基于无缺陷退货的供应链成本补贴策略

在一个供应商与一个零售商组成的供应链中,讨论了逆向物流中的无缺陷退货问题。无缺陷退货的成本很高,并且都是由供应商承担。为了减少无缺陷退货的数量,需要零售商付出努力,因此供应商应当对零售商的努力成本进行补贴。当零售商的成本可以验证时,证明了成本分担合同可以协调供应链,并且讨论了供应链的利润分配问题;如果零售商的成本不易验证,供应商也可以采用零售努力水平的线性补贴合同达到相同的目的;最后结合数值算例说明了所得结果并分析了渠道内存在Pareto改进的可能性。     

多渠道供应链中的跨渠道退货服务策略研究

考虑在一个多渠道供应链结构中,零售商同时拥有实体店和网店,制造商开设直营网店且通过双渠道零售商销售产品。考虑消费者的无产品质量退货现象,研究了双渠道零售商为消费者提供跨渠道退货服务的多渠道整合问题。揭示了零售商愿意提供跨渠道退货服务的条件,探讨了跨渠道退货服务策略对市场均衡的影响,并且构建了制造商和零售商之间基于横向合作处理消费者退货的供应链机制,以改善双方的利润。     

基于电子优惠券的多渠道整合策略研究

在由制造商的网络直销渠道和混合零售商的实体渠道和网络渠道所构成的多渠道供应链中,考虑存在消费者无缺陷退货和消费者对购买渠道偏好的异质性,研究了混合零售商的基于电子优惠券的多渠道整合策略问题。探明了混合零售商愿意采用电子优惠券实现多渠道整合的临界条件,揭示了多渠道整合策略对市场均衡的影响,并且构建了基于零售商订货量和接受消费者退货量的转移支付机制来协调多渠道供应链。     

零售商主导型供应链渠道管理与悖论机制分析

普遍认为零售企业压榨供应商、但实际上供应商利润率远高于零售商是业界关注的一个热点商业悖论问题。通过构建无退货、一般退货、全额退货、线性回扣等体现零售商不同强势地位的供应链渠道管理模型,研究并比较了退货和回扣等强势契约机制以及销售努力对零售供应链管理绩效的影响。分析表明供应商通过批发价定价可以有效转移强势契约带来的风险和成本支付,零售商不能通过强势契约显著提升零售供应链效益。零售商应该利用渠道优势首先强化对批发价定价权的影响,在此基础上合理采用强势契约机制。本文研究很好地解释了零供双方渠道地位与利润水平矛盾的商业悖论问题。     

考虑供应商服务与零售商退货的定价博弈分析

研究由一个供应商和一个零售商组成的二级供应链,由供应商提供产品服务,零售商制定产品零售价,在一个销售周期结束后存在零售商向供应商的退货,退货产生的物流成本由零售商与供应商通过博弈的方式共同分担.基于博弈理论,建立了供应商和零售商以各自利润最大化为目标,以服务水平、零售价和退货为主要影响因素的Nash和Stackelberg博弈.采用数值方法,对这两个博弈进行了求解.得到供应商为零售商分担退货物流成本最优比例、供应商最优服务水平和零售商最优定价策略.研究表明,Nash博弈时的解是唯一的,此时供应商不会分担退货物流成本;Stackelberg博弈时,供应商分担退货物流成本比例依据批发价大小而定.     

考虑退货价格的易逝品供应链联合契约模型

在由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的两级供应链框架下,考虑到需求受退货价格的影响,建立了易逝品供应链联合契约模型;指出了作为单纯的批发价格契约只是该联合契约的特殊形式,无法实现供应链的协调;而基于批发价格契约与利润共享契约的联合契约能够实现供应链协调,并给出了供应链协调的条件式,进而分析了契约参数之间的关系;最后,通过数值计算验证了所得结论的正确性.     

公平关切下零售商主导的供应链决策及协调模型

研究公平关切下由一个制造商和一个主导零售商构成供应链的决策及协调问题,当零售商公平关切时,分析了制造商和主导零售商的最优决策以及供应链系统的协调策略。研究表明在零售商主导的供应链系统中,无论零售商是否公平关切,批发价格契约均不能协调供应链系统。零售商的最优零售价格以及最大效用值,在一定条件下,与其公平关切系数无关。零售商公平关切下,收益共享契约和数量折扣契约均可以协调供应链系统,且协调条件均仅与零售商的渠道能力有关,而与其公平关切系数无关。     

考虑退货策略和贸易信贷的库存运营策略选择研究

在贸易信贷背景下,研究了退货策略对供应链和供应链中各成员库存运营策略选择的影响,把不提供退货策略作为基准,通过建立模型求解表明:无论是否提供退货策略,供应链和供应链中各成员都会选择零售商管理库存的库存运营策略,并且提供退货策略要始终优于不提供退货策略;贷款利率对零售价、订购量和供应链利润无影响,对批发价和供应商的利润有负向影响,对零售商的利润有正向影响;供应商在市场中要通过平衡批发价和贷款利率来使供应链和供应链中各成员都获益.     

考虑市场需求不确定下的供应链协调优化

在市场需求不确定的情况下,考察市场需求依赖销售价格,建立一个由单一供应商和单一零售商组成的二级退货模型,并分别从集中决策和分散决策两方面讨论,证明单纯的退货政策无法实现供应链协调,而通过引入回馈与惩罚机制后则可以实现协调,并求出此时的最优订货量和最优售价.最后,通过数值算例证明以上的结论.     

