不同支付方式下的多模式项目支付进度问题研究

本文首先明确了研究的假设条件并对多模式项目支付进度问题（MPPSP）进行了界定;随后从承包商和业主两个角度构建了MPPSP的基本优化模型;鉴于支付方式的不同,将基本优化模型扩展为基于进展、基于时间和基于费用的MPPSP优化模型;最后,通过对一个算例的计算分析,讨论了支付方式对最优支付进度安排及合同双方收益的影响.     

基于不同奖惩机制项目支付进度优化:双重视角

奖惩机制会对合同双方的收益产生重大影响,本文基于承包商和业主的双重视角,对不同奖惩机制下项目支付进度优化问题进行了研究。首先对所研究问题进行界定,并分别基于承包商和业主视角构建了不同奖惩机制下的优化模型;基于模型的属性设计了模拟退火启发式算法;最后通过一个实例对比了承包商和业主在四种不同奖惩机制下收益的优化结果,并对其中的关键参数进行了敏感性分析。结果显示:不同的奖惩机制对承包商和业主的收益有较大影响;不同的奖惩强度也会影响承包商和业主的收益。通过对奖惩机制类型及强度的分析,可以为项目中奖惩机制的设置提供定量化决策支持。     

基于融资能力约束的多模式Max-npv项目调度优化: 双重视角

从项目双方的视角出发,研究融资能力约束下的Max-npv项目调度问题。首先进行问题界定,构建由两个子模型构成的多模式Max-npv项目调度优化模型。随后,鉴于问题的强NP-hard属性,设计针对两个子模型迭代循环求解的禁忌搜索启发式算法,得到项目双方都满意的解。最后用一个实际案例对研究进行验证说明,并分析关键参数对合同双方收益的影响,结果表明:与实际进度安排相比,满意进度安排下合同双方的收益均有显著的提升;承包商和业主的融资能力、项目截止日期、承包商收益底线、折现率及支付比例均会对双方的收益产生重要影响。     

具有质量差异的项目支付进度问题研究——以软件项目为例

目前带有惩罚结构的项目支付进度模型通常以时间或成本为激励因子,来约束承包商保证进度和节约成本,未考虑质量因素对支付进度的影响。质量是项目管理的主要目标和决定项目成败的关键因素,研究质量对项目支付进度的影响有助于激励承包商提高表现从而保证项目质量。以软件项目为例,以软件产品质量为激励因子, 分别从承包商和客户的角度构建现金流净现值最大化为目标的项目支付进度优化模型,分析承包商表现水平及风险规避对双方收益的影响。针对模型的特点设计了遗传算法和禁忌搜索算法的混合算法求解模型。最后通过算例分析表明, 质量激励因子对项目的支付进度和双方的收益均存在较大的影响,为双方协商支付进度提供决策支持。     

基于双重视角的MPPSP及其禁忌搜索启发式算法

首先界定研究假设条件并定义文中所使用的符号;随后从业主及承包商双重视角构建MPPSP的整数规划优化模型;针对问题的强NP-hard属性,设计禁忌搜索启发式算法;在随机生成的标准算例集合上对算法进行测试;最后用一个算例对研究结果进行说明。结论如下:本文所开发的禁忌搜索启发式算法可以有效地求解MPPSP;关于给定项目的支付进度安排,承包商和业主的偏好存在显著差异;随着支付次数与支付比例的增加,承包商收益提高,业主收益下降,而双方收益均随折现率的上升而下降。     

银行授信约束多模式工期最小化项目进度问题研究

本文研究银行授信额度约束下活动具有多种执行模式的工期最小化项目进度问题。首先对所研究问题进行界定;随后采用基于事件的研究方法构建了问题的整数规划优化模型;鉴于问题的NP-hard属性,设计了双层模拟退火搜索嵌套的启发式求解算法;最后对一个算例进行了求解分析,讨论了银行授信额度对项目进度安排及完成时间的影响。结果表明:随着银行授信额度的提高,承包商安排项目进度的可用资金随之增加,使得项目可以在较短的时间内完成;然而,如果在此过程中业主对承包商的支付总量保持不变,那么承包商的项目收益会随完成时间的提前而下降。     

软件项目支付进度问题研究

软件项目的复杂性和特点使得其支付进度问题较具特殊性。针对软件质量的差异性,对软件项目支付进度问题进行研究。以承包商净现值最大化为优化目标,构建了具有惩罚结构的支付进度优化模型,该模型反映了不同软件质量对承包商收益的影响;针对该问题的特点设计了启发式求解算法;最后通过一个算例对模型进行了验证。可为承包商在签订外包合同及外包实施中的策略提供决策依据。     

多种费用下具有时间转换约束的工期费用均衡项目调度研究

传统离散时间-费用均衡项目调度问题DTCTP未考虑各个活动执行时间差别,本文将时间转换约束引入传统DTCTP,同时考虑项目间接费用和联系合同双方的奖惩费用,形成多种费用条件下具有活动类型时间转换约束的工期-费用均衡项目调度模型DTCTPTSC,并对模型进行优化分析.实例结果表明,间接费用率对工期-费用决策产生影响的阈值减小,业主设置的奖惩因子对承包商的激励约束效果具有区间响应特点;进一步从业主和承包商双方角度探讨了奖惩因子的取值对各自行为的影响,分析结果对双方在项目谈判过程中具有借鉴意义.     

