On the support varieties of tilting modules

Let G be a reductive algebraic group scheme defined over the finite field F_p, with Frobenius kernel G₁. The tilting modules of G are defined as rational G-modules for which both the module itself and its dual have good filtrations. In 1997, J.E. Humphreys conjectured that the support varieties of certain tilting modules for regular weights should be given by the Lusztig bijection between cells of the affine Weyl group and nilpotent orbits of G, when p>h, where h is the Coxeter number. We present a conjecture for the support varieties of tilting modules when G=GL_n. Our conjecture is equivalent to Humphreys’ conjecture for p≥h and regular weights, but our formulation allows us to consider small p or singular weights as well. We obtain results for several infinite classes of tilting modules, including the case p=2, and tilting modules whose support variety corresponds to a hook partition. In the case p=2, we prove the conjecture by S. Donkin for the support varieties of tilting modules.     

Solving a multi-objective multi-skilled manpower scheduling model by a fuzzy goal programming approach

Manpower scheduling is an intricate problem in production and service environments with the purpose of generating fair schedules that consider employers’ objectives and employees’ preferences as much as possible. However, sometimes, vagueness of information related to employers’ objectives and employees’ preferences leads to the fuzzy nature of the problem. This paper presents a multi-objective manpower scheduling model regarding the lack of clarity on the target values of employers’ objectives and employees’ preferences. Hence, a fuzzy goal programming model is developed for the presented model. Afterwards, two fuzzy solution approaches are used to convert the fuzzy goal programming model to two single-objective models. Finally, the results obtained by both single-objective models are compared with each other to select the solution that has the greatest degree of the satisfaction level of employers’ objectives and employees’ preferences.     

Sixteenth-order method for nonlinear equations

Modification of Newton’s method with higher-order convergence is presented. The modification of Newton’s method is based on King’s fourth-order method. The new method requires three-step per iteration. Analysis of convergence demonstrates that the order of convergence is 16. Some numerical examples illustrate that the algorithm is more efficient and performs better than classical Newton’s method and other methods.     

Early work of N.G. (Dick) de Bruijn in analysis and some of my own

There are parallels between de Bruijn’s early work in analysis and that of the author. However, Dick’s work soon became much broader and deeper. While the present paper reviews several topics of common interest, its main content is a short version of Dick’s important article related to Riemann’s Hypothesis, entitled ‘The roots of trigonometric integrals’ [N.G. de Bruijn, The roots of trigonometric integrals, Duke Math. J. 17 (1950) 197–226]. The associated ‘de Bruijn–Newman constant’ is also discussed.     

Wang’s B machines are efficiently universal,as is Hasenjaeger’s small universal electromechanical toy

In the 1960s Gisbert Hasenjaeger built Turing Machines from electromechanical relays and uniselectors. Recently, Glaschick reverse engineered the program of one of these machines and found that it is a universal Turing machine. In fact, its program uses only four states and two symbols, making it a very small universal Turing machine. (The machine has three tapes and a number of other features that are important to keep in mind when comparing it to other small universal machines.) Hasenjaeger’s machine simulates Hao Wang’s B machines, which were proved universal by Wang. Unfortunately, Wang’s original simulation algorithm suffers from an exponential slowdown when simulating Turing machines. Hence, via this simulation, Hasenjaeger’s machine also has an exponential slowdown when simulating Turing machines. In this work, we give a new efficient simulation algorithm for Wang’s B machines by showing that they simulate Turing machines with only a polynomial slowdown. As a second result, we find that Hasenjaeger’s machine also efficiently simulates Turing machines in polynomial time. Thus, Hasenjaeger’s machine is both small and fast. In another application of our result, we show that Hooper’s small universal Turing machine simulates Turing machines in polynomial time, an exponential improvement.     

