A characterization of a limit solution for finite horizon bargaining problems

We investigate a two-person random proposer bargaining game with a deadline. A bounded time interval is divided into bargaining periods of equal length and we study the limit of the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes as the number of bargaining periods goes to infinity while the deadline is kept fixed. This limit is close to the discrete Raiffa solution when the time horizon is very short. If the deadline goes to infinity the limit outcome converges to the time preference Nash solution. Regarding this limit as a bargaining solution under deadline, we provide an axiomatic characterization.     

A generalization of the Egalitarian and the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solutions

We characterize the class of weakly efficient n-person bargaining solutions that solely depend on the ratios of the players’ ideal payoffs. In the case of at least three players the ratio between the solution payoffs of any two players is a power of the ratio between their ideal payoffs. As special cases this class contains the Egalitarian and the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solutions, which can be pinned down by imposing additional axioms.     

A dynamic solution in N-person cooperative game theory

We formulate a cooperative game as an extended form game in which each player in turn proposes payoffs to a coalition over M steps. Payoffs at time t are discounted by a penalty function f(t). If all players in a coalition agree to their payoffs, they receive them. Under a convergence hypothesis verified by computer for three players in many cases, we compute the payoffs resulting from a coalition pattern and give necessary conditions for particular patterns. The resulting solution is related to the Nash bargaining solution and the competitive solution.     

多目标协商模型的标量化方法

多目标协商问题是协商理论的一个新的研究领域.本文讨论了由Bronisz和Krus提出的多目标协商模型和Bronisz-Krus-协商解概念,构造了由Bronisz-Krus多目标协商模型诱导的单目标协商模型并对其提出了一套公理系统和引入了Raiffa-协商解概念,讨论了诱导结局空间的性质,给出了Bronisz-Krus多目标协商模型与其诱导的单目标协商模型在某种意义下的等价性,即Bronisz-Krus-协商解与Raiffa-协商解可以互相确定,并给出了这种相互确定的关系式.     

Flexibility of disagreement actions in negotiations

Negotiation games in which two players engage in disagreement games to determine their payoffs during the bargaining generally admit multiple perfect equilibrium outcomes, including inefficient ones. This paper shows that if the two players cannot change their disagreement actions as frequent as they bargain, then the set of perfect equilibrium payoffs shrinks. As disagreement actions become completely inflexible relative to the bargaining frequency, the set of equilibrium payoffs shrinks to Nash's (1953) bargaining solution with strategic threat. Received January 1999/Final version March 2001     

Variational inequality formulation for the games with random payoffs

We consider an n-player non-cooperative game with random payoffs and continuous strategy set for each player. The random payoffs of each player are defined using a finite dimensional random vector. We formulate this problem as a chance-constrained game by defining the payoff function of each player using a chance constraint. We first consider the case where the continuous strategy set of each player does not depend on the strategies of other players. If a random vector defining the payoffs of each player follows a multivariate elliptically symmetric distribution, we show that there exists a Nash equilibrium. We characterize the set of Nash equilibria using the solution set of a variational inequality (VI) problem. Next, we consider the case where the continuous strategy set of each player is defined by a shared constraint set. In this case, we show that there exists a generalized Nash equilibrium for elliptically symmetric distributed payoffs. Under certain conditions, we characterize the set of a generalized Nash equilibria using the solution set of a VI problem. As an application, the random payoff games arising from electricity market are studied under chance-constrained game framework.     

Networks of infinite-server queues with nonstationary Poisson input

In this paper we focus on networks of infinite-server queues with nonhomogeneous Poisson arrival processes. We start by introducing a more general Poisson-arrival-location model (PALM) in which arrivals move independently through a general state space according to a location stochastic process after arriving according to a nonhomogeneous Poisson process. The usual open network of infinite-server queues, which is also known as a linear population process or a linear stochastic compartmental model, arises in the special case of a finite state space. The mathematical foundation is a Poisson-random-measure representation, which can be obtained by stochastic integration. It implies a time-dependent product-form result: For appropriate initial conditions, the queue lengths (numbers of customers in disjoint subsets of the state space) at any time are independent Poisson random variables. Even though there is no dependence among the queue lengths at each time, there is important dependence among the queue lengths at different times. We show that the joint distribution is multivariate Poisson, and calculate the covariances. A unified framework for constructing stochastic processes of interest is provided by stochastically integrating various functionals of the location process with respect to the Poisson arrival process. We use this approach to study the flows in the queueing network; e.g., we show that the aggregate arrival and departure processes at a given queue (to and from other queues as well as outside the network) are generalized Poisson processes (without necessarily having a rate or unit jumps) if and only if no customer can visit that queue more than once. We also characterize the aggregate arrival and departure processes when customers can visit the queues more frequently. In addition to obtaining structural results, we use the stochastic integrals to obtain explicit expressions for time-dependent means and covariances. We do this in two ways. First, we decompose the entire network into a superposition of independent networks with fixed deterministic routes. Second, we make Markov assumptions, initially for the evolution of the routes and finally for the entire location process. For Markov routing among the queues, the aggregate arrival rates are obtained as the solution to a system of input equations, which have a unique solution under appropriate qualifications, but not in general. Linear ordinary differential equations characterize the time-dependent means and covariances in the totally Markovian case.     

