On Nash Equilibrium Strategy of Two-person Zero-sum Games with Trapezoidal Fuzzy Payoffs

In this paper, we investigate Nash equilibrium strategy of two-person zero-sum games with fuzzy payoffs. Based on fuzzy max order, Maeda and Cunlin constructed several models in symmetric triangular and asymmetric triangular fuzzy environment, respectively. We extended their models in trapezoidal fuzzy environment and proposed the existence of equilibrium strategies for these models. We also established the relation between Pareto Nash equilibrium strategy and parametric bi-matrix game. In addition, numerical examples are presented to find Pareto Nash equilibrium strategy and weak Pareto Nash equilibrium strategy from bi-matrix game.     

Continuity properties of bargaining solutions

Three different concepts of continuity of bargaining solutions are examined: Pareto continuity, Hausdorff continuity, and Kuratowski continuity. A new axiomatic characterization of the Nash solution is proposed. In this axiomatization, Kuratowski continuity plays a major role.     

Efficiency-free characterizations of the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solution

Roth (1977) axiomatized the Nash (1950) bargaining solution without Pareto optimality, replacing it by strong individual rationality in Nash’s axiom list. In a subsequent work (Roth, 1979) he showed that when strong individual rationality is replaced by weak individual rationality, the only solutions that become admissible are the Nash and the disagreement solutions. In this paper I derive analogous results for the Kalai–Smorodinsky (1975) bargaining solution.     

Nash equilibrium based fairness

There are several approaches of sharing resources among users. There is a noncooperative approach wherein each user strives to maximize its own utility. The most common optimality notion is then the Nash equilibrium. Nash equilibria are generally Pareto inefficient. On the other hand, we consider a Nash equilibrium to be fair as it is defined in a context of fair competition without coalitions (such as cartels and syndicates). We show a general framework of systems wherein there exists a Pareto optimal allocation that is Pareto superior to an inefficient Nash equilibrium. We consider this Pareto optimum to be ??Nash equilibrium based fair.?? We further define a ??Nash proportionately fair?? Pareto optimum. We then provide conditions for the existence of a Pareto-optimal allocation that is, truly or most closely, proportional to a Nash equilibrium. As examples that fit in the above framework, we consider noncooperative flow-control problems in communication networks, for which we show the conditions on the existence of Nash-proportionately fair Pareto optimal allocations.     

相位阻尼信道条件下量子斗鸡博弈模型均衡解分析

利用量子博弈的相关理论,以噪音强度和记忆强度为参量,建立了相位阻尼信道条件下的量子斗鸡博弈模型,求出了模型的量子纳什均衡解,讨论了两参量对均衡解稳定性的影响,得出在无记忆相位阻尼信道条件下,当噪音强度小于阈值0.24时,纳什均衡仍然为帕累托最优解,当噪音强度大于0.24时,均衡解演变为另2个均衡解,不再是帕累托最优;在有记忆相位阻尼信道条件下,当噪音强度小于0.24,且记忆强度大于0.5时,均衡解是稳定的.特殊地,当信道是完全记忆时,均衡解的稳定性与噪音强度无关.     

An interactive fuzzy satisficing method for structured multiobjective linear fractional programs with fuzzy numbers

In this paper, by considering the experts' vague or fuzzy understanding of the nature of the parameters in the problem formulation process, multiobjective linear fractional programming problems with block angular structure involving fuzzy numbers are formulated. Using the a-level sets of fuzzy numbers, the corresponding nonfuzzy a-multiobjective linear fractional programming problem is introduced. The fuzzy goals of the decision maker for the objective functions are quantified by eliciting the corresponding membership functions including nonlinear ones. Through the introduction of extended Pareto optimality concepts, if the decision maker specifies the degree a and the reference membership values, the corresponding extended Pareto optimal solution can be obtained by solving the minimax problems for which the Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition method and Ritter's partitioning procedure are applicable. Then a linear programming-based interactive fuzzy satisficing method with decomposition procedures for deriving a satisficing solution for the decision maker efficiently from an extended Pareto optimal solution set is presented. An illustrative numerical example is provided to demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed method.     

An interactive fuzzy satisficing method for multiobjective 0–1 programming problems with fuzzy numbers through genetic algorithms with double strings

In this paper, by considering the experts' vague or fuzzy understanding of the nature of the parameters in the problem-formulation process, multiobjective 0–1 programming problems involving fuzzy numbers are formulated. Using the a-level sets of fuzzy numbers, the corresponding nonfuzzy α-programming problem is introduced. The fuzzy goals of the decision maker (DM) for the objective functions are quantified by eliciting the corresponding linear membership functions. Through the introduction of an extended Pareto optimality concept, if the DM specifies the degree α and the reference membership values, the corresponding extended Pareto optimal solution can be obtained by solving the augmented minimax problems through genetic algorithms with double strings. Then an interactive fuzzy satisficing method for deriving a satisficing solution for the DM efficiently from an extended Pareto optimal solution set is presented. An illustrative numerical example is provided to demonstrate the feasibility and efficiency of the proposed method.     