Diagnostic assessment of children’s proportional reasoning

A proportional reasoning item bank was created from the relevant literature and tested in various forms. Rasch analyses of 303 pupils’ test results were used to calibrate the bank, and data from 84 pupils’ interviews was used to confirm our diagnostic interpretations. A number of sub-tests were scaled, including parallel ‘without models’ and ‘with models’ forms. We provide details of the 13-item ‘without models’ test which was formed from the ‘richest’ diagnostic items and verified on a further test sample (N=212, ages 10-13). Two scales were constructed for this test, one that measures children’s ‘ratio attainment’ and one that measures their ‘tendency for additive strategy.’ Other significant errors — ‘incorrect build-up,’ ‘magical doubling/halving,’ ‘constant sum’ and ‘incomplete reasoning’ — were identified. Finally, an empirical hierarchy of pupils’ attainment of proportional reasoning was formed, incorporating the significant errors and the additive scale.     

Ramanujan formula for the generalized Stirling approximation

The aim of this paper is to improve Ramanujan’s formula for approximation of the factorial function, starting from Burnside’s formula in contradistinction with the classical formula that starts from Stirling’s formula.     

Optimal benchmarking for active portfolio managers

Within an agency theoretic framework adapted to the portfolio delegation issue, we show how to construct optimal benchmarks. In accordance with US regulations, the benchmark-adjusted compensation scheme is taken to be symmetric. The investor’s control consists in forcing the manager to adopt the appropriate benchmark so that his first-best optimum is attained. Solving simultaneously the manager’s and the investor’s dynamic optimization programs in a fairly general framework, we characterize the optimal benchmark. We then provide completely explicit solutions when the investor’s and the manager’s utility functions exhibit different CRRA parameters. We find that, even under optimal benchmarking, it is never optimal for the manager, and therefore for the investor, to follow exactly the benchmark, except in a very restrictive case. We finally assess by simulation the practical importance, in particular in terms of the investor’s welfare, of selecting a sub-optimal benchmark.     

A Chebyshev spectral collocation method for solving Burgers’-type equations

In this paper, we elaborated a spectral collocation method based on differentiated Chebyshev polynomials to obtain numerical solutions for some different kinds of nonlinear partial differential equations. The problem is reduced to a system of ordinary differential equations that are solved by Runge–Kutta method of order four. Numerical results for the nonlinear evolution equations such as 1D Burgers’, KdV–Burgers’, coupled Burgers’, 2D Burgers’ and system of 2D Burgers’ equations are obtained. The numerical results are found to be in good agreement with the exact solutions. Numerical computations for a wide range of values of Reynolds’ number, show that the present method offers better accuracy in comparison with other previous methods. Moreover the method can be applied to a wide class of nonlinear partial differential equations.     

Avoiding non-optimal management decisions by applying a three-person inspection game

An inspection game models a conflict situation between an inspector and an inspectee. The mathematical analysis aims to generate optimal behavior of the inspectee under the assumption that an undesirable action of the inspectee could otherwise be carried out strategically. In this paper the controller’s (inspector’s) particular job is to audit a manager’s (inspectee’s) decision and to submit a report to the company’s top managers for examination. Thus, a conflict as regards the choice of behavioral actions of the manager, the controller and the top management impends. Based on Fandel and Trockel (2011a) this modified inspection game is discussed here for the first time as a three-person game in the context of a manager’s faulty decision that will unnecessarily add to the company’s costs and that the top management understandably wishes to minimize. We will first examine the conditions under which a Nash equilibrium occurs in this three-person game in which poor management, poor monitoring and poor revision coincide. We will then examine the effects that the penalties and bonuses exert on the Nash equilibrium solution. We will find that penalties and bonuses can neutralize each other in their effects on the improved decision making by the manager and the controller.     

Improving reliability of a shared supplier with competition and spillovers

Supplier reliability is a key determinant of a manufacturer’s competitiveness. It reflects a supplier’s capability of order fulfillment, which can be measured by the percentage of order quantity delivered in a given time window. A perfectly reliable supplier delivers an amount equal to the order placed by its customer, while an unreliable supplier may deliver an amount less than the amount ordered. Therefore, when suppliers are unreliable, manufacturers often have incentives to help suppliers improve delivery reliability. Suppliers, however, often work with multiple manufacturers and the benefit of enhanced reliability may spill over to competing manufacturers. In this study, we explore how potential spillover influences manufacturers’ incentives to improve supplier’s reliability. We consider two manufacturers that compete with imperfectly substitutable products on Type I service level (i.e., in-stock probability). The manufacturers share a common supplier who, due to variations in production quality or yield, is unreliable. Manufacturers may exert efforts to improve the supplier’s reliability in the sense that the delivered quantity is stochastically larger after improvement. We develop a two-stage model that encompasses supplier improvement, uncertain supply and random demand in a competitive setting. In this complex model, we characterize the manufacturers’ equilibrium in-stock probability. Moreover, we characterize sufficient conditions for the existence of the equilibrium of the manufacturers’ improvement efforts. Finally, we numerically test the impact of market characteristics on the manufacturers’ equilibrium improvement efforts. We find that a manufacturer’s equilibrium improvement effort usually declines in market competition, market uncertainty or spillover effect, although its expected equilibrium profit typically increases in spillover effect.     

