ALOHA networks: a game-theoretic approach

In this paper we consider a wireless network consisting of various nodes, where transmissions are regulated by the slotted ALOHA protocol. Nodes using the protocol behave autonomously, and decide at random whether to transmit in a particular time slot. Simultaneous transmissions by multiple nodes cause collisions, rendering the transmissions useless. Nodes can avoid collisions by cooperating, for example by exchanging control messages to coordinate their transmissions. We measure the network performance by the long-term average fraction of time slots in which a successful transmission takes place, and we are interested in how to allocate the performance gains obtained from cooperation among the nodes. To this end we define and analyze a cooperative ALOHA game. We show that this type of game is convex and we consider three solution concepts: the core, the Shapley value, and the compromise value. Furthermore, we develop a set of weighted gain splitting (WGS) allocation rules, and show that this set coincides with the core of the game. These WGS allocation rules can be used to provide an alternative characterization of the Shapley value. Finally, we analyze the sensitivity of the cooperative solution concepts with respect to changes in the wireless network.     

On shortest path games

A class of cooperative TU-games arising from shortest path problems is introduced and analyzed. Some conditions under which a shortest path game is balanced are obtained. Also an axiomatic characterization of the Shapley value for this class of games is provided.     

On the core and nucleolus of directed acyclic graph games

We introduce directed acyclic graph (DAG) games, a generalization of standard tree games, to study cost sharing on networks. This structure has not been previously analyzed from a cooperative game theoretic perspective. Every monotonic and subadditive cost game—including monotonic minimum cost spanning tree games—can be modeled as a DAG-game. We provide an efficiently verifiable condition satisfied by a large class of directed acyclic graphs that is sufficient for the balancedness of the associated DAG-game. We introduce a network canonization process and prove various structural results for the core of canonized DAG-games. In particular, we characterize classes of coalitions that have a constant payoff in the core. In addition, we identify a subset of the coalitions that is sufficient to determine the core. This result also guarantees that the nucleolus can be found in polynomial time for a large class of DAG-games.     

The minimum cost shortest-path tree game

A minimum cost shortest-path tree is a tree that connects the source with every node of the network by a shortest path such that the sum of the cost (as a proxy for length) of all arcs is minimum. In this paper, we adapt the algorithm of Hansen and Zheng (Discrete Appl. Math. 65:275?C284, 1996) to the case of acyclic directed graphs to find a minimum cost shortest-path tree in order to be applied to the cost allocation problem associated with a cooperative minimum cost shortest-path tree game. In addition, we analyze a non-cooperative game based on the connection problem that arises in the above situation. We prove that the cost allocation given by an ??à la?? Bird rule provides a core solution in the former game and that the strategies that induce those payoffs in the latter game are Nash equilibrium.     

Node-Consistent Shapley Value for Games Played over Event Trees with Random Terminal Time

We consider a class of dynamic games played over an event tree, with random terminal time. We assume that the players wish to jointly optimize their payoffs throughout the whole planning horizon and adopt the Shapley value to share the joint cooperative outcome. We devise a node-consistent decomposition of the Shapley value, which means that in any node of the event tree, the players prefer to stick to cooperation and to continue implementing the Shapley value rather than switching to noncooperation. For each node and each player, we provide two payment values, one that applies if the game terminates at that node and the other if the game continues. We illustrate our results with an example of pollution control.     

Weighted allocation rules for standard fixed tree games

In this paper we consider standard fixed tree games, for which each vertex unequal to the root is inhabited by exactly one player. We present two weighted allocation rules, the weighted down-home allocation and the weighted neighbour-home allocation, both inspired by the painting story in Maschler et al. (1995) . We show, in a constructive way, that the core equals both the set of weighted down-home allocations and the set of weighted neighbour allocations. Since every weighted down-home allocation specifies a weighted Shapley value (Kalai and Samet (1988)) in a natural way, and vice versa, our results provide an alternative proof of the fact that the core of a standard fixed tree game equals the set of weighted Shapley values. The class of weighted neighbour allocations is a generalization of the nucleolus, in the sense that the latter is in this class as the special member where players have all equal weights.     

