A consistent value for games with n players and r alternatives

In Bolger [1993], an efficient value was obtained for a class of games called games with n players and r alternatives. In these games, each of the n players must choose one and only one of the r alternatives. This value can be used to determine a player’s “a priori” value in such a game. In this paper, we show that the value has a consistency property similar to the “consistency” for TU games in Hart/Mas-Colell [1989] and we present a set of axioms (including consistency) which characterizes this value.  The games considered in this paper differ from the multi-choice games considered by Hsiao and Raghavan [1993]. They consider games in which the actions of the players are ordered in the sense that, if i >j, then action i carries more “weight” than action j.  These games also differ from partition function games in that the worth of a coalition depends not only on the partitioning of the players but also on the action chosen by each subset of the partition. Received: April 1994/final version: June 1999     

Trembling hand perfection for mixed quantal/best response equilibria

The quantal response equilibrium (QRE) is a powerful alternative to full rationality equilibrium concepts. At a QRE, all joint moves have non-zero probability. However in “mixed scenarios”, where some players use quantal response and some use best response, equilibrium strategy profiles can have joint moves with zero probability. This raises the question of applying the trembling hand refinement to such mixed scenarios. To address this I first show how to reformulate the QRE as a “best response” equilibrium where expected utilities are replaced by more general objective functions. I then show that under this reformulation the two popular types of trembling hand perfection can differ when some players use quantal response and some use best response. I end by showing that one of those types of trembling hand perfection cannot be used to remove certain troubling kinds of equilibrium in such mixed scenarios, while the other type can. The conclusion is that only the one type of trembling hand perfection should be applied when we allow some players to be quantal response and some to be best response.     

Negotiation-proof Nash equilibrium

This paper defines “negotiation-proof Nash equilibrium', a notion that applies to environments where players can negotiate openly and directly prior to the play of a noncooperative game. It recognizes the possibility that a group of self-interested players may choose, voluntarily and without binding agreement, to coordinate their choice of strategies and make joint objections; moreover, it takes the perfect foresight of rational players fully into account. The merit of the notion of negotiation-proof Nash equilibrium is twofold: (1) It offers a way to rectify the nestedness assumption and myopia embedded in the notion of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium. (2) The negotiation process is formalized by a “graph”, which serves as a natural extension to the approach that models preplay communication by an extensive game. Received: October 1998/Final version: May 2000     

The Geometry of Standard Deontic Logic

Whereas geometrical oppositions (logical squares and hexagons) have been so far investigated in many fields of modal logic (both abstract and applied), the oppositional geometrical side of “deontic logic” (the logic of “obligatory”, “forbidden”, “permitted”, . . .) has rather been neglected. Besides the classical “deontic square” (the deontic counterpart of Aristotle’s “logical square”), some interesting attempts have nevertheless been made to deepen the geometrical investigation of the deontic oppositions: Kalinowski (La logique des normes, PUF, Paris, 1972) has proposed a “deontic hexagon” as being the geometrical representation of standard deontic logic, whereas Joerden (jointly with Hruschka, in Archiv für Rechtsund Sozialphilosophie 73:1, 1987), McNamara (Mind 105:419, 1996) and Wessels (Die gute Samariterin. Zur Struktur der Supererogation, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 2002) have proposed some new “deontic polygons” for dealing with conservative extensions of standard deontic logic internalising the concept of “supererogation”. Since 2004 a new formal science of the geometrical oppositions inside logic has appeared, that is “n-opposition theory”, or “NOT”, which relies on the notion of “logical bi-simplex of dimension m” (m = n − 1). This theory has received a complete mathematical foundation in 2008, and since then several extensions. In this paper, by using it, we show that in standard deontic logic there are in fact many more oppositional deontic figures than Kalinowski’s unique “hexagon of norms” (more ones, and more complex ones, geometrically speaking: “deontic squares”, “deontic hexagons”, “deontic cubes”, . . ., “deontic tetraicosahedra”, . . .): the real geometry of the oppositions between deontic modalities is composed by the aforementioned structures (squares, hexagons, cubes, . . ., tetraicosahedra and hyper-tetraicosahedra), whose complete mathematical closure happens in fact to be a “deontic 5-dimensional hyper-tetraicosahedron” (an oppositional very regular solid).      

