PPP项目中非完全利益群体的合作形成机制研究

协调政府与社会资本合作的利益分歧,进而实现个体理性向集体理性的趋同,这是纾解PPP项目合作困境的切入点之一。基于合作博弈理论,本文构建PPP项目非完全利益群体的合作形成机制,分析政府与社会资本间“合作共赢”的必要因素。研究表明,由政府与社会资本组成的PPP项目非完全利益群体,可在“理性-效用转移-有效协商”机制的协同作用下主动采取最优合作策略。其中,理性机制验证了政府与社会资本达成合作意向的前提,效用转移机制可实现二者之间的风险-收益对等,有效协商机制将达成政府与社会资本合作的帕累托均衡。     

基于学习的互利协调与互制均衡及其矢量分析

纳什均衡代表了博弈参与人如何博弈的一致性预测.但是,有限理性的博弈者一般不会在一次博弈中取得一致性预期,他们总是通过不断的重复学习,使得预期逐渐向均衡方向演化.对互利协调与互制均衡进行分析,并探讨协调和均衡的动态形成机理.互制均衡强调自我实现,倾向个体利益最优.互利协调在强调自我实现的基础上,注重双赢,引导合作.现代博弈学习理论正是从有限理性的实际出发,通过学习和进化,最终实现博弈的均衡或协调.这对于如何走出传统博弈的困境具有重要意义.     

成渝地区双城经济圈核心城市的博弈分析与对策研究——以交通物流基础设施建设为例

推进成渝地区双城经济圈建设已经上升为国家发展战略.以交通物流基础设施建设为例,从个体理性和团体理性两个方面,对竞争状态、合作状态和混合状态三种情况分别构建博弈关系模型并求解,得出结论:在成渝地区双城经济圈建设交通物流基础设施的过程中,核心城市的个体利益大于团体利益,表现为个体理性与团体理性之间的冲突,即两者存在非合作博弈关系.最后针对核心城市存在的非合作博弈关系,提出促进成渝地区双城经济圈核心城市协同发展的对策建议.     

考虑随机扰动的群体决策理性演化模型

在群体决策过程中,随机噪音对个体理性和群体理性的变化具有不可忽视的影响.针对存在随机扰动条件下群体决策理性的演化行为,在假设个体和群体理性之间存在作用叠加效果的基础上,建立了刻画个体和群体理性受随机噪声影响的个体和群体理性演化动力学模型,利用随机微分方程理论,论证了模型解的存在性和唯一性,在给定群体决策的随机扰动为白噪声的假设条件下得到了模型的解析解,讨论了群体决策中两个重要参数:理性作用强度和随机干扰作用强度对于群体理性演化的影响.理论分析结果表明:群体决策理性的演化行为取决于这两个参数的相对大小,存在着三条不同的演化路径,数值算例验证了模型的合理性和有效性,并对群体理性的演化行为进行了直观说明,对于深入认识群体决策规律和提高决策质量具有积极的理论和实际意义.     

基于Agent仿真的个体有限理性与众包绩效的关系研究

如何筛选有限理性参与者是企业实施众包的关键问题。通过引入个体有限理性,扩展了经典的NK模型,构建了模拟竞赛式众包问题解决过程的多主体仿真模型,研究了个体有限理性水平、个体有限理性系统化程度以及个体有限理性水平标准差对众包绩效的影响。仿真结果显示,个体有限理性水平对提高众包绩效有显著的正向影响,尤其是在任务复杂性较高的情况下;个体有限理性系统化程度和个体有限理性水平标准差对众包绩效也有正向影响,但依赖于个体有限理性水平。当企业有一个复杂性较高的任务时,如果追求所有方案的整体改善,企业需要招募有限理性水平较高的个体,并组成有限理性系统化程度较高且有限理性水平标准差较大的群体;如果追求少数优质方案,企业需要招募有限理性水平较高的个体,并组成有限理性系统化程度较低且有限理性水平标准差较大的群体。     

不确定环境下基于演化博弈的生态旅游开发利益相关者行为分析

当前针对生态旅游这类问题的研究主要采用非合作博弈中的"囚徒困境"模型.介于外部环境的复杂性和模糊性,以及需要从长远角度来考察各利益相关者的行为,利用更符合实际情况的区间数来表示各利益相关者的收益及成本,并认为各利益相关者均为有限理性,构建了利益相关者的区间数演化博弈模型,再利用各利益相关者的区间数复制动态方程求解出纳什均衡,并用微分方程稳定性理论对其均衡结果进行稳定性分析.结果表明:三方最终策略的选择受博弈初始支付矩阵及关键参数的影响;提高旅游企业不保护环境行为的最低罚款;降低当地政府的最高监督成本和居民告发旅游企业不保护环境行为所承担的最高成本等策略,可实现博弈三方利益共赢.     

