The design of equity-indexed annuities

There is a rich variety of tailored investment products available to the retail investor in every developed economy. These contracts combine upside participation in bull markets with downside protection in bear markets. Examples include equity-linked contracts and other types of structured products. This paper analyzes these contracts from the investor’s perspective rather than the issuer’s using concepts and tools from financial economics. We analyze and critique their current design and examine their valuation from the investor’s perspective. We propose a generalization of the conventional design that has some interesting features. The generalized contract specifications are obtained by assuming that the investor wishes to maximize end of period expected utility of wealth subject to certain constraints. The first constraint is a guaranteed minimum rate of return which is a common feature of conventional contracts. The second constraint is new. It provides the investor with the opportunity to outperform a benchmark portfolio with some probability. We present the explicit form of the optimal contract assuming both constraints apply and we illustrate the nature of the solution using specific examples. The paper focusses on equity-indexed annuities as a representative type of such contracts but our approach is applicable to other types of equity-linked contracts and structured products.     

Equity-linked pension schemes with guarantees

This paper analyses the relationship between the level of a return guarantee in an equity-linked pension scheme and the proportion of an investor’s contribution needed to finance this guarantee. Three types of schemes are considered: investment guarantee, contribution guarantee and surplus participation. The evaluation of each scheme involves pricing an Asian option, for which relatively tight upper and lower bounds can be calculated in a numerically efficient manner.We find a negative (and for two contract specifications also concave) relationship between the participation in the surplus return of the investment strategy and the guarantee level in terms of a minimum rate of return. Furthermore, the introduction of the possibility of early termination of the contract (e.g. due to the death of the investor) has no qualitative and very little quantitative impact on this relationship.     

Optimal benchmarking for active portfolio managers

Within an agency theoretic framework adapted to the portfolio delegation issue, we show how to construct optimal benchmarks. In accordance with US regulations, the benchmark-adjusted compensation scheme is taken to be symmetric. The investor’s control consists in forcing the manager to adopt the appropriate benchmark so that his first-best optimum is attained. Solving simultaneously the manager’s and the investor’s dynamic optimization programs in a fairly general framework, we characterize the optimal benchmark. We then provide completely explicit solutions when the investor’s and the manager’s utility functions exhibit different CRRA parameters. We find that, even under optimal benchmarking, it is never optimal for the manager, and therefore for the investor, to follow exactly the benchmark, except in a very restrictive case. We finally assess by simulation the practical importance, in particular in terms of the investor’s welfare, of selecting a sub-optimal benchmark.     

Portfolio insurance under a risk-measure constraint

We study the problem of portfolio insurance from the point of view of a fund manager, who guarantees to the investor that the portfolio value at maturity will be above a fixed threshold. If, at maturity, the portfolio value is below the guaranteed level, a third party will refund the investor up to the guarantee. In exchange for this protection, the third party imposes a limit on the risk exposure of the fund manager, in the form of a convex monetary risk measure. The fund manager therefore tries to maximize the investor’s utility function subject to the risk-measure constraint. We give a full solution to this non-convex optimization problem in the complete market setting and show in particular that the choice of the risk measure is crucial for the optimal portfolio to exist. Explicit results are provided for the entropic risk measure (for which the optimal portfolio always exists) and for the class of spectral risk measures (for which the optimal portfolio may fail to exist in some cases).     

Consignment contracts with retail competition

Consignment contracts have been widely employed in many industries. Under such contracts, items are sold at a retailer’s but the supplier retains the full ownership of the inventory until purchased by consumers; the supplier collects payment from the retailer based on actual units sold. We investigate how competition among retailers influences the supply chain decisions and profits under different consignment arrangements, namely a consignment price contract and a consignment contract with revenue share. First, we investigate how these two consignment contracts and a price only contract compare from the perspective of each supply chain partner. We find that the retailers benefit more from a consignment price contract than from a consignment contract with revenue share or a price only contract, regardless of the level of retailer differentiation. The supplier’s most beneficial contact, however, critically depends upon the level of retailer differentiation: a consignment contract with revenue share is preferable for the supplier if retailer differentiation is strong; otherwise a consignment price contract is preferable. Second, we study how retailer differentiation affects the profits of all supply chain partners. We find that less retailer differentiation improves the supplier’s profit for both types of consignment contract. Moreover, less retailer differentiation improves profits of the retailers in a consignment price contract, but not necessarily in a consignment contract with revenue share.     

