Noncooperative Games with Vector Payoffs Under Relative Pseudomonotonicity

We consider the Nash equilibrium problem with vector payoffs in a topological vector space. By employing the recent concept of relative (pseudo) monotonicity, we establish several existence results for vector Nash equilibria and vector equilibria. The results strengthen in a major way existence results for vector equilibrium problems which were based on the usual (generalized) monotonicity concepts.     

A set optimization approach to zero-sum matrix games with multi-dimensional payoffs

A new solution concept for two-player zero-sum matrix games with multi-dimensional payoffs is introduced. It is based on extensions of the vector order in \(\mathbb {R}^d\) to order relations in the power set of \(\mathbb {R}^d\), so-called set relations, and strictly motivated by the interpretation of the payoff as multi-dimensional loss for one and gain for the other player. The new concept provides coherent worst case estimates for games with multi-dimensional payoffs. It is shown that–in contrast to games with one-dimensional payoffs–the corresponding strategies are different from equilibrium strategies for games with multi-dimensional payoffs. The two concepts are combined into new equilibrium notions for which existence theorems are given. Relationships of the new concepts to existing ones such as Shapley and vector equilibria, vector minimax and maximin solutions as well as Pareto optimal security strategies are clarified.     

Generalized Vector Variational Inequalities over Countable Product of Sets

In this paper, we consider vector variational inequalities with set-valued mappings over countable product sets in a real Banach space setting. By employing concepts of relative pseudomonotonicity, we establish several existence results for generalized vector variational inequalities and for systems of generalized vector variational inequalities. These results strengthen previous existence results which were based on the usual monotonicity type assumptions     

Generalized Vector Variational Inequalities over Countable Product of Sets

In this paper, we consider vector variational inequalities with set-valued mappings over countable product sets in a real Banach space setting. By employing concepts of relative pseudomonotonicity, we establish several existence results for generalized vector variational inequalities and for systems of generalized vector variational inequalities. These results strengthen previous existence results which were based on the usual monotonicity type assumptions     

An order-centric treatment of the Bayesian supermodular game

We take an order-centric approach to an incomplete-information version of the supermodular game (SG). In particular, we first introduce concepts related to ordered normal form games and the stochastic dominance order. Then, we work on a Bayesian SG, for which we show the existence of a monotone equilibrium and its monotonic trend as the player type distribution varies. Our results complement those that appeared in the Bayesian-SG literature.     

Threat bargaining games with a variable population

In this paper we establish links between desirable properties satisfied by familiar solutions to bargaining games with a variable population and the Nash equilibrium concept for threat bargaining games. We introduce three new concepts for equilibrium threat strategies called strategic stability, strategic monotonicity with respect to changes in the number of agents and strategic constancy. Our primary objective in this paper is to show that familiar assumptions satisfied by bargaining games with a variable population yield equilibrium threat strategies which satisfies in a very natural way the concepts we have introduced.     

Equilibrium Problems under Generalized Convexity and Generalized Monotonicity

Generalized convex functions preserve many valuable properties of mathematical programming problems with convex functions. Generalized monotone maps allow for an extension of existence results for variational inequality problems with monotone maps. Both models are special realizations of an abstract equilibrium problem with numerous applications, especially in equilibrium analysis (e.g., Blum and Oettli, 1994). We survey existence results for equilibrium problems obtained under generalized convexity and generalized monotonicity. We consider both the scalar and the vector case. Finally existence results for a system of vector equilibrium problems under generalized convexity are surveyed which have applications to a system of vector variational inequality problems. Throughout the survey we demonstrate that the results can be obtained without the rigid assumptions of convexity and monotonicity.     

Equilibrium Problems under Generalized Convexity and Generalized Monotonicity

Generalized convex functions preserve many valuable properties of mathematical programming problems with convex functions. Generalized monotone maps allow for an extension of existence results for variational inequality problems with monotone maps. Both models are special realizations of an abstract equilibrium problem with numerous applications, especially in equilibrium analysis (e.g., Blum and Oettli, 1994). We survey existence results for equilibrium problems obtained under generalized convexity and generalized monotonicity. We consider both the scalar and the vector case. Finally existence results for a system of vector equilibrium problems under generalized convexity are surveyed which have applications to a system of vector variational inequality problems. Throughout the survey we demonstrate that the results can be obtained without the rigid assumptions of convexity and monotonicity.     

Lexicographic variational inequalities with applications

In this article, we consider equivalence properties between various kinds of lexicographic variational inequalities. By employing various concepts of monotonicity, we show that the usual sequential variational inequality is equivalent to the direct lexicographic variational inequality or to the dual lexicographic variational inequality. We establish several existence results for lexicographic variational inequalities. Also, we introduce the lexicographic complementarity problem and establish its equivalence with the lexicographic variational inequality. We illustrate our approach by several examples of applications to vector transportation and vector spatial equilibrium problems.     

Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution Equilibria

Multicriteria games describe strategic interactions in which players, having more than one criterion to take into account, don’t have an a-priori opinion on the relative importance of all these criteria. Roemer (Econ. Bull. 3:1–13, 2005) introduces an organizational interpretation of the concept of equilibrium: each player can be viewed as running a bargaining game among criteria. In this paper, we analyze the bargaining problem within each player by considering the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution (see Kalai and Smorodinsky in Econometrica 43:513–518, 1975). We provide existence results for the so called Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution equilibria for a general class of disagreement points which properly includes the one considered by Roemer (Econ. Bull. 3:1–13, 2005). Moreover we look at the refinement power of this equilibrium concept and show that it is an effective selection device even when combined with classical refinement concepts based on stability with respect to perturbations; in particular, we consider the extension to multicriteria games of the Selten’s trembling hand perfect equilibrium concept (see Selten in Int. J. Game Theory 4:25–55, 1975) and prove that perfect Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution equilibria exist and properly refine both the perfect equilibria and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution equilibria.     

