Costly information acquisition under horizontal competition

We analyze endogenous acquisition of costly information for two firms that sell homogeneous products. Prior to determining its production quantity, either firm has an opportunity to acquire a costly forecast. There exists a correlation between errors in the acquired forecasts. We model the problem as a two-stage game in which the firms first decide whether to acquire their respective forecasts and then decide their production quantities. We derive the equilibrium outcome on information acquisition and production quantity.     

Optimal contracts under endogenous demand information acquisition

We consider a supplier selling to a retailer who decides whether or not to exert a fixed cost to acquire private demand information. We show that quantity discounts, established by the extant literature to be the optimal response for exogenous information acquisition, are also optimal under the setting with endogenous information acquisition.     

Endogenous information acquisition in supply chain management

In this paper, we analyze an endogenous determination of efforts put into information acquisition and its impact on supply chain management. More specifically, we consider a supplier who sells a product to a buyer during a single selling season. Prior to placing an order with the supplier, the buyer has an option to acquire additional information about the demand by hiring experts (who are capable of providing forecasts). Because a commission fee must be paid to each hired expert, there exists a tradeoff between the cost and the value of the information, and the buyer needs to determine how much information to acquire. We derive the optimal information-acquisition level in an integrated setting and compare it with that determined in a decentralized setting. We also analyze several types of supply contracts to examine if they can coordinate the supply chain and allow an arbitrary division of system profit between the supplier and the buyer.     

Information aggregation in multicandidate elections under plurality rule and runoff voting

I consider a model in which imperfectly informed voters with common interests participate in a multicandidate election decided by either plurality rule or a runoff. Prior to the election, each voter receives a private signal corresponding to the candidate the voter thinks is best. Voters are relatively more likely to think a given candidate is best if the candidate is a relatively better candidate. I show that there is a sequence of equilibrium strategies for the voters such that, as the number of voters goes to infinity, the probability that the best candidate is elected goes to 1. I further show that all candidates receive significant vote shares in any equilibrium in which information fully aggregates under plurality rule and that voters do at least as well when the election is decided by a runoff as they do when the election is decided by plurality rule.     

Wholesale-price contract of supply chain with information gathering

This paper investigates a wholesale-price contract of supply chain under the endogenous information structure. This supply chain consists of one supplier and one retailer during the selling season. The retailer does not know his selling cost but can spend resources to acquire information. The supplier offers a contract, which induces the retailer to gather information and generate more production orders with beta costs. We find that there exists an upper bound of the information gathering cost such that the supplier induces the retailer to gather information. The increasing cost of information gathering may decrease the order quantity and wholesale price. Moreover, the cost beta has an impact on the expected profits of the two parties. With the increasing cost of information gathering, the supplier’s expected profit is reduced, while that of the retailer becomes ambiguous in terms of the distribution function and the interval of selling cost information. Finally, a numerical example is presented to explain the main results.     

A lemma in open sequential voting by veto

The paper is devoted to the investigation of intuitively rational choice in a hierarchical game that is a model of election by open sequential veto-voting. Casting a veto against voter’s least preferred alternative (among remaining ones) may not lead to a sophisticated equilibrium. It means that sincere choice (being intuitive) is not rational. There arises the problem of finding conditions under which a sophisticated optimal sequence of actions is intuitively rational. We prove that in the case of strict preference ordering of alternatives, there exists an intuitively rational sophisticated optimal sequence. In the sequence, each voter vetoes an alternative less preferred than the sophisticated equilibrium outcome. Thus, only intuitively rational strategies are to be considered, although complete information about voters’ preferences is still needed.     

