保险公司和再保险公司之间的停止损失再保险策略选择博弈

本文在扩散逼近风险模型下考虑保险公司和再保险公司之间的停止损失再保险策略选择博弈问题.假设保险公司和再保险公司都以期望终端盈余效用增加作为购买停止损失再保险和接受承保的条件.在保险公司和再保险公司都具有指数效用函数条件下,运用动态规划原理,通过求解其对应的Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman方程,得到了三种博弈情形下保险公司和再保险公司之间的停止损失再保险策略和值函数的显示解,以及再保险合约能够成交时再保费满足的条件.结果显示,在适当的条件下,保险公司和再保险公司之间的停止再保险合约是可以成交的.最后,通过灵敏性分析给出了最优停止损失再保险策略和再保费,以及效用损益与模型主要参数之间的关系,并给出相应的经济分析.     

风险相依下再保险双方的联合最优再保险问题

结合保险人和再保险人的共同利益,研究了具有两类相依险种风险模型下的最优再保险问题.假定再保险公司采用方差保费原理收取保费,利用复合Poisson模型和扩散逼近模型两种方式去刻画保险公司和再保险公司的资本盈余过程,在期望效用最大准则下,证明了最优再保险策略的存在性和唯一性,通过求解Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman（HJB）方程,得到了两种模型下相应的最优再保险策略及值函数的明晰解答,并给出了数值算例及分析.     

期望效用原理中风险保费的信度估计

期望效用保费定价方法是保费定价的重要方法之一.本文建立了期望效用保费原理的贝叶斯模型,定义了期望效用原理的风险保费,并给出了风险保费的信度估计.进而,研究了保费估计的统计性质.最后通过数值模拟的方法验证了风险保费估计的渐近正态性和收敛速度.     

有保证权益连结寿险合约的定价

本文在考虑买卖标的股票需支付比例交易成本的条件下,根据效用最大化原理,将效用无差别定价方法应用到有保证权益连结寿险合约的定价上,给出了合约保留卖价的表达式,并做了数值模拟,计算结果表明本文的方法是合理的.     

Heston随机波动率模型下的资产负债管理问题

应用随机最优控制方法研究Heston随机波动率模型下带有负债过程的动态投资组合问题,其中假设股票价格服从Heston随机波动率模型,负债过程由带漂移的布朗运动所驱动.金融市场由一种无风险资产和一种风险资产组成.应用随机动态规划原理和变量替换法得出了上述问题在幂效用和指数效用函数下最优投资策略的显示解,并给出数值算例分别分析了市场参数在幂效用和指数效用函数下对最优投资策略的影响.     

零期望效用原理下的贝叶斯保费

在零期望效用保费原理下,定义了风险保费及贝叶斯保费,讨论了零期望效用保费及损失函数的关系,得到了各种效用函数下的贝叶斯保费,并证明了这些贝叶斯保费的强相合性,最后通过数值模拟的方法验证了贝叶斯保费的收敛速度.     

随机序FSD在保险费计算中的应用

本文首先对随机序FSD的一个等价定义给出一个新的证法,然后建立一种保险费收取的FSD原理,并讨论净保费、零效用保费、指数保费三种常见保险费计算方法适合该原理的情况.     

风险相依下再保险双方的联合最优再保险问题

结合保险人和再保险人的共同利益,研究了具有两类相依险种风险模型下的最优再保险问题.假定再保险公司采用方差保费原理收取保费,利用复合Poisson模型和扩散逼近模型两种方式去刻画保险公司和再保险公司的资本盈余过程,在期望效用最大准则下,证明了最优再保险策略的存在性和唯一性,通过求解Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman(HJB)方程,得到了两种模型下相应的最优再保险策略及值函数的明晰解答,并给出了数值算例及分析.     

