不公平厌恶条件下的闭环供应链收人费用共享契约协调北大核心

在不公平厌恶条件下研究闭环供应链收入费用共享契约协调问题实质是在模拟现实条件的基础上,探讨实现供应链整体最优化.在前人的研究基础上,构建基于不公平厌恶的二级闭环供应链利润模型,对比集中决策与独立决策的利润差距,得出不公平厌恶条件下的独立决策效用水平低于集中决策,再通过收入费用再分配契约改变独立决策效用,得出不公平厌恶条件下的收入费用共享契约有利于提高闭环供应链整体效用的结论.最后,提出建立收入费用共享契约约束供应链主体行为,扩大整体供应链效用的管理学建议.     

不公平厌恶条件下的闭环供应链收人费用共享契约协调

在不公平厌恶条件下研究闭环供应链收入费用共享契约协调问题实质是在模拟现实条件的基础上,探讨实现供应链整体最优化.在前人的研究基础上,构建基于不公平厌恶的二级闭环供应链利润模型,对比集中决策与独立决策的利润差距,得出不公平厌恶条件下的独立决策效用水平低于集中决策,再通过收入费用再分配契约改变独立决策效用,得出不公平厌恶条件下的收入费用共享契约有利于提高闭环供应链整体效用的结论.最后,提出建立收入费用共享契约约束供应链主体行为,扩大整体供应链效用的管理学建议.     

供应链买卖双方协调订货模型

供需关系贯穿供应链的整个过程;然而,如何促使非一体化供应链协调问题在实践中是非常重要的.因此,供需双方订货批量的研究是供应链管理的一个重要内容之一.本文以订单方式为背景,针对供应链环境下单个供应商和多个订货商在非合作情况下的订货模型进行讨论,并在此基础上给出了一个改进后的线性价格折扣策略,该策略同时考虑了增量折扣和减量折扣两种情况,同时给出了供需上双方订货的S tackelberg博弈模型.数字实验结果表明该折扣模型对于改善供应链运作协调是相当有效的.     

JIT环境下供需采购模型的研究

模型以单一供应商、单一采购商为背景,通过分别对JIT环境下单独考虑供应商利益和综合考虑供需双方利益两种情况下订购、运输策略的研究,求得两种情况下的订购批量和运输批次.模型在相关研究的基础上加入了一个新的成本因素:采购方的柔性损失成本,来量化供应链长期合同的风险.研究结果表明,综合考虑供需双方利益的模型不仅能够降低供需双方的总成本,而且也有效的加强了供需双方的合作关系.     

非对称信息和模糊需求下的闭环供应链协调决策研究

在模糊需求和非对称销售价格信息下,研究了由单一制造商和零售商组成的两级闭环供应链系统的协调问题。通过建立不确定环境下的集中决策和收益共享-费用共担契约决策模型,分别得到了不同模型下闭环供应链系统的最优策略。并进一步通过算例分析了契约下供应链各方收益随模糊需求和价格的变化情况,以及该契约对整个系统决策效率的影响。结果表明:收益共享-费用共担契约能有效实现模糊闭环供应链系统的协调,实现闭环供应链系统决策的最优化;其次,需求和零售价格的不确定性程度越高,对零售商的最优订购量、供应链成员及系统利润的影响也越大。     

安全因子优化与协调模型研究

在需求和供应都不确定的情形下 ,通过模型研究对两阶供应链的安全因子优化与协调作了一些有益的探讨 .本文引入了有效库存水平的概念 ,以反映上游缺货对下游库存的影响 ,在基准库存水平补货模式下构造了的供需双方的库存模型 ,且对安全因子进行整体优化以降低供应链的库存成本 .     

供应链中供需协调及价格折扣订货模型研究

本文研究由单一供方和单一需方组成的供应链协调问题。通过制定一个合理的价格折扣范围,提出一种改进的订货策略—n阶段订货策略,使供应链整体利润最大化,同时使供需双方达到双赢。     

货架和仓库商品共同影响需求的供应链延期支付协调

针对单一制造商和单一零售商组成的供应链,研究了需求受货架和仓库库存水平共同影响的企业间延期支付协调问题.首先根据制造商主导的Stackelberg对策结构,对供应链成员间的决策问题进行了分析;然后为制造商提出了一个改善整个供应链运作效率的延期支付策略,研究结果表明该延期支付模型不仅能提高制造商的利润,而且能提高零售商的利润.最后给出了数值例子,并对模型参数灵敏度进行了分析.     