Contract design and supply chain coordination in the electricity industry

In this article we propose a model of the supply chain in electricity markets with multiple generators and retailers and considering several market structures. We analyze how market design interacts with the different types of contract and market structure to affect the coordination between the different firms and the performance of the supply chain as a whole. We compare the implications on supply chain coordination and on the players’ profitability of two different market structures: a pool based market vs. bilateral contracts, taking into consideration the relationship between futures and spot markets. Furthermore, we analyze the use of contracts for differences and two-part-tariffs as tools for supply chain coordination. We have concluded that there are multiple equilibria in the supply chain contracts and structure and that the two-part tariff is the best contract to reduce double marginalization and increase efficiency in the management of the supply chain.     

Quantile hedging for equity-linked contracts

We consider an equity-linked contract whose payoff depends on the lifetime of the policy holder and the stock price. We provide the best strategy for an insurance company assuming limited capital for the hedging. The main idea of the proof consists in reducing the construction of such strategies for a given claim to a problem of superhedging for a modified claim, which is the solution to a static optimization problem of the Neyman-Pearson type. This modified claim is given via some sets constructed in an iterative way. Some numerical examples are also given.     

Portfolio selection under strict uncertainty: A multi-criteria methodology and its application to the Frankfurt and Vienna Stock Exchanges

In modern portfolio theory, it is common practice to first compute the risk-reward efficient frontier and then to support an individual investor in selecting a portfolio that meets his/her preferences for profitability and risk. Potential flaws include (a) the assumption that past data provide sufficient evidence for predicting the future performances of the securities under consideration and (b) the necessity to mathematically determine or approximate the investor’s utility function. In this paper, we propose a methodology whose initial phase filters portfolios that are inefficient from a historical perspective. While this is consistent with traditional approaches, the second phase differs from the standard approach as it uses a decision table constructed by considering multiple scenarios assuming strict uncertainty. The table cells measure consequences by a multi-criteria linear performance index of simulated future returns, which avoids difficulties with performance ratios. The real world applicability is illustrated through two studies based on data from the stock exchanges in Frankfurt and Vienna.     

Contracting with an urgent supplier under cost information asymmetry

We investigate a contract setting problem faced by a manufacturer who can procure major modules from an overseas supplier, as well as a local supplier. The overseas supplier is prime and offers quality products, whereas the local supplier is viewed only as a backup, and its products are inferior in quality. As the local supplier needs to put in additional effort to fulfill the urgent orders, it is difficult for the manufacturer to estimate this urgent supplier’s production cost. This asymmetric cost information becomes an obstacle for the manufacturer in managing the urgent supplier. In this paper, we study two types of contingent contracts. One is the common price-only contract, and the other is a contract menu consisting of a transfer payment and a lead time quotation. We construct a Stackelberg game model and evaluate how the involvement of an urgent supplier with private cost information affects performances of the prime supplier and the manufacturer in different scenarios (with or without the urgent supplier, under different contingent contracts). We also conduct numerical experiments to show how the parameters of the contracts affect profits of the manufacturer.     

Risk comparison of different bonus distribution approaches in participating life insurance

The fair pricing of explicit and implicit options in life insurance products has received broad attention in the academic literature over the past years. Participating life insurance (PLI) contracts have been the focus especially. These policies are typically characterized by a term life insurance, a minimum interest rate guarantee, and bonus participation rules with regard to the insurer’s asset returns or reserve situation. Researchers replicate these bonus policies quite differently. We categorize and formally present the most common PLI bonus distribution mechanisms. These bonus models closely mirror the Danish, German, British, and Italian regulatory framework. Subsequently, we perform a comparative analysis of the different bonus models with regard to risk valuation. We calibrate contract parameters so that the compared contracts have a net present value of zero and the same safety level as the initial position, using risk-neutral valuation. Subsequently, we analyze the effect of changes in the asset volatility and in the initial reserve amount (per contract) on the value of the default put option (DPO), while keeping all other parameters constant. Our results show that DPO values obtained with the PLI bonus distribution model of Bacinello (2001), which replicates the Italian regulatory framework, are most sensitive to changes in volatility and initial reserves.     

