经营者双因素薪酬方案的社会因素分析与实施策略

由于企业是社会系统的子系统,没有那一家企业不受社会环境的影响,所以,当经济工作者不考虑经济以外的因素去模型化社会经济问题时,许多理论(包括经营者薪酬理论)可能会面临与社会实践不一致的窘境.为了弥补经营者薪酬理论在这方面的缺陷,本文运用系统思想,在提出双因素薪酬方案、评价函数、转换系数概念之后,将社会环境因素引入委托-代理模型之中;然后,通过求解模型和参数分析,提出了实施经营者薪酬计划的策略.     

制造企业供应网络治理策略选择研究

针对制造企业供应网络治理策略的选择问题,通过建立动态的委托代理模型对封闭式和开放式两种供应网络治理策略条件下制造商的期望效用进行了比较分析,研究结果表明环境不确定性,知识转移和折现率都决定了特定的供应网络治理策略的效率.最后得出在环境高度不确定的行业制造商只有加强与供应商之间的知识转移及对长期利益的关注才更有利于实施封闭式治理策略的结论.     

基于存货质押融资业务的阶段贷款最优决策研究

存货质押融资业务作为解决中小企业融资的方式之一在国内外都有所发展,这种业务模式在解决银行和企业委托代理问题的同时,引入了新的银行与物流企业之间的委托代理问题。本文针对新的问题,引入阶段贷款的方法来控制风险和降低道德风险,运用参数函数比较了阶段贷款和一次性贷款的异同,得出了阶段贷款优于一次性贷款的结论,并通过运用合约作为阶段贷款的有效补充机制来更好的控制代理问题。     

非对称信息条件下的税收管理博弈分析

本利用非对称信息条件下的委托——代理理论对我国的税收管理进行系统的研究，建立了税收机关与纳税人之间的博弈模型，并对我国个人征税效率低下的原因作出详细分析，同时给出了几点建设性建议。     

博弈论在企业管理中的应用

本文把博弈论应用于企业管理 ,利用博弈论的委托 -代理理论构造了一个委托 -代理激励模型 ,针对信息对称与信息不对称情况进行了分析。在设计企业的委托代理机制时 ,若考虑了对经理的激励 ,则委托人的风险成本、代理成本都比没有考虑对经理的激励时要小。从理论上证明了对企业经理激励的必要性。     

委托-代理理论在保险代理激励机制中的应用

本文将委托 代理模型应用于保险人与保险代理人之间的激励机制中 ,在外生环境服从指数分布的随机变量时 ,针对对称信息与不对称信息情况分别进行讨论 .     

基于“激励相容”的企业集团绩效信息管理机制分析

为解决企业集团总部与子公司存在着基于绩效信息的博弈问题,本文通过拓展基本的委托代理模型,分析子公司操纵绩效信息的条件及绩效信息操纵程度的影响因素.结果表明,当总部对子公司激励采用固定工资制或总部可完全监督时,子公司不操纵,并且总部应从提高监督的有效性、子公司操纵业绩的惩罚系数、子公司绩效操纵难度系数、盈利能力和降低努力成本系数五个方面着手,降低子公司绩效信息操纵程度.集团据此建立绩效信息管理机制,提高集团绩效信息管理效率和效果.     

公共信息产品与最佳完全契约

委托-代理理论对于建立完全契约,防治机会主义行为具有重要意义.讨论了三种参数化的委托-代理模型,通过比较分析得出:在委托代理契约中,若代理人在职消费的信息以及所有公司平均净资产报酬率的信息能体现在契约条款中,并以现金为基础来评价代理人的经营业绩,则代理契约的完全程度将增加,其激励程度也将增强,代理成本将降低.但所有公司的平均净资产报酬率是一个公共信息产品,只有政府提供才具有权威性.因此只要政府提供了相关的公共信息产品,完善了相关的制度环境,最佳完全契约是可以实现的.     