需求依赖于货架展示量的单供应商两零售商模型与协调合同设计

针对一个供应商和两个竞争的零售商组成的单产品供应链,研究零售商的货架展示量和订货决策及供应链协调问题.假定产品总需求随机依赖于两个零售商的总货架展示量,给出了每个零售商的产品需求,然后分别建立了供应链的集中式决策模型和分散式决策模型,提出了协调供应链的回购加线性补贴合同和回购加货架补贴加转移支付合同,最后的算例表明了决策模型和协调合同的有效性.     

Coordinating order quantity decisions in the supply chain contract under random demand

In this paper, we are concerned with the coordinating quantity decision problem in a supply chain contract. The supply chain contract is composed of one manufacturer and one retailer to meet the random demand of a single product with a short lifecycle. Our analysis show that the retailer expects to obtain higher profit under proper ordering policies, which can also maximize the expected profit of the supply chain. The manufacturer may induce the retailer to order the coordinated quantity by adjusting the unit return price. As a result, the supply chain is expected to achieve the optimal expected profit.     

需求不确定性对闭环供应链系统决策的影响分析

在由一个制造商与一个销售商组成的闭环供应链系统中,构建了市场需求不确定环境下废旧产品回收率为外生变量和零售商决策变量两种情形的闭环供应链系统决策模型,并通过数值仿真得到了各模型供应链成员的最优定价和订货策略以及最终利润,进一步分析了两种情形下市场需求不确定性对零售商、制造商决策行为及利润的影响,最后对两种情形进行了对比分析.     

Analysis and design of returns policies from a supplier's perspective

This paper considers the problem of designing a returns policy in a supply chain from a supplier's perspective. The supply chain considered here is assumed to have one supplier and one retailer who serves a random demand of a product with a short life cycle. The retailer can return all the unsold products to the supplier with a partial refund. We found that if the retailer behaviour is rational, that is, ordering the optimal quantity to maximize its expected profit, then both retailer and supplier could benefit from the returns policy. Furthermore, we established that the optimal buyback price is independent of the mean of the random demand, but the variance of the demand has a significant impact on setting the optimal buyback price. The higher the variance the higher the optimal buyback price and the larger the profit gain of both parties. Numerical studies are employed to help understand the benefits of returns policies for the supplier, the retailer, and the whole supply chain.     

考虑成员风险态度的零售商资金约束闭环供应链定价与回收决策

针对由制造商、回收商和资金约束的零售商组成的三级闭环供应链,考虑供应链成员面对市场需求不确定时表现出不同的风险态度,研究了闭环供应链的定价与回收决策问题。首先给出了产品的市场需求函数与回收商的回收成本函数;然后基于均值-方差法,构建了各成员和闭环供应链的效用函数;进一步地,依据博弈论的思想,确定了不同渠道权力结构下的最优零售价格、最优回收率和最优批发价格;最后分析了闭环供应链成员风险态度和贷款利率对供应链最优决策和效用的影响。研究表明,成员风险态度和贷款利率能够影响闭环供应链最优决策和效用,其中,风险规避的零售商和制造商对闭环供应链其他成员均有利,但是对自身和闭环供应链不利;风险规避的回收商对闭环供应链成员均不利;贷款利率的增长会降低成员和闭环供应链的效用。     

Ordering and pricing decisions in a two-echelon supply chain with asymmetric demand information

This article examines coordinated decisions in a decentralized supply chain that consists of one supplier and one retailer, and faces random demand of a single product with a short life cycle. We consider a setting where the retailer has accurate demand information while the supplier does not. Such a problem with asymmetric demand information can be viewed as an extension of the newsboy problem in which both the supplier and the retailer possess the same demand information. Combining the mechanism of sharing demand information and that of quantity discount and return policy enables us to develop three coordinated models in contrast with the basic and uncoordinated model. We are able to show the ordinal relationship among the retailer’s optimal order quantities in these four models under a general form of random demand, and compare the supply chain profits and conduct sensitivity analysis analytically in four models under uniform random demand. We also provide numerical results under normal random demand that bear a resemblance to those under uniform random demand.     

需求不确定的强势零售商的闭环供应链决策

建立了需求不确定下两个竞争的生产商和一个强势零售商组成的具有产品再制造的闭环供应链模型.利用逆向归纳法对不同废旧品回收渠道下的模型进行分析,然后通过算例分析了不同模型的回收成本和新增回收率对零售价格、回收模式决策、供应链系统及成员期望利润的影响.结果表明:回收成本的增加导致生产商和系统的期望利润降低,零售商领头下只有在零售商负责回收的模式中,零售商的期望利润才是增加的;新增回收率的增加,可降低产品的零售价,增加供应链成员的期望利润,继而提高整个供应链系统的利润.     

Contracting with demand uncertainty under supply chain competition

We examine supply chain contracts for two competing supply chains selling a substitutable product, each consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer. Both manufacturers are Stackelberg leaders and the retailers are followers. Manufacturers in two competing supply chains may choose different contracts, either a wholesale price contract in which the retailer??s demand forecasting information is not shared, or a revenue-sharing contract in which the retailer??s demand forecasting information is shared. Under supply chain competition and demand uncertainty, we identify which contract is more advantageous for each supply chain, and under what circumstances.     

Return Policy Model of Supply Chain Management for Single-Period Products

A return policy is one of the major issues in supply chain management, particularly for managing single-period products that are characterized with short sales period and little salvage value. The value of the buyback price is important to ensure a stable supply chain. The role of the risk attitude of the retailer and supplier is also known as an essential factor to the decision in determining a return policy. In this paper, we present the result of our investigation into this problem. The aim of our work is to develop a model to determine optimal return policies for single-period products based on uncertain market demands and in the presence of risk preferences. The impact of the wholesale price and selling price is also investigated to determine the optimal order quantities and optimal buyback price for different types of risk attitudes.