官员腐败的经济学分析及对策研究——基于信号传递博弈模型

针对官员腐败现象,从经济学的视角出发,在信息不对称条件下展开分析,基于斯宾塞的劳动力模型弓l入信号传递模型的建立廉洁声誉信号博弈模型.通过分析,得出官员选择存在逆向选择问题的结论,并进一步研究了分离精炼贝叶斯均衡及其影响.在分离均衡范围一定存在的情况下,建立财产公示制度、加强监督、提高查处力度以及高薪养廉对策能配合模型系统地提高反腐效果.     

逆向选择与伯川德竞争下两期保险完全分离均衡

多期保险作为单期保险自选机制的一种补充,是一种重要的动态风险分类方法,有利于控制逆向选择风险.在伯川德竞争假设下,研究两期保险完全分离均衡存在的充要条件.首先,建立了两期保险问题的动态博弈模型,然后,通过分析投保人的激励相容约束与个人合理性约束推导出完全分离均衡存在的充要条件,并在直观标准下对均衡结果进行精炼,论证结果表明,这一最优均衡使得信号传递成本达到最小.     

全支付拍卖模型的信息结构及其对均衡的影响分析——纪念李国平院士吴新谋教授诞辰100周年

研究全支付拍卖模型中参与人的参与结构以及均衡问题.首先给出了非对称信息下参与人的参与选择问题,分析了异质参与人的参与选择. 尔后给出了参与人参与均衡策略,给出当参与人估价分布函数在对称和非对称情形时, 竞赛中的对称均衡策略.最后给出了当均衡存在时, 竞争对手对均衡分布函数的估计.     

全支付拍卖模型的信息结构及其对均衡的影响分析

研究全支付拍卖模型中参与人的参与结构以及均衡问题.首先给出了非对称信息下参与人的参与选择问题,分析了异质参与人的参与选择.尔后给出了参与人参与均衡策略,给出当参与人估价分布函数在对称和非对称情形时,竞赛中的对称均衡策略.最后给出了当均衡存在时,竞争对手对均衡分布函数的估计.     

极大极小投资组合选择模型和均衡价格系统

讨论了市场上不存在无风险资产条件下投资组合选择的极大极小模型,推导出市场上不存在无风险资产时极大极小模型的最优投资策略和有效前沿,得到了资本市场均衡时存在唯一的非负均衡价格系统的充分必要条件和各资产均衡价格的解析表达式.     

路段关联影响下出行路径选择的一个非线性互补模型

在网络供需都不确定的情况下,提出一个考虑路段关联的路径选择模型.假定网络中每一用户的路径选择效用受到三个因素的影响:出行时间均值、出行成本均值和以出行时间方差表现的出行时间可靠性.在出行路径选择效用最大化前提下,修改了出行阻抗单调可分的常见假设,考虑出行阻抗非单调且不可分的情形,建立了模型的均衡公式和约束条件.探讨了模型解的存在性和唯一性特征,并将之表示为一个非线性互补问题,研究非线性互补问题的解得到结论:其唯一性不保证.最后用一个小型网络进行测试来表现模型的特征,测试结果表明出行阻抗的非单调、不可分性质通过影响出行时间方差来影响网络均衡流分配,造成均衡路段和路径阻抗的增加.     

具有随机需求的多种差异产品供应链网络均衡模型研究

针对产品的品牌和产地存在的差异性,研究了供应链网络的均衡模型,构建了具有随机需求的多种差异产品的供应链网络均衡模型.运用随机效用理论和多项式logit模型分析了需求市场上产品的随机选择问题,利用变分不等式的形式给出了制造商、零售商,需求市场以及整个供应链网络的均衡条件,并给出了经济解释.最后,通过算例验证了模型的合理性.     