The impact of disaster on the strategic interaction between company and government

A company allocates a resource between safety effort and production. The government earns taxes on production. The disaster probability is modeled as a contest between the disaster magnitude and the two players’ safety efforts. The model illustrates that safety efforts are strategic substitutes and inverse U shaped in the disaster magnitude. The company’s safety effort increases, and the government’s safety effort decreases, in taxation. Taxation can ameliorate companies’ free riding on governments’ safety efforts. With sufficiently large production, the government prefers, and the company does not prefer, raising taxation above 0%. For the government, an upper limit usually exists above which taxation cannot be profitably increased. The model shows how both or no players exert safety efforts when the disaster magnitude is small and large respectively, and how they free ride on each other’s safety efforts when the disaster magnitude is intermediate. The company free rides when the unit production cost is low so that the large profits outweigh the negative impact of the disaster. With endogenized taxation determined by the government, the tax rate decreases in the disaster magnitude, the unit production cost, the government’s unit cost of safety effort, and how the company is negatively affected by the disaster. The tax rate increases in the company’s resource and how the government is negatively affected by the disaster. The tax rate is weakly U shaped in the company’s unit safety effort. The model is illustrated with numerical examples and with the oil spill disasters by BP in 2010 and by Exxon Valdez in 1989.     

Learning trajectories in teacher education: Supporting teachers’ understandings of students’ mathematical thinking

Recent work by researchers has focused on synthesizing and elaborating knowledge of students’ thinking on particular concepts as core progressions called learning trajectories. Although useful at the level of curriculum development, assessment design, and the articulation of standards, evidence is only beginning to emerge to suggest how learning trajectories can be utilized in teacher education. Our paper reports on two studies investigating practicing and prospective elementary teachers’ uses of a learning trajectory to make sense of students’ thinking about a foundational idea of rational number reasoning. Findings suggest that a mathematics learning trajectory supports teachers in creating models of students’ thinking and in restructuring teachers’ own understandings of mathematics and students’ reasoning.     

Optimal enlistment age: A cost–benefit analysis and some simulations

Enlistment at the earliest viable age maximizes the country’s wartime army size and thereby the country’s attack-deterrence capacity. Injuries and death generate a loss of quantity and quality of life that reduces the benefit from early-age enlistment. The benefit from any age of recruitment is also affected by the rise and decline of the individual’s military performance and civilian productivity and by the changes in the individual’s adjustment costs over his lifecycle. The simulations of an optimization model incorporating these cost and benefit elements suggest that if the intensity of the rise and decline of the individual’s military performance is sufficiently larger than the intensity of the rise and decline of his civilian productivity, there exists an interior optimal enlistment age that is greater than the commonly practiced 18. In such a case, most of the simulation results are closely scattered around 21 despite large parameter changes.     

Why do U.S. and Chinese students think differently in mathematical problem solving?: Impact of early algebra learning and teachers’ beliefs

This paper reports two studies that examined the impact of early algebra learning and teachers’ beliefs on U.S. and Chinese students’ thinking. The first study examined the extent to which U.S. and Chinese students’ selection of solution strategies and representations is related to their opportunity to learn algebra. The second study examined the impact of teachers’ beliefs on their students’ thinking through analyzing U.S. and Chinese teachers’ scoring of student responses. The results of the first study showed that, for the U.S. sample, students who have formally learned algebraic concepts are as likely to use visual representations as those who have not formally learned algebraic concepts in their problem solving. For the Chinese sample, students rarely used visual representations whether or not they had formally learned algebraic concepts. The findings of the second study clearly showed that U.S. and Chinese teachers view students’ responses involving concrete strategies and visual representations differently. Moreover, although both U.S. and Chinese teachers value responses involving more generalized strategies and symbolic representations equally high, Chinese teachers expect 6th graders to use the generalized strategies to solve problems while U.S. teachers do not. The research reported in this paper contributed to our understanding of the differences between U.S. and Chinese students’ mathematical thinking. This research also established the feasibility of using teachers’ scoring of student responses as an alternative and effective way of examining teachers’ beliefs.     

