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1.
在支付矩阵和约束条件都是灰色的情况下,给出灰双矩阵博弈的一般形式,并且定义了灰双矩阵博弈的均衡解,证明灰双矩阵博弈的均衡解可由求解一个非线性规划问题得到.  相似文献   

2.
熊国强  张毅 《运筹与管理》2019,28(9):99-106
针对经典博弈理论“理性人”假设存在的局限性,将RDEU博弈模型与复杂系统脆性理论集成来研究情绪因素影响下城市拆迁的冲突演化问题。首先基于新的RDEU理论将参与人的情绪因素融入期望效用函数中,给出了地方政府、被拆迁人的RDEU期望收益函数,构建了城市拆迁的RDEU博弈模型,讨论了情绪影响下被拆迁人采取抗争策略和地方政府采取强拆策略的行为演化规律。随后基于熵和元胞自动机建立了城市拆迁的系统脆性演化规则,模拟了城市拆迁由纠纷演化为对抗冲突的脆性激发过程。研究结果表明:无论是被拆迁人还是地方政府,当他们具有“悲观”情绪时,随着情绪的加剧,他们采取强硬策略相互对抗的可能性会增大,悲观情绪会使城市拆迁系统崩溃所需的时间缩短,拆迁纠纷会快速演化为对抗冲突。最后提出了相应的对策建议。  相似文献   

3.
在合作博弈中,Shapley单点解按照参与者对联盟的边际贡献率对联盟的收益进行分配.联盟收益具有不确定性,往往不能用精确数值表示,更多学者关注特征函数取值为有限区间的合作博弈(区间合作博弈)的收益分配.文章利用矩阵半张量积,研究区间合作博弈中含有折扣因子的Shapley区间值的矩阵计算.首先利用矩阵的半张量积将合作博弈的特征函数表示为矩阵形式,得到特征函数区间矩阵.然后通过构造区间合作博弈Shapley矩阵,将区间合作博弈的Shapley值(区间)计算转化为矩阵形式.最后利用区间合作博弈Shapley值矩阵公式计算分析航空公司供应链联盟收益的Shapley值.文章给出的区间合作博弈Shapley值的矩阵计算公式形式简洁,为区间合作博弈的研究提供了新的思路.  相似文献   

4.
研究沉默策略对囚徒困境博弈合作水平的影响.在博弈中玩家得到的利益不能达到期望值时,大部分的玩家会选择沉默来避免在博弈中的损失,在下一次的博弈中再选择有利的策略来获取更多的收益.利用矩阵的半张量积方法,建立带有沉默策略的网络化囚徒困境博弈演化的数学模型,并结合逻辑的矩阵表达,将其表示成代数形式.最后讨论博弈的最终合作水平并给出实例.  相似文献   

5.
在合作博弈的一般模型中总是假设所有联盟都能形成。不过,在实际中由于受到一些因素的制约,有些联盟是不能形成的。基于此,Myerson提出了具有图通讯结构的合作博弈。Myerson值和Position值是超图博弈上的两个重要分配规则。2005年,Slikker给出了在图博弈上Position值的公理化刻画。但超图博弈上Position值的公理化刻画一直悬而未决。本文通过引入 “赋权平衡超边贡献公理”,并结合经典的“分支有效性”,提出了超图博弈上赋权Position值的公理化刻画。作为推论,解决了超图博弈上Position值的公理化刻画问题。  相似文献   

6.
生产能力储备是突发事件应急物资储备的有效储备方案之一,是基于联合储备的政企演化博弈过程.运用演化博弈理论,在考虑收益、成本、环境、风险等要素的基础上,给出政府和企业选择不同策略下政企演化博弈的支付矩阵,构建政府和企业演化博弈模型,利用系统的相位图分析政府与企业博弈过程的演化路径,得到政企演化博弈系统收敛的最佳均衡点.最后,运用Netlogo5.2.0软件,分析相关参数的变化对政企演化博弈方向的影响,并进行数值模拟,验证模型方法的有效性,并给出相关政策建议.  相似文献   

