Coordinating supply chain inventories through common replenishment epochs

This paper proposes a model to study and analyze the benefit of coordinating supply chain inventories through the use of common replenishment epochs or time periods. A one-vendor, multi-buyer supply chain for a single product is analyzed. Under the proposed strategy, the vendor specifies common replenishment periods and requires all buyers to replenish only at those time periods. The vendor offers a price discount to entice the buyers to accept this strategy. The optimal replenishment period and the price discount to be offered by the vendor are determined as a solution to a Stackelberg game. After developing a method to solve the game, a numerical study is conducted to evaluate the benefit of the proposed coordinated strategy.     

需求与库存水平相关的供应链量折扣协调模型

考虑由一个供应商和一个零售商构成的供应链系统,零售商的市场需求依赖于该产品的库存水平,研究了利用批量折扣实现供应链完美协调的问题.首先,我们得出了在分散式系统下供应链无法实现完美协调,讨论了供需双方的最优决策.其次,作为stackelberg的主导方,供应商提供批量折扣计划,得出了此折扣计划实现系统完美协调的条件,分别给出了实现完美协调和不能实现完美协调时的批量折扣计划.最后分析了需求函数中的参数和产品的成本对实现供应链系统完美协调的影响.     

供应链买卖双方协调订货模型

供需关系贯穿供应链的整个过程;然而,如何促使非一体化供应链协调问题在实践中是非常重要的.因此,供需双方订货批量的研究是供应链管理的一个重要内容之一.本文以订单方式为背景,针对供应链环境下单个供应商和多个订货商在非合作情况下的订货模型进行讨论,并在此基础上给出了一个改进后的线性价格折扣策略,该策略同时考虑了增量折扣和减量折扣两种情况,同时给出了供需上双方订货的S tackelberg博弈模型.数字实验结果表明该折扣模型对于改善供应链运作协调是相当有效的.     

A robust optimization approach to reduce the bullwhip effect of supply chains with vendor order placement lead time delays in an uncertain environment

Supply chain management is important for companies and organizations to improve their business and enhance competitiveness in the global marketplace. The bullwhip effect problem of supply chain systems with vendor order placement lead time delays in an uncertain environment is addressed in this paper. Among the numerous causes of bullwhip effect, we focus on uncertainties with respect to demand, production process, supply chain structure, inventory policy implementation and especially vendor order placement lead time delays. Minimizing the negative effect of these uncertainties in inducing bullwhip effect creates a need for developing dynamical inventory policy that increases responsiveness to demand and decreases volatility in inventory replenishment. First, a dynamic model of supply chain with above uncertainties is developed. Then, a novel uncertainty-dependent robust inventory control method using inventory position information is proposed. Additionally, the maximum allowable vendor order placement lead time delay that ensures the stability of supply chains and the suppression of bullwhip effect under the proposed inventory control policy is explored and measured. We find that vendor order placement lead time delays do play important role in supply chain dynamics and contribute to its turbulence and volatility. The effectiveness and flexibility of proposed method is verified through simulation study.     

Multiple-buyer multiple-vendor multi-product multi-constraint supply chain problem with stochastic demand and variable lead-time: A harmony search algorithm

In this paper, a multi-buyer multi-vendor supply chain problem is considered in which there are several products, each buyer has limited capacity to purchase products, and each vendor has warehouse limitation to store products. In this chain, the demand of each product is stochastic and follows a uniform distribution. The lead-time of receiving products from a vendor to a buyer is assumed to vary linearly with respect to the order quantity of the buyer and the production rate of the vendor. For each product, a fraction of the shortage is backordered and the rest are lost. The ordered product quantities are placed in multiple of pre-defined packets and there are service rate constraints for the buyers. The goal is to determine the reorder points, the safety stocks, and the numbers of shipments and packets in each shipment of the products such that the total cost of the supply chain is minimized. We show that the model of this problem is of an integer nonlinear programming type and in order to solve it a harmony search algorithm is employed. To validate the solution and to compare the performance of the proposed algorithm, a genetic algorithm is utilized as well. A numerical illustration and sensitivity analysis are given at the end to show the applicability of the proposed methodology in real-world supply chain problems.     

订单生产方式下供应链1∶1买卖双方协调订货模型

供需关系贯穿供应链的整个过程。因此,供需双方订货批量研究是供应链管理的一个最重要也最基本的内容之一。本文以订单方式为背景,讨论了供应链环境下1∶1非合作订货模型,并在此基础上给出了1∶1供需双方通过适当的线性价格折扣政策的Stackelberg博弈模型。最后给出了两个算例加以说明。     

随机需求下的价格折扣策略研究

供需关系贯穿供应链的整个过程。因此，供需双方订货批量研究是供应链管理的一个最重要也最基本的内容之一。本以订单方式为背景，讨论了供应链环境下一个供应商和一个订货商在非合作情况下的订货模型，并在此基础上引进了一个价格折扣策略，该策略同时考虑了增量折扣和减量折扣两个情况，并给出了供需双方订货的Stackelberg博弈模型和考虑完全合作的Pareto优化模型。最后以算例加以说明。     

