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1.
具有区间联盟值n人对策的Shapley值 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
本文提出了一类具有区间联盟收益值n人对策的Shapley值.利用区间数运算有关理论,通过建立公理化体系,对具有区间联盟收益值n人对策的Shapley值进行深入研究,证明了这类n人对策Shapley值存在性与唯一性,并给出了此Shapley值的具体表达式及一些性质.最后通过一个算例检验了其有效性与正确性. 相似文献
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M.Lassonde在[3]中用逼近论和同伦方法证明了几个非凸集上的集值映射的不动点定理。本文推广了[3]中的定理3.15,得到一个较好的不动点定理及若干有用的推论。 相似文献
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Shapley值的特点——参与人之间的平等性,可以通过构造联盟、联盟内外平等性和联盟中参与人贡献平等性这三个角度进行体现.然而,实践案例的结果分析显示Shapley值不能将所有联盟影响因子显示出来,这一局限性的根源在于联盟成员的非平等性.针对局限性提出了引入权重的Shapley值计算方法. 相似文献
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研究区间Shapley值通常对区间值合作对策的特征函数有较多约束,本文研究没有这些约束条件的区间值合作对策,以拓展区间Shapley值的适用范围。首先,本文指出广义H-差在减法与加法运算中存在的问题,进而提出了一种改进的广义H-差,称为扩展的广义H-差。然后,基于扩展的广义H-差,定义了区间值合作对策的广义区间Shapley值,并用区间有效性、区间对称性、区间哑元性和区间可加性等四条公理刻画了该广义区间Shapley值。同时,证明了该值的存在性与唯一性,而且得到了该值的一些性质。研究表明,任意的区间值合作对策的广义区间Shapley值都存在。最后,以算例说明该广义区间Shapley值的可行性与实用性。 相似文献
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锥凸集值映射的基本性质 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
本文首先在R~m的幂集上定义了一种锥序关系并借助这种序关系定义锥凸集值映射,证明了普通单值凸函数的一些基本性质拓广到这种锥凸集值映射时仍成立. 相似文献
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本文讨论了集值拟鞅和集值一致渐近鞅,证明了集值拟鞅与集值一致渐近鞅的选样定理,对于集值一致渐近鞅得到了一些收敛性结果,并由此刻化了空间的 Radon-Nikodym性质. 相似文献
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引入实值函数关于有界闭凸值测度的集值积分,并讨论了集值积分的收敛定理,证明了当集值测度为有界闭凸集值的有界变差集值测度时,关于弱紧凸集值测度的积分性质对有界闭凸集值测度仍然保持.推广了实值函数关于弱紧凸值测度的积分. 相似文献
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This study provides a unified axiomatic characterization method of one-point solutions for cooperative games with transferable utilities. Any one-point solution that satisfies efficiency, the balanced cycle contributions property (BCC), and the axioms related to invariance under a player deletion is characterized as a corollary of our general result. BCC is a weaker requirement than the well-known balanced contributions property. Any one-point solution that is both symmetric and linear satisfies BCC. The invariance axioms necessitate that the deletion of a specific player from games does not affect the other players’ payoffs, and this deletion is different with respect to solutions. As corollaries of the above characterization result, we are able to characterize the well-known one-point solutions, the Shapley, egalitarian, and solidarity values, in a unified manner. We also studied characterizations of an inefficient one-point solution, the Banzhaf value that is a well-known alternative to the Shapley value. 相似文献
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Anna B. Khmelnitskaya Elena B. Yanovskaya 《Mathematical Methods of Operations Research》2007,66(2):255-261
We show that the Owen value for TU games with coalition structure can be characterized without the additivity axiom similarly
as it was done by Young for the Shapley value for general TU games. Our axiomatization via four axioms of efficiency, marginality,
symmetry across coalitions, and symmetry within coalitions is obtained from the original Owen’s one by the replacement of
additivity and null-player via marginality. We show that the alike axiomatization for the generalization of the Owen value
suggested by Winter for games with level structure is valid as well.
