Patent-investment games under asymmetric information

This paper analyzes preemptive patenting in a two-stage real options game where an incumbent firm competes with a potential entrant firm for the patent of a substitute product in a product market with profit flow uncertainty. The incumbent suffers loss of monopoly in the product market if the entrant acquires the patent of a substitute product and later commercializes the product. Our patent-investment game model assumes that the entrant has complete information on the incumbent’s commercialization cost while the incumbent only knows the distribution of the entrant’s cost. We investigate the impact of information asymmetry on the preemption strategies adopted by the two competing firms on patenting the substitute product by comparing the optimal preemption strategies and the real option value functions of the two competing firms under complete information and information asymmetry. Our analysis reveals that the informationally disadvantaged incumbent always suffers from loss in its real option value of investment since it tends to act more aggressively in competing for the patent. On the other hand, the real option value of investment of the informationally advantaged entrant may be undermined or enhanced. The incumbent’s aggressive response under information asymmetry may lead to reversal of winner in the patent race. We also examine how information asymmetry may affect the occurrence of sleeping patent and the corresponding expected duration between the two stages of patenting and product commercialization.     

Mathematical structure of a bilevel strategic pricing model

This paper is concerned with the characterization of optimal strategies for a service firm acting in an oligopolistic environment. The decision problem is formulated as a leader–follower game played on a transportation network, where the leader firm selects a revenue-maximizing price schedule that takes explicitly into account the rational behavior of the customers. In the context of our analysis, the follower’s problem is associated with a competitive network market involving non atomic customer groups. The resulting bilevel model can therefore be viewed as a model of product differentiation subject to structural network constraints.     

The computational complexity of bilevel assignment problems

In bilevel optimization problems there are two decision makers, the leader and the follower, who act in a hierarchy. Each decision maker has his own objective function, but there are common constraints. This paper deals with bilevel assignment problems where each decision maker controls a subset of edges and each edge has a leader’s and a follower’s weight. The edges selected by the leader and by the follower need to form a perfect matching. The task is to determine which edges the leader should choose such that his objective value which depends on the follower’s optimal reaction is maximized. We consider sum- and bottleneck objective functions for the leader and follower. Moreover, if not all optimal reactions of the follower lead to the same leader’s objective value, then the follower either chooses an optimal reaction which is best (optimistic rule) or worst (pessimistic rule) for the leader. We show that all the variants arising if the leader’s and follower’s objective functions are sum or bottleneck functions are NP-hard if the pessimistic rule is applied. In case of the optimistic rule the problem is shown to be NP-hard if at least one of the decision makers has a sum objective function.     

A note on price and quality competition between asymmetric firms

This paper analyzes the impact of asymmetry between firms on the outcome of price and quality competition from a microeconomic viewpoint. Consumers purchase a product based on not only its price but also its quality level; therefore, two firms compete in determining their prices and quality levels to maximize their profits. The asymmetry arises from the difference in consumers’ loyalty to each firm; that asymmetry then determines a character of differentiation between firms. Our purpose is to show how asymmetry influences competition under varying consumers’ price- and quality-sensitivity. In doing so, we extend earlier work in the area of price and quality competition. We show that in both the moderately quality-sensitive and price-sensitive markets, higher consumers’ sensitivity as well as lower consumers’ loyalty to any firm leads to intense competition, resulting in a decrease of both firms’ equilibrium profits. On the other hand, in highly quality-sensitive market, asymmetry compels the smaller firm to change its competitive strategy. In general, this is more beneficial to the larger firm, as the smaller firm’s profit tends to decline. In the worst case, the smaller firm is driven out of business under equilibrium.     

A real options approach for entering the Internet securities trading businesses with start‐up time

This paper uses a real options approach to establish a new evaluation model under uncertainty of both the volume of Internet securities transactions and the total transaction volume of a securities firm. The proposed approach can assist securities firms in evaluating the optimal thresholds for entering the Internet securities trading business and withdrawing from the conventional securities trading business. This paper assumes that the annual number of Internet securities transactions and the total annual number of securities transactions both follow a geometric Brownian motion. Besides, this model considers a start‐up time to complete the entry project's procedure. Accordingly, a decision model based on the real options approach is introduced, and the closed form solutions for the optimal threshold values of the entry or withdrawal models are determined. The conclusions provide some valuable references to help strategic managers of securities firms in making decisions on entering the Internet securities trading business or withdrawing from the conventional trading business. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Strategic multi-store opening under financial constraint

This paper analyzes strategic store openings in a situation in which firms can open multiple stores depending on the financial constraints of the firm. Specifically, given any upper limit of the number of store openings that two potentially symmetric firms can open, they sequentially determine the number of store openings, including their locations, to maximize their profits. As a result of our analysis in a microeconomic framework, we show that the equilibrium strategy can be wholly classified into only two following opposite strategies according to the level of their financial constraints involved. When firms can afford to invest significant amounts of money in the market, the leader chooses “segmentation strategy,” in which a part of the market can be monopolized by opening a chain of multiple stores and deterring the follower’s entry. In contrast, when the leader has a severe financial constraint so that it can only monopolize less than half of the market, the leader chooses “minimum differentiation strategy,” where firms open each of their stores at exactly the same point as the rival’s. Under this strategy, the leader necessarily captures just half of the market. Furthermore, we show that regardless of potential symmetry between firms, both first and second mover advantages in terms of profit can occur in the equilibrium.     