建设项目风险评价的群体决策矩阵方法

建设项目在政治、环境、经济、施工、安全等方面的风险评估的群决策过程中,各利益相关群体对于候选方案的每个属性都可以提出自己的个体决策信息,采用乘性加权集结算子构造群体决策矩阵,并判断群体决策矩阵与个体决策矩阵之间的相似度差异值,指导个体决策矩阵的修正,完成个体意见的一致化,得到最终确定评价方案的风险顺序.实例分析的结果表明,采用计算方法有利于提高多利益主体对建设项目风险评价的群决策过程中的综合满意度.     

观乎人文,以化成天下——数学教学中“人文精神”的养育

1"人文精神"的内涵何谓人文精神?迄今为止,学术界对"人文精神"没有统一的定义,笔者在此就引用华东师范大学陆有铨教授的说法:人文精神,是浓厚的文化积淀和人之为人的素质与文化精神.其核心部分包括了文化和人格的含义.它实质上是一种人性教育,以个体的人格完善为最高目标,体现的主要是以个人发展需要为标准的教育价值观.人文精神关注的是人类共有的利益,增加生命的价值是所有努力的结果.人文精神不会排斥对科学理性的认同,因为人文关怀和科学理性代表人类思想统一性的不同方面.要考虑两个方面:一是学校生活中的人文性,尤其是课堂教学中的人文性;二是师生的人文精神的建构.人文主义强调在对个人独特的潜在能力和创造能力的尊重上.     

基于参与主体异质性条件下囚徒困境合作演化博弈模型研究

利用演化博弈理论,对参与主体异质性条件下的囚徒困境模型进行了探讨,求出了满足不同条件下的演化稳定策略,并对种群中个体异质性对演化稳定策略的影响进行了分析,得出种群中选择相同策略的个体异质性差异越大,参与个体选择合作行为作为演化稳定策略的可能性就越大.极端地,当个体的异质性趋向于无穷大时,合作成为唯一的演化稳定占优策略,为现实大多数合作系统中能保持长期的一种合作稳定状态提供了合理地解释.     

敏捷供应链管理中最优激励方案的实现问题研究

合理的利益分配策略可以稳定敏捷供应链的运营过程,加速敏捷供应链目标的实现.基于委托-代理理论,研究了敏捷供应链利益分配中最优激励方案的设计问题,得出在信息对称条件下由于合作伙伴企业的努力水平可以为主导企业所观测,因而容易制定最优激励方案并实现利益分配.而在更多的信息不对称条件下,需要对合作伙伴企业的产出结果进行监督和评估,通过不同努力水平下的分布概率间接地获得努力水平信息.该结论对于敏捷供应链利益分配系统的设计与实现具有重要指导意义.对最优激励方案在敏捷供应链利益分配中的实现过程进行了说明,通过适当的评价指标体系和评价方法,实现了利益分配中考虑努力水平等因素的激励策略.     

基于模糊TOPSIS法的职业选择定量分析

由于职业选择受多种因素的影响,且许多因素又具有模糊不确定性,单纯地从定性的角度无法准确清晰地进行选择判断.为解决这一问题,本文运用模糊TOPSIS法对职业选择问题进行定量分析.首先,从个人兴趣爱好、单位的工资收入水平、地理位置、单位性质、发展前景、继续深造的条件和机会、发展机会等,建立职业选择的评价指标体系;然后,采用模糊集理论与专家综合评判相结合的方法求出模糊评价指标的概率并给出所有评价指标的权数;接着,以模糊数学和传统TOPSIS(逼近理想解的排序法)法为基础,建立职业选择评价方法;最后,以某大学生职业选择为例,验证该评价方法的有效性.结果表明,运用模糊TOPSIS法对职业选择定量分析是可行的.     

Individual choice and reputation distribution of cooperative behaviors among heterogeneous groups

Cooperation is vital for our society, but the temptation of cheating on cooperative partners undermines cooperation. The mechanism of reputation is raised to countervail this temptation and therefore promote cooperation. Reputation microcosmically records individual choices, while cooperation macrocosmically refers to the group or averaged cooperation level. Reputation should be preferred in order to investigate how individual choices evolve. In this work, we study the distribution of reputation to figure out how individuals make choices within cooperation and defection. We decompose reputation into its mean and standard deviation and inspect effects of their factors respectively. To achieve this goal, we construct a model where agents of three groups or classes play the prisoners’ dilemma game with neighbors on a square lattice. It indicates in outcomes that the distribution of reputation is distinct from that of cooperation and both the mean and standard deviation of reputation follow clear patterns. Some factors have negative quadratic effects on reputation's mean or standard deviation, and some have merely linear effects.     

Bundle Trust-Region Algorithm for Bilinear Bilevel Programming

The bilevel programming problem (BLPP) is equivalent to a two-person Stackelberg game in which the leader and follower pursue individual objectives. Play is sequential and the choices of one affect the choices and attainable payoffs of the other. The purpose of this paper is to investigate an extension of the linear BLPP where the objective functions of both players are bilinear. To overcome certain discontinuities in the master problem, a regularized term is added to the follower objective function. Using ideas from parametric programming, the generalized Jacobian and the pseudodifferential of the regularized follower solution function are computed. This allows us to develop a bundle trust-region algorithm. Convergence analysis of the proposed methodology is given.     

