具有不对称网络外部性和纵向差异化的产品竞争策略

在产品不完全覆盖市场中,研究具有不对称网络外部性的纵向差异化产品的Bertrand价格竞争或Cournot数量竞争策略.研究表明,两产品在Cournot数量竞争中的市场利润和社会福利都大于在Bertrand价格竞争中的市场利润和社会福利.在Bertrand价格竞争或Cournot数量竞争中,当低质量产品的网络外部性较大且满足一定条件时,低质量产品也可以获得较大的市场利润;当高质量产品具有较大网络外部性,或网络外部性虽然较小但满足一定条件条件,网络外部性相等或产品都不具有网络外部性时,高质量产品获得较大的市场利润.随着网络外部性的增强,Cournot-Nash均衡点并不稳定,在重复博弈以后,均衡点向Bertrand-Nash均衡点靠近.     

存在水平差异化的多寡头双边平台企业竞争研究

构建了多寡头双边平台企业竞争的Salop双环模型,研究了双边平台企业在不同规模下均衡解的存在性以及均衡解的结构。研究发现:不论双边平台企业规模如何,双边平台企业的收益不仅受平台对买卖双方制定的价格总量的影响,而且还受价格结构的影响;多寡头双边平台企业在竞争中存在明显的买方市场时,买方并不能获得类似单边市场里的主动权,且若卖方存在竞争,则无论买方是否存在竞争,均不存在均衡解;无论是买方竞争还是卖方竞争,若存在均衡解,则对双边平台企业、买方和卖方均有利,出现三方多赢的局面。     

2×2网络型寡头垄断市场结构下Cournot模型研究

通过对市场结构理论演变过程的回顾,认为以SCP范式为基础的传统市场结构分析框架越来越不适应于当前日益复杂的经济环境.基于此,本文提出了网络型市场结构的概念,分析了网络型市场结构的特征,讨论了网络结构型市场结构的分类,并提出了网络型市场结构的一般模式.接着,构建了网络型寡头垄断市场结构模型,分析了该模型的四个特性.之后,对2×2网络型寡头垄断市场结构存在的八种策略组合进行了合并整理,求出了在现实中经常采用的四种不同的策略组合下的Cournot产量均衡解、价格均衡解以及实现均衡时的利润.最后,通过一个算例对各个Cournot均衡解的特性进行了分析,并比较了四种策略组合的优劣.     

基于套期保值的双寡头零售商供应链均衡策略分析

考虑一个供应商和两个零售商构成的供应链,零售商在面对市场需求风险时决策是否采用套期保值来规避风险.文章分别分析了Cournot和Bertrand两种博弈情景.研究表明:两种博弈存在相同的纳什均衡,两个零售商都会采取套期保值策略.在Cournot博弈下,零售商通过套期保值能够为供应商带来更多的利润;而在Bertrand博弈下,零售商选择套期保值却会降低供应商的利润.相比Cournot博弈,供应商在Bertrand博弈下获利更高.     

在光伏制造企业联盟协议中的寡头竞争模型

利用博弈论对光伏制造企业的联盟合作行为进行了分析,首先通过古诺(Cournot)寡头竞争模型和战略联盟模型分析了光伏制造企业的产量和利润,然后分别研究了在光伏制造企业一次博弈和重复博弈情形下可能采取的策略,指出在重复博弈情形下光伏制造企业存在合作的可能性,光伏制造企业可以根据不同的贴现因子选择最佳策略.     

双寡头动态R&D竞合模型的构建与分析

放松了经典Cournot模型中市场容量不变的假设,构建了双寡头企业R&D动态竞争的Cournot模型,研究了双寡头在R&D投入和产量决策两个阶段完全竞争与完全合作情形下的均衡结果.结果表明增加新增市场容量可以提高企业的最佳R&D投入水平和均衡利润,并且可以维持更长久的博弈周期.结果还表明动态R&D竞争模型是对传统模型的进一步拓展,能适用于更广泛、更实际的竞争情形.     

