Exploring two explanations of loyalty in application service provision

While the application service provider (ASP) market continues to grow, it is fiercely competitive, and ASPs encounter difficulties in retaining customers and achieving long-term profitability. One stream of prior literature suggests that customer loyalty is driven by service quality, while another argues that loyalty is driven by partnerships between the firms. However, to date these competing explanations have not been tested together in the ASP context. This empirical study contributes to the literature by unifying these two previously separate streams of research on customer loyalty. Using a survey of 135 ASP clients, we find a significant relationship between the service quality perspective and the partnership perspective. We thus argue that service loyalty models ought to include both of these constructs in order to effectively explain service loyalty.     

随机需求下物流服务供应链订购策略研究

针对由单个物流服务提供商和集成商组成的物流服务供应链,基于集中化模式、纳什博弈模式和Stackelberg博弈模式三种典型模式,考虑市场需求随机且受服务质量缺陷承诺水平的影响,探讨物流服务供应链的订购与质量缺陷承诺策略问题。通过分析发现:物流服务质量缺陷承诺水平随着市场需求弹性系数的增加而递减,但其受物流服务集成商观测水平的影响却因合作模式不同而变化不一致;集中化模式下的物流服务订购量随着物流服务集成商观测水平或市场需求弹性系数的增大而递减,但在其他两种合作模式下物流服务订购量随着物流服务集成商观测水平或市场需求弹性系数的增加而增加;在三种模式下,物流服务供应链的整体利润随着市场需求弹性系数的增加而递减,但其受物流服务集成商观测水平的影响却因合作模式不同而变化不一致。     

产品服务化供应链核心企业的服务模式决策研究

在以系统集成商为主导的产品服务化供应链中,考虑顾客效用的情况下,将服务提供商单独提供服务和系统集成商与服务提供商共同提供服务这两种情形下的最优决策进行比较,发现当服务提供商单独提供服务时,随着服务成本的增加,服务提供商的服务水平会降低,从而导致顾客需求、顾客的总效用、服务提供商的收益、系统集成商的收益和供应链总收益均会降低。当系统集成商与服务提供商共同提供服务时,可以增加顾客需求,提高系统集成商的收益、供应链的总收益和顾客的总效用,但降低了服务提供商的收益。     

公平关切下物流服务供应链质量缺陷承诺策略研究

考虑物流服务供应链中成员的公平关切行为,以Nash讨价还价均衡解作为公平收益参照点,构建Nash讨价还价公平关切下物流服务供应链质量缺陷承诺策略模型,分析和研究公平关切对最优策略、利润和效用的影响。研究结果表明,物流服务质量缺陷承诺水平随着物流服务集成商公平关切系数的增加而减少,却随着物流服务提供商公平关切系数的增加而增加;物流服务订购量随着物流服务集成商公平关切系数的增加而减少,也随着物流服务提供商公平关切系数的增加而减少;当物流服务提供商的公平关切系数增加时,物流服务供应链中各成员的利润和效用以及整体利润和效用都会不断减少;但当物流服务提供商的公平关切程度一定而物流服务集成商的公平关切系数增加时,物流服务供应链中各成员的利润和效用以及整体利润和效用不断提高。     

Price and speed decisions in customer-intensive services with two classes of customers

In many customer-intensive services, the perceived quality of service decreases in the speed of service. Usually, an increase in service speed induces different marginal reductions in quality for heterogeneous customers. To bring insight into the managerial implications of this difference, we classify customers in terms of intensity parameters, and investigate the behavior of each class of customers in a queueing framework. The optimal service speed and price are derived to maximize service provider’s revenue. Our results demonstrate that no class is always attractive to the provider, and thus there are usually several combinations of service price and speed reaching the same maximal revenue. Moreover, under some mild conditions, the provider could gain more revenue by treating different classes with discrimination than by adopting uniform treatment.     

Make-or-buy service capacity decision in a supply chain providing after-sales service

We consider a supply chain comprising a manufacturer and a retailer. The manufacturer supplies a product to the retailer, while the retailer sells the product bundled with after-sales service to consumers in a fully competitive market. The sales volume is affected by the retailer’s service-level commitment. The retailer can build service capacity in-house at a deterministic price before service demand is realized, or buy the service from an outsourcing market at an uncertain price after service demand realization. We find that the outsourcing market encourages the retailer to make a higher level of service commitment, while prompting the manufacturer to reduce the wholesale price, resulting in more demand realization. We analyze how the expected cost of the service in the outsourcing market and the retailer’s risk attitude affect the decisions of both parties. We derive the conditions under which the retailer is willing to build service capacity in-house and under which it will buy the service from the outsourcing market. Moreover, we find that the manufacturer’s sharing with the retailer the cost to build service capacity improves the profits of both parties.     

When should service firms provide free experience service?

By providing a free experience service, a service firm can attract more uninformed customers. However, it could reversely effect the delay-sensitive, informed customers’ decision. In this paper, we study a priority queueing system with free experience services. We study the customer behavior in equilibrium after we derive the expected customer waiting time. We then construct the service firm’s revenue function and obtain an optimal strategy for the service firm. Our results suggest that when the market size of informed customers is relatively small, the firm should consider providing free experience services for uninformed customers. Conversely, if the demand rate of potential informed customers is quite high, the firm should ignore uninformed customers.     

