考虑低碳偏好和产出随机的供应链两级碳减排策略

考虑消费者低碳偏好和制造商的产出随机性,以包含一个供应商和一个制造商的低碳供应链为研究对象,供应商和制造商均需进行碳减排技术研发投入.通过构建供应商主导、制造商追随情形下的Stackelberg博弈模型,讨论低碳供应链的两级主体碳减排策略.研究结果表明,消费者对原材料和产成品的低碳偏好对供应商和制造商的碳减排研发投入均有促进作用,且均有利于供应商和制造商提高利润水平,但对制造商利润的影响更加直接和明显;制造商的产出随机性对供应商和制造商的碳减排水平以及利润均产生不利影响,并且抑制制造商的生产积极性.     

基于契约和关系治理的供应链质量控制机制设计

本文考虑制造商和供应商共同努力改进产品质量的情况,研究在一个制造商处于领导地位的二级供应链中,如何通过有效的治理机制设计,提高产品质量水平,协调供应链。文章以理想的协同情况为基准,分析了两种治理机制下的质量努力程度,比较了正式契约治理与契约和关系混合治理对供应链效率的影响。结果表明,关系和契约混合治理在有效范围内能够将制造商和供应商紧密地联系起来,通过共同的质量努力获得比正式契约治理下更大的利润,实现供应链协调。     

三级供应链中信息共享的价值研究

通过建立模型研究三级供应链中信息共享的价值.研究建立简单的三级供应链模型,在Lee H L,So KC,Tang C S模型的基础上重点研究并量化了第三级即供应商共享需求信息所带来的价值,并对影响参数进行matlab仿真实验.研究表明信息共享可以降低供应商库存水平和期望费用,给供应商带来价值;供应商在制造商参与信息共享的条件下要比不参与时更优,制造商在三级供应链需求信息共享中地位至关重要.     

持股策略下随机需求低碳供应链融资决策均衡

随机市场需求且受制造商减排水平影响,考虑碳限额与交易机制,研究制造商进行单纯银行借贷和供应商投资持股的组合融资时的最优决策和利润情况,分析消费者低碳偏好、碳交易价格和供应商的投资持股比例对供应链的最优决策变量和利润的影响。研究发现:无资金约束、单纯银行借贷和组合融资下,消费者低碳偏好、碳交易价格和持股比例与制造商的减排水平和利润以及供应链系统的利润正相关,而供应商的批发价格和制造商的生产量与消费者低碳偏好正相关,与碳交易价格负相关,而持股比例与供应商的批发价格负相关,与制造商的生产量和减排水平正相关;持股策略下制造商的减排水平和生产量最大,无资金约束时次之,单纯银行借贷时最小;而无资金约束时供应商的批发价格最高,单纯银行借贷时次之,持股策略时最低;在持股比例满足一定条件下,供应商和制造商的利润优于单纯银行借贷时的利润,并且可以优于无资金约束时的利润,提高了供应链的竞争力和效率。     

政府补贴下供应链合作减排的微分博弈

借助微分博弈理论,研究政府补贴下由一个供应商和一个制造商组成的供应链长期合作减排的动态协调问题。在产品需求受减排量的影响下,构建了集中式和分散式微分博弈模型,并设计了成本分担契约协调供应链。结合算例对参数进行灵敏度分析,研究发现:政府补贴对企业减排起到有效的激励作用并且有助于供应链实现协调;成本分担契约的引入可提高供应商和制造商的减排努力水平、产品减排量及需求量,并实现了供应链协调;随着供应商、制造商减排成本系数以及减排量自衰减率的增大,引入契约后产品减排量呈下降趋势;相反,随着产品减排量对减排努力水平的敏感性以及消费者低碳意识的增强,产品减排量呈上升趋势。     

基于多Agent的Supply-Hub库存策略建模与仿真研究北大核心

Supply-Hub是一种能较好地解决装配式供应链协同运作问题的供应链运作模式,其库存参数设置对于平衡上游供应商与下游制造商之间的利益,吸弓l供应商加入Supply-Hub非常关键.建立了由两个供应不同零部件的供应商向制造商补货时的供应商多周期成本模型,采用多Agent仿真方法,研究了三种情形下(s,S)库存策略参数的变动对供应商及制造商的影响,以期为Supply-Hub运营商合理确定库存策略参数提供一定参考.     

基于多Agent的Supply-Hub库存策略建模与仿真研究

Supply-Hub是一种能较好地解决装配式供应链协同运作问题的供应链运作模式,其库存参数设置对于平衡上游供应商与下游制造商之间的利益,吸弓l供应商加入Supply-Hub非常关键.建立了由两个供应不同零部件的供应商向制造商补货时的供应商多周期成本模型,采用多Agent仿真方法,研究了三种情形下(s,S)库存策略参数的变动对供应商及制造商的影响,以期为Supply-Hub运营商合理确定库存策略参数提供一定参考.     