基于演化博弈理论的知识服务网络复制动态模型

在知识服务网络中,知识供应方和知识需求方在传递知识的过程中进行着重复博弈,并根据收益矩阵选择有利策略逐渐模仿,最终采用某个策略达到了演化稳定均衡状态.首先,根据演化博弈理论,建立了知识服务网络的复制动态演化博弈模型.然后,采用多智能体建模仿真方法及Netlogo仿真平台对所建模型进行仿真分析.最后,通过仿真分析得到在不同的初始情况下,知识主体最终的演化稳定策略与各主体中采取合作策略的初始比例和鞍点的大小关系有关,验证了所建立模型的正确性.     

一个带产品定价约束的竞争选址双层规划模型及其求解算法

以大型连锁卖场的选址为研究背景,提出了一个在竞争环境下使获利最大的竞争选址定价双层规划模型,其中上层模型做出选址决策,下层模型确定产品的纳什均衡价格.将设施效用引入到模型中,用指数效用函数来刻画顾客的购物行为偏好,首次证明了不合作状态下双方价格均衡解的存在性和唯一性,并给出了求解最优设施点设置方案和价格均衡解的算法思想及数值算例.     

石油价格波动对粮食价格的传导效应研究——基于APT-ECM模型的实证检验

石油价格是影响粮食价格走势的重要因素,将传统的误差修正模型(ECM)改进,并加入农业生产资料价格作为石油价格向粮食价格传递的中间变量,分析了石油价格和农资价格在上涨和下跌阶段对粮食价格传递的非对称性,此外还对石油价格与粮食价格间的传导效率和传导强度进行实证检验.研究结果表明:石油价格、农资价格和粮食价格之间存在长期均衡关系,石油和农资价格下降要比价格上升更快速和完全的传递给粮食价格;石油价格向粮食价格的传导存在滞后,石油价格的增长不会快速放大粮食价格变化.     

优质猪肉供应链中养猪场的行为选择机理及其优化策略研究

实施供应链管理是优质猪肉生产的有效途径,养猪场行为是决定猪肉产品质量安全的关键.本文依据博弈理论和方法,分析了优质猪肉供应链中养猪场和公司行为选择的机理,导出了双方行为选择的混合战略纳什均衡点.研究表明:降低风险偏好、监督成本和违约超常收益,增加违约惩罚、违约潜在损失、违约信用损失、供应链内外收益差和合作期限,是优化养猪场行为选择的有效途径,据此从强制性和诱致性两种作用入手提出了6种基本优化策略.     

Strategic stability in repeated signaling games

This paper extends selection rules now used in the signaling literature (such as the Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987)) to a class of repeated signaling games, where each player can exchange the messages conditioned on his private information. STABAC (STAbility and BACkward induction) is defined as a procedure whereby forward induction arguments (Kohlberg and Mertens (1986)) are applied in combination with the backward induction process. We specify the conditions under which any strategically stable outcome of a repeated signaling game includes an equilibrium that induces a stable equilibrium outcome in every subform, whence STABAC does not eliminate any stable outcome of the repeated signaling game.     

CONVERGENCE TO TRAP ALMOST EVERYWHERE FOR FLOWS GENERATED BY COOPERATIVE AND IRREDUCIBLE VECTOR FIELDS

This paper is concerned with the asymptotic behavior of cooperative systems in $W\subset R^n$. For a $C^2$ cooperative system whose Jacobian matrices are irreducible, it is proved that the forward orbit converges to an equilibrium for almost every point having compact forward orbit closure and the set of all points which have compact forward orbit closures and do not converge to a semi-asymptotically stable equilibrium is meager in W if the equilibrium set cannot contain a simply ordered curve. The invariant function and the geometry of the stable manifold of an unstable equilibrium are considered.     

Two-settlement electricity markets with price caps and Cournot generation firms

We compare two alternative mechanisms for capping prices in two-settlement electricity markets. With sufficient lead time, forward market prices are implicitly capped by competitive pressure of potential entry that will occur when forward prices rise above some backstop price. Another more direct approach is to cap spot prices through a regulatory intervention. In this paper we explore the implications of these two alternative mechanisms in a two-settlement Cournot equilibrium framework. We formulate the market equilibrium as a stochastic equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC) capturing congestion effects, probabilistic contingencies and horizontal market power. As an illustrative test case, we use the 53-bus Belgian electricity network with representative generator costs but hypothetical demand and ownership structure. Compared to a price-uncapped two-settlement system, a forward cap increases firms’ incentives for forward contracting, whereas a spot cap reduces such incentives. Moreover, in both cases, more forward contracts are committed as the generation resource ownership structure becomes more diversified.     