Economic order quantity under advance payment

Though advance payment is widely used in practice, its influences on buyer’s inventory policy are rarely discussed. This paper investigates the buyer’s inventory policy under advance payment, including all payment in advance and partial-advanced–partial-delayed payment. The buyer’s ordering policy is derived by minimizing his total inventory costs including inventory holding cost, ordering cost, and interest cost caused by advance payment or delayed payment. The conclusions show that when all the payment is paid in advance, the buyer’s optimal replenishment cycle is influenced only by the price discount associated with advance payment, and the length of advance payment has no effect. For the partial-advanced–partial-delayed payment case, the buyer’s replenishment cycle is also not influenced by the length of advance period. However, in this situation, the delayed period and the price discount may have impacts on the inventory policy. We also use discounted cash flow (DCF) model to derive the buyer’s replenishment cycle and show that the replenishment cycle is negatively related to the length of advance period. Numerical examples are presented to illustrate the results.     

Optimizing referral reward programs under impression management considerations

We examine referral reward programs (RRP) that are intended for a service firm to encourage its current customers (inductors) to entice their friends (inductees) to purchase the firm’s service. By considering the interplay among the firm, the inductor, and the inductee, we solve a “nested” Stackelberg game so as to determine the optimal RRP in equilibrium. We determine the conditions under which it is optimal for the firm to reward the inductor only, reward the inductee only, or reward both. Also, our results suggest that RRP dominates direct marketing when the firm’s current market penetration or the inductor’s referral effectiveness is sufficiently high. We then extend our model to incorporate certain key impression management factors: the inductor’s intrinsic reward of making a positive impression by being seen as helping a friend, the inductor’s concerns about creating a negative impression when making an incentivized referral, and the inductee’s impression of the inductor’s credibility when an incentive is involved. In the presence of these impression management factors, we show that the firm should reward the inductee more and the inductor less. Under certain conditions, it is optimal for the firm to reward neither the inductor nor the inductee so that the optimal RRP relies purely on unincentivized word of mouth.     

Symmetries of the Julia sets of Newton’s method for multiple root

The symmetries of Julia sets of Newton’s method is investigated in this paper. It is shown that the group of symmetries of Julia set of polynomial is a subgroup of that of the corresponding standard, multiple and relax Newton’s method when a nonlinear polynomial is in normal form and the Julia set has finite group of symmetries. A necessary and sufficient condition for Julia sets of standard, multiple and relax Newton’s method to be horizontal line is obtained.     

Optimal insurance in the presence of insurer’s loss limit

In this paper we consider the optimal insurance problem when the insurer has a loss limit constraint. Under the assumptions that the insurance price depends only on the policy’s actuarial value, and the insured seeks to maximize the expected utility of his terminal wealth, we show that coverage above a deductible up to a cap is the optimal contract, and the relaxation of insurer’s loss limit will increase the insured’s expected utility.When the insurance price is given by the expected value principle, we show that a positive loading factor is a sufficient and necessary condition for the deductible to be positive. Moreover, with the expected value principle, we show that the optimal deductible derived in our model is not greater (lower) than that derived in Arrow’s model if the insured’s preference displays increasing (decreasing) absolute risk aversion. Therefore, when the insured has an IARA (DARA) utility function, compared to Arrow model, the insurance policy derived in our model provides more (less) coverage for small losses, and less coverage for large losses.Furthermore, we prove that the optimal insurance derived in our model is an inferior (normal) good for the insured with a DARA (IARA) utility function, consistent with the finding in the previous literature. Being inferior, the insurance can also be a Giffen good. Under the assumption that the insured’s initial wealth is greater than a certain level, we show that the insurance is not a Giffen good if the coefficient of the insured’s relative risk aversion is lower than 1.