减排技术视域下碳交易对企业市场势力的影响研究

碳交易促进减排技术进步须以技术进步增进寡头垄断企业市场势力为前提。论文以斯塔克博格(Stackberg)模型为基础，研究了减排技术是否成熟两种情况下，碳交易对寡头垄断企业产量及市场势力的影响。结果表明，尽管无论碳减排技术是否成熟，寡头企业初始碳排放系数相对大小都是影响企业产量及市场势力的关键变量，但是对企业产量及市场势力的影响迥异。在减排技术不成熟时，追随企业与领导企业初始碳排放系数的比值越大，碳交易越有利于领导企业增强市场势力，碳交易拉大企业间市场势力的差异；减排技术成熟时，追随企业与领导初始碳排放系数的比值越大，碳交易越有利于追随企业增强市场势力，碳交易缩小企业间市场势力的差异。在实施碳交易的过程中，须高度重视行业的竞争格局与减排的效率差异，防止行业进一步走向垄断。     

基于模糊机会约束规划的最优产量决策

研究了模糊环境下,双寡头市场中两企业的最优产量决策问题。在四种博弈结构下,结合Cournot模型、Stackelberg模型以及模糊可能性理论,建立了模糊机会约束规划模型来确定两企业的最优产量水平。最后通过一个算例说明,基于市场的最大收益,最优决策应为两企业均为追随者。     

双寡头动态定位定价博弈分析

本分析双寡头两阶段动态定位定价策略，首先两个企业同时选择地址，然后进行价格竞争。市场上有两种类型的消费，对企业提供的产品有不同的偏好，每个企业预测它对地址的选择会影响它的需求和竞争密度，给出了使企业利润最大的子博弈精练Nash均衡。     

寡头垄断市场三度价格歧视动态博弈分析

对两寡头厂商2元市场用完全信息动态博弈的方法分析了实施三度价格歧视情形和统一定价情形的均衡产量,均衡价格和均衡总收益,并研究了这两种情形三个指标之间的关系.结果显示,在两个子市场的需求函数为线性需求的条件下,统一定价的市场均衡产量等于歧视定价的市场均衡产量;统一定价的均衡价格是歧视定价时两个子市场均衡价格的加权平均;统一定价的市场均衡总收益小于歧视定价的市场均衡总收益.     

Controlled predatory pricing in a multiperiod Stackelberg game: an MPEC approach

We analyze a multiperiod oligopolistic market where each period is a Stackelberg game between a leader firm and multiple follower firms. The leader chooses his production level first, taking into account the reaction of the followers. Then, the follower firms decide their production levels after observing the leader’s decision. The difference between the proposed model and other models discussed in literature is that the leader firm has the power to force the follower firms out of business by preventing them from achieving a target sales level in a given time period. The leader firm has an incentive to lower the market prices possibly lower than the Stackelberg equilibrium in order to push the followers to sell less and eventually go out of business. Intentionally lowering the market prices to force competitors to fail is known as predatory pricing, and is illegal under antitrust laws since it negatively affects consumer welfare. In this work, we show that there exists a predatory pricing strategy where the market price is above the average cost and consumer welfare is preserved. We develop a mixed integer nonlinear problem (MINLP) that models the multiperiod Stackelberg game. The MINLP problem is transformed to a mixed integer linear problem (MILP) by using binary variables and piecewise linearization. A cutting plane algorithm is used to solve the resulting MILP. The results show that firms can engage in predatory pricing even if the average market price is forced to remain higher than the average cost. Furthermore, we show that in order to protect the consumers, antitrust laws can control predatory pricing by setting rules on consumer welfare.     

基于制造商技术创新水平的古诺与斯坦伯格博弈对比分析

研究了不同博弈模型下制造商产品策略的问题,建立并求解制造商在古诺博弈和斯坦伯格博弈下的模型。通过逆推法求解最优决策,进一步给出了两种博弈模型下的均衡解,并将结果加以对比,得出两种博弈模型对供应商的批发价格和利润、制造商的产品质量和利润的影响。研究表明:供应商的批发价格与博弈模型无关,只和市场规模有关;供应商的利润、制造商的产品质量和利润不仅与博弈模型相关还与制造商的技术创新水平有关。     

Launching new products through exclusive sales channels

When launching a new product, a manufacturer usually sells it through competing retailers under non-exclusive arrangements. Recently, many new products (cellphones, electronics, toys, etc.) are sold through a single sales channel via an exclusive arrangement. In this paper we present two separate models that examine these two arrangements. Each model is based on a Stackelberg game in which the manufacturer acts as the leader by setting the wholesale price and the retailers act as the followers by choosing their retail prices. For each model, we solve the Stackelberg game by determining the manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price and each retailer’s optimal retail price in equilibrium. Then we examine the conditions under which the manufacturer should sell the new product through an exclusive retailer. In addition, we examine the impact of postponing the wholesale price decision and the impact of demand uncertainty on the manufacturer’s optimal profit under both arrangements.     