The research was supported by NWO (The Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research) grant NL-RF 047.017.017. 相似文献
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《Operations Research Letters》2019,47(2):122-126
A new class of values for cooperative games with level structure is introduced. We apply a multi-step proceeding to the weighted Shapley values. For characterization, two well-known axiomatizations of the weighted Shapley values are extended, the first one by efficiency and weighted balanced contributions and the second one by weighted standardness for two-player games and consistency. We get a new axiomatization of the Shapley levels value too. 相似文献
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利用夏普里值来识别导致顾客不满意的质量属性.因为夏普里值差异很小的质量属性具有高度的相关性,所以可以把具有相同或者类似的夏普里值的质量属性划分为同类属性,从而能够识别导致顾客不满意的质量属性.算例进一步验证该方法的可行性和正确性. 相似文献
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《Operations Research Letters》2020,48(1):55-60
In this note, we discuss two solutions for cooperative transferable utility games, namely the Shapley value and the Proper Shapley value. We characterize positive Proper Shapley values by affine invariance and by an axiom that requires proportional allocation of the surplus according to the individual singleton worths in generalized joint venture games. As a counterpart, we show that affine invariance and an axiom that requires equal allocation of the surplus in generalized joint venture games characterize the Shapley value. 相似文献
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具有超图交流结构的可转移效用合作对策,也称为超图对策,它由一个三元组(N,v,H)所组成,其中(N,H)是一个可转移效用对策(简称TU-对策),而(N,H)是一个超图(超网络)。在超图对策中,除Myerson值(Myerson)外,Position值(Meessen)是另一个重要的分配规则。该模型要求把超图结构中每条超边Shapley的值平均分配给它所包含的点,而不考虑每个点的交流能力或合作水平。本文引入超图结构中点的度值来度量每条超边中每个点的交流能力或合作水平,并结合Haeringer提出用于推广Shapley值的权重系统,并由此定义了具有超图合作结构的赋权Position值。我们证明了具有超图合作结构的赋权Position值可以由“分支有效性”、“冗余超边性”、“超边可分解性”、“拟可加性”、“弱积极性”和“弱能转换”六个性质所唯一确定,并且发现参与者获得的支付随其度值的增加而增加,参与者分摊的成本随其度值的增加而降低。 相似文献
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Cooperative games are considered where only those coalitions of players are feasible that respect a given precedence structure on the set of players. Strengthening the classical symmetry axiom, we obtain three axioms that give rise to a unique Shapley value in this model. The Shapley value is seen to reflect the expected marginal contribution of a player to a feasible random coalition, which allows us to evaluate the Shapley value nondeterministically. We show that every exact algorithm for the Shapley value requires an exponential number of operations already in the classical case and that even restriction to simple games is #P-hard in general. Furthermore, we outline how the multi-choice cooperative games of Hsiao and Raghavan can be treated in our context, which leads to a Shapley value that does not depend on pre-assigned weights. Finally, the relationship between the Shapley value and the permission value of Gilles, Owen and van den Brink is discussed. Both refer to formally similar models of cooperative games but reflect complementary interpretations of the precedence constraints and thus give rise to fundamentally different solution concepts. 相似文献
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Koji Yokote 《International Journal of Game Theory》2017,46(3):631-654
Monderer et al. (Int J Game Theory 21(1):27–39, 1992) proved that the core is included in the set of the weighted Shapley values in TU games. The purpose of this paper is to extend this result to NTU games. We first show that the core is included in the closure of the positively weighted egalitarian solutions introduced by Kalai and Samet (Econometrica 53(2):307–327, 1985). Next, we show that the weighted version of the Shapley NTU value by Shapley (La Decision, aggregation et dynamique des ordres de preference, Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris, pp 251–263, 1969) does not always include the core. These results indicate that, in view of the relationship to the core, the egalitarian solution is a more desirable extension of the weighted Shapley value to NTU games. As a byproduct of our approach, we also clarify the relationship between the core and marginal contributions in NTU games. We show that, if the attainable payoff for the grand coalition is represented as a closed-half space, then any element of the core is attainable as the expected value of marginal contributions. 相似文献
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A. Ioffe 《Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications》2007,335(2):882-901
If F is a set-valued mapping from Rn into Rm with closed graph, then y∈Rm is a critical value of F if for some x with y∈F(x), F is not metrically regular at (x,y). We prove that the set of critical values of a set-valued mapping whose graph is a definable (tame) set in an o-minimal structure containing additions and multiplications is a set of dimension not greater than m−1 (respectively a σ-porous set). As a corollary of this result we get that the collection of asymptotically critical values of a set-valued mapping with a semialgebraic graph has dimension not greater than m−1. We also give an independent proof of the fact that a definable continuous real-valued function is constant on components of the set of its subdifferentiably critical points. 相似文献
20.
M. Álvarez-Mozos R. van den Brink G. van der Laan O. Tejada 《European Journal of Operational Research》2013
In a standard TU-game it is assumed that every subset of the player set N can form a coalition and earn its worth. One of the first models where restrictions in cooperation are considered is the one of games with coalition structure of Aumann and Drèze (1974). They assumed that the player set is partitioned into unions and that players can only cooperate within their own union. Owen (1977) introduced a value for games with coalition structure under the assumption that also the unions can cooperate among them. Winter (1989) extended this value to games with levels structure of cooperation, which consists of a game and a finite sequence of partitions defined on the player set, each of them being coarser than the previous one. 相似文献