大型群体决策问题中的简单多数规则（3个评选对象场合）

一个群体决策问题取决于两个因素,一个是群体决策的规则,另一个是投票。当选定群体决策规则时,一个群体决策问题由投票完全决定,此时,群体决策问题与投票之间一一对应。简单多数规则是个简单且被广泛采用的群体决策规则,但它有缺陷,我们可举出些群体决策问题使用简单多数规则没法从投票得到最后群体决策的结果。这里我们将给出一个简单多数规则的有趣性质,即在3个评选对象场合,使用简单多数规则没法从投票得到最后群体决策结果的n个评选人的群体决策问题的个数与所有n个评选人的群体决策问题的个数之比当评选人个数n趋向无穷时趋于零,这说明3个评选对象的大型群体决策场合,简单多数规则的缺陷不严重。     

Optimal transfer pricing schemes for work averse division managers with private information

This paper models a decentralized firm under information asymmetry and effort disutility on the part of managers. We assume that managers choose efforts before observing some private information. However, after the effort choice managers receive private information on their cost parameters which they report to the headquarters. There exist many situations in which managers need to take efforts before obtaining private information; for example, the regular maintenance effort on the machine, the effort on R&D for reducing costs and the effort taken to build relationships with the supplier. Two models are considered in this paper based on the timing of acquisition of private information by the managers. We derive optimal coordination mechanisms to facilitate internal transactions for the models. The equilibrium outcome of this paper suggests that: 1) regardless of the timing of managers' information acquisition, the optimal output level under asymmetric information can have overproduction or underproduction when compared with the full information optimal output; 2) under certain demand conditions managers cannot receive any information rent benefit for their private information even if they have the option to renege on the contract after obtaining their private information.     

Randomized strategy equilibrium in the action commitment game with costs of leading

We investigate a two-player action commitment game where one simultaneous-move and two sequential-move pure strategy equilibria exist when the cost of leading is zero, while the simultaneous-move outcome is not an equilibrium when the leading cost is small positive. We show that this discontinuity disappears if we consider randomized strategy equilibria. We investigate a price competition model and show that randomized strategy equilibria exist and any of them converges to the Bertrand equilibrium when the leading cost converges to zero.     

不同信息条件下创新联盟合作伙伴的选择——基于知识获取的研究视角

以知识获取为研究视角,应用动态博弈理论,研究了不同信息条件下创新联盟合作伙伴选择的问题.通过研究发现,在信息对称条件下,知识共享成本越低或者知识获取能力越高,越容易实现帕累托改进;在信息非对称条件下,企业的合作成本、知识获取能力影响了分离均衡区间的范围,并进而影响帕累托效率与逆向选择风险的大小.     

Information acquisition and disclosure by firms in the presence of additional available information

In this paper we analyze a model which addresses two stylized facts which have received little attention in disclosure theory. (a) Information that is acquired for internal decision-making can subsequently be disclosed to outside investors who can use it to update their assessment of the firm’s prospects. Thus, the decision to gather information in the first place does not only depend on the decision value of information. (b) Information disclosed by firms is only one element of the information environment upon which investors can draw. This setting creates an interaction between firms’ information gathering and disclosure decisions as well as alternative sources of information. We identify an equilibrium structure which we call a Countersignaling equilibrium in which only average firms acquire information whereas good and bad firms do not. We show that while several equilibria can coexist, a Countersignaling equilibrium is often the economically most efficient one.     

Equilibrium and effectiveness of two-parameter scoring rules

We study a cardinal model of voting with three alternatives where voters’ von Neumann Morgenstern utilities are private information. We consider voting protocols given by two-parameter scoring rules, as introduced by Myerson (2002). For these voting rules, we show that all symmetric Bayes Nash equilibria are sincere, and have a very specific form. These equilibria are unique for a wide range of model parameters, and we can therefore compare the equilibrium performance of different rules. Computational results regarding the effectiveness of different scoring rules (where effectiveness is captured by a modification of the effectiveness measure proposed in Weber, 1978) suggest that those which most effectively represent voters’ preferences allow for the expression of preference intensity, in contrast to more commonly used rules such as the plurality rule, and the Borda Count. While approval voting allows for the expression of preference intensity, it does not maximize effectiveness as it fails to unambiguously convey voters’ ordinal preference rankings.     

Complete voting systems with two classes of voters: weightedness and counting

We investigate voting systems with two classes of voters, for which there is a hierarchy giving each member of the stronger class more influence or important than each member of the weaker class. We deduce for voting systems one important counting fact that allows determining how many of them are for a given number of voters. In fact, the number of these systems follows a Fibonacci sequence with a smooth polynomial variation on the number of voters. On the other hand, we classify by means of some parameters which of these systems are weighted. This result allows us to state an asymptotic conjecture which is opposed to what occurs for symmetric games.     

