Coordinating a decentralized supply chain with customer returns and price-dependent stochastic demand using a buyback policy

We investigate a decentralized supply chain that consists of a manufacturer and a retailer where the retailer simultaneously determines the retail price and order quantity while experiencing customer returns and price dependent stochastic demand. We propose an agreement between the manufacturer and the retailer that includes two buyback prices, one for unsold inventory and a second for customer returns, and show that this type of easy-to-implement agreement can achieve perfect supply chain coordination and be a win-win for both manufacturer and retailer when a complementary profit-sharing agreement is included.     

Coordination mechanism for the supply chain with leadtime consideration and price-dependent demand

We study a coordination contract for a supplier–retailer channel producing and selling a fashionable product exhibiting a stochastic price-dependent demand. The product’s selling season is short, and the supply chain faces great demand uncertainty. We consider a scenario where the supplier reserves production capacity for the retailer in advance, and permits the retailer to place an order not exceeding the reserved capacity after a demand information update during a leadtime. We formulate a two-stage optimization problem in which the supplier decides the amount of capacity reservation in the first stage, and the retailer determines the order quantity and the retail price after observing the demand information in the second stage. We propose a three-parameter risk and profit sharing contract that coordinates the supply chain. The proposed contract permits any agreed-upon division of the supply-chain profit between the channel members.     

Channel coordination in green supply chain management

Environmental consciousness has become increasingly important in everyday life and business practice. The effort to reduce the impact of business activities on the environment has been labelled as green supply chain management. Any major greening project would require efforts on the part of the entire supply chain. However, very few studies have addressed the issue of coordinating the green supply chain. We consider the problem of coordination of a manufacturer and a retailer in a vertical supply chain, who put in efforts for ‘greening’ their operations. We address some pertinent questions in this regard such as extent of effort in greening of operations by manufacturer or retailer, level of cooperation between the two parties, and how to coordinate their operations in a supply chain. The greening efforts by the manufacturer and retailer result in demand expansion at the retail end. The decision variables of the manufacturer are wholesale price and greening effort, while those of the retailer are retail price and its greening effort. We find that the ratio of the optimal greening efforts put in by the manufacturer and retailer is equal to the ratio of their green sensitivity ratios and greening cost ratios. Further, profits and efforts are higher in the integrated channel as compared to the case of the decentralized channel. Finally, a two-part tariff contract is found to produce channel coordination in this problem. A numerical example illustrates the results.     

Coordinating a three-echelon fresh agricultural products supply chain considering freshness-keeping effort with asymmetric information

This paper studies the coordination problem of a three-echelon supply chain system consisting of one supplier, third-party logistics service providers (TPLSP) and one retailer that provides seasonal fresh agricultural products to customers. The market demand for the retailer is assumed to be influenced by the retail price, the product's freshness and other random variables. Both quantity and quality losses are viewed as endogenous variables of the freshness-keeping effort, which is decided by the TPLSP. Dynamic game models for both the decentralized decision mode and the centralized decision mode are developed, and asymmetric demand information is considered in the decentralized decision mode. The analysis shows that decentralized decision making could result in the distortion of the order quantity and selling price and could ultimately result in a loss of supply chain profit. The TPLSP is motivated to exaggerate the demand, which could seriously damage the supplier's interests. Based on an analysis of the major influencing factors in the supply chain system, a coordination contract based on cost and revenue sharing (RS) is designed for the two transaction processes in the three-echelon supply chain system. We illustrate the proposed models with a numerical study and conduct a sensitivity analysis of some of the key parameters in the models. It is proven that with the designed contract, the sales volume can be significantly expanded, all the supply chain members can benefit from Pareto improvement, and both the retailer and the TPLSP have no incentive to exaggerate the market demand.     