7.
不确定型的行为控制较之确定型的行为控制更为复杂,但在现实中又有一定的广泛性,且目前的研究基础比较薄弱.把研究的视角放在不确定性回报下行为控制的博弈机理上,考察了博弈双方的行为观测偏差,定义了在信息不对称条件下管理者对被管理者的行为的观测矩阵、管理者的博弈策略矩阵、被管理者对管理者观测能力的估计矩阵及对管理者博弈策略的估计矩阵等,分析了管理者与被管理者之间的动态博弈过程和行为策略选择,给出了满足博弈均衡的不确定性回报的设计要求.这些都可以推广应用于各种具体管理制度的设计和改进当中,为行为控制研究提供了定量分析的新方法.在此基础上,选择房地产投资开发行为控制机制的实例进行了诊断研究.  相似文献   

8.
林杨  王应明 《运筹学学报》2010,24(1):155-162
针对带有不确定偏好序的双边匹配问题,现有方法大都仅注重整体收益之和,忽略了参与人的个体收益以及在交互选择中的策略运用.基于最大满意度准则,给出不确定序下的收益(满意度)矩阵的推导过程;然后,从个体理性视角,结合矩阵博弈的思想构建一种兼顾整体和个体收益的博弈匹配优化模型,并证明模型最优解满足纳什均衡.最后,进一步探讨各种策略选择及其优劣分析.  相似文献   

9.
应用Mathematica软件中的LinearProgramming函数求解矩阵博弈及给出几个例子.  相似文献   

10.
拥有"暂停期权"的不对称双寡头投资博弈模型   总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2  
对于许多项目而言,投资商普遍拥有在利润流为负数时暂停生产、在利润流为正数时重启生产的“暂停期权”。文献[13]提出了拥有“暂停期权”的对称性双寡头投资博弈模型,本文针对文献[13]的博弈模型中两个投资项目是同质的这一不足,假定项目的投资成本及经营成本不对称,提出了更具现实意义的拥有“暂停期权”的不对称双寡头投资博弈模型,给出了不同情况下两投资商的投资均衡策略,并用案例对此做了进一步的诠释。  相似文献   

11.
矩阵对策的公平性研究   总被引:3,自引:1,他引:2  
众所周知,零和二人有限对策也称为矩阵对策。设做一个矩阵对策的两个局中人都希望对策结果尽可能公平。当两个局中人使用对策解中的策略进行对策时,如果对策结果最公平,那么这个对策解称为最优的。本文证明了最优对策解集的一些性质,然后给出矩阵对策公平度的概念并证明了它的一些有趣的性质。  相似文献   

12.
将求解一般0-1策略对策的完全混合Nash均衡的问题转化为求解根为正的纯小数的高次代数方程组的问题.作为一种特殊而重要的情形,利用Pascal矩阵,Newton矩阵(对角元素为Newton二项式系数的对角矩阵)和Pascal-Newton矩阵(Pascal矩阵和Newton矩阵的逆阵的乘积)将求解对称0-1对策的完全混合Nash均衡的问题转化为求解根为正的纯小数的高次代数方程的问题,并给出第二问题的反问题(由完全混合Nash均衡求解对称0-1对策族)的求解方法.同时,给出了一些算例来说明对应问题的算法.  相似文献   

13.
Luck can play a big part in tournament success, and progress is not necessarily the best measure of performance. A linear model is used to fit least squares ratings to margins of victory in the cricket World Cup. The Duckworth/Lewis rain interruption rules are used to project a winning second innings score and create a margin of victory in runs, equivalent to that used when the team batting first wins. Results show that, while the better teams progressed through the first round of the competition, some injustices occurred in the Super-Six round. This appears to be due to the double counting of selected matches. Ordering teams by average margin of victory gives similar results to the more complicated linear model, and its use as a tie breaker is suggested. Publication of the margin of victory as estimated by the Duckworth/Lewis method for second innings victories in all one-day matches would provide a common margin of victory suitable for analysis.  相似文献   