A class of games having Pareto optimal Nash equilibria

A simple two-person exchange model is considered first as a cooperative game without side payments, then as a non-cooperative game. It is shown that the Nash equilibrium solution of the latter agrees with the von Neumann-Morgenstern and core solutions of the former. This is made possible by the Pareto optimality of the Nash equilibrium, which is the main theoretical result presented.     

基于模糊数的政府与绿色制造商博弈分析

近年来环境问题已经成为人们迫切需要解决的重要问题,促使制造商采取绿色制造模式也是各国政府正在面临的一大难题。因此文章结合三角模糊数与博弈理论建立了政府与绿色制造商的模糊博弈模型,将博弈结果分为纯策略和混合策略两类,并讨论了各种情形下政府与绿色制造商的不同策略以及影响因素,分析了最优博弈结果以及相应的管理策略,为绿色制造模式的顺利实施提供了相关建议。研究结果表明,政府的补贴和惩罚等策略在绿色制造模式的采取方面起着举足轻重的作用。最后利用三角结构元法对算例分纯策略和混合策略两种情况进行分析求解,从而验证了结论的正确性和可行性。     

Fuzzy Optimization Problems Based on Ordering Cones

The solution concepts of the fuzzy optimization problems using ordering cone (convex cone) are proposed in this paper. We introduce an equivalence relation to partition the set of all fuzzy numbers into the equivalence classes. We then prove that this set of equivalence classes turns into a real vector space under the settings of vector addition and scalar multiplication. The notions of ordering cone and partial ordering on a vector space are essentially equivalent. Therefore, the optimality notions in the set of equivalence classes (in fact, a real vector space) can be naturally elicited by using the similar concept of Pareto optimal solution in vector optimization problems. Given an optimization problem with fuzzy coefficients, we introduce its corresponding (usual) optimization problem. Finally, we prove that the optimal solutions of its corresponding optimization problem are the Pareto optimal solutions of the original optimization problem with fuzzy coefficients.     

A sufficiency condition for coalitive pareto-optimal solutions

In ak-player, nonzero-sum differential game, there exists the possibility that a group of players will form a coalition and work together. If allk players form the coalition, the criterion usually chosen is Pareto optimality whereas, if the coalition consists of only one player, a minmax or Nash equilibrium solution is sought.In this paper, games with coalitions of more than one but less thank players are considered. Coalitive Pareto optimality is chosen as the criterion. Sufficient conditions are presented for coalitive Pareto-optimal solutions, and the results are illustrated with an example.     

Multilateral non-cooperative bargaining in a general utility space

We consider an n-player bargaining problem where the utility possibility set is compact, convex, and stricly comprehensive. We show that a stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists, and that, if the Pareto surface is differentiable, all such equilibria converge to the Nash bargaining solution as the length of a time period between offers goes to zero. Without the differentiability assumption, convergence need not hold.     

Saddle Point Optimality Conditions in Fuzzy Optimization Problems

The fuzzy-valued Lagrangian function of fuzzy optimization problem via the concept of fuzzy scalar (inner) product is proposed. A solution concept of fuzzy optimization problem, which is essentially similar to the notion of Pareto solution in multiobjective optimization problems, is introduced by imposing a partial ordering on the set of all fuzzy numbers. Under these settings, the saddle point optimality conditions along with necessary and sufficient conditions for the absence of a duality gap are elicited.     

Game theoretic approach for fertilizer application: looking for the propensity to cooperate

This paper continues the research implemented in previous work of (Schreider et al. in Environ. Model. Assess. 15(4):223–238, 2010) where a game theoretic model for optimal fertilizer application in the Hopkins River catchment was formulated, implemented and solved for its optimal strategies. In that work, the authors considered farmers from this catchment as individual players whose objective is to maximize their objective functions which are constituted from two components: economic gain associated with the application of fertilizers which contain phosphorus to the soil and environmental harms associated with this application. The environmental losses are associated with the blue-green algae blooming of the coastal waterways due to phosphorus exported from upstream areas of the catchment. In the previous paper, all agents are considered as rational players and two types of equilibria were considered: fully non-cooperative Nash equilibrium and cooperative Pareto optimum solutions. Among the plethora of Pareto optima, the solution corresponding to the equally weighted individual objective functions were selected. In this paper, the cooperative game approach involving the formation of coalitions and modeling of characteristic value function will be applied and Shapley values for the players obtained. A significant contribution of this approach is the construction of a characteristic function which incorporates both the Nash and Pareto equilibria, showing that it is superadditive. It will be shown that this approach will allow each players to obtain payoffs which strictly dominate their payoffs obtained from their Nash equilibria.     