GPSJ分布类下的无赔款优待系统及应用

本文利用GPSJ1的性质,导出此分布类下的最优无赔款优待系统和零效用原理下的无赔款优待系统。同时以我国一家保险公司的索赔数据为例,对本文给出的结果进行说明。     

由时变Lévy噪声驱动的随机微分方程的平均值原理

该文讨论了一类由时变Lévy噪声驱动的随机微分方程(LSDE)的平均值原理,提出了其均值化方程,在均方和以概率意义下得到了均值化方程的解收敛到原LSDE的解,给出了一个具体例子.     

Selling to the “Newsvendor” with a forecast update: Analysis of a dual purchase contract

We consider a supply chain in which a manufacturer sells to a procure-to-stock retailer facing a newsvendor problem with a forecast update. Under a wholesale price contract, the retailer waits as long as she can and optimally places her order after observing the forecast update. We show that the retailer’s wait-and-decide strategy, induced by the wholesale price contract, hinders the manufacturer’s ability to (1) set the wholesale price and maximize his profit, (2) hedge against excess inventory risk, and (3) reduce his profit uncertainty. To mitigate the adverse effect of wholesale price contract, we propose the dual purchase contract, through which the manufacturer provides a discount for orders placed before the forecast update. We characterize how and when a dual purchase contract creates strict Pareto improvement over a wholesale price contract. To do so, we establish the retailer’s optimal ordering policy and the manufacturer’s optimal pricing and production policies. We show how the dual purchase contract reduces profit variability and how it can be used as a risk hedging tool for a risk averse manufacturer. Through a numerical study, we provide additional managerial insights and show, for example, that market uncertainty is a key factor that defines when the dual purchase contract provides strict Pareto improvement over the wholesale price contract.     

在有限执行假设下对最优契约的扩展模型研究

本文运用违约保证金条款改进了代理人事前报酬契约；在契约有限执行的假设下，扩展了代理人的逆向选择模型，并运用扩展逆向选择模型分析了改进后的最优报酬契约。文章指出，改进后的最优报酬契约严格优于委托人为防范代理人违约而被迫采用的非负参与性约束条件下的最优报酬契约。     

Worst-case comparison of valid inequalities for the TSP

We consider most of the known classes of valid inequalities for the graphical travelling salesman polyhedron and compute the worst-case improvement resulting from their addition to the subtour polyhedron. For example, we show that the comb inequalities cannot improve the subtour bound by a factor greater than 10/9. The corresponding factor for the class of clique tree inequalities is 8/7, while it is 4/3 for the path configuration inequalities.Research supported in part by Air Force contract F49620-92-J-0125, DARPA contract N00014-92-J-1799 and NSF contract 9302476-CCR.     

Consignment contracts with retail competition

Consignment contracts have been widely employed in many industries. Under such contracts, items are sold at a retailer’s but the supplier retains the full ownership of the inventory until purchased by consumers; the supplier collects payment from the retailer based on actual units sold. We investigate how competition among retailers influences the supply chain decisions and profits under different consignment arrangements, namely a consignment price contract and a consignment contract with revenue share. First, we investigate how these two consignment contracts and a price only contract compare from the perspective of each supply chain partner. We find that the retailers benefit more from a consignment price contract than from a consignment contract with revenue share or a price only contract, regardless of the level of retailer differentiation. The supplier’s most beneficial contact, however, critically depends upon the level of retailer differentiation: a consignment contract with revenue share is preferable for the supplier if retailer differentiation is strong; otherwise a consignment price contract is preferable. Second, we study how retailer differentiation affects the profits of all supply chain partners. We find that less retailer differentiation improves the supplier’s profit for both types of consignment contract. Moreover, less retailer differentiation improves profits of the retailers in a consignment price contract, but not necessarily in a consignment contract with revenue share.     

Framing contingencies in contracts

This paper develops a contracting model in which the principal frames the contract when the agent is unaware of some contingencies, yet is aware that she may be unaware. We call the contract vague if the agent is still unaware of some contingencies after understanding the contract. We show that the optimal contract is vague if and only if the principal exploits the agent. Applying the model to an insurance problem, we show the insuree is free from exploitation if she slightly underestimates the unforeseen calamities. In a contracting problem, whenever the contractor is unaware of the force majeure event, she is exploited by the employer.     