VMCI下考虑顾客退货的供应链联合促销与协调

在允许顾客退货的环境下,以供应商管理寄售库存(VMCI)的供应链为对象,探讨了供应链的促销决策及协调问题。研究发现,集中情景下最优的寄售库存量与促销水平均高于分散情景下的对应值;根据在供应链运营过程中双方成员承担的不同风险设计的滞销补贴-双向促销成本分担契约可以实现供应链协调;期望退货费用不超过某一阈值时,全额退货策略优于不允许退货策略。此外,通过数值仿真揭示了顾客评估风险对利润及协调契约的影响。     

基于三方回购契约的供应链库存调度协调研究

针对由单一供应商、单一制造商和单一零售商构成的三级供应链,研究了如何协调非集成化模式下的供应链库存调度问题.在回购运输成本由相应下游企业承担的假定下,分别探讨了四种供应链运输模式回购契约协调,在此基础上提出了供应链三方回购契约,其参数为:运输选择因子,最优订货量因子,利润分享因子.最后对供应链三方回购契约进行了相关的数值分析,并得到了一些管理上的启示,对降低三级供应链的库存与运输成本提供了参考.     

带有常数返回率的动态易逝品供应链协调模型

以动态易逝品为研究对象,探讨了由单个制造商单个零售商所组成的两层供应链生产订购协调问题.在假定零售商所售产品存在返回的前提下,分别建立了集中决策和分散决策模型,并证明了这两个模型解的存在唯一性.提出了一个两阶段的收益共享契约,该契约不仅能达到供应链协调,而且还能实现供应链两成员的"双赢".最后,通过数值实例来验证模型的结论并得出相关管理启示.     

A fuzzy newsvendor approach to supply chain coordination

In the absence of a clear command and control structure, a key challenge in supply chain management is the coordination and alignment of supply chain members who pursue divergent and often conflicting goals. The newsvendor model is typically used as a framework to quantify the cost of misalignment and to assess the impact of various coordination initiatives. The application of the newsvendor framework, however, requires the specification of some probability distribution for the sources of uncertainty, and in particular, for the market demand. The specification of an adequate demand distribution becomes difficult in the absence of statistical data. We therefore consider a fuzzy approach to the newsvendor problem. We use several fuzzy parameters in the model for the demand, the wholesale price, and the market sales price. We solve the fuzzy newsvendor problem to study three coordination policies: quantity discounts, profit sharing, and buyback. For each coordination policy, the optimal order quantity of the retailer is computed. The possible profits of the members in the supply chain are calculated with minimum sharing of private information. We further extend the fuzzy newsvendor model to a setting with a single manufacturer and multiple retailers under the assumption of ample capacity for the manufacturer. Detailed numerical examples are also provided.     

收益共享的寄售契约下供应商生产成本谎报行为分析

在收益共享寄售契约下的两级供应链中,供应商向零售商报告其生产成本;零售商根据供应商报告的生产成本,决定零售商的收益分配比例;供应商决定零售价格和生产数量,并且保持产品的所有权.由于信息不对称,供应商可能谎报其生产成本.作者应用博弈论分析了供应商谎报行为对供应链及其成员决策及绩效的影响.利用解析的方法得出一些理论结果:零售价格在信息对称时小于生产成本信息不对称时;订货数量在信息对称时大于生产成本信息不对称时;零售商的利润分配比例在信息对称时大于生产成本信息不对称时.供应商的谎报行为使其自身利润增加,使零售商和供应链的利润减少.     

Coordination mechanism for a deteriorating item in a two-level supply chain system

The subject of the coordination between the suppliers and the buyers in multi-echelon inventory-distribution systems has been studied by many researchers. This paper considers a supply chain including a manufacturer and several buyers and assumes that the inventory items deteriorate over time and its inventory level decreases. In order to determine the order policies, coordination over the supply chain is achieved by scheduling the buyers’ delivery days and their coordination with the manufacturer’s production cycle. A mathematical model is developed and analyzed. To test the efficiency of the proposed model, two other models with the supposition of lot-sizing policies with common order cycle and independent deciding are also developed. In comparison to the other two models, the numerical results show that the synchronizing model of production and delivery cycles works better and has less total cost. In addition, in order to encourage the buyers in cooperation, a model on profit sharing is proposed that equitably shares the total savings with all the parties.     

基于减排成本共担期权契约的供应链协调

考虑消费者具有低碳产品偏好的情况,研究需求随机且受减排影响的期权契约,建立了由单个制造商和单个零售商组成的供应链模型。该模型中制造商处主导地位,零售商处追随地位,制造商首先提出期权契约,零售商购买期权。求解发现,由于传统双重边际化效应的存在,只有当零售价格等于期权执行价格时,才能达到供应链的协调,这时零售商利润为负,不满足参与约束。为此,从降低期权执行价格的角度,对期权契约进行补充,增加了成本共担条款。研究表明,减排成本共担的期权契约能够实现供应链的协调。最后利用算例验证了结论,计算了制造商和零售商利润及零售商分担的减排成本比例随期权价格和期权执行价格的变化情况,并对减排难度系数的敏感性做了分析。     

