A solitaire game played on 2-colored graphs

We introduce a solitaire game played on a graph. Initially one disk is placed at each vertex, one face green and the other red, oriented with either color facing up. Each move of the game consists of selecting a vertex whose disk shows green, flipping over the disks at neighboring vertices, and deleting the selected vertex. The game is won if all vertices are eliminated. We derive a simple parity-based necessary condition for winnability of a given game instance. By studying graph operations that construct new graphs from old ones, we obtain broad classes of graphs where this condition also suffices, thus characterizing the winnable games on such graphs. Concerning two familiar (but narrow) classes of graphs, we show that for trees a game is winnable if and only if the number of green vertices is odd, and for n-cubes a game is winnable if and only if the number of green vertices is even and not all vertices have the same color. We provide a linear-time algorithm for deciding winnability for games on maximal outerplanar graphs. We reduce the decision problem for winnability of a game on an arbitrary graph G to winnability of games on its blocks, and to winnability on homeomorphic images of G obtained by contracting edges at 2-valent vertices.     

乒乓球赛制的概率分析

乒乓球比赛的每局原先是21分制现在是11分制,单打由5局3胜制改为7局4胜制。赛制的改变增加了比赛结果的偶然性。本文用概率方法对赛制的改变进行了定量分析,给出了新赛制和旧赛制下运动员取胜的概率。     

The complexity of node blocking for dags

We consider the following modification of annihilation games called node blocking. Given a directed graph, each vertex can be occupied by at most one token. There are two types of tokens, each player can move only tokens of his type. The players alternate their moves and the current player i selects one token of type i and moves the token along a directed edge to an unoccupied vertex. If a player cannot make a move then he loses. We consider the problem of determining the complexity of the game: given an arbitrary configuration of tokens in a planar directed acyclic graph (dag), does the current player have a winning strategy? We prove that the problem is PSPACE-complete.     

Atomic weights and the combinatorial game of bipass

We define an all-small ruleset, bipass, within the framework of normal play combinatorial games. A game is played on finite strips of black and white stones. Stones of different colors are swapped provided they do not bypass one of their own kind. We find a simple surjective function from the strips to integer atomic weights (Berlekamp, Conway and Guy 1982) that measures the number of units in all-small games. This result provides explicit winning strategies for many games, and in cases where it does not, it gives narrow bounds for the canonical form game values. We find game values for some parametrized families of games, including an infinite number of strips of value ?, and we prove that the game value ?2 does not appear as a disjunctive sum of bipass. Lastly, we define the notion of atomic weight tameness, and prove that optimal misére play bipass resembles optimal normal play.     

Maker–Breaker domination game

We introduce the Maker–Breaker domination game, a two player game on a graph. At his turn, the first player, Dominator, selects a vertex in order to dominate the graph while the other player, Staller, forbids a vertex to Dominator in order to prevent him to reach his goal. Both players play alternately without missing their turn. This game is a particular instance of the so-called Maker–Breaker games, that is studied here in a combinatorial context. In this paper, we first prove that deciding the winner of the Maker–Breaker domination game is pspace-complete, even for bipartite graphs and split graphs. It is then showed that the problem is polynomial for cographs and trees. In particular, we define a strategy for Dominator that is derived from a variation of the dominating set problem, called the pairing dominating set problem.     

Communication, complexity, and evolutionary stability

In games with costless preplay communication, some strategies are more complex than others in the sense that they induce a finer partition of the set of states of the world. This paper shows that if the concept of evolutionary stability, which is argued to be a natural solution concept for communication games, is modified to take lexicographic complexity preferences into account, then for a class of games of common interest only communication strategies that induce payoff-dominant Nash outcomes of the underlying game are stable. Received April 1998/Final version September 1998     

Semi-marginalistic Values for Set Games

Concerning the solution theory for set games, the paper focuses on a family of values, each of which allocates to any player some type of marginalistic contribution with respect to any coalition containing the player. For any value of the relevant family, an axiomatization is given by means of three properties, namely one type of an efficiency property, the equal treatment property and one type of a monotonicity property. We present one proof technique which is based on the decomposition of any arbitrary set game into a union of simple set games, the value of which are much easier to determine. A simple set game is associated with an arbitrary, but fixed item of the universe.     

The advantage of complexity in two 2 × 2 games

Competing populations of finite automata co‐evolve in an evolutionary algorithm to play two player games. Populations endowed with greater complexity do better against their less complex opponents in a strictly competitive constant sum game. In contrast, complexity determines efficiency levels, but not relative earnings, in a Prisoner's Dilemma game; greater levels of complexity result in mutually higher earnings. With reporting noise, advantages to complexity are lost and efficiency levels are reduced as relatively less complex strategies are selected. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Complexity 9: 71–78, 2004     

Dictator game giving: Rules of fairness versus acts of kindness

In both dictator and impunity games, one player, the dictator, divides a fixed amount of money between himself and one other, the recipient. Recent lab studies of these games have produced seemingly inconsistent results, reporting substantially divergent amounts of dictator giving. Also, one prominent explanation for some of these differences, the impact of experimenter observation, displayed weak explanatory power in a different but related lab game. Data from the new experiment reported here offers some explanations. We find that dictators determine how much they will give on the basis of the total money available for the entire experimental session, not on the basis of what is available per game. This explains the reported differences between impunity and dictator studies. When distributing a gift among several recipients, individual dictators show little tendency towards equal treatment. Also, we find no evidence for the experimenter observation effect. Comparison with earlier experiments suggests that differences in the context of the game, affected by differences in written directions and independent of experimenter observation, account for differences across dictator studies. We propose a hypothetical decision procedure, based on the notion that dictator giving originates with personal and social rules that effectively constrain self-interested behavior. The procedure provides a link between dictator behavior and a broader class of laboratory phenomena. Received August 1993/Final version April 1994     