多因素扰动下同价双渠道供应链协调应对突发事件

一条双渠道供应链存在一个传统零售商和一个拥有电子渠道的制造商,制造商采用了跟随零售商线上线下同价的定价策略。通过建立市场需求模型,求出供应链的最优价格、生产数量,利用博弈论和合同理论的原理设计收益共享契约。研究表明,当供应链处于稳定状态时,收益共享契约可以用来实现同价双渠道供应链的协调。当突发事件导致市场规模和制造成本发生扰动时,同价双渠道供应链存在鲁棒性,而收益共享契约也能够很好地协调同价机制下的双渠道分权供应链,最后给出一个算例验证了结论。     

碳税政策下时变需求依赖库存与价格的供应链协调模型

研究由一个供应商和一个零售组成的二级供应链系统在碳税政策下的协调问题.对于市场需求率为时变函数且依赖于当前库存水平和销售价格的情形,建立分散式和集中式供应链决策模型.比较两种模型得出供应商和零售商合作能够提高供应链的整体利润但是也会产生更多的碳排放.分别利用批发价格契约和两部收费契约协调分散式决策模型得出供应链协调的条件.最后通过数值算例验证理论结果并分析碳税单价对供应链在两部收费契约下实现协调的影响.     

突发事件下不对称信息供应链协调机制研究

针对一个由供应商和一个零售商构成的供应链,在零售商成本为私有信息条件下,假设产品的市场需求为零售价格的指数函数,研究如何协调供应链应对突发事件。首先,给出了对称信息下供应链协调模型;然后,研究了不对称信息下集权式与分权式供应链的协调机制;再次,在突发事件引起零售商成本分布函数扰动情况下,通过引入供应商由于可能需要调整生产计划而产生的偏差成本,研究了供应链的最优应对策略。 研究表明,供应链的最优生产计划、最优批发价格和最优零售价格均具有一定的鲁棒性,当突发事件造成零售商期望成本在一定范围内发生扰动时,三者可以保持不变,当零售商期望成本扰动超过一定范围内时,则需要对之加以调整,才能有效应对突发事件。最后,通过数值仿真验证了相关结论。     

Coordination of a socially responsible two-stage supply chain under price-dependent random demand

This paper investigates the coordination problem of a supply chain (SC) composed of a manufacturer exhibiting corporate social responsibility (CSR) and a retailer faced with random demand. The random demand is made up of the multiplication of price-dependent demand and random demand factor (RDF), plus the CSR-dependent demand. The centralized decision problem of the SC is an extension of the existing price setting newsvendor problem (PSNP). It is found that the sufficient condition for the quasi-concavity of expected profit (EP) on PSNP can not ensure the quasi-concavity of EP of the SC. Then, the concavity condition of EP related to the CSR effect factor is presented in the case of uniformly distributed RDF and linear demand in price, and the concavity of EP is proven under centralized decision. For decentralized decision under manufacturer’s Stackelberg game, the manufacturer determines wholesale price and its CSR investment, and then the retailer decides the order quantity and the retail price. The standard revenue-sharing (RS) contract is found not able to coordinate the SC, so a modified RS (MRS) contract is proposed to coordinate the SC. Finally, numerical examples illustrate the validity of the theoretical analysis and the coordination effectiveness of the MRS contract via Matlab.     

零售商占优下的两部定价合同与通道费

本文考虑由单个占优的零售商和单个供应商组成的二级供应链模型.在价格相依的随机需求下,研究分散系统下的批发价格合同与两部定价合同.在一定的条件下得到两种合同中供应链成员的最优决策和利润以及供应链系统的利润.分析表明,当零售商占优时两部定价合同比批发价格合同更有效.这在一定程度上说明当前零售业中收取通道费的合理性.     

Some properties of buyback and other related schemes in a newsvendor-product supply chain with price-sensitive demand

A manufacturer wholesaling to a retailer a ‘newsvendor-type’ product such as a seasonal/fashion good or a perishable food item is considered here. It is known that such a manufacturer/retailer channel has difficulties in fully realizing the market's profit potential. We study a theoretical construct of such a channel and present practically useful results for a manufacturer trying to design more profitable pricing schemes. Specifically, we consider a ‘dominant’ manufacturer supplying a newsvendor-type product to a retailer. The retail market volume varies with the unit retail price according to a stochastic demand curve. We study the design and performance of ‘price-only’, ‘buyback’ and ‘manufacturer-imposed retail price’ schemes. All these schemes have been considered in earlier works. The first part of this paper studies some important but previously overlooked aspects of price-only and buyback schemes. We show that the performance of these schemes is strongly and somewhat counter-intuitively affected by the specific form of demand curve and of demand randomization. Thus, we identify hitherto neglected factors that must be carefully considered when designing pricing schemes for actual implementation. The second part of this paper demonstrates the practicality and merit of using buyback in conjunction with a manufacturer-imposed retail price—an arrangement overlooked in the literature because it is widely mistaken as illegal. Overall, the paper shows how a manufacturer can better realize the market's potential by: (i) modifying slightly the well-known buyback arrangement; and (ii) carefully modelling certain hitherto neglected aspects of the price/demand relationship—a conclusion quite contrary to what one might surmise from the current theoretical literature.     