How canonical is the canonical model? A comment on Aumann's interactive epistemology

Aumann (1989) argued that the natural partitions on the space of all maximally consistent sets of formulas in multi-player S5 logic are necessarily “commonly known” by the players. We show, however, that there are many other sets of partitions on this space that conform with the formulas that build the states – as many as there are subsets of the continuum! Thus, assuming a set of partitions on this space is “common knowledge” is an informal but meaningful meta-assumption.     

On equilibrium in pure strategies in games with many players

We demonstrate that, if there are sufficiently many players, any Bayesian equilibrium of an incomplete information game can be “ε-purified” . That is, close to any Bayesian equilibrium there is an approximate Bayesian equilibrium in pure strategies. Our main contribution is obtaining this result for games with a countable set of pure strategies. In order to do so we derive a mathematical result, in the spirit of the Shapley–Folkman Theorem, permitting countable strategy sets. Our main assumption is a “large game property,” dictating that the actions of relatively small subsets of players cannot have large affects on the payoffs of other players. E. Cartwright and M. Wooders are indebted to Phillip Reny, Frank Page and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.     

Combinatorial Groupoids,Cubical Complexes,and the Lovász Conjecture

This paper lays the foundation for a theory of combinatorial groupoids that allows us to use concepts like “holonomy”, “parallel transport”, “bundles”, “combinatorial curvature”, etc. in the context of simplicial (polyhedral) complexes, posets, graphs, polytopes and other combinatorial objects. We introduce a new, holonomy-type invariant for cubical complexes, leading to a combinatorial “Theorema Egregium” for cubical complexes that are non-embeddable into cubical lattices. Parallel transport of Hom-complexes and maps is used as a tool to extend Babson–Kozlov–Lovász graph coloring results to more general statements about nondegenerate maps (colorings) of simplicial complexes and graphs. The author was supported by grants 144014 and 144026 of the Serbian Ministry of Science and Technology.     

Phenomena in Inverse Stackelberg Games,Part 2: Dynamic Problems

Games are considered in which the role of the players is a hierarchical one. Some players behave as leaders, others as followers. Such games are named after Stackelberg. In the current paper, a special type of these games is considered, known in the literature as inverse Stackelberg games. In such games, the leader (or: leaders) announces his strategy as a mapping from the follower (or: followers) decision space into his own decision space. Arguments for studying such problems are given. The routine way of analysis, leading to a study of composed functions, is not very fruitful. Other approaches are given, mainly by studying specific examples. Phenomena in problems with more than one leader and/or follower are studied within the context of the inverse Stackelberg concept. As a side issue, expressions like “two captains on a ship” and “divide and conquer” are given a mathematical foundation.     

No random reals in countable support iterations

We prove a preservation theorem for limit steps of countable support iterations of proper forcing notions whose particular cases are preservations of the following properties on limit steps: “no random reals are added”, “μ(Random(V))≠1”, “no dominating reals are added”, “Cohen(V) is not comeager”. Consequently, countable support iterations of σ-centered forcing notions do not add random reals. The work was supported by BRF of Israel Academy of Sciences and by grant GA SAV 365 of Slovak Academy of Sciences.     

Choice of solution in one-step bimatrix games

A new approach to the solution of one-step games is constructed, without using the concept of mixed strategy. The notion of a “set” solution of a bimatrix game is defined. It is shown that this solution always exists and may be found by a finite procedure. Examples are given illustrating the form of the “set” solution and the structure of the set of best responses for various levels of information availability to the players regarding the opponent’s behavior. __________ Translated from Nelineinaya Dinamika i Upravlenie, No. 4, pp. 341–356, 2004.     

The Existence and Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium Point in an m-player Game “Shoot Later, Shoot First!”

We consider the following “silent duel” of m players with a possible economic interpretation. Each player has one “bullet”, which she can shoot at any time during the time interval [0,1]. The probability that the i-th player hits the “target” at moment t is given by an increasing accuracy function f _i (t). The winner is the player who hits the target first. Under natural assumptions on the functions f _i (t) we prove the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium point in this game, and we provide an explicit construction of this equilibrium. This construction allows us to obtain exact solutions for many specific examples. Some of them are presented.This work was partly supported by RBRF grants 03-01-00479.     