Quality uncertainty and quality-compensation contract for supply chain coordination

Many firms often face quality problems, even though quality improvement has long been a competitive imperative for performance enhancement. When suppliers are the sources of quality problems, prior literature has focused on sustaining a buyer’s competitiveness given the suppliers’ quality uncertainty. Surprisingly, the literature has not paid sufficient attention to quality uncertainty from a coordination perspective. On the other hand, the literature on channel coordination has not considered quality uncertainty in designing a contract of alliance. We bridge the gap between these two streams of literature by explicitly considering quality uncertainty in a coordination framework. In contrast to the coordination literature, we show that channel integration may result in smaller order quantity and less accurate inspection than in a decentralized supply chain if product quality is uncertain. We examine the two most extensively discussed contracts for coordination, buybacks and revenue-sharing, in the presence of quality uncertainty, and find that these two contracts fail to coordinate the supply chain. We then propose a new scheme, the quality-compensation contract, in which the manufacturer compensates the retailer for defective products that are inadvertently sold to consumers, and analytically show that the contract fully coordinates the supply chain.     

Horizontal coordinating contracts in the semiconductor industry

Integrated device manufacturers (IDMs) and foundries are two types of manufacturers in the semiconductor industry. IDMs integrate both design and manufacturing functions whereas foundries solely focus on manufacturing. Since foundries often have cost advantage over IDMs due to their specialization and economies of scale, IDMs have incentives to source from foundries for the purpose of avoiding excessive capacity investment risk. As the IDM is also a potential capacity source, the IDM and foundry are in a horizontal setting rather than a purely vertical setting. In the absence of sophisticated contracts, the benchmark contract for the IDM and foundry is a wholesale price contract. We define “coordinating” contracts as those that improve both the IDM’s and foundry’s expected profits over the benchmark wholesale price contract and also lead to the maximum system profit. This paper examines if there exist coordinating capacity reservation contracts. It is found that wholesale price contracts in the horizontal setting cannot achieve the maximum system profit due to either double marginalization effect, or “misalignment of capacity-usage-priority”. In contrast, if the IDM’s capacity investment risk is not too low, there always exist coordinating capacity reservation contracts. Furthermore, under coordinating contracts, the IDM’s sourcing structure, either sole sourcing from the foundry or dual sourcing, is contingent on the firms’ cost structures.     

Asset management and surplus distribution strategies in life insurance: An examination with respect to risk pricing and risk measurement

In this paper, we investigate the impact of different asset management and surplus distribution strategies in life insurance on risk-neutral pricing and shortfall risk. In general, these feedback mechanisms affect the contract’s payoff and hence directly influence pricing and risk measurement. To isolate the effect of such strategies on shortfall risk, we calibrate contract parameters so that the compared contracts have the same market value and same default-value-to-liability ratio. This way, the fair valuation method is extended since, in addition to the contract’s market value, the default put option value is fixed. We then compare shortfall probability and expected shortfall and show the substantial impact of different management mechanisms acting on the asset and liability side.     

A sensitivity analysis of typical life insurance contracts with respect to the technical basis

In [Christiansen, M.C., 2007. A sensitivity analysis concept for life insurance with respect to a valuation basis of infinite dimension. Insurance: Math. Econom. doi:10.1016/j.insmatheco.2007.07.005] a sensitivity analysis concept was introduced for the prospective reserve of individual life insurance contracts as functional of the technical basis parameters such as interest rate, mortality probability, disability probability, et cetera. On the basis of that concept, the present paper gives in addition the sensitivities of the premium level.Applying these approaches, an extensive sensitivity analysis is carried out: A study of the basic life insurance contract types ‘pure endowment insurance’, ‘temporary life insurance’, ‘annuity insurance’ and ‘disability insurance’ identifies their diverse characteristics, in particular their weakest points concerning fluctuations of the technical basis. An investigation of combinations of these insurance contract types shows what synergy effects can be expected by creating insurance packages.     

