Exploring multiple equilibria for symmetric 2×2 CES/LES pure exchange economies

This paper explores the existence of 3 equilibria for symmetric 2-individual 2-good CES/LES pure exchange economies. For certain parameterizations in the economies, we show analytically that there are no more than 3 equilibria. We generalize our analytical results of existence of 3 equilibria for a wide range of parameterizations. Then we provide examples of 3 equilibria and parameter zones of 3 equilibria for CES and CES/LES economies.     

Existence of equilibrium for economies with infinitely many commodities and infinitely countable consumers

This paper examines the existence of equilibria for double infinite eonomies. S.F. Richard and S. Srivastava have established the existence of equilibria for economies with infinitely countable consumers when commodity space isL ^∞ (M, M, μ). However, most Banach Lattices as commodity spaces haven’t interior points in their positive cones, so their result can’t be applied to many cases. We here consider a general Banach Lattice as commodity space and introduce a concept of equiproperness on preferences. Under the assumption the existence of equilibrium for economy is established. Finally, we examine the existence of equilibria for production economies.     

On Equilibria when Agents Have Multiple Priors

We discuss the existence and the qualitative properties of equilibria when agents have multiple priors and there is only one good in each state of the world. We first prove a general existence result in infinite dimension economies. We then fully describe the equilibria in two special cases. We first consider the case of CEU maximizers that have same capacities. We next consider the case of no aggregate uncertainty. We prove that if agents have non-random initial endowments and are uncertainty averse and maximize the minimal expected utility according to a set of possible priors, then the existence of a common prior is equivalent to the existence of a unique equilibrium, the no-trade equilibrium. We lastly give a mild assumption for indeterminacy of equilibria and compute the dimension of indeterminacy.     

On the existence of strong Nash equilibria

This paper investigates the existence of strong Nash equilibria (SNE) in continuous and concave games. It is shown that the coalition consistency property introduced in the paper, together with concavity and continuity of payoffs, permits the existence of SNE in games with compact and convex strategy spaces. We also characterize the existence of SNE by providing necessary and sufficient conditions. We suggest an algorithm for computing SNE. The results are illustrated with applications to economies with multilateral environmental externalities and to the static oligopoly model.     

Time consistent Markov policies in dynamic economies with quasi-hyperbolic consumers

We study the question of existence and computation of time-consistent Markov policies of quasi-hyperbolic consumers under a stochastic transition technology in a general class of economies with multidimensional action spaces and uncountable state spaces. Under standard complementarity assumptions on preferences, as well as a mild geometric condition on transition probabilities, we prove existence of time-consistent solutions in Markovian policies, and provide conditions for the existence of continuous and monotone equilibria. We present applications of our methods to habit formation models, environmental policies, and models of consumption under borrowing constraints, and hence show how our methods extend the results obtained by Harris and Laibson (Econometrica 69:935–957, 2001) to a broad class of dynamic economies. We also present a simple successive approximation scheme for computing extremal equilibrium, and provide some results on the existence of monotone equilibrium comparative statics in the model’s deep parameters.     

Existence Theorems for Systems of Generalized Vector Quasiequilibrium Problems and Optimization Problems

In this paper, we use existence theorems for the equilibria of generalized abstract economies proved recently to establish existence theorems for systems of generalized vector quasiequilibrium problems. Then, these existence theorems for equilibrium problems are used to derive existence theorems for systems of generalized vector quasivariational-like inequality problems, and vector quasioptimization problems.This research was supported by the National Science Council of the Republic of China. The authors express their gratitude to the referees for valuable suggestions.     

The Study of Abstract Economies with Two Constraint Correspondences

We apply the Himmelberg fixed-point theorem to establish existence theorems of equilibria for generalized abstract economies with two constraint correspondences in which the strategic spaces may not be compact and the set of players may not be countable. Our results have applications in other sciences or disciplines (e.g. game theory, optimization theory and economics) in our subsequent paper. This research was supported by the National Science Council of Republic of China.     