多工厂环境下考虑个体利益的多目标协同生产计划模型及算法

针对由多个工厂组成的分布式系统,考虑不同工厂的个体利益诉求,构建了多目标协同生产计划模型。在该模型中,以最大化整体收益作为第一个优化目标;同时,基于亚当斯的公平理论,利用偏离系数法,以最小化个体收益平衡偏差作为第二个优化目标。结合模型结构特点,基于快速非支配排序遗传算法,设计了相应的求解过程。最后,通过一个算例验证表明,本文设计的计划模型和求解方法,不仅可以从网络集成角度协调各个工厂的生产、库存和运输活动,而且能够实现整体利益和个体利益非一致性的最小化。     

Coordination in Dynamic Social Networks Under Heterogeneity

People often make choices or form opinions depending on the social relations they have, but they also choose their relations depending on their preferred behavior and their opinions. Most of the existing models of coevolution of networks and individual behavior assume that actors are homogeneous. In this article, we relax this assumption in a context in which actors try to coordinate their behavior with their partners. We investigate with a game-theoretic model whether social cohesion and coordination change when interests of actors are not perfectly aligned as compared to the homogeneous case. Using analytical and simulation methods we characterize the set of stable networks and examine the consequences of heterogeneity for social optimality and segregation in emerging networks.     

Fairness Norms Can Explain the Emergence of Specific Cooperation Norms in the Battle of the Prisoner's Dilemma

Cooperation norms often emerge in situations, where the long term collective benefits help to overcome short run individual interests, for instance in repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) situations. Often, however, there are different paths to cooperation, benefiting different kinds of actors to different degrees. This leads to payoff asymmetries even in the state of cooperation, and consequently can give rise to normative conflicts about which norms should be in place. This norm coordination problem will be modeled as a Battle of the Sexes game (BoS) with different degrees of asymmetry in payoffs. I combine the PD and the BoS to the 3 × 3 Battle of the Prisoner's Dilemma (BOPD) with several asymmetric cooperative and 1 noncooperative equilibria. Game theoretical and “behavioral” predictions are derived about the kind of norms that are likely to emerge under different shadows of the future and degrees of asymmetry and tested in a lab experiment. The experimental data show that game theory fairly well predicts the basic main effects of the experimental manipulations but “behavioral” predictions perform better in describing the equilibrium selection process of emerging norms.     

On the Painlevé integrability, periodic wave solutions and soliton solutions of generalized coupled higher-order nonlinear Schrödinger equations

It is proven that generalized coupled higher-order nonlinear Schrödinger equations possess the Painlevé property for two particular choices of parameters, using the Weiss–Tabor–Carnevale method and Kruskal’s simplification. Abundant families of periodic wave solutions are obtained by using the Jacobi elliptic function expansion method with the assistance of symbolic manipulation system, Maple. It is also shown that these solutions exactly degenerate to bright soliton, dark soliton and mixed dark and bright soliton solutions with physical interests.     

Visualizing preferences on spheres for group decisions based on multiplicative preference relations

Decision makers’ choices are often influenced by visual background information. One of the difficulties in group decision is that decision makers may bias their judgment in order to increase the possibility of a preferred result. Hence, the method used to provide visual aids in helping decision making teams both to observe the background context and to perceive outliers is an important issue to consider. This study proposes an extended Decision Ball model to visualize a group’s decisions. By observing the Decision Balls, each decision maker can: see individual ranking as well as similarities between alternatives, identify the differences between individual judgments and the group’s collective opinion, observe the clusters of alternatives as well as clusters of decision makers, and discover outliers. Thus, this method can help decision makers make a more objective judgment.     

中国-东盟贸易自由化博弈分析

在经济全球化和区域经济一体化的背景下,中国-东盟自由贸易区的全面启动将对世界经济格局产生深远的影响.但在实施自由化贸易的过程中,当事双方的共同利益和本位利益既有协同也有冲突.因此,尝试从博弈论的角度来分析中国-东盟贸易自由化的利益机制和推动贸易自由化的条件.通过对双方的利益博弈分析,指出贸易双方应该逐步看淡本位利益,为推动贸易自由化进程而应更多地考虑共同利益和长远利益;其次,双方在制定贸易政策和进行谈判时,虽然不能忽略本位利益,但只有通过满足他方的利益才能使本位利益得到实现;因此,满足贸易双方“利己”和“利他”的唯一均衡解就是同步实施关税减让.在整个博弈过程中,中国作为一个负责任的大国,可以通过首先放弃部分局部利益来换取东盟各国的信任,从而确立中国在贸易战略中的市场领导者地位.这正是确保区域贸易自由化实现的基本要件.     

正项级数拉阿伯判别法等价形式及其应用

利用Stolz定理得出了与拉阿伯（Rabbe）判别法等价的几个判别法中p的意义,即p为正项级数中通项un单调减少的阶,并利用它来判别正项级数的敛散性.