基于现货市场的供应链博弈模型

构建了现货市场价格及市场需求均不确定的供应链博弈模型,分析了风险中性供应商的批发价决策、风险厌恶制造商的采购决策,证明博弈均衡存在且唯一。通过解析分析及数值实验探讨了风险态度、现货价格和需求波动及其相关性对供应链博弈的影响。结果表明:1)制造商因规避风险会减小采购,这降低了供应链总效用;2)现货市场存在时制造商会减小向供应商采购的数量,这降低了供应商的利润,但提高了供应链总效用;3)现货价格与市场需求的相关关系让供应商掌握主动,但会降低制造商及整个供应链的绩效。     

基于企业环境自我规制的电器电子产品供应链决策与协调

电器电子产品制造商与零部件供应商环境自我规制是供应链获得竞争优势的重要战略,也是实现WEEE源头污染控制的关键。考虑供应商环境自我规制的溢出效应,构建四种不同环境自我规制模式下电器电子产品供应链成员的决策与协调模型,分析供应链成员决策和利润变化。发现分散决策时,制造商与供应商同时进行环境自我规制模式最优,单方企业环境自我规制模式次之,且企业环境自我规制不改变制造商在供应链上的利润优势。单方企业环境自我规制模式下,规制方的利润增量总是小于无规制方。与无环境自我规制模式相比,制造商环境自我规制模式下,供应商存在“敲竹杠”行为。最后,针对供应商和制造商同时进行环境自我规制模型,设计了制造商收益共享契约,激励制造商和供应商提高其环境自我规制水平,实现各企业利润的Pareto改进。     

供应链协作创新模式比较与协调

从供应链中居于核心地位的供应商出发,基于下游制造商对上游创新的影响,在需求对价格敏感情况下考虑了供应商、制造商、第三方研发机构协作创新的博弈过程,对供应链创新协作的三种模式进行了建模分析。研究结果发现在创新能力相当的情况下,无论从创新力度、各方期望利润,还是从满足需求量等来看,供应商与供应链上关系紧密的下游协作创新的模式不仅可以降低自己创新的投资和创新风险,而且提高了整个供应链创新力度和水平,又可以在收益上双赢,其优于不进行协作创新和委托第三方研发机构的协作创新模式。最后进一步提出了供应链协调策略。     

Quality investment and inspection policy in a supplier–manufacturer supply chain

This paper examines a serial supply chain that consists of one supplier and one manufacturer, each having imperfect production and inspection processes. Both the supplier and the manufacturer invest in quality improvement actions in their production processes to reduce defective items being produced. In addition to quality investment, the supplier engages in outbound inspection before sending the components to the manufacturer, and the manufacturer engages in inbound inspection, when receiving the components from the supplier, and outbound inspection, before sending final products to customers. We investigate the supplier’s and the manufacturer’s quality investment and inspection strategies in four noncooperative games with different degrees of information revealed. We study the effects of inspection-related information on both parties’ equilibrium strategies and profits, and further assess, at equilibrium, the rationality of the penalty on defective components.     

Dynamic conformance and design quality in a supply chain: an assessment of contracts’ coordinating power

We consider a two-echelon supply chain involving one manufacturer and one supplier who collaborate on improving both design and conformance quality. Design quality is supposed to increase product desirability, and therefore market demand, while conformance quality should reduce the proportion of defective items, and therefore increase the manufacturer’s sales revenue. We investigate how the supply chain parties allocate effort between design and conformance quality under both cooperative and non-cooperative settings in an intertemporal framework. Furthermore, we evaluate wholesale price contracts and revenue-sharing contracts in terms of their performance and coordination power. We show that although a revenue-sharing contract enables the manufacturer to effectively involve the supplier in quality improvement, neither contract type allows for perfect coordination resulting in the quality that can be achieved by a cooperative supply chain. We thus suggest a reward-based extension to the revenue-sharing contract, to ensure system-wide optimal quality performance. Importantly, we find that the supplier would be better off adopting a reward-based revenue sharing contract and refusing a standard revenue-sharing contract, while the opposite would be true for the manufacturer.     

Coordinating a three-echelon supply chain under price and quality dependent demand with sub-supply chain and RFM strategies

The paper considers a three-echelon supply chain which consists of one supplier, one manufacturer and one retailer for trading a single product. The market demand at the retailer is influenced by the retail price and the quality of the product. The quality of the finished product at the manufacturer depends on the supplier’s raw material quality. We analyze the model for both deterministic and stochastic demand patterns. We first study the centralized and decentralized systems, and then the decentralized system with a sub-supply chain coordination strategy (where the manufacturer chooses to merge with either the supplier or the retailer and then acts as a single entity) and the two-level retail fixed mark-up (RFM) strategy. In the case of the two-level RFM strategy, the manufacturer and the retailer use fixed mark ups over the supplier’s wholesale price. The proposed models are demonstrated through numerical examples. It is observed from the numerical study that the two-level RFM strategy is superior to the sub-supply chain coordination strategy. Further, the two-level RFM strategy in the stochastic demand scenario is not as effective as in the deterministic demand scenario.     