Games with a permission structure - A survey on generalizations and applications

In the field of cooperative games with restricted cooperation, various restrictions on coalition formation are studied. The most studied restrictions are those that arise from restricted communication and hierarchies. This survey discusses several models of hierarchy restrictions and their relation with communication restrictions. In the literature, there are results on game properties, Harsanyi dividends, core stability, and various solutions that generalize existing solutions for TU-games. In this survey, we mainly focus on axiomatizations of the Shapley value in different models of games with a hierarchically structured player set, and their applications. Not only do these axiomatizations provide insight in the Shapley value for these models, but also by considering the types of axioms that characterize the Shapley value, we learn more about different network structures. A central model of games with hierarchies is that of games with a permission structure where players in a cooperative transferable utility game are part of a permission structure in the sense that there are players that need permission from other players before they are allowed to cooperate. This permission structure is represented by a directed graph. Generalizations of this model are, for example, games on antimatroids, and games with a local permission structure. Besides discussing these generalizations, we briefly discuss some applications, in particular auction games and hierarchically structured firms.     

On the computation of the nucleolus of a cooperative game

We consider classes of cooperative games. We show that we can efficiently compute an allocation in the intersection of the prekernel and the least core of the game if we can efficiently compute the minimum excess for any given allocation. In the case where the prekernel of the game contains exactly one core vector, our algorithm computes the nucleolus of the game. This generalizes both a recent result by Kuipers on the computation of the nucleolus for convex games and a classical result by Megiddo on the nucleolus of standard tree games to classes of more general minimum cost spanning tree games. Our algorithm is based on the ellipsoid method and Maschler's scheme for approximating the prekernel. Received February 2000/Final version April 2001     

Fast paths in large-scale dynamic road networks

Efficiently computing fast paths in large-scale dynamic road networks (where dynamic traffic information is known over a part of the network) is a practical problem faced by traffic information service providers who wish to offer a realistic fast path computation to GPS terminal enabled vehicles. The heuristic solution method we propose is based on a highway hierarchy-based shortest path algorithm for static large-scale networks; we maintain a static highway hierarchy and perform each query on the dynamically evaluated network, using a simple algorithm to propagate available dynamic traffic information over a larger part of the road network. We provide computational results that show the efficacy of our approach.     

On the K shortest path trees problem

We address the problem of finding the K best path trees connecting a source node with any other non-source node in a directed network with arbitrary lengths. The main result in this paper is the proof that the kth shortest path tree is adjacent to at least one of the previous (k-1) shortest path trees. Consequently, we design an O(f(n,m,C_max)+Km) time and O(K+m) space algorithm to determine the K shortest path trees, in a directed network with n nodes, m arcs and maximum absolute length C_max, where O(f(n,m,C_max)) is the best time needed to solve the shortest simple paths connecting a source node with any other non-source node.     

On the second point-to-point undirected shortest simple path problem

We address the determination of the second point-to-point shortest simple path in undirected networks. The effective reduced cost concept is introduced to compute the second best solution. This concept is used to prove that a path tree containing the second point-to-point shortest simple path is adjacent to any shortest path tree. Therefore, this result immediately implies a method requiring O(m) time once that the shortest path tree is obtained on an undirected network with n nodes and m edges.     

Multilinear extensions and values for multichoice games

We define multilinear extensions for multichoice games and relate them to probabilistic values and semivalues. We apply multilinear extensions to show that the Banzhaf value for a compound multichoice game is not the product of the Banzhaf values of the component games, in contrast to the behavior in simple games. Following Owen (Manag Sci 18:64–79, 1972), we integrate the multilinear extension over a simplex to construct a version of the Shapley value for multichoice games. We compare this new Shapley value to other extensions of the Shapley value to multichoice games. We also show how the probabilistic value (resp. semivalue, Banzhaf value, Shapley value) of a multichoice game is equal to the probabilistic value (resp. semivalue, Banzhaf value, Shapley value) of an appropriately defined TU decomposition game. Finally, we explain how semivalues, probabilistic values, the Banzhaf value, and this Shapley value may be viewed as the probability that a player makes a difference to the outcome of a simple multichoice game.     

灾后运输网络中的最短路修复合作博弈

在最短路修复合作博弈中,当灾后运输网络规模较大时,最优成本分摊问题难以直接求解。基于拉格朗日松弛理论,提出了一种最短路修复合作博弈成本分摊算法。该算法将最短路修复合作博弈分解为两个具有特殊结构的子博弈,进而利用两个子博弈的结构特性,可以{高效地}求解出二者的最优成本分摊,将这两个成本分摊相加,可以获得原博弈的一个近乎最优的稳定成本分摊。结果部分既包含运输网络的随机仿真,也包含玉树地震灾区的现实模拟,无论数据来源于仿真还是现实,该算法都能在短时间内为最短路修复合作博弈提供稳定的成本分摊方案。     