向量拟平衡问题的本质解及解集的本质连通区

本文研究向量拟平衡问题,得到了向量拟平衡问题解的一个存在性结果,证明了在满足一定的连续性和凸性条件的问题构成的空间Y中,大多数(在Baire分类意义下)问题的解集是稳定的,并证明Y的某子集中,每个向量拟平衡问题的解集中至少存在一个本质连通区。作为应用,我们导出了多目标广义对策弱Pareto-Nash平衡点的存在性,证明了在满足一定的连续性和凸性条件的多目标广义对策构成的空间P中,大多数对策的弱Pareto-Nash平衡点是稳定的,并证明了P中的每个对策的弱Pareto-Nash平衡点集中至少有一个本质连通区。     

Cops and Robbers on Planar‐Directed Graphs

Aigner and Fromme initiated the systematic study of the cop number of a graph by proving the elegant and sharp result that in every connected planar graph, three cops are sufficient to win a natural pursuit game against a single robber. This game, introduced by Nowakowski and Winkler, is commonly known as Cops and Robbers in the combinatorial literature. We extend this study to directed planar graphs, and establish separation from the undirected setting. We exhibit a geometric construction that shows that a sophisticated robber strategy can indefinitely evade three cops on a particular strongly connected planar‐directed graph.     

Computational complexity in additive hedonic games

We investigate the computational complexity of several decision problems in hedonic coalition formation games and demonstrate that attaining stability in such games remains NP-hard even when they are additive. Precisely, we prove that when either core stability or strict core stability is under consideration, the existence problem of a stable coalition structure is NP-hard in the strong sense. Furthermore, the corresponding decision problems with respect to the existence of a Nash stable coalition structure and of an individually stable coalition structure turn out to be NP-complete in the strong sense.     

How to play the one-lie Rényi-Ulam game

The one-lie Rényi-Ulam liar game is a two-player perfect information zero-sum game, lasting q rounds, on the set [n]?{1,…,n}. In each round Paul chooses a subset A⊆[n] and Carole either assigns one lie to each element of A or to each element of [n]?A. Paul wins the original (resp. pathological) game if after q rounds there is at most one (resp. at least one) element with one or fewer lies. We exhibit a simple, unified, optimal strategy for Paul to follow in both games, and use this to determine which player can win for all q,n and for both games.     

Fast Winning Strategies in Avoider-Enforcer Games

In numerous positional games the identity of the winner is easily determined. In this case one of the more interesting questions is not who wins but rather how fast can one win. These types of problems were studied earlier for Maker-Breaker games; here we initiate their study for unbiased Avoider-Enforcer games played on the edge set of the complete graph K _n on n vertices. For several games that are known to be an Enforcer’s win, we estimate quite precisely the minimum number of moves Enforcer has to play in order to win. We consider the non-planarity game, the connectivity game and the non-bipartite game.     

The desirability relation of simple games

We prove some properties of simple games with a complete desirability relation, and investigate the relationships between the desirability of a simple game G and that of some simple games that are derived from G. We also provide an example of a proper simple game that has a complete and acyclic desirability relation but is not a weighted majority game.     

Forms of representation for simple games: Sizes,conversions and equivalences

Simple games are cooperative games in which the benefit that a coalition may have is always binary, i.e., a coalition may either win or loose. This paper surveys different forms of representation of simple games, and those for some of their subfamilies like regular games and weighted games. We analyze the forms of representations that have been proposed in the literature based on different data structures for sets of sets. We provide bounds on the computational resources needed to transform a game from one form of representation to another one. This includes the study of the problem of enumerating the fundamental families of coalitions of a simple game. In particular we prove that several changes of representation that require exponential time can be solved with polynomial-delay and highlight some open problems.     

Axiomatizations of the core on the universal domain and other natural domains

We prove that the core on the set of all transferable utility games with players contained in a universe of at least five members can be axiomatized by the zero inessential game property, covariance under strategic equivalence, anonymity, boundedness, the weak reduced game property, the converse reduced game property, and the reconfirmation property. These properties also characterize the core on certain subsets of games, e.g., on the set of totally balanced games, on the set of balanced games, and on the set of superadditive games. Suitable extensions of these properties yield an axiomatization of the core on sets of nontransferable utility games. Received September 1999/Final version December 2000     

Second-order game problem: Decision dynamics in gaming phenomena

The paradigm of decision dynamics (Ref. 1) is used to describe the decision dynamics involving more than one decision-maker. The framework supplied in this paper is different from traditional game theory or differential games. Traditional simplicity assumptions are replaced by a more complicated, but more realistic, setting. Although many mathematically beautiful results in traditional game theory or differential games have disappeared in second-order games, the more realistic setting of the latter does make it easier for the decision-makers to find agood decision. Concepts of time optimality and time stability, and their necessary and/or sufficient conditions are described. Unconventional concepts of strategies and uncertainty involved in gaming phenomena are discussed. A highlight of the paper is a systematic discussion on reframing tactics of gaming situations, which do not exist in the context of traditional game theory or differential games. Various research topics are discussed at the end of the paper.