模糊环境下带有平衡条件的投资项目评估与选择决策方法

文章提出在模糊环境下求解带有平衡条件的投资项目评估与选择问题的决策方法。该方法由模糊综合评价系统和项目选择的模糊整数规划模型两部分组成。其中模糊综合评价系统采用三角模糊数来描述决策人对项目的主观评价以及多个评价因素的综合，而模糊整数规划模型则描述了各种不同门类利益之间的平衡。最后以实例说明该方法的应用。     

A best-response approach for equilibrium selection in two-player generalized Nash equilibrium problems

ABSTRACT

In this paper, we propose a best-response approach to select an equilibrium in a two-player generalized Nash equilibrium problem. In our model we solve, at each of a finite number of time steps, two independent optimization problems. We prove that convergence of our Jacobi-type method, for the number of time steps going to infinity, implies the selection of the same equilibrium as in a recently introduced continuous equilibrium selection theory. Thus the presented approach is a different motivation for the existing equilibrium selection theory, and it can also be seen as a numerical method. We show convergence of our numerical scheme for some special cases of generalized Nash equilibrium problems with linear constraints and linear or quadratic cost functions.     

Basic Reproduction Number of Rabies Model with Stage Structure

The mathematical model is proposed to simulate the dynamics of rabies transmissions in the raccoon population where juveniles stay with their mother and become adults until they establish their own habitats. The basic reproduction number of rabies transmission is formulated and is shown to be a threshold value of disease invasion. The bifurcation direction from the disease-free equilibrium is proved to be forward when the basic reproduction number passes through unity for spatial homogenous environment. The global stability of the disease-free steady state is also studied.     

Global asymptotic properties of an SEIRS model with multiple infectious stages

The paper presents a rigorous mathematical analysis of a deterministic model, which uses a standard incidence function, for the transmission dynamics of a communicable disease with an arbitrary number of distinct infectious stages. It is shown, using a linear Lyapunov function, that the model has a globally-asymptotically stable disease-free equilibrium whenever the associated reproduction threshold is less than unity. Further, the model has a unique endemic equilibrium when the threshold exceeds unity. The equilibrium is shown to be locally-asymptotically stable, for a special case, using a Krasnoselskii sub-linearity trick. Finally, a non-linear Lyapunov function is used to show the global asymptotic stability of the endemic equilibrium (for the special case). Numerical simulation results, using parameter values relevant to the transmission dynamics of influenza, are presented to illustrate some of the main theoretical results.     

基于服务竞争的航运供应链的纵向整合决策

在港口服务竞争下构建两条平行竞争的港口—承运商—货代三级航运供应链,研究承运商的纵向整合决策,并结合货主效益识别不同整合策略的可行条件及其均衡特征。研究发现,对手链的整合策略仅影响自身链是否选择纵向整合。当承运商选择整合策略时,前向整合策略的选择取决于港口服务竞争程度,而后向整合策略的选择则与港口服务投入系数有关。在对手链不同的整合策略下,都存在一个最优条件,此时承运商选择后向整合能够同时最大化自身利润和满足货主期望。     

Stochastically perturbed vector-borne disease models with direct transmission

In this paper we study a stochastic epidemic model of vector-borne diseases with direct mode of transmission and its delay modification. More precisely, we extend the deterministic epidemic models by introducing random perturbations around the endemic equilibrium state. By using suitable Lyapunov functions and functionals, we obtain stability conditions for the considered models and study the effect of the delay on the stability of the endemic equilibrium. Finally, numerical simulations for the stochastic model of malaria disease transmission are presented to illustrate our mathematical findings.