单调集对策及合成对策的边缘值

本文给出了单调集对策及其合成对策的边缘值，它类似于我们所熟知的TU—对策的Shapley值及文献[6]．集对策的边缘值的意义在于允许局中人共享项目．这使得不能分割的项目在局中人之间的分配成为可能．我们给出了这种边缘值的一些性质，并讨论了合成集对策的核及其子对策的核之间的关系．     

Equilibrium strategies for multiple interdictors on a common network

In this work, we introduce multi-interdictor games, which model interactions among multiple interdictors with differing objectives operating on a common network. As a starting point, we focus on shortest path multi-interdictor (SPMI) games, where multiple interdictors try to increase the shortest path lengths of their own adversaries attempting to traverse a common network. We first establish results regarding the existence of equilibria for SPMI games under both discrete and continuous interdiction strategies. To compute such an equilibrium, we present a reformulation of the SPMI game, which leads to a generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) with non-shared constraints. While such a problem is computationally challenging in general, we show that under continuous interdiction actions, an SPMI game can be formulated as a linear complementarity problem and solved by Lemke’s algorithm. In addition, we present decentralized heuristic algorithms based on best response dynamics for games under both continuous and discrete interdiction strategies. Finally, we establish theoretical lower bounds on the worst-case efficiency loss of equilibria in SPMI games, with such loss caused by the lack of coordination among noncooperative interdictors, and use the decentralized algorithms to numerically study the average-case efficiency loss.     

A generalized linear production model: A unifying model

We introduce a generalized linear production model whose attractive feature being that the resources held by any subset of producersS is not restricted to be the vector sum of the resources held by the members ofS. We provide sufficient conditions for the non-emptiness of the core of the associated generalized linear production game, and show that if the core of the game is not empty then a solution in it can be produced from a dual optimal solution to the associated linear programming problem. Our generalized linear production model is a proper generalization of the linear production model introduced by Owen, and it can be used to analyze cooperative games which cannot be studied in the ordinary linear production model framework. We use the generalized model to show that the cooperative game induced by a network optimization problem in which players are the nodes of the network has a non-empty core. We further employ our model to prove the non-emptiness of the core of two other classes of cooperative games, which were not previously studied in the literature, and we also use our generalized model to provide an alternative proof for the non-emptiness of the core of the class of minimum cost spanning tree games. Thus, it appears that the generalized linear production model is a unifying model which can be used to explain the non-emptiness of the core of cooperative games generated by various, seemingly different, optimization models.This research was partially done while the author was visiting the Graduate School of Business Administration at Tel-Aviv University. The research was partially supported by Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council Canada Grant A4181 and by SSHRC leave fellowship 451-83-0030.Dedicated to George B. Dantzig.     

Fuzzy cores and fuzzy balancedness

We study the relation between the fuzzy core and balancedness for fuzzy games. For regular games, this relation has been studied by Bondareva (Problemy Kibernet 10:119–139, 1963) and Shapley (Naval Res Logist Q 14: 453–460, 1967). First, we gain insight in this relation when we analyse situations where the fuzzy game is continuous. Our main result shows that any fuzzy game has a non-empty core if and only if it is balanced. We also consider deposit games to illustrate the use of the main result.     

最短路博弈群体单调分配方案构造

群体单调分配方案(Population Monotonic Allocation Scheme, 后简称PMAS)是合作博弈的一类分配机制。在合作博弈中, PMAS为每一个子博弈提供一个满足群体单调性的核中的分配方案, 从而保证大联盟的动态稳定性。本文主要贡献为利用线性规划与对偶理论构造与求解一类基于最短路问题的合作博弈(最短路博弈)的PMAS。我们首先借助对偶理论, 利用组合方法为最短路博弈构造了一个基于平均分摊思想的PMAS。然后借鉴计算核仁的Maschler方案, 将PMAS的存在性问题转化为一个指数规模的线性规划的求解问题, 并通过巧妙的求解得到了与之前组合方法相同的最短路博弈的PMAS。     

最短路博弈群体单调分配方案构造

群体单调分配方案(Population Monotonic Allocation Scheme, 后简称PMAS)是合作博弈的一类分配机制。在合作博弈中, PMAS为每一个子博弈提供一个满足群体单调性的核中的分配方案, 从而保证大联盟的动态稳定性。本文主要贡献为利用线性规划与对偶理论构造与求解一类基于最短路问题的合作博弈(最短路博弈)的PMAS。我们首先借助对偶理论, 利用组合方法为最短路博弈构造了一个基于平均分摊思想的PMAS。然后借鉴计算核仁的Maschler方案, 将PMAS的存在性问题转化为一个指数规模的线性规划的求解问题, 并通过巧妙的求解得到了与之前组合方法相同的最短路博弈的PMAS。