Supply chain coordination with controllable lead time and asymmetric information

This paper considers coordinated decisions in a decentralized supply chain consisting of a vendor and a buyer with controllable lead time. We analyze two supply chain inventory models. In the first model we assume the vendor has complete information about the buyer’s cost structure. By taking both the vendor and the buyer’s individual rationalities into consideration, a side payment coordination mechanism is designed to realize supply chain Pareto dominance. In the second model we consider a setting where the buyer possesses private cost information. We design the coordination mechanism by using principal-agent model to induce the buyer to report his true cost structure. The solution procedures are also developed to get the optimal solutions of these two models. The results of numerical examples show that shortening lead time to certain extent can reduce inventory cost and the coordination mechanisms designed for both symmetric and asymmetric information situations are effective.     

Vendor managed inventory contracts – coordinating the supply chain while looking from the vendor’s perspective

The paper studies coordination of a supply chain when the inventory is managed by the vendor (VMI). We also provide a general mathematical framework that can be used to analyze contracts under both retailer managed inventory (RMI) and VMI. Using a simple newsvendor scenario with a single vendor and single retailer, we study five popular coordinating supply chain contracts: buyback, quantity flexibility, quantity discount, sales rebate, and revenue sharing contracts. We analyze the ability of these contracts to coordinate the supply chain under VMI when the vendor freely decides the quantity. We find that even though all of them coordinate under RMI, quantity flexibility and sales rebate contracts do not generally coordinate under VMI. Furthermore, buyback and revenue sharing contracts are equivalent. Hence, we propose two new contracts which coordinate under VMI (one of which coordinates under RMI too, provided a well-known assumption holds). Finally, we extend our analysis to consider multiple independent retailers with the vendor incurring linear or convex production cost, and show that our results are qualitatively unchanged.     

Strategic information sharing in a supply chain

We consider a two-member supply chain that manufactures and sells newsboy-type products and comprises a downstream retailer and an upstream vendor. In this supply chain, the vendor is responsible for making stock-level decisions and holding the inventory, and the retailer is better informed about market demand. In each period, the retailer receives a signal about market demand before the actual demand is realized, and must decide whether to reveal the information to the vendor, at a cost, before the vendor starts production. We assume that any information that the retailer reveals is truthful. We model the situation as a Bayesian game, and find that, in equilibrium, whether the retailer reveals or withholds the information depends on two things—the cost of revealing the information and the nature of market demand signal that the retailer receives. If the cost of sharing the information is sufficiently large, then the retailer will withhold the information from the vendor regardless of the type of signal that is received. If the cost of sharing the information is small, then the retailer will reveal the information to the vendor if a high demand is signaled, but will withhold it from the vendor if a low demand is signaled. In general, reducing the cost of sharing information and increasing the profit margin of either the retailer or the vendor (or reducing the cost of the vendor or retailer) will facilitate information sharing.     

需求预测更新条件下两阶段电子商务供应链契约协调

研究了一类在贝叶斯需求预测更新情形下,生命周期中采用B2C与C2B两阶段进行产品销售的供应链模型,研究发现无法使用单一契约来协调供应链。在此基础上,设计了具有供应商价格折扣契约与零售商承诺订购契约的两阶段供应链契约协调机制,证明了两阶段协调机制能够实现供应链的帕累托改进。算例分析表明了两阶段契约协调机制的有效性,并发现能够实现供应链完美协调的契约参数不一定在帕累托集合内,供应链不一定能够达到完美协调;且由于零售商与供应商的最优契约参数不同,需要通过零售商与供应商之间的谈判达到纳什均衡。     

预付款融资下基于改进收益共享与回购联合契约的双渠道供应链协调研究

随机需求下,考虑了制造商存在资金约束的双渠道供应链在采用预付款融资时,如何实现供应链协调的问题。在制造商为主方的Stackelberg博弈下,研究了制造商和零售商分散决策时的最优库存决策问题,并通过设计改进收益共享与回购联合契约使得供应链达到协调。在此基础上,讨论了供应链的帕累托改进区间。最后,通过算例验证了联合契约对双渠道供应链协调及帕累托改进的有效性,并分析了契约参数和融资参数对供应链的影响。     

基于回购契约的供应链鲁棒协调模型

研究了需求不确定条件下供应链回购契约协调问题。针对未知需求具体分布形式的两级供应链系统,建立了基于回购契约的供应链鲁棒协调模型。给出了仅知需求均值和方差信息条件下,集成供应链系统的鲁棒订货策略和分散供应链系统的鲁棒契约协调策略。分析了不同契约参数条件下的供应链及其成员利润情况。最后,进行了数值计算,验证了当获得需求的真实分布形式时．供应链鲁棒回购契约协调策略的有效性。结果表明,供应链鲁棒回购契约协调策略能够有效减少需求不确定性对系统及其成员利润的影响。     