离散无穷时期不完全资产市场随机平衡

Abstract. This paper examines the existence of general equilibrium in a discrete time economywith the infinite horizon incomplete markets. There is a single good at each node in the eventtree. The existence of general equilibrium for the infinite horizon economy is proved by takinglimit of equilibria in truncated economies in which trade stops at a sequence of dates.     

Resource pricing games on graphs: existence of Nash equilibria

In this letter, we consider a non-cooperative resource pricing game on a graph where sellers (i.e., players) set the prices for their own resources to maximize the payoffs and buyers migrate to seek the least expensive resources. We present a model for the resource pricing game and prove the existence of Nash equilibria on regular and hierarchical graphs. The results obtained are applicable to the study of market economies, social networks and computer networks where individuals trade resources in a spatially extended environment.     

Equilibria of noncompact abstract economies in general almost convex strategy spaces

We first extend the concept of almost convex condition and establish a fixed point theorem for correspondences with convex values only on an almost convex subset for their ranges. This generalizes both results of Himmelberg [C.J. Himmelberg, Fixed points of compact multifunctions, J. Math. Anal. Appl. 38 (1972) 205–207] and the result of Jafari and Sehgal [F. Jafari, V.M. Sehgal, An extension to a theorem of Himmelberg, J. Math. Anal. Appl. 327 (2007) 298–301]. Furthermore, applying it, we have existence theorems for equilibria of noncompact abstract economies in general almost convex strategy spaces. Our theorems generalize the corresponding results of Zhou [Jianxin Zhou, On the existence of equilibrium for abstract economies, J. Math. Anal. Appl. 193 (1995) 839–858], Tan and Wu [K.-K. Tan, Z. Wu, A note on abstract economies with upper semicontinuous correspondence, Appl. Math. Lett. 11 (5) (1998) 21–22] in several ways. In particular, we answer the question raised by Zhou in the reference cited above in the affirmative with weaker hypotheses.     

On topological existence theorems and applications to optimization-related problems

In this paper, we establish a continuous selection theorem and use it to derive five equivalent results on the existence of fixed points, sectional points, maximal elements, intersection points and solutions of variational relations, all in topological settings without linear structures. Then, we study the solution existence of a number of optimization-related problems as examples of applications of these results: quasivariational inclusions, Stampacchia-type vector equilibrium problems, Nash equilibria, traffic networks, saddle points, constrained minimization, and abstract economies.     

The Marginal Pricing Rule in Economies with Infinitely Many Commodities

Clarke's normal cone appears as the right tool to define the marginal pricing rule in finite dimensional commodity space since it allows to consider in the same framework convex, smooth as well as nonsmooth nonconvex production sets. Furthermore it has nice continuity and convexity properties. But it is not well adapted for economies with infinitely many commodities since it does satisfy minimal continuity properties. In this paper, we propose an alternative definition of the marginal pricing rule. It allows us to prove the second welfare theorem and the existence of marginal pricing equilibria for economies with several producers under assumptions similar to the one used for economies with a finite set of commodities. Our approach is sufficiently general to take into account the convex and the smooth cases for which our definition of the marginal pricing rule coincides with the one given by the Clarke's normal cone or the normal cone of convex analysis.     

An answer to a question by Herings et al.

We answer an open question by Herings et al. [J.J. Herings, G. van der Laan, D. Talman, Z. Yang, A fixed point theorem for discontinuous functions, Operations Research Letters 36 (1) (2008) 89–93], by proving that their fixed point theorem for discontinuous functions works for mappings defined on convex compact subset of , and not only polytopes. This rests on a fixed point result of Toussaint [S. Toussaint, On the existence of equilibria in economies with infinitely many commodities and without ordered preferences, Journal of Economic Theory 33 (1) (1984) 98–115].     