竞争环境下随机产出供应商的融资策略研究

考虑由一个制造商和两个竞争性供应商组成的供应链系统,其中一个供应商存在资金短缺的问题,自有资金不足以完成正常生产任务,需要通过融资获得资金完成生产。针对供应链内部和外部两种融资模式,分别构建了供应链成员的收益模型,计算了不同融资方式下的决策结果,并在此基础上对两种融资模式进行了比较分析。结果表明,资金短缺的供应商生产不确定性较低时,供应链成员所能获得的利润较高,并且内部融资下资金短缺的供应商生产积极性高于外部融资。同时发现,对融资方式偏好的不一致将导致制造商利润损失,此时制造商可以采取一定的激励措施引导供应商选择合适的融资方式以提高整体收益。     

Supply contracting and process innovation in a dynamic supply chain with information asymmetry

We investigate the process innovation and contracting decisions of a dynamic supply chain consisting of a supplier and a manufacturer, with the manufacturer possessing private information about her efficiency of process innovation. To overcome the potential adverse selection problem due to the asymmetric information, the supplier designs a menu of supply contracts that stipulates both the wholesale price and the purchasing quantity. We find that under information asymmetry, the supplier will optimally set a higher wholesale price but a lower purchasing quantity for the manufacturer with high innovation efficiency than that for the manufacturer with low innovation efficiency. As a consequence, the manufacturer with high innovation efficiency will significantly underinvest in innovation due to information asymmetry in addition to the impact of the double marginalization effect. Moreover, although a longer contract period tends to better motivate innovation, it can also magnify the influences of adverse selection on supply chain contracting, leading to a higher wholesale price for the manufacturer with high innovation efficiency.     

Don’t forget your supplier when remanufacturing

A popular assumption in the current literature on remanufacturing is that the whole new product is produced by an integrated manufacturer, which is inconsistent with most industries. In this paper, we model a decentralised closed-loop supply chain consisting of a key component supplier and a non-integrated manufacturer, and demonstrate that the interaction between these players significantly impacts the economic and environmental implications of remanufacturing. In our model, the non-integrated manufacturer can purchase new components from the supplier to produce new products, and remanufacture used components to produce remanufactured products. Thus, the non-integrated manufacturer is not only a buyer but also a rival to the supplier. In a steady state period, we analyse the performances of an integrated manufacturer and the decentralised supply chain. We find that, although the integrated manufacturer always benefits from remanufacturing, the remanufacturing opportunity may constitute a lose–lose situation to the supplier and the non-integrated manufacturer, making their profits be lower than in an identical supply chain without remanufacturing. In addition, the non-integrated manufacturer may be worse off with a lower remanufacturing cost or a larger return rate of used products due to the interaction with the supplier. We further demonstrate that the government-subsidised remanufacturing in the non-integrated (integrated) manufacturer is detrimental (beneficial) to the environment.     

收益共享的寄售契约下供应商生产成本谎报行为分析

在收益共享寄售契约下的两级供应链中,供应商向零售商报告其生产成本;零售商根据供应商报告的生产成本,决定零售商的收益分配比例;供应商决定零售价格和生产数量,并且保持产品的所有权.由于信息不对称,供应商可能谎报其生产成本.作者应用博弈论分析了供应商谎报行为对供应链及其成员决策及绩效的影响.利用解析的方法得出一些理论结果:零售价格在信息对称时小于生产成本信息不对称时;订货数量在信息对称时大于生产成本信息不对称时;零售商的利润分配比例在信息对称时大于生产成本信息不对称时.供应商的谎报行为使其自身利润增加,使零售商和供应链的利润减少.     

Penalties,rewards, and inspection: provisions for quality in supply chain contracts

Rewards for better quality, penalties for poorer quality, and the type of inspection policy are among the most common quality-related provisions of supply chain contracts. In this paper, we examine the effect of rewards, penalities, and inspection policies on the behaviour of an expected cost minimizing supplier. We assume that the supplier selects a batch size and target quality level in order to meet a buyer's deterministic demand. We show that the reward and/or penalty that motivates a supplier to deliver the buyer's target quality depends upon the inspection policy. We also show that, when sampling inspection is used, penalties and rewards are substitutes for one another in motivating the supplier and that there exists a unique reward/penalty combination at which the buyer's expected cost of quality is zero.