基于时间窗延迟的资源约束项目调度双层优化研究

本研究从业主—承包商交互的视角构建了一种RCPSP(resource-constrained project scheduling problem)双层优化模型,即在可更新资源约束条件下,项目双方如何进行交互决策达到双方NPV(Net present value)最大化的目标。首先对研究问题进行界定,构建资源约束下的max-NPV项目调度双层优化模型;然后利用延迟优先规则设计了一种基于时间窗延迟的嵌套式自适应遗传算法来求解该模型,以达到双方NPV最大化;最后用一个算例验证算法的有效性,同时通过PSPLIB数值实验说明算法的稳定性,并分析关键参数对项目双方收益的影响。研究结果为项目进程的安排以及奖励机制的设计提供依据,以提高双方利益。     

项目管理中业主-承包商最优激励模型研究

为解决项目管理中承包商不努力工作的问题,运用信息经济学中的委托代理理论,建立了业主一承包商间的激励数学模型.构造了努力产出函数和努力成本函数,求出了业主的最优激励水平以及相应的承包商最优努力水平,给出了业主的最优激励合同安排.最后,通过一个简化算例求出了模型均衡解的解析式,结果表明模型的结论是符合工程项目实际的,从而本模型能够为业主的激励合同设计提供指导.     

On modelling payments in projects

Projects are often evaluated on financial performance. The net present value (NPV) has long been established as a highly relevant criterion in the management and control of projects. Research in this area has emphasised scheduling of activities in projects to maximise the contractor's NPV assuming that cash flows (both positive and negative) that occur over the duration of the project are known. In practice, however, the contractor usually knows the expenses associated with project activities. He can use this information combined with the knowledge of other project parameters such as activity durations to negotiate the payments received for completed work so that the project achieves the maximum level of financial returns. Extending previous research, this paper examines the problem of simultaneously determining the amount, location and timing of progress payments. We present several models and their solutions for an example problem. Based on the assumptions made, the models are applicable in different project environments. The problem and models presented here can be used by the contractor and client for managing cash flows, setting milestones, and negotiating critical contract parameters, in addition to identifying the location, timing, and amount of progress payments. They also contribute to the body of research on formulating and solving difficult combinatorial optimisation problems.     

基于总承包商的水电工程EPC项目利益相关方协调度测评研究

在水电工程EPC项目大规模发展的背景下提出提高总承包商协调管理能力的问题,识别水利水电工程EPC项目管理协调度的影响因素,构建协调度评价指标体系并基于欧氏距离构建协调度模型,通过四川JL水电站建设项目研究总承包商与各利益相关方之间的协调发展度.结果表明,总承包商与上游相关方(业主、咨询单位、监理单位)为优质协调;与项目实施主体(设计方、供应商、分包方)为较好协调;与政治相关方(政府、当地居民)的协调程度最差,与政府为一般协调,与当地居民为轻度失调.据此,从总承包商的视角提出同各利益相关方的协调发展策略,能更好地促进总承包商协调管理能力的提升以及提高水利水电EPC工程项目的完成质量.     

Simulated annealing for financing cost distribution based project payment scheduling from a joint perspective

Based on the distribution of the project financing cost over the contractor and the client, this paper involves the project payment scheduling problem from a joint perspective of the two parties. In the problem, the project financing cost is defined as the expense for raising money from the outside or the opportunity cost of the capital devoted into the project and the objective is to find the project payment schedule that can not only maximize the joint revenue of the two parties but also be accepted by them. Based on the characteristics of the problem, an optimization model consisting of two submodels is constructed using the activity-based method. For the strong NP-hardness of the problem, two simulated annealing algorithms with different searching structures are developed and compared with the multi-start iterative improvement method on the basis of a computational experiment performed on a data set generated randomly. The results show that the simulated annealing algorithm with the nested loop module seems to be the most promising algorithm for solving the defined problem especially when the scale of the problem becomes larger. In addition, the influences of some key parameters on the computational results are investigated through the full factorial experiment and a few useful conclusions are drawn.     

基于随机活动工期的多模式现金流均衡项目调度优化

承包商在项目执行过程中的现金流均衡是保证项目成功的关键因素。本文研究基于随机活动工期的多模式现金流均衡项目调度问题,旨是在项目工期及鲁棒性阈值约束下合理安排活动执行模式与开始时间,实现承包商现金流均衡。本文通过构建整数规划优化模型对研究问题进行刻画,随后设计模拟退火算法进行求解,最后进行案例分析。结果表明:鲁棒性阈值虽然可以保证基准进度的稳定性,但是提高鲁棒性阈值水平反而不利于承包商的现金流均衡,该值过高时甚至得不到可行解。本文研究可为随机活动工期背景下承包商的现金流控制提供定量化决策支持。     

Multi-mode project payment scheduling problems with bonus–penalty structure

This paper involves the multi-mode project payment scheduling problem with bonus–penalty structure where activities can be performed with several modes and a bonus–penalty structure exists at the deadline of the project. In the problem the decisions on when to schedule events and payments, the magnitude of each payment, and the performing mode of each activity need to be optimized. A two-module simulated annealing heuristic is proposed to solve the mixed integer non-linear programming models for the contractor and the client, and a satisfactory solution, which consists of payment event set, event schedule, and payment amount set, may be found through iterations between the heuristic’s two modules. The profits of the two parties of the contract are changed significantly by the bonus–penalty structure and the structure may be considered as a coordination mechanism essentially, which may enhance the flexibility of payment scheduling and be helpful for the two parties to get more profits from the project. Through solving and analyzing an instance the insight that the bonus–penalty structure may advance the project completion effectively and improve the profits of the two parties in the meantime can be obtained.