考虑即时采购价格的物流服务供应链优化

物流服务市场的不确定性会影响物流服务供应链的服务水平和收益。在考虑随机即时采购价格以及基础物流提供商在正常情况和应急情况下具有不同物流能力投资成本的情形下,引入期权机制研究不确定市场环境下物流服务供应链的优化决策,以提高物流服务供应链柔性和降低市场不确定性带来的风险。构建物流服务供应链的期权契约模型,采用Stackelberg博弈理论和优化算法分析和求得物流服务集成商的最优期权采购和即时采购策略,以及基础物流提供商的最优物流能力投资策略。结果表明即时采购价格将影响基础物流提供商和物流服务集成商的决策。最后通过数值分析研究即时采购价格的不确定程度对物流服务集成商和提供商的优化策略和利润的影响。     

Revenue management model for on-demand IT services

This paper presents a model for applying revenue management to on-demand IT services. The multinomial logit model is used to describe customer choice over multiple classes with different service-level agreements (SLAs). A nonlinear programming model is provided to determine the optimal price or service level for each class. Through a numerical analysis, we examine the impacts of system capacity and customer waiting incentives on the service provider’s profit and pricing strategies.     

考虑衍生需求和粉丝效应的视频服务供应链质量努力策略研究

视频服务作为“互联网+”时代下的新型文化产业模式,日益受到人们的关注。本文构建一个视频服务平台和一个视频服务提供商组成的视频服务供应链,视频服务提供商通过视频服务平台向用户提供基础服务和两阶段衍生服务。考虑视频服务供应链成员的四种行为因素对服务需求的影响,并分别建立平台定价模式和提供商定价模式下服务供应链成员的利润函数,运用博弈理论,优化求解得到两种模式下服务供应链成员最优的质量努力策略和利润。最后,通过数值仿真,探讨了粉丝效应和收益分成比例与最优质量努力策略和最优利润的相关性,并得出相关结论,给出管理启示。     

A location–allocation problem for a web services provider in a competitive market

Web Services have become a viable component technology in distributed e-commerce platforms. Due to the move to high-speed Internet communication and tremendous increases in computing power, network latency has begun to play a more important role in determining service response time. Hence, the locations of a Web Services provider’s facilities, customer allocation, and the number of servers at each facility have a significant impact on its performance and customer satisfaction. In this paper we introduce a location–allocation model for a Web Services provider in a duopoly competitive market. Demands for services of these servers are available at each node of a network, and a subset of nodes is to be chosen to locate one or more servers in each. The objective is to maximize the provider’s profit. The problem is formulated and analyzed. An exact solution approach is developed and the results of its efficiency are reported.     

Make waiting not to seem like waiting: Capacity management of waiting-area entertainment

To operationalize the psychological principle that “occupied time feels shorter than unoccupied time”, it is common for service providers to offer entertainment options in the waiting areas. Typical examples that put in practice this mechanism include amusement parks, car dealers, airports, hospitals, restaurants, etc. In this paper, we study a queueing system where the server provides entertainment services to waiting customers. Assuming customers are strategic and delay-sensitive, we formulate a game-theoretical model and study customers' equilibrium behavior in response to this mechanism. Because offering waiting-area entertainment incurs extra operational costs, we discuss whether and when this option will benefit the service provider and obtain the optimal entertainment capacity that maximizes the system's profit. Our analysis reveals that this option is appealing if and only if the market size is intermediate and that the optimal capacity of the entertainment is a unimodal function in the market size. Our insights continue to remain valid when the service fee becomes endogenous.     

基于分类服务机制的可预约排队系统设计和服务定价研究

采取合理有效的服务机制和服务定价是确保服务型企业持续有效运行的重要方式,服务提供商设计合理的服务策略可以使得服务收益达到最优。本文以服务可预约的排队系统为研究背景,对服务提供商分类服务机制选择和服务定价策略进行研究。通过考虑由两种服务策略下顾客之间的平均等待时间的对比和顾客等待厌恶心理参数形成的全新顾客服务效用模型,给出服务提供商在不同服务机制下的最优服务策略以及顾客市场规模对其服务策略选择的影响。研究表明,当预约顾客的市场规模相对较小时,服务提供商可以采取分类服务机制,即同时服务预约顾客和未预约顾客以增加服务收益,反之亦然。此外,预约顾客等待厌恶程度能够显著增大服务提供商的服务定价。     

Service outsourcing under co-opetition and information asymmetry

Co-opetition refers to the phenomenon that firms simultaneously cooperate and compete in order to maximize their profits. This paper studies the contracting for an outsourcing supply chain (a user company vs. a service provider) in the presence of co-opetition and information asymmetry. The user company outsources part of his service capacity at a discount price to the service provider for sale. The service provider charges a commission for doing outsourcing work and competes with the user company for the service capacity to satisfy their respective demands. We solve for the service provider’s optimal commission decision and the user company’s optimal outsourcing decisions (outsourcing volume and price discount) when the user company has private information about his service capacity. Specifically, we highlight the following observations. For the service provider, a menu of two-part tariffs that consist of a fixed commission and a per-volume commission can reveal the true type of the user company’s capacity; the user company’s optimal outsourcing proportion is quasi-convex and the optimal price discount is non-decreasing in his capacity volume, which is counterintuitive.     