Don’t forget your supplier when remanufacturing

A popular assumption in the current literature on remanufacturing is that the whole new product is produced by an integrated manufacturer, which is inconsistent with most industries. In this paper, we model a decentralised closed-loop supply chain consisting of a key component supplier and a non-integrated manufacturer, and demonstrate that the interaction between these players significantly impacts the economic and environmental implications of remanufacturing. In our model, the non-integrated manufacturer can purchase new components from the supplier to produce new products, and remanufacture used components to produce remanufactured products. Thus, the non-integrated manufacturer is not only a buyer but also a rival to the supplier. In a steady state period, we analyse the performances of an integrated manufacturer and the decentralised supply chain. We find that, although the integrated manufacturer always benefits from remanufacturing, the remanufacturing opportunity may constitute a lose–lose situation to the supplier and the non-integrated manufacturer, making their profits be lower than in an identical supply chain without remanufacturing. In addition, the non-integrated manufacturer may be worse off with a lower remanufacturing cost or a larger return rate of used products due to the interaction with the supplier. We further demonstrate that the government-subsidised remanufacturing in the non-integrated (integrated) manufacturer is detrimental (beneficial) to the environment.     

零售商主导的模糊供应链博弈——考虑销售努力的情形

以包含一个制造商与一个零售商的两级供应链为研究对象,考虑零售商居于主导地位并付出销售努力时供应链各成员的决策。结合经济环境的不确定性,将市场需求函数和制造商的制造成本、零售商的经营成本视为模糊变量;运用斯塔克尔伯格模型刻画零售商和制造商之间的博弈过程,并引入期望值模型、机会约束模型来解决最优决策问题;通过一个数值算例证明了供应链博弈模型的有效性。研究表明,在均衡结果中,考虑到零售商所承担的销售努力成本,其总体期望值利润相比于制造商而言偏低,但单位产品边际利润较高。原因在于,零售商的主导地位使其不仅通过销售努力提高产品销量,提高了供应链的整体利润,同时也能够采用压低批发价格的方式,使自身在供应链中获取更多收益。     

Coordinating a three-echelon supply chain under price and quality dependent demand with sub-supply chain and RFM strategies

The paper considers a three-echelon supply chain which consists of one supplier, one manufacturer and one retailer for trading a single product. The market demand at the retailer is influenced by the retail price and the quality of the product. The quality of the finished product at the manufacturer depends on the supplier’s raw material quality. We analyze the model for both deterministic and stochastic demand patterns. We first study the centralized and decentralized systems, and then the decentralized system with a sub-supply chain coordination strategy (where the manufacturer chooses to merge with either the supplier or the retailer and then acts as a single entity) and the two-level retail fixed mark-up (RFM) strategy. In the case of the two-level RFM strategy, the manufacturer and the retailer use fixed mark ups over the supplier’s wholesale price. The proposed models are demonstrated through numerical examples. It is observed from the numerical study that the two-level RFM strategy is superior to the sub-supply chain coordination strategy. Further, the two-level RFM strategy in the stochastic demand scenario is not as effective as in the deterministic demand scenario.     

Price discount based on early order commitment in a single manufacturer–multiple retailer supply chain

Early order commitment (EOC) is a strategy for supply chain coordination, wherein the retailer commits to purchasing from a manufacturer a fixed order quantity a few periods in advance of the regular delivery lead time. In this paper, we formulate and analyze the EOC strategy for a decentralized, two-level supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and multiple retailers, who face external demands that follow an autocorrelated AR(1) process over time. We characterize the special structure of the optimal solutions for the retailers’ EOC periods to minimize the total supply chain cost and discuss the impact of demand parameters and cost parameters. We then develop and compare three solution approaches to solving the optimal solution. Using this optimal cost as the benchmark, we investigate the effectiveness of using the wholesale price-discount scheme for the manufacturer to coordinate this decentralized system. We give numerical examples to show the benefits of EOC to the whole supply chain, examine the efficiency of the discount scheme in general situation, and provide the special conditions when the full coordination is achieved.     

Coordination in a two-stage capacitated supply chain with multiple suppliers

The aim of this paper is to coordinate the inventory policies in a decentralized supply chain with stochastic demand by means of contracts. The system considered is a decentralized two-stage supply chain consisting of multiple independent suppliers and a manufacturer with limited production capacities. The suppliers operate on a make-to-stock basis and apply base stock policy to manage their inventories. On the other hand, the manufacturer employs a make-to-order strategy. Under the necessary assumptions, each supplier is modeled as an M/M/1 make-to-stock queue; and the manufacturer is modeled as a GI/M/1 queue after deriving an approximate distribution for the interarrival times of the manufacturer. Once the supply chain is modeled as a queuing system, centralized and decentralized models are developed. Comparison of the optimal solutions to these models reveals that the supply chain needs coordination. Three different transfer payment contracts are examined in this paper. These are the backorder and holding cost subsidy contracts, the transfer payment contract based on Pareto improvement, and the cost sharing contract. Each contract is evaluated according to its coordination ability and whether it is Pareto improving or not. The results indicate that all three contracts can coordinate the supply chain. However, when the Pareto improvement is taken into account, the cost sharing contract seems to be the one that will be preferred by all parties.