两阶段双任务委托代理情形下煤矿安全管理激励机制

煤矿企业安全监管效能低下一直困扰煤炭行业的重大问题,监管效能低下的根本原因是煤矿企业的委托代理激励机制的失衡,进而导致在安全产出中搭便车行为大量存在.煤矿的委托代理问题是一个多阶段多任务的动态问题,因此构造了一个两阶段双任务的委托代理模型.在模型第二阶段中煤矿职工能够通过对第一阶段信息的学习了解自身努力与回报之间的映射,进而决定自己在两项任务的委托代理中努力程度的付出.通过模型的分析得到:煤炭生产任务的正向激励会对煤矿职工在安全产出方面的努力程度造成负面的影响,且煤矿职工在完成安全产出任务方面的能力越高,在此方面努力程度就下降的越慢,降低截断水平能够导致更多的职工在第二阶段的工作中提高努力水平,进而减少搭便车行为.     

高科技企业创业社会网络构建的委托代理机制

本文比较了高科技企业创业社会网络构建的委托代理关系与传统意义上的委托代理关系的差异；考虑创业社会网络（个体）的成长因素，建立了创业社会网络构建的单期委托代理模型和三期委托代理模型，并进行了比较分析，提出高科技企业创业社会网络的构建必须关注对象的多元化、能力的差异化、激励的滞后化、观念的动态化。     

代建制中委托代理的激励、监督与合谋防范

在推行代建制的过程中,信息的不对称不可避免,易引发道德风险,因而在当前相关法规和信用机制都不健全的情况下,如何有效保证政府投资人的利益备受关注.针对该问题,基于委托-代理理论和优化理论,突破传统的单变量建模方法,将严格监管、有效激励与合谋防范纳入政府代建项目管理的框架,分别建立了以努力变量为多维变量的激励合同和监管模型,以及项目管理公司与承包商之间的合谋防范模型.最终建立了由政府投资人、项目管理公司及承包商等三大主体组成代建制的委托代理体系.     

逆向信息和道德风险下的供应链线性激励契约研究

本文我们利用委托代理理论，研究了供应商和零售商之间的利益博弈．考察了两类不对称信息——逆向信息和道德风险并存下的供应链线性契约．通过把问题归结为一个二层规划问题，求解得到了相关结论：与道德风险下的线性契约[12]相比，两类不对称信息的存在，使得对零售商的激励变得更加复杂．通过数值试验，比较了线性甄别契约和线性混同契约，发现对于作为委托人的供应商而言，甄别契约比汇同契约更有效率．     

Managing risks in information systems outsourcing: An approach to analyzing outsourcing risks and structuring incentive contracts

Information systems outsourcing is now almost standard practice for many companies. Outsourcing the information processing activities is a complex issue that entails considerable implications for the strategy of the firm. An important mechanism for managing the performance of outsourcing vendors is incentive contracts. But to develop an outsourcing contract the IS manager must quantify risks and benefits. However methods and tools for analyzing and quantifying outsourcing risks that IS managers have at their disposal are rudimentary. In this paper we offer a method and some mathematical models for analyzing risks and constructing incentive contracts for IS outsourcing. We are aware that most managers do not like to use mathematical models, consequently we have minimized the technical discussion and have illustrated how this model could be implemented using spreadsheet software for ease of use.     

“高水位”法下私募基金经理的激励与风险选择

私募基金契约本质上是一种复杂的委托—代理关系。本文基于现行私募基金行业标准的“2-20”合同,在委托代理框架下,结合前景理论,讨论了“高水位”法对基金经理的激励效应及其导致的冒险行为。研究发现,在高水位激励下产生“承诺升级”现象,当基金经理在评估期对基金业绩超过“高水位”持乐观信念时,经理倾向采用保守型投资策略;反之其倾向激进的投资策略。由此提出“2-20”合同改进：业绩激励乘数随着基金经理的差异信念而时变,同时纳入对基金风险范围的约束,以防范代理投资过程中的过度冒险问题。     

隐性约束机制的设计研究

文章研究在多阶段动态博弈情况下隐蔽行为的隐性约束机制设计问题，用博弈论方法和信息经济学的委托-代理理论方法，建立多阶段委托-代理关系约束问题重复博弈的声誉模型，对隐蔽行为的隐性约束机制进行研究，证明了多阶段委托-代理关系中隐性约束机制的存在，给出了这种情况下的有效约束条件，隐性约束机制的设计方法以及其他结论。     