考虑质量偏好的两阶段服务供应链质量控制策略

研究了一个集成商和一个提供商所组成的服务供应链的质量控制问题。考虑集成商的质量缺陷承诺和提供商的质量偏好,并将提供商的质量活动区分为质量改进和质量保持两个阶段,分别建立了服务供应链成员的效用函数,同时考虑服务供应链成员的竞争与合作,运用博弈理论,优化得到单阶段与两阶段时,集成商的最优服务价格和质量缺陷承诺,以及提供商的最优服务质量改进程度。最后,通过对比分析及数值仿真发现,考虑两阶段质量控制较单阶段情形,更有利于服务供应链较长期限内获得更多效用。其次,服务提供商质量偏好对服务供应链单阶段与两阶段下的最优效用和质量控制策略均产生一定影响。     

电信运营商双寡头定价机制设计

电信市场存在运营商之间的竞争关系,运营商针对异质性消费者的定价机制设计更是直接影响其利润的实现,本文利用机制设计方法,分析了电信运营商的双寡头垄断定价策略,研究发现:(1)运营商的核心利润来源于低类型消费者的总剩余。低类型消费者的消费扭曲来源于运营商提供给高类型消费者过高的信息成本。要想改善低类型消费者的不满和消费扭曲,需要降低对高类型消费者的优惠幅度。(2)电信运营商的最优定价随竞争对手的价格同向变动。(3)电信运营商最优定价与消费者对该运营商的服务体验成正比,与消费者对竞争对手运营商的服务体验成反比。所以,运营商应当不断优化自己网络的服务质量,提高消费者的服务体验,进而才能有涨价的空间。     

基于排队系统的偏好差异性顾客服务策略分析

在服务商为不同偏好顾客提供差异性服务的排队系统中,其收益受到需求规模、顾客类型等因素影响,如何制定策略才能达到服务特定类型顾客并获取最大收益的目的？本文以服务时间与效果正相关的顾客密集型服务为背景,基于M/M/1模型对服务商为两种偏好顾客提供两种服务的情景进行研究,并将从偏好服务所获基准效用相对较低、较高的顾客分别定义为1类、2类顾客。结果表明,①随着潜在顾客规模的增加,最优策略所适用的3种基本策略依次为公平策略、优先服务2类顾客的策略以及仅服务2类顾客的排他性策略;②3种基本策略的适用范围仅与1类顾客的服务选择标准相关;③在优先服务某类顾客的策略中,有效到达速率及服务速度由另一类顾客的特征决定。     

Optimal quoting of delivery time by a third party logistics provider: The impact of shipment consolidation and temporal pricing schemes

Increased competition in business environments requires that firms provide not only quality but also timely service with minimal cost. Offering a delivery-time guarantee may increase the demand for a product or service, or allow the firm to charge a price premium. This paper investigates the effects of different pricing schemes for a Third Party Logistics (3PL) provider. The 3PL tenders a consolidated load to a carrier that line-hauls over a certain origin–destination lane. In a price- and time-sensitive logistics market, we derive the optimal quotations that should be made for price and delivery-time, with the objective of maximizing the profit rate of the 3PL provider. We propose four easy-to-use temporal pricing schemes, and derive the corresponding optimal length of shipment consolidation cycles and the prices. Depending on the logistics market parameters, we show that charging according to an order’s time of arrival is not necessarily the best pricing scheme. Various managerial insights and numerical examples with sensitivity analysis are provided.     

Optimal pricing,EOL (end of life) warranty,and spare parts manufacturing strategy amid product transition

We study firm’s strategy to determine its product price and warranty period, and plan the spare parts manufacturing so as to maximize its profit and at the same time to fulfill its commitment to providing the customer with the key part continuously over the relevant decision time horizon, i.e., the product’s life cycle plus its EOL service (warranty) period. To examine the research question, we develop and solve a two-stage optimal control theory model. From the numerical analysis, we infer as follows. It is not always true that the longer the EOL warranty period, the better for the company’s profitability, implying there exists an optimal EOL warranty period that balances all the relevant forces like market demand and cost structures. The relationship between optimal EOL warranty period and failure rate (defect rate) is concave: when the defect rate is moderate, the company has to increase its EOL warranty period as the defect rate increases so as to compensate for the deteriorating quality; but, when the defect rate is beyond a threshold level, the company needs to curtail its EOL warranty commitment as the defect rate increases in order to avoid excessive cost to service the failed parts. By depicting key dynamics in this managerial problem, this paper sheds light on how to make decision for optimal pricing and warranty when the product life cycle is finite and the company is obliged to provide after-sales services to customers for an extended period of time after the current product is no longer produced.