外部市场存在替代产品的VMI系统研究

供应商管理用户库存(VMI)作为一种有效的补货机制,能对购买渠道的需求信息做出积极正确的反应.现在对VMI的研究往往集中于单个零售商和单个供应商组成的系统,不考虑VMI系统受市场上其他零售商或供应商的影响.假设市场上多个零售商出售相互之间可替代的产品,某个零售商与其供应商之间应用VMI系统.我们的研究主要有两方面:1)VMI系统是否有助于零售商和供应商组成的供应链在差异产品市场上获得更大的收益;2)供应商和零售商如何决策是否应用VMI系统。     

Using the K5Connected Cognition Diagram to analyze teachers’ communication and understanding of regions in three-dimensional space

This paper reports on a study that introduces and applies the K₅Connected Cognition Diagram as a lens to explore video data showing teachers’ interactions related to the partitioning of regions by axes in a three-dimensional geometric space. The study considers “semiotic bundles” ( Arzarello, 2006), introduces “semiotic connections,” and discusses the fundamental role each plays in developing individual understanding and communication with peers. While all teachers solved the problem posed, many failed to make or verbalize connections between the types of semiotic resources introduced during their discussions.     

随机需求下供应商管理库存的供应链模型

以一个供应商和一个零售商的两阶段供应链为背景,利用报童模型给出了供应商管理库存(VMI)的供应链模型,在需求服从均匀分布的条件下得出解析解,并与传统的零售商管理库存(RMI)系统作了比较,分析了这两种情况下批发价和订货量的变化.数值结果表明VMI导致了批发价的缩减,但提高了订货量,VMI减轻了双重边际效应,系统利润多于传统的RMI系统.     

The impact of consumer returns policies on consignment contracts with inventory control

We consider a consignment contract with consumer non-defective returns behavior. In our model, an upstream vendor contracts with a downstream retailer. The vendor decides his consignment price charged to the retailer for each unit sold and his refund price for each returned item, and then the retailer sets her retail price for selling the product. The vendor gets paid based on net sold units and salvages unsold units as well as returned items in a secondary market. Under the framework, we study and compare two different consignment arrangements: the retailer/vendor manages consignment inventory (RMCI/VMCI) programs. To study the impact of return policy, we discuss a consignment contract without return policy as a benchmark. We show that whether or not the vendor offers a return policy, it is always beneficial for the channel to delegate the inventory decision to the vendor. We find that the vendor’s return policy depends crucially on the salvage value of returns. If the product has no salvage value, the vendor’s optimal decision is not to offer a return policy; otherwise, the vendor can gain more profit by offering a return policy when the salvage value turns out to be positive.     

A comparison of different quantity discount pricing policies in a two-echelon channel with stochastic and asymmetric demand information

In this paper, we study quantity discount pricing policies in a channel of one manufacturer and one retailer. The paper assumes that the channel faces a stochastic price-sensitive demand but the retailer can privately observe the realization of an uncertain demand parameter. The problem is analyzed as a Stackelberg game in which the manufacturer declares quantity discount pricing schemes to the retailer and then the retailer follows by selecting the retail price and associated quantity. Proposed in the paper are four quantity-discount pricing policies: “regular quantity discount”; “fixed percentage discount”; “incremental volume discount” and “fixed marginal-profit-rate discount”. Optimal solutions are derived, and numerical examples are presented to illustrate the efficiency of each discount policy.     

An analytical study of the modification ability of distribution centers

This paper considers a two-level vendor managed inventory (VMI) system comprising a distribution center (DC) and a retailer. Both the DC’s and the retailer’s replenishment decisions follow the order-up-to-level policy and aim at maximizing the profit of the overall system. We critically examine the potential of the DC’s ability to modify delivery decisions, identify and quantify the cost factors that influence the DC’s modification ability, establish a relationship between the DC’s location and its modification ability, and show the trade-off between the DC’s modification ability and related costs. Our analysis provides a new insight into the role of the DC and reveals the full potential of the VMI system. Our findings and their practical implications, demonstrated with the aid of computational examples, are helpful for enhancing the practice of VMI at both strategic and operational levels.     