需求受价格影响的三层供应链协调模型

针对由一个制造商、一个批发商和一个零售商构成的三层供应链系统,在随机市场需求且需求受商品零售价格影响的情况下,研究了零售商如何定价和确定订货量.在此基础上给出了一个能使供应链系统达到完美协调的收益分享合约策略,最后给出了数值例子.     

Demand forecast sharing in a dual-channel supply chain

We assess the benefits of sharing demand forecast information in a manufacturer–retailer supply chain, consisting of a traditional retail channel and a direct channel. The demand is a linear function of price with a Gaussian primary demand (i.e., zero-price market potential). Both the manufacturer and the retailer set their price based on their forecast of the primary demand. In this setting, we investigate the value of sharing demand forecasts. We analyze the ‘make-to-order’ scenario, in which prices are set before and production takes place after the primary demand is known, and the ‘make-to-stock’ scenario, in which production takes place and prices are set before the primary demand is known. We also compare the supply chain performance with and without the direct channel under some assumptions (production cost is zero, and each demand function has the same slope of price). We find that the direct channel has a negative impact on the retailer’s performance, and, under some conditions, the manufacturer and the whole supply chain are better off. Our research extends and complements prior research that has investigated only the inventory and replenishment-related benefits of information sharing.     

闭环供应链竞争的博弈分析与链内协调合同设计

假定生产商委托零售商回收废旧产品以进行再制造活动,研究两条分别由单生产商和单零售商组成的闭环供应链的竞争和链内协调。对应两条闭环供应链均为分散式供应链、均为集中式供应链、一条为分散式供应链另一条为集中式供应链,运用博弈论和均衡分析方法分别建立了三种情况下刻画闭环供应链竞争的带均衡约束的均衡模型、纳什均衡模型和带均衡约束的优化模型,进行了模型求解。基于合同理论,提出供应链竞争下协调链内零售商的零售价和回收价格决策的批发价加回收补贴合同。最后的算例验证了模型的合理性和协调合同的有效性。研究表明:产品零售价、需求量与产品替代效应正相关,废旧产品供给量、供应链利润与回收价格敏感性正相关;供应链协调是供应链竞争下的占优策略,有利于提高供应链的运作效率,但两条协调供应链之间的竞争将更激烈,存在囚徒困境现象。     

基于利润—CVaR的期权契约供应链协调

文章以一个风险厌恶销售商与风险中性供应商所组成的两级供应链为背景,以条件风险价值(CVaR)和期望利润的加权平均作为销售商的决策目标,对期权契约下销售商的订购策略及供应链协调问题进行了研究,并对比分析了销售商以CVaR为目标时的情形。在给出销售商在不同风险厌恶程度下的最优订购策略后,文章进一步给出了供应链相应的协调条件,并分析了此时期权权利金,销售商的风险厌恶程度和期望利润权重等参数对供销双方收益的影响,发现“利润-CVaR”法下销售商的风险厌恶程度对供销双方利润的影响与CVaR法下的情况有所不同,但权利金依然起到了分配整体供应链利润的作用,且销售商期望利润权重的增加会降低自身收益水平而提高供应商利润。最后,文章通过数值模拟的方式对上述结论进行了验证。     

The coordinating contracts for a fuzzy supply chain with effort and price dependent demand

This paper investigates the coordination of a two-echelon supply chain with fuzzy demand that is dependent on both retail price and sales effort. In contrast with the centralized and decentralized decision models, two coordinating models based on symmetric information and asymmetric information about retailer’s scale parameter are developed by game theory, and the corresponding analytical solutions are obtained. Theoretical analysis and numerical examples yield the maximal supply chain profits in two coordination situations are equal to that in the centralized situation and greater than that in the decentralized situation. Furthermore, under asymmetric information contract, the maximal expected profit obtained by the low-scale-level retailer is higher than that under symmetric information contract.     