Full-line or specialization strategy? The negative effect of product variety on product line strategy

This paper studies the product line decisions of firms under two consumer segments differing in their quality-sensitivity. We focus on a negative impact of the product variety on the consumers’ motivation to purchase, while each product is horizontally differentiated. In the presence of this impact and high fixed costs relative to variable costs, it is shown that when a highly quality-sensitive segment exists, it is always advantageous for the monopoly to specialize in only one product serving this segment. However, the appearance of a competitor can drastically change the product line in the market. Under the duopolistic setting where two firms sequentially determine their product lines, we show that the leader gains a better financial result by offering its product to the low segment for many cases, including the case where no product is offered to the high segment by either of the firms who are in equilibrium. Furthermore, we obtain another interesting result that indicates that the follower’s profit can exceed the leader’s profit when the quality-sensitivities between the two consumer segments are sufficiently different, even though the two firms are symmetric except for the order of their product offerings.     

Duopolistic competition under risk aversion and uncertainty

A monopolist typically defers entry into an industry as both price uncertainty and the level of risk aversion increase. By contrast, the presence of a rival typically hastens entry under risk neutrality. Here, we examine these two opposing effects in a duopoly setting. We demonstrate that the value of a firm and its entry decision behave differently with risk aversion and uncertainty depending on the type of competition. Interestingly, if the leader’s role is defined endogenously, then higher uncertainty makes her relatively better off, whereas with the roles exogenously defined, the impact of uncertainty is ambiguous.     

Hysteresis effects under CIR interest rates

Most decision making research in real options focuses on revenue uncertainty assuming discount rates remain constant. However, for many decisions revenue or cost streams are relatively static and investment is driven by interest rate uncertainty, for example the decision to invest in durable machinery and equipment. Using interest rate models from Cox et al. (1985b), we generalize the work of Ingersoll and Ross (1992) in two ways. Firstly, we include real options on perpetuities (in addition to zero coupon cash flows). Secondly, we incorporate abandonment or disinvestment as well as investment options, and thus model interest rate hysteresis (parallel to revenue uncertainty in Dixit (1989a)). Under stochastic interest rates, economic hysteresis is found to be significant, even for small sunk costs.     

非对称情形下R & D竞争项目的策略性投资

在非对称情形下,考虑具有技术不确定和未来收益不确定的竞争研究与开发(R&;D)项目的不可逆策略性投资.利用期权博弈理论和随机优化方法给出了高效研发公司(主导者) 的最优投资阈值和最优投资规则的解析表达式,并证明了由于两公司的竞争使投资阈值下降.其次讨论了两公司的混合投资策略,并给出每个公司执行投资期权的概率和两公司同时执行投资期权的概率. 在最后给出了数值模拟算例来说明该文结论的合理性.     

Impact of product pricing and timing of investment decisions on supply chain co-opetition

In supply chain co-opetition, firms simultaneously compete and co-operate in order to maximize their profits. We consider the nature of co-opetition between two firms: The product supplier invests in the technology to improve quality, and the purchasing firm (buyer) invests in selling effort to develop the market for the product before uncertainty in demand is resolved. We consider three different decision making structures and discuss the optimal configuration from each firm’s perspective. In case 1, the supplier invests in product quality and sets the wholesale price for the product. The buyer then exerts selling effort to develop the market and following demand potential realization, sets the resale price. In case 2, the supplier invests in product quality followed by the buyer’s investment in selling effort. Then, after demand potential is observed, the supplier sets the wholesale price and the buyer sets the resale price. Finally, in case 3, both firms simultaneously invest in product quality and selling effort, respectively. Subsequently, observing the demand potential, the supplier sets the wholesale price and the buyer sets the resale price. We compare all configuration options from both the perspective of the supplier and the buyer, and show that the level of investment by the firms depends on the nature of competition between them and the level of uncertainty in demand. Our analysis reveals that although configuration 1 results in the highest profits for the integrated channel, there is no clear dominating preference on system configuration from the perspective of both parties. The incentives of the co-opetition partners and the investment levels are mainly governed by the cost structure and the level of uncertainty in demand. We examine and discuss the relation between system parameters and the incentives in desiging the supply contract structure.     

Optimal access pricing for natural monopoly networks when costs are sunk and revenues are uncertain

This paper studies optimal access pricing for natural monopoly networks with large sunk costs and uncertain revenues. Using techniques from the option pricing literature, we show that the optimal access price corresponds to a risk-free form of the Efficiency Component Pricing Rule (ECPR), that is, where the opportunity cost is based on the risk free rate of return. We also show that at levels of revenue above the optimal level that triggers entry, the entrant should pay a premium above risk-free ECPR that rewards the incumbent for relinquishing his rights to the risky cash flows at the higher revenue level.     