Endogenous platforms: the case of many parties

We analyze existence of equilibrium in a one-dimensional model of endogenous party platforms and more than two parties. The platforms proposed by parties depend on their membership composition. The policy implemented is a function of the different proposals and the vote distribution among such proposals. It is shown that if voters are sincere there is always an equilibrium regardless of the number of parties. In the case of strategic voting behavior, existence of equilibrium can be shown provided a subadditivity condition on the outcome function holds.     

Optimal bounds for the no-show paradox via SAT solving

One of the most important desirable properties in social choice theory is Condorcet-consistency, which requires that a voting rule should return an alternative that is preferred to any other alternative by some majority of voters. Another desirable property is participation, which requires that no voter should be worse off by joining an electorate. A seminal result by Moulin (1988) has shown that Condorcet-consistency and participation are incompatible whenever there are at least 4 alternatives and 25 voters. We leverage SAT solving to obtain an elegant human-readable proof of Moulin’s result that requires only 12 voters. Moreover, the SAT solver is able to construct a Condorcet-consistent voting rule that satisfies participation as well as a number of other desirable properties for up to 11 voters, proving the optimality of the above bound. We also obtain tight results for set-valued and probabilistic voting rules, which complement and significantly improve existing theorems.     

Voting with preferences over margins of victory

This paper analyzes a two-alternative voting model with the distinctive feature that voters have preferences over margins of victory. We study voting contests with a finite as well as an infinite number of voters, and with and without mandatory voting. The main result of the paper is the existence and characterization of a unique equilibrium outcome in all those situations. At equilibrium, voters who prefer a larger support for one of the alternatives vote for such alternative, providing a formal argument for the conditional sincerity voting condition in [Alesina, Alberto, Rosenthal, Howard, 1995. Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge] and the benefit of voting function in [Llavador, Humberto, 2006. Electoral platforms, implemented policies and abstention. Social Choice and Welfare 27 (1), 55–81]. Finally, we offer new insights on explaining why some citizens may vote strategically for an alternative different from the one declared as the most preferred.     

成本约束下不可再生资源开采微分对策问题研究

研究开采成本等重要因素对不可再生资源开采的影响.假定有N个厂商对不可再生资源进行开采,其面临的市场需求价格弹性为常数,开采成本是开采量的线性函数.利用微分对策理论,分析该寡头市场中各个厂商的均衡开采策略.研究表明,开采成本对是否开采、开采速度、结束时点等有重要影响.同时,本文还与某些经典论文进行了简要比较.     

Modeling the effect of campaign advertising on US presidential elections when differences across states matter

We provide a stochastic electoral model of the US Presidential election where candidates take differences across states into account when developing their policy platforms and advertising campaigns. Candidates understand the political and economic differences that exist across states and voters care about candidates’ policies relative to their ideals, about the frequency of candidates’ advertising messages relative to their ideal message frequency, their campaign tolerance level, and vote taking into account their perceptions of candidates’ traits and competencies with their vote also depending on their sociodemographic characteristics. In the local Nash equilibrium, candidates give maximal weight to undecided voters and swing states and little weight to committed voters and states. These endogenous weights pin down candidates’ campaign and depend on the probability with which voters choose each candidate which depends on candidates’ policies and advertising campaigns. Weights vary across candidates’ policy and ad campaigns, reflecting the importance voters in each state give to the two dimensions and the variation in voters’ preferences across states.     

Zero‐Hopf bifurcation in the FitzHugh–Nagumo system

We characterize the values of the parameters for which a zero‐Hopf equilibrium point takes place at the singular points, namely, O (the origin), P₊, and P_? in the FitzHugh–Nagumo system. We find two two‐parameter families of the FitzHugh–Nagumo system for which the equilibrium point at the origin is a zero‐Hopf equilibrium. For these two families, we prove the existence of a periodic orbit bifurcating from the zero‐Hopf equilibrium point O. We prove that there exist three two‐parameter families of the FitzHugh–Nagumo system for which the equilibrium point at P₊ and at P_? is a zero‐Hopf equilibrium point. For one of these families, we prove the existence of one, two, or three periodic orbits starting at P₊ and P_?. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.