚｅｒ算法以及Ｗｕｙｔａｃｋ算法等等,见［８,４,５,６］．本文为寻求尽可能接近显式的插值公式,进而揭示有理插值问题的内在结构,得到了有理插值函数存在的一个充要条件,同时也给出了有理插值函数的一种表现形式,参见［１１］．本文约定,所有矩阵…     

Stackelberg博弈均衡点的存在性及通有存在性

针对具有一个领导者和一个跟随者的Stackelberg博弈模型,考虑两种情况:(i)没有凸性条件;(ii)没有凸性条件且减弱连续性.并利用非线性分析方法,证明了在这两种情况下的Stackelberg博弈均衡点的存在性及通有存在性的结论,这些结论改进了Basar T,Olsder G J的结论[1].     

单主多从博弈中中级社会Nash均衡的存在性与应用

对单主多从博弈进行分析,给出跟随者反应函数的相关性质.进一步,针对跟随者反应函数是集值映射的情形,定义出中级社会Nash均衡,讨论该均衡的存在性,并把该均衡应用到非线性反需求函数的单主多从寡头竞争,得出该模型的中级社会Nash均衡解.     

不确定性下强Berge均衡的存在性

在已知不确定参数变化的范围下,研究了非合作博弈与广义非合作博弈的强Berge均衡的存在性,基于强Berge均衡与不确定性下非合作博弈的强Nash均衡的概念,给出了不确定参数下非合作博弈与广义非合作博弈的强Berge均衡的定义,并利用Fan-Glicksberg不动点定理证明其存在性,最后用算例验证其可行性.     

模糊值二人零和对策的Nash均衡策略

我们将在Ramik定义的模糊最大序关系基础上研究模糊环境中的二人零和对策。在非对称模糊数基础上,引入模糊环境中的几种Nash均衡策略,讨论各种均衡策略存在的充要条件。并引入含参变量确定性矩阵对策及其均衡策略的概念,讨论含参变量确定性矩阵对策的Nash均衡策略和模糊值矩阵对策的均衡策略的关系。     

On Nash Equilibrium Strategy of Two-person Zero-sum Games with Trapezoidal Fuzzy Payoffs

In this paper, we investigate Nash equilibrium strategy of two-person zero-sum games with fuzzy payoffs. Based on fuzzy max order, Maeda and Cunlin constructed several models in symmetric triangular and asymmetric triangular fuzzy environment, respectively. We extended their models in trapezoidal fuzzy environment and proposed the existence of equilibrium strategies for these models. We also established the relation between Pareto Nash equilibrium strategy and parametric bi-matrix game. In addition, numerical examples are presented to find Pareto Nash equilibrium strategy and weak Pareto Nash equilibrium strategy from bi-matrix game.     

超级模数博弈的存在性

本文定义了一类在有序Banach空间上的超模博弈,并利用著名的Birkhoff不动点定理证明了有序Banach空间上超模博弈Nash均衡的存在性.     

On existence of undominated pure strategy Nash equilibria in anonymous nonatomic games: a generalization

In this paper, we generalize the exitence result for pure strategy Nash equilibria in anonymous nonatomic games. By working directly on integrals of pure strategies, we also generalize, for the same class of games, the existence result for undominated pure strategy Nash equilibria even though, in general, the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria may fail to be weakly compact. Received August 2001     

Existence Theorems of Random Nash Equilibrium Points for Random Set-valued Maps

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Discriminatory power and pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the lottery Blotto game

This paper highlights the role of discriminatory power in showing the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium in a two-player lottery Blotto game. Precisely, when the discriminatory power of the contest success function in every battle is less than or equal to one, a pure strategy Nash equilibrium always exists for any prizes and budgets. However, we construct examples in which pure strategy Nash equilibrium fails to exist as long as the discriminatory power of only one battle exceeds one.     

Pure strategy Nash equilibria and the probabilistic prospects of Stackelberg players

We consider the set of all m×n bimatrix games with ordinal payoffs. We show that on the subset E of such games possessing at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium, both players prefer the role of leader to that of follower in the corresponding Stackelberg games. This preference is in the sense of first-degree stochastic dominance by leader payoffs of follower payoffs. It follows easily that on the complement of E, the follower’s role is preferred in the same sense. Thus we see a tendency for leadership preference to obtain in the presence of multiple pure strategy Nash equilibria in the underlying game.     

Finding all pure strategy Nash equilibria in a planar location game

In this paper, we deal with a planar location-price game where firms first select their locations and then set delivered prices in order to maximize their profits. If firms set the equilibrium prices in the second stage, the game is reduced to a location game for which pure strategy Nash equilibria are studied assuming that the marginal delivered cost is proportional to the distance between the customer and the facility from which it is served. We present characterizations of local and global Nash equilibria. Then an algorithm is shown in order to find all possible Nash equilibrium pairs of locations. The minimization of the social cost leads to a Nash equilibrium. An example shows that there may exist multiple Nash equilibria which are not minimizers of the social cost.     

On Existence of Nash Equilibria of Games with Constraints on Multistrategies

In this paper, sufficient conditions are given, which are less restrictivethan those required by the Arrow–Debreu–Nash theorem, on theexistence of a Nash equilibrium of an n-player game {₁, . . . , Y_n,f₁, . . . , f_n} in normal form with a nonempty closedconvex constraint C on the set Y=i Y_i of multistrategies. Theith player has to minimize the function fi with respect to the ithvariable. We consider two cases.In the first case, Y is a real Hilbert space and the loss function class isquadratic. In this case, the existence of a Nash equilibrium is guaranteedas a simple consequence of the projection theorem for Hilbert spaces. In thesecond case, Y is a Euclidean space, the loss functions are continuous, andf_i is convex with respect to the ith variable. In this case, the techniqueis quite particular, because the constrained game is approximated with asequence of free games, each with a Nash equilibrium in an appropriatecompact space X. Since X is compact, there exists a subsequence of theseNash equilibrium points which is convergent in the norm. If thelimit point is in C and if the order of convergence is greater than one,then this is a Nash equilibrium of the constrained game.