Consignment contracts with retail competition

Consignment contracts have been widely employed in many industries. Under such contracts, items are sold at a retailer’s but the supplier retains the full ownership of the inventory until purchased by consumers; the supplier collects payment from the retailer based on actual units sold. We investigate how competition among retailers influences the supply chain decisions and profits under different consignment arrangements, namely a consignment price contract and a consignment contract with revenue share. First, we investigate how these two consignment contracts and a price only contract compare from the perspective of each supply chain partner. We find that the retailers benefit more from a consignment price contract than from a consignment contract with revenue share or a price only contract, regardless of the level of retailer differentiation. The supplier’s most beneficial contact, however, critically depends upon the level of retailer differentiation: a consignment contract with revenue share is preferable for the supplier if retailer differentiation is strong; otherwise a consignment price contract is preferable. Second, we study how retailer differentiation affects the profits of all supply chain partners. We find that less retailer differentiation improves the supplier’s profit for both types of consignment contract. Moreover, less retailer differentiation improves profits of the retailers in a consignment price contract, but not necessarily in a consignment contract with revenue share.     

Optimal promotion planning—depth and frequency—for a two-stage supply chain under Markov switching demand

In considering the retailer–supplier supply chain, this paper analyzes how a retailer reasonably decides both the depth and frequency of the price discount promotion including or excluding a supplier’s inventory decision. Assuming that the promotion frequency used by the retailer is probabilistic, we model a promotion-inventory decision under an AR(1) demand with a Markov switching promotion regime. After obtaining the optimal promotion plan, our analysis also considers the behavior of the optimal promotion decision; the retailer’s price format selection, either an Every-Day-Low-Price policy (EDLP) or a Promotion policy (HiLo); and the impact of information sharing of promotion status on the system’s performance. Our results suggest that a retailer tends to overpromote if inventory cost is excluded in its promotion decision, that increasing the market share is a preferable action for both the retailer and the supplier, that total margin and price-elasticity play an important role in selecting the price format, and that the profitability for a supplier of sharing promotion information depends on the transition probabilities of the Markov switching regime.     

An uncooperative order model for items with trade credit,inventory-dependent demand and limited displayed-shelf space

This paper considers a two-echelon supply chain where a supplier sells a single product through a retailer, who faces an inventory-dependent demand. The supplier hopes to incentive the retailer to order more items by offering trade credit. The retailer places the ordered items on the display shelf (DS) with limited space and stocks the remaining items (if any) that exceed the shelf capacity in his/her backroom/warehouse (BW). From the supplier’s perspective, we focus mainly on under which conditions the supplier should offer trade credit and how he/she should design such trade credit policy and corresponding ordering policy to obtain much more benefits. From the retailer’s perspective, we discuss whether the retailer needs BW and exactly how many items need to be stocked in BW when the supplier offers trade credit. We formulate a “supplier-Stackelberg” game model, from which we obtain the conditions under which the presented simple trade credit policy not only increases the overall chain profit but also each member’s profit. We also show that the trade credit policy is always more beneficial to the retailer than to the supplier if it is offered.     

Random yield supply chain with a yield dependent secondary market

This paper considers a simple supply chain with one supplier and one retailer where the supplier’s production is subject to random yield and the retailer faces uncertain demand. There exists a secondary market for acquiring or disposing products by the supplier. We study both the centralized and decentralized systems. In the decentralized system, a no risk sharing contract and a risk sharing minimum commitment contract are analyzed. The supply chain with the risk sharing contract is further analyzed with a constant secondary market price and a yield dependent secondary market price. We present both the supplier’s and the retailer’s optimal strategies and provide insights for managers when making decisions under random yield risk and demand uncertainty. We find that the secondary market generally has a positive impact on supply chain performance and the actual effect of random yield risk on the supply chain performance depends on cost parameters and supply chain contract settings. Under certain conditions, reducing yield randomness may weaken the double marginalization effect and improve the chain performance. From the numerical study, we also show that there exists an optimal commitment level for the supply chain.     

A dynamic model of supplier switching

While a broad branch of literature deals with the development of buyer–supplier relationships, limited research exists under which circumstances a buyer should terminate such a relationship and switch to a new supplier. Recently, Wagner and Friedl (2007) have developed a framework to analyze a static one-shot supplier switching decision when the buyer has asymmetric information about the supplier’s production costs. We extend their basic framework to a dynamic one, assuming that the supplier learns the production costs over time when he sets up the production process. Since the supplier’s cost information at the individual stages crucially determines the setup and the switching decision, it becomes essential for supply chain management to provide proper incentives so that the supplier reveals his cost information truthfully over time. We characterize the optimal setup and switching strategy as well as the optimal supply chain contract. We also compare our findings with those of the static setting to provide further insights.     