Analysis of heuristics for the design of tree networks

We analyze the tour partitioning heuristics for the Capacitated Minimum Spanning Tree problem. Lower bounds for the worst-case performance ratios of these heuristics are obtained by using worst-case examples. We also generalize the heuristics to the multi-center case with the same worst-case bounds.The work of the first author was supported by a Dean Summer Research Grant from Owen Graduate School of Management, Vanderbilt University.Work done in part in the Department of Industrial Engineering and Operations Research at Columbia University.The work of the last two authors was supported in part by ONR contract N00014-90-J-1649, NSF contract DDM-8922712 and the Center for Telecommunications Research under NSF contract CDR 84-21402.     

A note on the prize collecting traveling salesman problem

We study the version of the prize collecting traveling salesman problem, where the objective is to find a tour that visits a subset of vertices such that the length of the tour plus the sum of penalties associated with vertices not in the tour is as small as possible. We present an approximation algorithm with constant bound. The algorithm is based on Christofides' algorithm for the traveling salesman problem as well as a method to round fractional solutions of a linear programming relaxation to integers, feasible for the original problem.Research supported in part by ONR contract N00014-90-J-1649 and NSF contract DDM-8922712.     

Contract and product quality in platform selling

More and more e-tailers (platforms) are allowing manufacturers direct access to customers. Two common contracts are offered by platforms to manufacturers: the revenue sharing contract where a platform appropriates a portion of the manufacturer’s revenue, and the fixed fee contract where a platform charges a fixed rent for each sale. Using an analytical model, this paper studies the interrelationship between a platform’s contract choice and a manufacturer’s product quality decision. We find that if product quality is exogenously given, the platform will always adopt the revenue sharing contract. If the manufacturer endogenously decides the quality, however, the platform’s contract choice may be changed. This is because the revenue sharing contract, compared to fixed fee, leads to a lower selling price of the manufacturer, whereas the fixed fee contract can motivate a higher quality than does revenue sharing. As a result, a large (small) market heterogeneity induces the platform to adopt the revenue sharing (fixed fee) contract. We also extend the model to several directions, finding that longer product line, manufacturer competition, lower marginal production cost, and higher platform cost all tend to induce the platform to put forward a fixed fee contract; while if quality decision is less flexible than contract decision, the platform is more ready to embrace revenue sharing. Besides, when there are two platforms competing for the same market, they should differentiate their contract choices so as to mitigate competition.     

Coordinating a supply chain with effort and price dependent stochastic demand

This paper investigates the issue of channel coordination for a supply chain facing stochastic demand that is sensitive to both sales effort and retail price. In the standard newsvendor setting, the returns policy and the revenue sharing contract have been shown to be able to align incentives of the supply chain’s members so that the decentralized supply chain behaves as well as the integrated one. When the demand is influenced by both retail price and retailer sales effort, none of the above traditional contracts can coordinate the supply chain. To resolve this issue, we explore a variety of other contract types including joint return policy with revenue sharing contract, return policy with sales rebate and penalty (SRP) contract, and revenue sharing contract with SRP. We find that only the properly designed returns policy with SRP contract is able to achieve channel coordination and lead to a Pareto improving win–win situation for supply chain members. We then provide analytical method to determine the contract parameters and finally we use a numerical example to illustrate the findings and gain more insights.     

Infinite reload options: Pricing and analysis

Infinite reload options allow the user to exercise his reload right as often as he chooses during the lifetime of the contract. Each time a reload occurs, the owner receives new options where the strike price is set to the current stock price. We consider a modified version of the infinite reload option contract where the strike price of the new options received by the owner is increased by a certain percentage; we refer to this new contract as an increased reload option. The pricing problem for this modified contract is characterized as an impulse control problem resulting in a Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation. We use fully implicit timestepping and prove that the discretized equations are monotone, stable and consistent, implying convergence to the viscosity solution. We also derive a globally convergent iterative method for solving the non-linear discrete equations. Numerical examples show that both the exercise policy and the option value are very sensitive to the percentage increase in the reload strike.