14.
首先给出了互反判断矩阵与一致性互反判断矩阵集之间距离的定义,基于此定义,提出了一个新的互反判断矩阵一致性指标,并给出了此一致性指标的度量方法。对于不满足此一致性指标的互反判断矩阵,提出了一个迭代算法来提高其一致性程度。得出了群体互反判断矩阵一致性指标的下界,为提出的一致性指标应用于群决策问题提供了理论基础。最后用数值例子说明了该迭代算法的可行性和有效性以及群决策中的相关结论。  相似文献   

15.
本文为网球运动员提供了如何选择快发球和慢发球的策略来提高赢球的概率 .通过用决策树表示F F,F S,SF,SS几种不同的策略 ,根据最大概率和最大期望值准则提出了概率意义下的最佳策略 ,考虑到网球运动的特点 ,为赢得全盘的胜利又制订了 BT策略 .最后 ,通过计算机模拟对两种策略进行了比较 .  相似文献   

16.
In sport tournaments in which teams are matched two at a time, it is useful for a variety of reasons to be able to quantify how important a particular game is. The need for such quantitative information has been addressed in the literature by several more or less simple measures of game importance. In this paper, we point out some of the drawbacks of those measures and we propose a different approach, which rather targets how decisive a game is with respect to the final victory. We give a definition of this idea of game decisiveness in terms of the uncertainty about the eventual winner prevailing in the tournament at the time of the game. As this uncertainty is strongly related to the notion of entropy of a probability distribution, our decisiveness measure is based on entropy-related concepts. We study the suggested decisiveness measure on two real tournaments, the 1988 NBA Championship Series and the UEFA 2012 European Football Championship (Euro 2012), and we show how well it agrees with what intuition suggests. Finally, we also use our decisiveness measure to objectively analyse the recent UEFA decision to expand the European Football Championship from 16 to 24 nations in the future, in terms of the overall attractiveness of the competition.  相似文献   

17.
We are concerned with an antagonistic stochastic game between two players A and B which finds applications in economics and warfare. The actions of the players are manifested by a series of strikes of random magnitudes at random times exerted by each player against his opponent. Each of the assaults inflicts a random damage to enemy's vital areas. In contrast with traditional games, in our setting, each player can endure multiple strikes before perishing. Predicting the ruin time (exit) of player A, along with the total amount of casualties to both players at the exit is a main objective of this work. In contrast to the time sensitive analysis (earlier developed to refine the information on the game) we insert auxiliary control levels, which both players will cross in due game before the ruin of A. This gives A (and also B) an additional opportunity to reevaluate his strategy and change the course of the game. We formalize such a game and also allow the real time information about the game to be randomly delayed. The delayed exit time, cumulative casualties to both players, and prior crossings are all obtained in a closed-form joint functional.  相似文献   

18.
基于建设节约型社会和保护资源环境的需要,提出了一类特殊的双层规划问题,即B规划.给出了B规划的数学模型、有关理论和求解方法.最后还给出了B规划在矩阵对策中的一个应用.我们把局中人设有得失控制值的对策问题称为稳妥型对策.稳妥型矩阵对策可化为B规划问题求解.  相似文献   

19.
Laplace矩阵的谱半径一直是近年来谱图理论的研究热点.本文主要讨论有向图Laplace矩阵的谱半径,用顶点的出度和公共邻域数给出了谱半径上界,用图的最大出度给出了一些特殊图类谱半径的下界.  相似文献   

20.
A coplanar aerial dogfight is analyzed by assuming constant, not necessarily identical, speeds and individual maximum turning rates and lethal ranges. A combatant (A) is assumed to be victorious when his opponent (B) has been maneuvered into a relative position within A's lethal range and in the direction of A's velocity. Three variables are required to define the instantaneous “state” of the game, namely the relative position (2) and the angle (1) between their velocities. A computer program has been constructed to divide the 3-dimensional region of possible initial (and subsequent) states into regions corresponding to victory by one or the other combatant, and, if the faster combatant has the smaller lethal range, a “no contest” region corresponding to escape by the faster combatant. The critical separating surface (or surfaces) is composed of a number of pieces corresponding to initial conditions leading either to simultaneous kill or to “near miss” situations of one type or another. Optimal play is defined in the immediate neighborhood of the entire separating surface, guaranteeing victory (or escape) to one combatant or the other, depending on location on one side or the other of the separating surface.  相似文献   

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