A note on efficient solutions for the linear bilevel programming problem

The solutions of linear bilevel programming problems frequently are non-Pareto-optimal. The potential increase in payoffs generated by Pareto improvements makes it worthwhile to consider methods with which to move the solution to the efficient frontier. Bargaining models offer one class of solutions, which, contrary to the original non-cooperative, sequential decision-making situation, however, assume cooperation. We make an attempt to maintain the original power structure by introducing the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution.     

Nondominated equilibrium solutions of a multiobjective two-person nonzero-sum game in extensive form and corresponding mathematical programming problem

In most of studies on multiobjective noncooperative games, games are represented in normal form and a solution concept of Pareto equilibrium solutions which is an extension of Nash equilibrium solutions has been focused on. However, for analyzing economic situations and modeling real world applications, we often see cases where the extensive form representation of games is more appropriate than the normal form representation. In this paper, in a multiobjective two-person nonzero-sum game in extensive form, we employ the sequence form of strategy representation to define a nondominated equilibrium solution which is an extension of a Pareto equilibrium solution, and provide a necessary and sufficient condition that a pair of realization plans, which are strategies of players in sequence form, is a nondominated equilibrium solution. Using the necessary and sufficient condition, we formulate a mathematical programming problem yielding nondominated equilibrium solutions. Finally, giving a numerical example, we demonstrate that nondominated equilibrium solutions can be obtained by solving the formulated mathematical programming problem.     

Duality Theory in Fuzzy Linear Programming Problems with Fuzzy Coefficients

The concept of fuzzy scalar (inner) product that will be used in the fuzzy objective and inequality constraints of the fuzzy primal and dual linear programming problems with fuzzy coefficients is proposed in this paper. We also introduce a solution concept that is essentially similar to the notion of Pareto optimal solution in the multiobjective programming problems by imposing a partial ordering on the set of all fuzzy numbers. We then prove the weak and strong duality theorems for fuzzy linear programming problems with fuzzy coefficients.     

An interactive fuzzy satisficing method for multiobjective nonconvex programming problems through floating point genetic algorithms

In this paper, we focus on multiobjective nonconvex nonlinear programming problems and present an interactive fuzzy satisficing method through floating point genetic algorithms. After determining the fuzzy goals of the decision maker, if the decision maker specifies the reference membership values, the corresponding Pareto optimal solution can be obtained by solving the augmented minimax problems for which the floating point genetic algorithm, called GENOCOP III, is applicable. In order to overcome the drawbacks of GENOCOP III, we propose the revised GENOCOP III by introducing a method for generating an initial feasible point and a bisection method for generating a new feasible point efficiently. Then an interactive fuzzy satisficing method for deriving a satisficing solution for the decision maker efficiently from a Pareto optimal solution set is presented together with an illustrative numerical example.     

AN INTERNATIONAL MARINE POLLUTANT SINK IN AN ASYMMETRIC ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY GAME

Abstract A differential game with N countries as players is developed for the analysis of a marine resource with open access used by the countries as a pollutant sink and for production of an ecosystem good. Consumption, investment, abatement, and environmental research sectors may differ across countries. Under the assumption that property rights are well defined within the sovereignty of each country although there is a lack of enforcement in the international area, the game is solved for the feedback Nash equilibrium, using the Isaacs–Bellman dynamic programming technique, identifying the nonlinear feedback Nash flows of consumption, investment, harvest effort, abatement, and environmental research effort in each country, which is then compared to the Pareto optimal global solution.     

The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions for multi-objective programming problems with fuzzy-valued objective functions

The KKT optimality conditions for multiobjective programming problems with fuzzy-valued objective functions are derived in this paper. The solution concepts are proposed by defining an ordering relation on the class of all fuzzy numbers. Owing to this ordering relation being a partial ordering, the solution concepts proposed in this paper will follow from the similar solution concept, called Pareto optimal solution, in the conventional multiobjective programming problems. In order to consider the differentiation of fuzzy-valued function, we invoke the Hausdorff metric to define the distance between two fuzzy numbers and the Hukuhara difference to define the difference of two fuzzy numbers. Under these settings, the KKT optimality conditions are elicited naturally by introducing the Lagrange function multipliers.