Oligopoly games under asymmetric costs and an application to energy production

Oligopolies in which firms have different costs of production have been relatively under-studied. In contrast to models with symmetric costs, some firms may be inactive in equilibrium. (With symmetric costs, the results trivialize to all firms active or all firms inactive.) We concentrate on the linear demand structure with constant marginal but asymmetric costs. In static one-period models, we compare the number of active firms, i.e. the number of firms producing a positive quantity in equilibrium, across four different models of oligopoly: Cournot and Bertrand with homogeneous or differentiated goods. When firms have different costs, we show that, for fixed good type, Cournot always results in more active firms than Bertrand. Moreover, with a fixed market type, differentiated goods result in more active firms than homogeneous goods. In dynamic models, asymmetric costs induce different entry times into the market. We illustrate with a model of energy production in which multiple producers from costly but inexhaustible alternative sources such as solar or wind compete in a Cournot market against an oil producer with exhaustible supply.     

On the uniqueness of Cournot equilibrium in case of concave integrated price flexibility

We consider a class of homogeneous Cournot oligopolies with concave integrated price flexibility and convex cost functions. We provide new results about the semi-uniqueness and uniqueness of (Cournot) equilibria for the oligopolies that satisfy these conditions. The condition of concave integrated price flexibility is implied by (but does not imply) the log-concavity of a continuous decreasing price function. So, our results generalize previous results for decreasing log-concave price functions and convex cost functions. We also discuss the particular type of quasi-concavity that characterizes the conditional revenue and profit functions of the firms in these oligopolies and we point out an error of the literature on the equilibrium uniqueness in oligopolies with log-concave price functions. Finally, we explain how the condition of concave integrated price flexibility relates to other conditions on the price and aggregate revenue functions usually considered in the literature, e.g., their concavity.     

Oligopolistic markets with leadership,cooperative followers and a multivalued inverse demand function

We consider an oligopolistic market with a leader, finitely many followers and a multivalued inverse demand function. By assuming that there exist cooperative behaviors of followers, we introduce the notions of Stackelberg Cournot equilibria for markets with nontransferable utilities and transferable utilities. We shall prove their existence theorems in our models.     

A Stackelberg game and its improvement in a VMI system with a manufacturing vendor

Vendor managed inventory (VMI) is an inventory management strategy to let a vendor manage his retailers’ inventories, which makes the vendor have the opportunity to obtain some inventory and market-related information of his retailers. This paper discusses how the vendor can take advantage of this information for increasing his own profit by using a Stackelberg game in a VMI system. The vendor here is a manufacturer who procures raw materials to produce a finished product and supplies it at the same wholesale price to multiple retailers. The retailers then sell the product in independent markets at retail prices. Solution procedures are developed to find the Stackelberg game equilibrium that each enterprise is not willing to deviate from for maximizing his own profit. The equilibrium makes the manufacturer benefited, and the retailers’ profits maximized. The equilibrium can then be improved for further benefiting the manufacturer and his retailers if the retailers are willing to cooperate with the manufacturer by using a cooperative contract. Finally, a numerical example and the corresponding sensitivity analysis are given to illustrate that: (1) the manufacturer can benefit from his leadership, and monopolize the added profit of the VMI system in some cases; (2) The manufacturer can further improve his own profit, and then the retailers’ profits by the cooperative contract, as compared to the Stackelberg equilibrium; (3) market and raw material related parameters have significant influence on every enterprise’s net profit.     

Leader-Follower Equilibria for Electric Power and NO x Allowances Markets

This paper investigates the ability of the largest producer in an electricity market to manipulate both the electricity and emission allowances markets to its advantage. A Stackelberg game to analyze this situation is constructed in which the largest firm plays the role of the leader, while the medium-sized firms are treated as Cournot followers with price-taking fringes that behave competitively in both markets. Since there is no explicit representation of the best-reply function for each follower, this Stackelberg game is formulated as a large-scale mathematical program with equilibrium constraints. The best-reply functions are implicitly represented by a set of nonlinear complementarity conditions. Analysis of the computed solution for the Pennsylvania–New Jersey–Maryland electricity market shows that the leader can gain substantial profits by withholding allowances and driving up NO _x allowance costs for rival producers. The allowances price is higher than the corresponding price in the Nash–Cournot case, although the electricity prices are essentially the same.We are grateful to two anonymous referees for their insightful comments that helped us improve the paper. This work is partially supported by NSF grants CS 0080577 and 0224817, by USEPA STAR grant R82873101-0, and by the Mathematical, Information, and Computational Sciences Division subprogram of the Office of Advanced Scientific Computing Research, Office of Science, U.S. Department of Energy, under Contract W-31-109-Eng-38. Any opinions or errors are the responsibility of the authors and not the sponsoring agencies.