A Markov Renewal Based Model for Wireless Networks

We propose a queueing network model which can be used for the integration of the mobility and teletraffic aspects that are characteristic of wireless networks. In the general case, the model is an open network of infinite server queues where customers arrive according to a non-homogeneous Poisson process. The movement of a customer in the network is described by a Markov renewal process. Moreover, customers have attributes, such as a teletraffic state, that are driven by continuous time Markov chains and, therefore, change as they move through the network. We investigate the transient and limit number of customers in disjoint sets of nodes and attributes. These turn out to be independent Poisson random variables. We also calculate the covariances of the number of customers in two sets of nodes and attributes at different time epochs. Moreover, we conclude that the arrival process per attribute to a node is the sum of independent Poisson cluster processes and derive its univariate probability generating function. In addition, the arrival process to an outside node of the network is a non-homogeneous Poisson process. We illustrate the applications of the queueing network model and the results derived in a particular wireless network.     

Some problems in finite dams with an application to insurance risk

Summary This paper considers a finite dam in continuous time fed by inputs, with a negative exponential distribution, whose arrival times form a Poisson process; there is a continuous release at unit rate, and overflow is allowed. Various results have been obtained by appropriate limiting methods from an analogous discrete time process, for which it is possible to find some solutions directly by determinantal methods.First the stationary dam content distribution is found. The distribution of the probability of first emptiness is obtained both when overflow is, and is not allowed. This is followed by the probability the overflow before emptiness, which is then applied to determine the exact solution for an insurance risk problem with claims having a negative exponential distribution. The time-dependent content distribution is found, and the analogy with queueing theory is discussed.     

模糊支付合作博弈的可信性准核仁

合作博弈是处理局中人之间协同行为的数学理论。有诸如核心、稳定集、沙普利值、准核仁和核仁等不同的解概念。在很多情形,除了借助专家经验和主观直觉,没有恰当的方式来确定支付函数,由此产生了具有模糊支付的合作博弈模型。准核仁是一种重要的解概念,在模糊支付合作博弈中如何恰当定义准核仁是个重要的问题。本文在可信性理论的框架下研究了这个问题,定义了两类可信性准核仁概念并证明了它们的存在性和唯一性,同时研究了可信性核心、可信性核仁与它们之间的关系。     

Link formation in cooperative situations

In this paper we study the endogenous formation of cooperation structures or communication graphs between players in a superadditive TU game. For each cooperation structure that is formed, the payoffs to the players are determined by an exogenously given solution. We model the process of cooperation structure formation as a game in strategic form. It is shown that several equilibrium refinements predict the formation of the complete cooperation structure or some structure which is payoff-equivalent to the complete structure. These results are obtained for a large class of solutions for cooperative games with cooperation structures. Received September 1995/Revised version I October 1996/Revised version II April 1997/Final version September 1997     

Application of Atanassov’s I-fuzzy set theory to matrix games with fuzzy goals and fuzzy payoffs

We aim to extend some results in [6, 7, 8, 2] on two person zero sum matrix games (TPZSMG) with fuzzy goals and fuzzy payoffs to I-fuzzy scenario. Because the payoffs of the matrix game are fuzzy numbers, the aspiration levels of the players are fuzzy as well. It is reasonable to believe that there is some indeterminacy in estimating the aspiration levels of both players from their respective expected pay offs. This situation is modeled in the game using Atanassov??s I-fuzzy set theory. A new solution concept is proposed for such games and a procedure is outlined to obtain the degrees of suitability of the aspiration levels for each of the two players.     

Departures inGR^{X{n}} /G_n /\infty

Departure processes in infinite server queues with non-Poisson arrivals have not received much attention in the past. In this paper, we try to fill this gap by considering the continuous time departure process in a general infinite server system with a Markov renewal batch arrival process ofM different types of customers. By a conditional approach, analytical results are obtained for the generating functions and binomial moments of the departure process. Special cases are discussed, showing that while Poisson arrival processes generate Poisson departures, departure processes are much more complicated with non-Poisson arrivals.This research has been supported in part by the Natural Science and Engineering Research Council of Canada (Grant A5639).     