Optimal credit period and lot size for deteriorating items with expiration dates under two-level trade credit financing

In a supplier-retailer-buyer supply chain, the supplier frequently offers the retailer a trade credit of S periods, and the retailer in turn provides a trade credit of R periods to her/his buyer to stimulate sales and reduce inventory. From the seller’s perspective, granting trade credit increases sales and revenue but also increases opportunity cost (i.e., the capital opportunity loss during credit period) and default risk (i.e., the percentage that the buyer will not be able to pay off her/his debt obligations). Hence, how to determine credit period is increasingly recognized as an important strategy to increase seller’s profitability. Also, many products such as fruits, vegetables, high-tech products, pharmaceuticals, and volatile liquids not only deteriorate continuously due to evaporation, obsolescence and spoilage but also have their expiration dates. However, only a few researchers take the expiration date of a deteriorating item into consideration. This paper proposes an economic order quantity model for the retailer where: (a) the supplier provides an up-stream trade credit and the retailer also offers a down-stream trade credit, (b) the retailer’s down-stream trade credit to the buyer not only increases sales and revenue but also opportunity cost and default risk, and (c) deteriorating items not only deteriorate continuously but also have their expiration dates. We then show that the retailer’s optimal credit period and cycle time not only exist but also are unique. Furthermore, we discuss several special cases including for non-deteriorating items. Finally, we run some numerical examples to illustrate the problem and provide managerial insights.     

Optimizing inventory decisions in a two-level supply chain with order quantity constraints

A fundamental assumption in traditional inventory models is that all of the ordered items are of perfect quality. A two-level supply chain is considered consists of one retailer and a collection of suppliers that operate within a finite planning horizon, including multiple periods, and a model is formulated that simultaneously determines both supplier selection and inventory allocation problems in the supply chain. It is supposed that the ordered products dependent on the suppliers include a certain percentage of imperfect quality products and have different prices. In this paper, we study the impact of the retailer’s financial constraint. On the other hand, suppliers have restricted capacities and set minimum order quantity (MOQ) policy for the retailer’s order amount happened in each period. So, the problem is modeled as a mixed integer nonlinear programming. The purpose of this model is to maximize the total profit. The nutrients, fishery and fruitage industries give good examples for the proposed model. A numerical example is presented to indicate the efficiency of the proposed model. Considering the complexity of the model, a genetic algorithm (GA) is presented to solve the model. We demonstrate analytically that the proposed genetic algorithm is suitable in the feasible situations.     

Wholesale-price contract of supply chain with information gathering

This paper investigates a wholesale-price contract of supply chain under the endogenous information structure. This supply chain consists of one supplier and one retailer during the selling season. The retailer does not know his selling cost but can spend resources to acquire information. The supplier offers a contract, which induces the retailer to gather information and generate more production orders with beta costs. We find that there exists an upper bound of the information gathering cost such that the supplier induces the retailer to gather information. The increasing cost of information gathering may decrease the order quantity and wholesale price. Moreover, the cost beta has an impact on the expected profits of the two parties. With the increasing cost of information gathering, the supplier’s expected profit is reduced, while that of the retailer becomes ambiguous in terms of the distribution function and the interval of selling cost information. Finally, a numerical example is presented to explain the main results.     

Retailer’s optimal replenishment and payment policies in the EPQ model under cash discount and two-level trade credit policy

The main purpose of this paper is to investigate the retailer’s optimal cycle time and optimal payment time under the supplier’s cash discount and trade credit policy within the economic production quantity (EPQ) framework. In this paper, we assume that the retailer will provide a full trade credit to his/her good credit customers and request his/her bad credit customers pay for the items as soon as receiving them. Under this assumption, we model the retailer’s inventory system as a cost minimization problem to determine the retailer’s optimal inventory cycle time and optimal payment time under the replenishment rate is finite. Then, an algorithm is established to obtain the optimal strategy. Finally, numerical examples are given to illustrate the theoretical results and obtain some managerial phenomena.     

A note on supply chain coordination for joint determination of order quantity and reorder point using a credit option

Credit options and side payments are two methods suggested for achieving coordination in a two-echelon supply chain. We examine the credit option coordination mechanism introduced by Chaharsooghi and Heydari [Chaharsooghi, S., & Heydari, J. (2010). Supply chain coordination for the joint determination of order quantity and reorder point using credit option. European Journal of Operational Research, 204(1), 86–95]. This method assumes that the supplier’s opportunity costs are equal to the reduction in the buyer’s financial holding costs during the credit period. In this note, we show that Chaharsooghi and Heydari’s method is not applicable when buyer and supplier opportunity costs are not equal. We introduce an alternate per order rebate method that reduces supply chain costs to centralized management levels.