Vendor managed inventory contracts – coordinating the supply chain while looking from the vendor’s perspective

The paper studies coordination of a supply chain when the inventory is managed by the vendor (VMI). We also provide a general mathematical framework that can be used to analyze contracts under both retailer managed inventory (RMI) and VMI. Using a simple newsvendor scenario with a single vendor and single retailer, we study five popular coordinating supply chain contracts: buyback, quantity flexibility, quantity discount, sales rebate, and revenue sharing contracts. We analyze the ability of these contracts to coordinate the supply chain under VMI when the vendor freely decides the quantity. We find that even though all of them coordinate under RMI, quantity flexibility and sales rebate contracts do not generally coordinate under VMI. Furthermore, buyback and revenue sharing contracts are equivalent. Hence, we propose two new contracts which coordinate under VMI (one of which coordinates under RMI too, provided a well-known assumption holds). Finally, we extend our analysis to consider multiple independent retailers with the vendor incurring linear or convex production cost, and show that our results are qualitatively unchanged.     

Minimizing the Total Cost in an Integrated Vendor—Managed Inventory System

In this paper we consider a complex production-distribution system, where a facility produces (or orders from an external supplier) several items which are distributed to a set of retailers by a fleet of vehicles. We consider Vendor-Managed Inventory (VMI) policies, in which the facility knows the inventory levels of the retailers and takes care of their replenishment policies. The production (or ordering) policy, the retailers replenishment policies and the transportation policy have to be determined so as to minimize the total system cost. The cost includes the fixed and variable production costs at the facility, the inventory costs at the facility and at the retailers and the transportation costs, that is the fixed costs of the vehicles and the traveling costs. We study two different types of VMI policies: The order-up-to level policy, in which the order-up-to level quantity is shipped to each retailer whenever served (i.e. the quantity delivered to each retailer is such that the maximum level of the inventory at the retailer is reached) and the fill-fill-dump policy, in which the order-up-to level quantity is shipped to all but the last retailer on each delivery route, while the quantity delivered to the last retailer is the minimum between the order-up-to level quantity and the residual transportation capacity of the vehicle. We propose two different decompositions of the problem and optimal or heuristic procedures for the solution of the subproblems. We show that, for reasonable initial values of the variables, the order in which the subproblems are solved does not influence the final solution. We will first solve the distribution subproblem and then the production subproblem. The computational results show that the fill-fill-dump policy reduces the average cost with respect to the order-up-to level policy and that one of the decompositions is more effective. Moreover, we compare the VMI policies with the more traditional Retailer-Managed Inventory (RMI) policy and show that the VMI policies significantly reduce the average cost with respect to the RMI policy.     

Optimal selection of retailers for a manufacturing vendor in a vendor managed inventory system

A Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) system consists of a manufacturing vendor and a number of retailers. In such a system, it is essential for the vendor to optimally determine retailer selection and other related decisions, such as the product’s replenishment cycle time and the wholesale price, in order to maximize his profit. Meanwhile, each retailer’s decisions on her willingness to enter the system and retail price are simultaneously considered in the retailer selection process. However, the above interactive decision making is complex and the available studies on interactive retailer selection are scarce. In this study, we formulate the retailer selection problem as a Stackelberg game model to help the manufacturer, as a vendor, optimally select his retailers to form a VMI system. This model is non-linear, mixed-integer, game-theoretic, and analytically intractable. Therefore, we further develop a hybrid algorithm for effectively and efficiently solving the developed model. The hybrid algorithm combines dynamic programming (DP), genetic algorithm (GA) and analytical methods. As demonstrated by our numerical studies, the optimal retailer selection can increase the manufacturer’s profit by up to 90% and the selected retailers’ profits significantly compared to non-selection strategy. The proposed hybrid algorithm can solve the model within a minute for a problem with 100 candidate retailers, whereas a pure GA has to take more than 1 h to solve a small sized problem of 20 candidate retailers achieving an objective value no worse than that obtained by the hybrid algorithm.     

An optimal replacement policy for a multistate degenerative simple system

In this paper, a degenerative simple system (i.e. a degenerative one-component system with one repairman) with k + 1 states, including k failure states and one working state, is studied. Assume that the system after repair is not “as good as new”, and the degeneration of the system is stochastic. Under these assumptions, we consider a new replacement policy T based on the system age. Our problem is to determine an optimal replacement policy T^∗ such that the average cost rate (i.e. the long-run average cost per unit time) of the system is minimized. The explicit expression of the average cost rate is derived, the corresponding optimal replacement policy can be determined, the explicit expression of the minimum of the average cost rate can be found and under some mild conditions the existence and uniqueness of the optimal policy T^∗ can be proved, too. Further, we can show that the repair model for the multistate system in this paper forms a general monotone process repair model which includes the geometric process repair model as a special case. We can also show that the repair model in the paper is equivalent to a geometric process repair model for a two-state degenerative simple system in the sense that they have the same average cost rate and the same optimal policy. Finally, a numerical example is given to illustrate the theoretical results of this model.     