基于期望损失厌恶的供应链期权契约协调研究

以一个损失厌恶销售商与一个损失中性供应商组成的两级供应链为背景,利用期望损失厌恶理论对销售商在期权契约下的最优采购策略进行了研究,并证明了期望损失厌恶理论能有效克服传统基于前景理论的研究中因参考点外生且固定假设带来的弊端。在此基础上,进一步给出了供销双方在期权契约下实现协调共赢的条件,分析了销售商损失厌恶程度,期权契约价格等参数对供应链协调共赢机制的影响。结果显示:销售商的损失厌恶偏好并不会改变权利金分配整体供应链利润的作用,但会增强销售商分享收益的能力,改变供销双方利润或效用水平对权利金,产品销售价格和生产成本的敏感程度,且较高的损失厌恶偏好还会阻碍供销双方协调共赢目标的达成。     

双渠道闭环供应链的三种回收模式的建模分析

针对生产商负责网上直销、零售商负责网下零售、且具有回收再制造功能的双渠道闭环供应链,首先分析了生产商负责产品回收和零售商负责产品回收下生产商和零售商之间的博弈行为,建立了刻画两种回收模式的两层规划模型;进而假定生产商委托第三方企业负责回收,分析了生产商、零售商和第三方回收企业之间的博弈行为,建立了对应此一主两从博弈结构的带均衡约束的两层规划模型.对所得模型进行了模型求解,得到了三种回收模式下双渠道闭环分散式供应链的最优直销价、零售价和回收再制造率决策.通过数值算例对上述三种回收模式进行了比较分析,并对刻画网上直销吸引力的相关参数进行了灵敏度分析.研究发现,生产商负责回收时的回收再制造率最高;网上直销具有激发潜在需求(正效应)和吸引零售市场需求发生转移(负效应)的双重效应等.     

Coordinating a supply chain with green innovation in a dynamic setting

This paper addresses the channel coordination problem in a green supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, in which the manufacturer controls green innovation and wholes price, while the retailer controls sales price. Pricing and green innovation strategies in integrated and decentralized channels are computed and compared, and a two-part tariff contract is designed to coordinate the decentralized supply chain. A Nash bargaining model is further developed to distribute the extra-profit between channel members. A numerical example is conducted to explore the impacts of green effectiveness and operational inefficiency effect on optimal/equilibrium solutions and coordination. The main results show that the green innovation investment, energy efficiency level and channel profit of integrated channel are larger than those of decentralized one, but the relationship of sales prices under two channel structures depends on system parameters. Green effectiveness exerts a positive effect on optimal/equilibrium solutions. The coordinator’s coordination capability is improved by green effectiveness, but weakened by operational inefficiency effect.     

Benefits of partial myopia in a durable product supply chain considering pricing and advertising

Consider a bilateral monopoly supply chain where a manufacturer distributes a durable product through a retailer to end consumers. This paper develops a differential game in which the manufacturer determines the advertising and the wholesale price while the retailer sets the retail price. Channel members are partially myopic when they only consider goodwill dynamics and disregard sales evolution. We derive and compare partially myopic and forward-looking strategies with the following observations: First, under decentralized scenario, partially myopic channel members get higher profits than the forward-looking ones, while the opposite result occurs in centralized scenario. Second, when channel members are partially myopic, the distribution channel can benefit from the strategic decentralization.     

Supply chain coordination for newsvendor-type products with two ordering opportunities and demand information update

This paper studies a coordination issue with two ordering opportunities in a two-echelon supply chain, where one manufacturer sells a single newsvendor-type product through one buyer. The manufacturer does not hold inventory and activates production or order with an infinite capacity and a fixed setup cost in response to the buyer’s order. The buyer places two orderings during the selling period of the product: one happens at the beginning of the period and the other at some specified time within the selling period. The whole selling period is divided into two stages or sub-periods by the buyer’s second order. The stochastic demands in the two sub-periods are assumed to be auto-correlated. The excess demand before the second order is partially backordered, whereas the excess demand at the end of the selling season is utterly lost. Under both the centralized and decentralized settings, we develop the models of how the buyer determines his two-ordering policies. We analyse the existence and uniqueness of the optimal solutions to the models and present the corresponding analytical solutions. Furthermore, we propose an improved revenue-sharing contract that can realize the perfect coordination of the supply chain and study how the revenue-sharing policies affect the supply chain members’ decisions. Finally, we show the superiority of the presented two-ordering strategy through numerical examples.