The Study of Minimax Inequalities, Abstract Economics and Applications to Variational Inequalities and Nash Equilibria

In this survey, a new minimax inequality and one equivalent geometricform are proved. Next, a theorem concerning the existence of maximalelements for an LC-majorized correspondence is obtained.By the maximal element theorem, existence theorems of equilibrium point fora noncompact one-person game and for a noncompact qualitative game withLC-majorized correspondences are given. Using the lastresult and employing 'approximation approach', we prove theexistence of equilibria for abstract economies in which the constraintcorrespondence is lower (upper) semicontinuous instead of having lower(upper) open sections or open graphs in infinite-dimensional topologicalspaces. Then, as the applications, the existence theorems of solutions forthe quasi-variational inequalities and generalized quasi-variationalinequalities for noncompact cases are also proven. Finally, with theapplications of quasi-variational inequalities, the existence theorems ofNash equilibrium of constrained games with noncompact are given. Our resultsinclude many results in the literature as special cases.     

On the existence of equilibria in generalized games

This paper deals with the existence of equilibrium in generalized games (the so-called abstract economies) and Nash equilibrium in games with general assumptions. Preference correspondences, unlike the existing theorems in the literature, need not have open graphs or open lower sections, strategy spaces need not be compact and finite dimensional, the number of agents need not be countable, and preference relations need not be ordered. Thus, our results generalize many of the existence theorems on equilibria in generalized games, including those of Debreu (1952), Shafer and Sonnenschein (1975), Toussaint (1984), Kim and Richter (1986), and Yannelis (1987).I wish to thank the editor and an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions.     

Linear stability of relative equilibria in the charged three-body problem

A relative equilibrium is a periodic orbit of the n-body problem that rotates uniformly maintaining the same central configuration for all time. In this paper we generalize some results of R. Moeckel and we apply it to study the linear stability of relative equilibria in the charged three-body problem. We find necessary conditions to have relative equilibria linearly stable for the collinear charged three-body problem, for planar relative equilibria we obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for linear stability in terms of the parameters, masses and electrostatic charges. In the last case we obtain a stability inequality which generalizes the Routh condition of celestial mechanics. We also proof the existence of spatial relative equilibria and the existence of planar relative equilibria of any triangular shape.     

Equi-well-posed games

In this paper, the notion of equi-well-posed optimization problem as studied by Dontchev and Zolezzi, (Ref. 1) is extended to noncooperative games. Some existence theorems for Berge and Nash equilibria are obtained. Under some invariance properties, the existence of Berge equilibria which are also Nash equilibria points is studied.     

ON EQUILIBRIA AND PERIODIC ORBITS OF COOPERATIVE SYSTEMS IN R~3

In the paper we present new criteria for existence of equilibria and periodic orbits for 3-dimensional systems which are cooperative. Particular attention is given to the relations of equilibria, cycle K and stable manifold of K. Meanwhile, the results of Hirsch [1, Theorem 9] and Jiang [2] are improved.     

On a New Class of Systems of Generalized Quasi-Variational Inequalities

We introduce new types of systems of generalized quasi-variational inequalities and we prove the existence of the solutions by using results of pair equilibrium existence for free abstract economies. We consider the fuzzy models and we also introduce the random free abstract economy and the random equilibrium pair. The existence of the solutions for the systems of quasi-variational inequalities comes as consequences of the existence of equilibrium pairs for the considered free abstract economies.     

Existence of competitive equilibrium in coalition production economies with a continuum of agents

Aumann (Econometrica 34: 1–17, 1966) established the existence of competitive equilibria in exchange economies with a continuum of traders. This result has been extended to special production economies under the condition that the production sets are countably additive or superadditive in the literature. In this paper, we extend Aumann’s result to coalition production economies with a continuum of traders in which each coalition can have a different production set and the production sets need not to be additive or superadditive. Our new existence theorem for competitive equilibrium implies the classical result by Hildenbrand (Econometrica 38: 608–623, 1970), and implies those by Sondermann (J Econ Theory 8: 259–291, 1974) and Greenberg et al. (J Math Econ 6: 31–41, 1979) under the assumption that the production sets are convex.