The N threshold policy for the GI/M/1 queue

We study a GI/M/1 queue with an N threshold policy. In this system, the server stops attending the queue when the system becomes empty and resumes serving the queue when the number of customers reaches a threshold value N. Using the embeded Markov chain method, we obtain the stationary distributions of queue length and waiting time and prove the stochastic decomposition properties.     

Pricing and volume discounting for a dominant retailer with uncertain manufacturing cost information

A product costs the manufacturer c/unit to produce; the retailer sells it at p/unit to the consumers. The retail-market demand volume V varies with p according to a given demand curve D_p. How would or should the “players” (i.e., the manufacturer and the retailer) set their prices? In contrast to many studies that assume a dominant manufacturer implementing the “manufacturer-Stackelberg” (“[mS]”) game, this paper examines how a dominant retailer should operate when his knowledge of c is imperfect. We first derive optimal decisions (some of them counter-intuitive) for the dominant retailer when he is restricted to choosing between [rS] (retailer-Stackelberg) and [mS]. Second, we propose a “reverse quantity discount” scheme that the dominant retailer (i.e., the downstream player) can offer to the manufacturer (note that the standard discount scheme is offered by the upstream player). We show that this discounting scheme is quite effective compared to the considerably more complicated though nevertheless theoretically optimal “menu of contracts.” We also reveal a largely overlooked function of discounting; i.e., discounting enables an “ignorant” but dominant player to usurp the earnings attributable to the knowledge of the dominated player. Finally, we also show that discounting works well when the demand curve is linear, but becomes ineffective when the demand curve is iso-elastic – a result echoing the conclusions of some earlier related works.     

A real-time decision rule for an inventory system with committed service time and emergency orders

In this paper, we study the inventory system of an online retailer with compound Poisson demand. The retailer normally replenishes its inventory according to a continuous review (nQ, R) policy with a constant lead time. Usually demands that cannot be satisfied immediately are backordered. We also assume that the customers will accept a reasonable waiting time after they have placed their orders because of the purchasing convenience of the online system. This means that a sufficiently short waiting time incurs no shortage costs. We call this allowed waiting time “committed service time”. After this committed service time, if the retailer is still in shortage, the customer demand must either be satisfied with an emergency supply that takes no time (which is financially equivalent to a lost sale) or continue to be backordered with a time-dependent backorder cost. The committed service time gives an online retailer a buffer period to handle excess demands. Based on real-time information concerning the outstanding orders of an online retailer and the waiting times of its customers, we provide a decision rule for emergency orders that minimizes the expected costs under the assumption that no further emergency orders will occur. This decision rule is then used repeatedly as a heuristic. Numerical examples are presented to illustrate the model, together with a discussion of the conditions under which the real-time decision rule provides considerable cost savings compared to traditional systems.     

How a dominant retailer might design a purchase contract for a newsvendor-type product with price-sensitive demand

A dominant retailer will purchase a newsvendor-type product from a manufacturer, who incurs a unit manufacturing cost k. The expected retail demand is a function of the unit retail price p. How should the retailer design her purchase contract? For this increasingly prevalent but inadequately studied scenario, we propose plausible adaptations of several contract formats that have been widely studied in the dominant-manufacturer context. For both symmetric-k and asymmetric-k-knowledge situations, we present performance results of these contracts. Our results then reveal that the performance of these contract formats under our scenario differs considerably from what one would surmise from the well-known results published for closely related scenarios. For example, the widely studied buyback and revenue-sharing formats turn out to be largely ineffective when implemented by a dominant retailer. In contrast, the two-part tariff format performs well relative to the theoretically optimal “menu of contracts.” Our results highlight the need to study purchase contract formats designed specifically for dominant-retailer newsvendor-product channels.     

Vendor Management Inventory with consignment contracts and the benefits of cooperative advertising

Most of the cooperative advertising literature has focused on studying the effects of such programs considering marketing variables. This paper integrates production and inventory management with pricing and advertising considerations to assess the effects of cooperative advertising programs in bilateral monopolies. We consider a supply chain where a Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) along with a consignment contract is implemented to coordinate the chain. We develop and solve a differential model for two games. The first one is a benchmark scenario where no cooperative advertising is offered, while the manufacturer offers the cooperative program in the second game. The main results show that cooperative advertising programs, usually considered as successful marketing initiatives, can be very difficult to implement in a supply chain undertaking a VMI policy with a consignment contract, in which operations and marketing interface is taken into account. A cooperative program mainly hurts the manufacturer’s profits, and can be profit-Pareto-improving only in a few cases. Although the retailer is generally willing to receive a support from the manufacturer, she can opt for a non-cooperative program when the largest part of the supply chain profits goes to the manufacturer. We developed several special cases to strengthen our findings.     