不确定竞争市场投资决策

本文针对不确定的竞争市场 ,分析现在作一个数量为 I的不可逆投资 ,产生一个生产容量 k,以在将来不确定竞争市场中比潜在进入的竞争对手具有某种占先优势这样一个投资机会的策略投资行为和机会的价值。用博奕论方法分析和给出了基于现在投资可获得将来增长期权价值的决策方法。     

竞争条件下公司最优投资策略纳什均衡分析

大多数实物期权文献都只是研究一个公司在没有竞争条件下的最优决策,然而实际上竞争者的行为经常影响到公司的投资机会.通过建立投资概率是临界值的函数模型,根据期权博弈理论研究了在不确定条件和不同信息结构下,一个或多个公司的最优投资策略纳什均衡解,并用MATLAB语言对案例进行了仿真分析,画图说明了参数变化对投资策略的影响.     

A Stochastic Competitive Research and Development Race Where “Winner Takes All” with Lower and Upper Bounds

The paper analyzes an environment in which several firms compete over the development of a project. Each firm decides how much to invest in the project while adhering to firm-specific lower and upper investment bounds. The completion time of the project by a firm has exponential distribution with rate that depends linearly on the investment of the firm. The firm that completes the project first collects all its revenues whereas the remaining firms earn nothing. The paper establishes the existence and uniqueness of both the Nash equilibrium and the globally optimal solution, provides explicit representations parametrically in the interest rate, and constructs computationally efficient methods to solve these two problems. It also examines sensitivity of Nash equilibrium to marginal changes in lower and upper bounds.     

Price and quality competition: The effect of differentiation and vertical integration

This paper studies an instance of price and quality competition between firms as seen in the recent Internet market. Consumers purchase a product based on not only its price but also its quality level; therefore, two firms compete in determining their prices and quality levels to maximize their profits. Characterizing this competition from a microeconomic viewpoint, we consider two possible business strategies that firms can utilize to overcome the competition—the differentiation and the vertical integration with another complementary firm. We show an interesting result not seen in the well-known Bertrand price competition: not only does the differentiation always increase the firms’ profits, but also it can increase the consumer’s welfare in a quality-sensitive market. We further derive that under some mild conditions the monopolistic vertical integration that excludes the combination-purchase with a competitor’s product is beneficial for both the integrated firm and its consumers.     

The determinant of production entry and exit model on financing behavior

This study seeks for equity/debt values and the relevant potential firm value with financing or not when the real options approach is assessed. The paper deals with the following relative problems: (1) the assessment rule of decision whether to stop production or not; (2) whether the (dis) investment cost or salvage could reflect the production scale; (3) whether the rate of capital cost or the rate of return in different stages could reflect the suitable risk premium; (4) when the investment cost, exit cost, and salvage are the linear functions of production volume and follow the geometric Brownian motion to analyze the optimum external financing behavior and to decide the production thresholds of production entry and exit.     

基于吸收能力的企业合作研发的动态模型

竞争还是合作,是企业研发投资时所面临的选择,本文应用最优控制论建立了一个考虑吸收能力的企业合作研发的动态模型,分析了双寡头垄断企业在竞争和合作两种情况下的均衡研发投资,并与D＇aspremont ＆ J＇aquemin的静态模型的结果进行了比较.     

Strategic real options with stochastic volatility in a duopoly model

The investment-timing problem has been considered by many authors under the assumption that the instantaneous volatility of the demand shock is constant. Recently, Ting et al. (2013) [12] carried out an asymptotic approach in a monopoly model by letting the volatility parameter follow a stochastic process. In this paper, we consider a strategic game in which two firms compete for a new market under an uncertain demand, and extend the analysis of Ting et al. to duopoly models under different strategic game structures. In particular, we investigate how the additional uncertainty in the volatility affects the investment thresholds and payoffs of players. Several numerical examples and comparison of the results are provided to confirm our analysis.     

Optimal production strategy under demand fluctuations: Technology versus capacity

This paper provides a comparative analysis of five possible production strategies for two kinds of flexibility investment, namely flexible technology and flexible capacity, under demand fluctuations. Each strategy is underpinned by a set of operations decisions on technology level, capacity amount, production quantity, and pricing. By evaluating each strategy, we show how market uncertainty, production cost structure, operations timing, and investment costing environment affect a firm’s strategic decisions. The results show that there is no sequential effect of the two flexibility investments. We also illustrate the different ways in which flexible technology and flexible capacity affect a firm’s profit under demand fluctuations. The results reveal that compared to no flexibility investment, flexible technology investment earns the same or a higher profit for a firm, whereas flexible capacity investment can be beneficial or harmful to a firm’s profit. Moreover, we prove that higher flexibility does not guarantee more profit. Depending on the situation, the optimal strategy can be any one of the five possible strategies. We also provide the optimality conditions for each strategy.