Portfolio selection and duality under mean variance preferences

This paper uses duality to analyze an investor’s behavior in a n-asset portfolio selection problem when the investor has mean variance preferences. The indirect utility and wealth requirement functions are used to derive Roy’s identity, Shephard’s lemma and the Slutsky equation. In our simple Slutsky equation the income effect is characterized by decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) and the substitution effect is always positive [negative] with respect to an asset’s holding if the asset’s mean return [risk] increases. Substitution effect and income effect work in the same direction presupposed mean variance preferences display DARA.     

Designing contracts for a closed-loop supply chain under information asymmetry

This paper studies the problem of designing contracts in a closed-loop supply chain when the cost of collection effort is the retailer’s private information. We investigate four cases: two contracts (a two-part nonlinear contract and a collection effort requirement contract), each under complete information and asymmetric information. We derive the manufacturer’s optimal contracts for all four cases and analyze the impact of information on the equilibrium results of supply chain members.     

Fuzzy portfolio selection model with real features and different decision behaviors

In the ever changing financial markets, investor’s decision behaviors may change from time to time. In this paper, we consider the effect of investor’s different decision behaviors on portfolio selection in fuzzy environment. We present a possibilistic mean-semivariance model for fuzzy portfolio selection by considering some real investment features including proportional transaction cost, fixed transaction cost, cardinality constraint, investment threshold constraints, decision dependency constraints and minimum transaction lots. To describe investor’s different decision behaviors, we characterize the return rates on securities by LR fuzzy numbers with different shape parameters in the left- and right-hand reference functions. Then, we design a novel hybrid differential evolution algorithm to solve the proposed model. Finally, we provide a numerical example to illustrate the application of our model and the effectiveness of the designed algorithm.     

Pricing of long dated equity-linked life insurance contracts

This article adopts an approach to pricing of equity-linked life insurance contracts, which only requires the existence of the numéraire portfolio. An equity-linked life insurance contract is equivalent to a sum of the guaranteed amount and the value of an option on the equity index with some mortality risk attached. The numéraire portfolio equals the growth optimal portfolio and is used as numéraire or benchmark, where the real-world probability measure is taken as pricing measure. To obtain tractable solutions the short rate is modelled as a quadratic form of some Gaussian factor processes. Furthermore, the dynamics of the mortality rate is modelled as a threshold life table. The dynamics of the discounted equity market index or benchmark is modelled by a time transformed squared Bessel process. The equity-linked life insurance contracts are evaluated analytically.     

Loss analysis of a life insurance company applying discrete-time risk-minimizing hedging strategies

The present paper investigates the net loss of a life insurance company issuing equity-linked pure endowments in the case of periodic premiums. Due to the untradability of the insurance risk which affects both the in- and outflow side of the company, the issued insurance claims cannot be hedged perfectly. Furthermore, we consider an additional source of incompleteness caused by trading restrictions, because in reality the hedging of the contingent claims is more likely to occur at discrete times. Based on Møller [Møller, T., 1998. Risk-minimizing hedging strategies for unit-linked life insurance contracts. Astin Bull. 28, 17–47], we particularly examine the situation, where the company applies a time-discretized risk-minimizing hedging strategy. Through an illustrative example, we observe numerically that only a relatively small reduction in ruin probabilities is achieved with the use of the discretized originally risk-minimizing strategy because of the accumulated extra duplication errors caused by discretizing. However, the simulated results are highly improved if the hedging model instead of the hedging strategy is discretized. For this purpose, Møller’s [Møller, T., 2001. Hedging equity-linked life insurance contracts. North Amer. Actuarial J. 5 (2), 79–95] discrete-time (binomial) risk-minimizing strategy is adopted.     

Robust Management and Pricing of Liquefied Natural Gas Contracts with Cancelation Options

Liquefied Natural Gas contracts offer cancelation options that make their pricing difficult, especially if many gas storages need to be taken into account. We develop a valuation mechanism from the buyer’s perspective, a large gas company whose main interest in these contracts is to provide to clients a reliable supply of gas. The approach combines valuation with hedging, taking into account that price-risk is driven by international markets, while volume-risk depends on local weather and is stage-wise dependent. The methodology is based on setting risk-averse stochastic mixed 0-1 programs, for different contract configurations. These difficult problems are solved with light computational effort, thanks to a robust rolling-horizon approach. The resulting pricing mechanism not only shows how a specific set of contracts will impact the company business, but also provides the manager with alternative contract configurations to counter-propose to the contract seller.