外部市场存在替代产品的VMI系统研究

供应商管理用户库存(VMI)作为一种有效的补货机制,能对购买渠道的需求信息做出积极正确的反应.现在对VMI的研究往往集中于单个零售商和单个供应商组成的系统,不考虑VMI系统受市场上其他零售商或供应商的影响.假设市场上多个零售商出售相互之间可替代的产品,某个零售商与其供应商之间应用VMI系统.我们的研究主要有两方面:1)VMI系统是否有助于零售商和供应商组成的供应链在差异产品市场上获得更大的收益;2)供应商和零售商如何决策是否应用VMI系统。     

Optimal production and distribution policies for a two-stage supply chain with imperfect items and price- and advertisement-sensitive demand: A note

This paper develops inventory models of a vendor–buyer supply chain with imperfect products and shortages based on Rad et al. (2014) and assumes that both the selling price and advertisements influence market demand. For this reason, the buyer mandates an advertising company for promoting the product. The objective of the paper is to determine pricing, advertising, lot-sizing, backordering, and shipment policies under independent and joint optimization. Numerical examples and a sensitivity analysis illustrate the proposed models. The results indicate that coordination becomes more and more advantageous for the supply chain as the sensitivity of demand to price or advertisements increases. Furthermore, as the uncertainty in item quality increases, the buyer reduces its demand to better match demand and supply.     

Supply chain model for a deteriorating product with time-varying demand and production rate

The paper develops a two-echelon supply chain model with a single-buyer and a single-vendor. The buyer sells a seasonal product over a short selling period and its inventory is subject to deterioration at a constant rate over time. The vendor's production rate is dependent on the buyer's demand rate, which is a linear function of time. Also, the vendor's production process is not perfectly reliable; it may shift from an in-control state to an out-of-control state at any time during a production run and produce some defective (non-conforming) items. Assuming that the vendor follows a lot-for-lot policy for replenishment made to the buyer, the average total cost of the supply chain is derived and an algorithm for finding the optimal solution is developed. The numerical study shows that the supply chain coordination policy is more beneficial than those policies obtained separately from the buyer's and the vendor's perspectives.     

公平偏好下考虑供应商质量投入的供应链契约协调

针对传统的基于数量参考标准的奖励惩罚契约无法适应当下“多品种,小批量”的需求特点实现供应链协调,本文建立公平偏好情况下,以供应商提供产品的质量水平为参考标准的奖励惩罚契约模型,探讨其对供应链协调的影响。假设在由单个供应商和单个零售商组成的两级供应链系统中零售商具有公平偏好,分别就供应链内各参与主体渠道力量相等和渠道力量不相等这两种情形进行分析。研究发现零售商对自身收益和对公平的关注程度相同时,供应商和零售商会自愿的按照契约进行合作,取得均衡结果,实现供应链协调,且各参与主体渠道力量的不同会对供应链的整体利润产生显著影响。最后使用算例验证了结论。     

Coordinated decisions for substitutable products in a common retailer supply chain

This paper studies coordination mechanisms in a supply chain which consists of two suppliers with capacity uncertainties selling differential yet substitutable products through a common retailer who faces price-sensitive random demand of these two products. We develop in a noncompetitive setting three coordination models – revenue sharing, return policy, and combination of revenue sharing and return policy – and contrast them with a basic and uncoordinated model. We are able to establish the ordinal relationship among the retailer’s ordering and pricing decisions and analytically compare the performances between certain models when two suppliers are identical. We find that the retailer’s ordering and pricing decisions in the model with return policy in the case of identical suppliers are independent of demand or supply uncertainty. Our numerical results reveal that the performances of coordination models in the case of nonidentical suppliers resemble those in the case of identical suppliers. We find that the retailer will place a larger order quantity in models where her average cost per unit sold is smaller. We also find that product substitutability and uncertainties have different effects on chain performances.     

An optimal batch size for integrated production–inventory policy in a supply chain

This study presents a new integrated production–inventory policy under a finite planning horizon and a linear trend in demand. We assume that the vendor makes a single product and supplies it to a buyer with a non-periodic and just-in-time (JIT) replenishment policy in a supply chain environment. The objective is to minimize the joint total costs incurred by the vendor and the buyer. In this study, first, we develop a mathematical model and prove that it has the optimal solution. Then, we describe an explicit solution procedure for obtaining the optimal solution. Finally, we provide two numerical examples to illustrate both increasing and decreasing demands in our proposed model, and we show that the performance of the integrated consideration is better than the performance of any independent decision from either the buyer or the vendor.     

Double marginalization and coordination in the supply chain with uncertain supply

This paper explores a generalized supply chain model subject to supply uncertainty after the supplier chooses the production input level. Decentralized systems under wholesale price contracts are investigated, with double marginalization effects shown to lead to supply insufficiencies, in the cases of both deterministic and random demands. We then design coordination contracts for each case and find that an accept-all type of contract is required to coordinate the supply chain with random demand, which is a much more complicated situation than that with deterministic demand. Examples are provided to illustrate the application of our findings to specific industrial domains. Moreover, our coordination mechanisms are shown to be applicable to the multi-supplier situation, which fills the research gap on assembly system coordination with random yield and random demand under a voluntary compliance regime.