Probabilities of Pure Nash Equilibria in Matrix Games when the Payoff Entries of One Player Are Randomly Selected

The Nash equilibrium in pure strategies represents an important solution concept in nonzero sum matrix games. Existence of Nash equilibria in games with known and with randomly selected payoff entries have been studied extensively. In many real games, however, a player may know his own payoff entries but not the payoff entries of the other player. In this paper, we consider nonzero sum matrix games where the payoff entries of one player are known, but the payoff entries of the other player are assumed to be randomly selected. We are interested in determining the probabilities of existence of pure Nash equilibria in such games. We characterize these probabilities by first determining the finite space of ordinal matrix games that corresponds to the infinite space of matrix games with random entries for only one player. We then partition this space into mutually exclusive spaces that correspond to games with no Nash equilibria and with r Nash equilibria. In order to effectively compute the sizes of these spaces, we introduce the concept of top-rated preferences minimal ordinal games. We then present a theorem which provides a mechanism for computing the number of games in each of these mutually exclusive spaces, which then can be used to determine the probabilities. Finally, we summarize the results by deriving the probabilities of existence of unique, nonunique, and no Nash equilibria, and we present an illustrative example.     

Characterizations of relatively generalized monotone maps

New concepts of relative monotonicity were introduced in Konnov (Oper Res Lett 28:21–26, 2001a) which extend the usual ones. These concepts enable us to establish new existence and uniqueness results for variational inequality problems over product sets. This paper presents first-order characterizations of new (generalized) monotonicity concepts. Specialized results are obtained for the affine case.      

向量拟平衡问题的本质解及解集的本质连通区

本文研究向量拟平衡问题,得到了向量拟平衡问题解的一个存在性结果,证明了在满足一定的连续性和凸性条件的问题构成的空间Y中,大多数(在Baire分类意义下)问题的解集是稳定的,并证明Y的某子集中,每个向量拟平衡问题的解集中至少存在一个本质连通区。作为应用,我们导出了多目标广义对策弱Pareto-Nash平衡点的存在性,证明了在满足一定的连续性和凸性条件的多目标广义对策构成的空间P中,大多数对策的弱Pareto-Nash平衡点是稳定的,并证明了P中的每个对策的弱Pareto-Nash平衡点集中至少有一个本质连通区。     

The modified stochastic game

We present a new tool for the study of multiplayer stochastic games, namely the modified game, which is a normal-form game that depends on the discount factor, the initial state, and for every player a partition of the set of states and a vector that assigns a real number to each element of the partition. We study properties of the modified game, like its equilibria, min–max value, and max–min value. We then show how this tool can be used to prove the existence of a uniform equilibrium in a certain class of multiplayer stochastic games.     

Robust Multiple Objective Game Theory

In this paper, we propose a distribution-free model instead of considering a particular distribution for multiple objective games with incomplete information. We assume that each player does not know the exact value of the uncertain payoff parameters, but only knows that they belong to an uncertainty set. In our model, the players use a robust optimization approach for each of their objective to contend with payoff uncertainty. To formulate such a game, named “robust multiple objective games” here, we introduce three kinds of robust equilibrium under different preference structures. Then, by using a scalarization method and an existing result on the solutions for the generalized quasi-vector equilibrium problems, we obtain the existence of these robust equilibria. Finally, we give an example to illustrate our model and the existence theorems. Our results are new and fill the gap in the game theory literature.     

Variational inequality formulation for the games with random payoffs

We consider an n-player non-cooperative game with random payoffs and continuous strategy set for each player. The random payoffs of each player are defined using a finite dimensional random vector. We formulate this problem as a chance-constrained game by defining the payoff function of each player using a chance constraint. We first consider the case where the continuous strategy set of each player does not depend on the strategies of other players. If a random vector defining the payoffs of each player follows a multivariate elliptically symmetric distribution, we show that there exists a Nash equilibrium. We characterize the set of Nash equilibria using the solution set of a variational inequality (VI) problem. Next, we consider the case where the continuous strategy set of each player is defined by a shared constraint set. In this case, we show that there exists a generalized Nash equilibrium for elliptically symmetric distributed payoffs. Under certain conditions, we characterize the set of a generalized Nash equilibria using the solution set of a VI problem. As an application, the random payoff games arising from electricity market are studied under chance-constrained game framework.     

Monotonic core solutions: beyond Young’s theorem

Young’s theorem implies that every core concept violates monotonicity. In this paper, we investigate when such a violation of monotonicity by a given core concept is justified. We introduce a new monotonicity property for core concepts. We pose several open questions for this new property. The open questions arise because the most important core concepts (the nucleolus and the per capita nucleolus) do not satisfy the property even in the class of convex games.     

Complementarity and Diagonal Dominance in Discounted Stochastic Games

We consider discounted stochastic games characterized by monotonicity, supermodularity and diagonal dominance assumptions on the reward functions and the transition law. A thorough novel discussion of the scope and limitations of this class of games is provided. Existence of a Markov-stationary equilibrium for the infinite-horizon game, proved by Curtat (1996), is summarized. Uniqueness of Markov equilibrium and dominance solvability of the finite-horizon game are established. In both cases, the equilibrium strategies and the corresponding value functions are nondecreasing Liptschitz-continuous functions of the state vector. Some specific economic applications are discussed.     

On the existence of equilibrium points of vector functions

The equilibrium problem concerning vector functions is formulated and some results on the existence of equilibrium points for this problem are proved and applied to vector optimizations , Nash equilibrium in noncooperative games, variational inequalities etc. concerning vector functions