风险内生的委托代理模型研究

证券投资基金的委托代理关系与一般的委托代理关系不同,在一般的委托代理关系中,产出的风险是外生的,而基金产出的风险是内生的,即风险是由基金管理人来选择的.在模型假设的背景下,在不考虑基金管理人的努力成本时,基金委托代理关系中不存在道德风险问题.如果考虑基金管理人的努力成本,当其行为不可观测时,基金投资者无法通过契约参数的变化来影响基金管理人的努力水平,但此时投资组合的风险水平将低于基金管理人行为可观测时的情况.实证研究证实了基金收益分享比例与基金管理人努力程度无关的模型推论.     

Contagion in cyber security attacks

Systems security is essential for the efficient operation of all organizations. Indeed, most large firms employ a designated ‘Chief Information Security Officer’ to coordinate the operational aspects of the organization’s information security. Part of this role is in planning investment responses to information security threats against the firm’s corporate network infrastructure. To this end, we develop and estimate a vector equation system of threats to 10 important IP services, using industry standard SANS data on threats to various components of a firm’s information system over the period January 2003 – February 2011. Our results reveal strong evidence of contagion between such attacks, with attacks on ssh and Secure Web Server indicating increased attack activity on other ports. Security managers who ignore such contagious inter-relationships may underestimate the underlying risk to their systems’ defence of security attributes, such as sensitivity and criticality, and thus delay appropriate information security investments.     

A Computational Model of Technological Innovation at the Firm Level

The factors which speed and slow technological innovation have been of interest to policy makers since at least the mid 1960's. Since that time, many theoretical models of innovation at the firm level and at the industry level have been proposed. Due to limitations in computational complexity, nearly all of these models have assumed a single, representative firm type. Very few have systematically investigated the implications of markets with a variety of firm types. With increases in computing power and the advent of agent-based modeling, interactions between agent types can now be explored. In this paper, a computational model of innovative firms in competitive markets is presented. Firms devote resources to R&D which can lead to new, improved products allowing firms to steal market share from their competitors. Two types of firms, differentiated by the strategies they use in pursuing new innovations, are allowed to coexist. One type pursues exclusively radical innovations, while the other pursues exclusively incremental innovations. It will be demonstrated that under certain conditions, a synergy exists between firms of different types which allows heterogeneous populations of firms to earn more than homogeneous ones.     

Solving nonlinear principal-agent problems using bilevel programming

While significant progress has been made, analytic research on principal-agent problems that seek closed-form solutions faces limitations due to tractability issues that arise because of the mathematical complexity of the problem. The principal must maximize expected utility subject to the agent’s participation and incentive compatibility constraints. Linearity of performance measures is often assumed and the Linear, Exponential, Normal (LEN) model is often used to deal with this complexity. These assumptions may be too restrictive for researchers to explore the variety of relationships between compensation contracts offered by the principal and the effort of the agent. In this paper we show how to numerically solve principal-agent problems with nonlinear contracts. In our procedure, we deal directly with the agent’s incentive compatibility constraint. We illustrate our solution procedure with numerical examples and use optimization methods to make the problem tractable without using the simplifying assumptions of a LEN model. We also show that using linear contracts to approximate nonlinear contracts leads to solutions that are far from the optimal solutions obtained using nonlinear contracts. A principal-agent problem is a special instance of a bilevel nonlinear programming problem. We show how to solve principal-agent problems by solving bilevel programming problems using the ellipsoid algorithm. The approach we present can give researchers new insights into the relationships between nonlinear compensation schemes and employee effort.     

随机波动率环境下企业内生破产的期权博弈分析

将企业破产作为委托人-代理人的博弈问题,应用期权博弈分析的方法讨论此问题．在企业的资产价值的波动率服从快速均值回复OU过程的假设下,导出各博弈方的权益满足的偏微分方程,利用Taylor级数展开及求解一组Poisson方程的技巧,得到各博弈方的价值表达式．进而,讨论各博弈方的破产决策;企业的投资决策;融资决策以及贷方避免在破产时遭受损失的激励合同．最后,总结波动率的随机性对文献结论的影响．