Inventory sharing via circular unidirectional chaining

This research studies the performance of circular unidirectional chaining – a “lean” configuration of lateral inventory sharing among retailers or warehouses – and compares its performance to that of no pooling and complete pooling in terms of expected costs and optimal order quantities. Each retailer faces uncertain demand, and we wish to minimize procurement, shortage and transshipment costs. In a circular unidirectional chain all retailers are connected in a closed loop, so that each retailer can cooperate with exactly two others as follows: receive units (if needed?available) from the left “neighbor” and send units (if needed?available) to the right, and a retailer who receives units from one neighbor is not allowed to send any units to its other neighbor. If the chain consists of at least three nodes and demands across nodes are i.i.d., its performance turns out to be independent of the number of nodes. The optimal stocking is therefore solved analytically. Analytical comparative statics with respect to cost parameters and demand distributions are provided. We also examine thoroughly the cases of uniform demand distribution (analytically) and normal demand distribution (numerically). In the uniform case with free transshipment, a unidirectional chain can save up to 1/3 of the expected cost of separate newsvendors caused by uncertainty. For three nodes, the advantage of complete pooling over unidirectional chaining does not exceed 19%.     

Comparisons between observable and unobservable M/M/1 queues with respect to optimal customer behavior

We consider an M/M/1 queueing system in which the queue length may or may not be observable by a customer upon entering the system. The “observable” and “unobservable” models are compared with respect to system properties and performance measures under two different types of optimal customer behavior, which we refer to as “selfishly optimal” and “socially optimal”. We consider average customer throughput rates and show that, under both types of optimal customer behavior, the equality of effective queue-joining rates between the observable and unobservable systems results in differences with respect to other performance measures such as mean busy periods and waiting times. We also show that the equality of selfishly optimal queue-joining rates between the two types of system precludes the equality of socially optimal joining rates, and vice versa.     

Production and availability policies through the Markov Decision Process and myopic methods for contractual and selective orders

In this paper, we consider a supply chain with one manufacturer, one retailer, and some online customers. In addition to supplying the retailer, manufacturers may selectively take orders from individuals online. Through the Markov Decision Process, we explore the optimal production and availability policy for a manufacturer to determine whether to produce one more unit of products and whether to indicate “in stock” or “out of stock” on website. We measure the benefits and influences of adding online customers with and without the retailer’s inventory information sharing. We also simulate the production and availability policy via a myopic method, which can be implemented easily in the real world. Prediction of simple switching functions for the production and availability is proposed. We find the information sharing, production capacity and unit profit from online orders are the primary factors influencing manufacturer profits and optimal policy. The manufacturer might reserve 50% production capacity for contractual orders from the retailer and devote the remaining capacity to selective orders from spontaneous online customers.     

The Cauchy problems for evolutionary pseudo-differential equations over p-adic field and the wavelet theory

We solve the Cauchy problems for p-adic linear and semi-linear evolutionary pseudo-differential equations (the time-variable t∈R and the space-variable ). Among the equations under consideration there are the heat type equation and the Schrödinger type equations (linear and nonlinear). To solve these problems, we develop the “variable separation method” (an analog of the classical Fourier method) which reduces solving evolutionary pseudo-differential equations to solving ordinary differential equations with respect to real variable t. The problem of stabilization for solutions of the Cauchy problems as t→∞ is also studied. These results give significant advance in the theory of p-adic pseudo-differential equations and can be used in applications.     

A two-echelon base-stock inventory model with Poisson demand and the sequential processing of orders at the upper echelon

We consider a two-echelon inventory system with a number of non-identical, independent ‘retailers’ at the lower echelon and a single ‘supplier’ at the upper echelon. Each retailer experiences Poisson demand and operates a base stock policy with backorders. The supplier manufactures to order and holds no stock. Orders are produced, in first-come first-served sequence, with a fixed production time. The supplier therefore functions as an M/D/1 queue. We are interested in the performance characteristics (average inventory, average backorder level) at each retailer. By finding the distribution of order lead time and hence the distribution of demand during order lead time, we find the steady state inventory and backorder levels based on the assumption that order lead times are independent of demand during order lead time at a retailer. We also propose two alternative approximation procedures based on assumed forms for the order lead time distribution. Finally we provide a derivation of the steady state inventory and backorder levels which will be exact as long as there is no transportation time on orders between the supplier and retailers. A numerical comparison is made between the exact and approximate measures. We conclude by recommending an approach which is intuitive and computationally straightforward.