Stability of the core mapping in games with a countable set of players

Greenberg (1990) and Ray (1989) showed that in coalitional games with a finite set of players the core consists of those and only those payoffs that cannot be dominated using payoffs in the core of a subgame. We extend the definition of the dominance relation to coalitional games with an infinite set of players and show that this result may not hold in games with a countable set of players (even in convex games). But if a coalitional game with a countable set of players satisfies a mild continuity property, its core consists of those and only those payoff vectors which cannot be dominated using payoffs in the core of a subgame.     

Sequentially compatible payoffs and the core in TU-games

In the context of cooperative TU-games, we introduce a recursive procedure to distribute the surplus of cooperation when there is an exogenous ordering among the set of players N. In each step of the process, using a given notion of reduced games, an upper and a lower bound for the payoff to the player at issue are required. Sequentially compatible payoffs are defined as those allocation vectors that meet these recursive bounds. For a family of reduction operations, the behavior of this new solution concept is analyzed. For any ordering of N, the core of the game turns out to be the set of sequentially compatible payoffs when the Davis–Maschler reduced games are used. Finally, we study which reduction operations give an advantage to the first player in the ordering.     

Internal correlation in repeated games

This paper characterizes the set of all the Nash equilibrium payoffs in two player repeated games where the signal that the players get after each stage is either trivial (does not reveal any information) or standard (the signal is the pair of actions played). It turns out that if the information is not always trivial then the set of all the Nash equilibrium payoffs coincides with the set of the correlated equilibrium payoffs. In particular, any correlated equilibrium payoff of the one shot game is also a Nash equilibrium payoff of the repeated game.For the proof we develop a scheme by which two players can generate any correlation device, using the signaling structure of the game. We present strategies with which the players internally correlate their actions without the need of an exogenous mediator.     

Subgame Consistent Solutions of a Cooperative Stochastic Differential Game with Nontransferable Payoffs

Subgame consistency is a fundamental element in the solution of cooperative stochastic differential games. In particular, it ensures that the extension of the solution policy to a later starting time and any possible state brought about by the prior optimal behavior of the players would remain optimal. Recently, mechanisms for the derivation of subgame consistent solutions in stochastic cooperative differential games with transferable payoffs have been found. In this paper, subgame consistent solutions are derived for a class of cooperative stochastic differential games with nontransferable payoffs. The previously intractable subgame consistent solution for games with nontransferable payoffs is rendered tractable.This research was supported by the Research Grant Council of Hong Kong, Grant HKBU2056/99H and by Hong Kong Baptist University, Grant FRG/02-03/II16.Communicated by G. Leitmann     

Power Measures and Solutions for Games Under Precedence Constraints

Games under precedence constraints model situations, where players in a cooperative transferable utility game belong to some hierarchical structure, which is represented by an acyclic digraph (partial order). In this paper, we introduce the class of precedence power solutions for games under precedence constraints. These solutions are obtained by allocating the dividends in the game proportional to some power measure for acyclic digraphs. We show that all these solutions satisfy the desirable axiom of irrelevant player independence, which establishes that the payoffs assigned to relevant players are not affected by the presence of irrelevant players. We axiomatize these precedence power solutions using irrelevant player independence and an axiom that uses a digraph power measure. We give special attention to the hierarchical solution, which applies the hierarchical measure. We argue how this solution is related to the known precedence Shapley value, which does not satisfy irrelevant player independence, and thus is not a precedence power solution. We also axiomatize the hierarchical measure as a digraph power measure.     

On the difficulty of extending the coco value to games with more than two players

Kalai and Kalai (2013) presented five axioms for solutions of 2-person semi-cooperative games: games in which the basic data specifies individual strategies and payoffs, but in which the players can sign binding contracts and make utility transfers. The axioms pin down a unique solution, the coco value. I show that if one adds a mild dummy player axiom to the list, then the axioms become inconsistent when there are more than two players.     

Alfa-cut based linear programming methodology for constrained matrix games with payoffs of trapezoidal fuzzy numbers

The purpose of this paper is to develop an effective methodology for solving constrained matrix games with payoffs of trapezoidal fuzzy numbers (TrFNs), which are a type of two-person non-cooperative games with payoffs expressed by TrFNs and players’ strategies being constrained. In this methodology, it is proven that any Alfa-constrained matrix game has an interval-type value and hereby any constrained matrix game with payoffs of TrFNs has a TrFN-type value. The auxiliary linear programming models are derived to compute the interval-type value of any Alfa-constrained matrix game and players’ optimal strategies. Thereby the TrFN-type value of any constrained matrix game with payoffs of TrFNs can be directly obtained through solving the derived four linear programming models with data taken from only 1-cut and 0-cut of TrFN-type payoffs. Validity and applicability of the models and method proposed in this paper are demonstrated with a numerical example of the market share game problem.