Orthogonal and bounded orthogonal spectral representations

The concept of an orthogonal spectral representation (OTSR) of a Hilbert spaceH relative to a spectral measureE(.) is introduced and it is shown that every Hilbert space admits an OTSR relative to a given spectral measure. Apart from the various results obtained about OTSRs, the principal result of Allan Brown (1974) is deduced as an easy consequence of this study. A new complete system of unitary invariants called the “equivalence of OTSRs”, is given for spectral measures. Two special types of OTSRs called “BOTSR” and “COBOTSR” are introduced and characterized respectively in terms of the “GCGS-property” and “CGS-property” of the associated spectral measure. Various complete systems of unitary invariants are given for spectral measures with the GCGS-property. Finally, the Wecken-Plesner-Rohlin theorem on hermitian operators with simple spectra is generalized to arbitrary spectral measures.     

Weak equilibrium in a spatial model

Spatial models of two-player competition in spaces with more than one dimension almost never have pure-strategy Nash equilibria, and the study of the equilibrium positions, if they exist, yields a disappointing result: the two players must choose the same position to achieve equilibrium. In this work, a discrete game is proposed in which the existence of Nash equilibria is studied using a geometric argument. This includes a definition of equilibrium which is weaker than the classical one to avoid the uniqueness of the equilibrium position. As a result, a “region of equilibrium” appears, which can be located by geometric methods. In this area, the players can move around in an “almost-equilibrium” situation and do not necessarily have to adopt the same position.     

Repeated communication through the mechanism and

We consider the “and” communication device that receives inputs from two players and outputs the public signal yes if both messages are yes, and outputs no otherwise. We prove that no correlation can securely be implemented using this device, even when infinitely many stages of communication are allowed. Received December 1998/Final version November 2000     

A Probabilistic Approach to Carne’s Bound

Carne’s bound is a sharp inequality controlling the transition probabilities for a discrete reversible Markov chain (Section 1). Its ordinary proof uses spectral techniques which look as efficient as miraculous. Here we present a new proof, comparing a “drift” for ways “out” and “back”, to get the gaussian part of the bound (Section 2), and using a conditioning technique to get the flight factor (Section 4). Moreover we show how our proof is more “supple” than Carne’s one and may generalize (Section 3.2).      

Statistics on wreath products and generalized binomial-stirling numbers

Various statistics on wreath products are defined via canonical words, “colored” right to left minima and “colored” descents. It is shown that refined counts with respect to these statistics have nice recurrence formulas of binomial-Stirling type. These extended Stirling numbers determine (via matrix inversion) dual systems, which are also shown to have combinatorial realizations within the wreath product. The above setting also gives rise to a MacMahon-type equi-distribution theorem over subsets with prescribed statistics. Partially supported by Minerva Grant No. 8441 and by EC's IHRP Programme, within the Research Training Network “Algebraic Combinatorics in Europe”, grant HPRN-CT-2001-00272. Partially supported by EC's IHRP Programme, within the Research Training Network “Algebraic Combinatorics in Europe”, grant HPRN-CT-2001-00272.     

Some new closures on orders

For each of the relations “less than or equal to”, “less than”, “covered by”, and “covered by or equal to”, we characterize finite orders (also called posets) with the property that the pair of Galois closure operators induced by the relation in question coincides with the pair of closure operators introduced and applied in our previous paper in 2007. We also consider the “less than or equal to” relation between the set of join-irreducible elements and the set of meet-irreducible elements, and we show that the above-mentioned pairs of closure operators coincide for finite modular lattices.     

Advertising Strategies in a Differential Game with Negative Competitor’s Interference

We consider a duopolistic industry where the current sales of each firm is proportional to its goodwill stock. The evolution of the latter depends positively on own advertising effort and negatively on competitor’s advertising. A standard assumption in the literature in differential games of advertising is that the players remain active throughout the whole (infinite) duration of the game. We relax this assumption and characterize the circumstances under which a firm finds it optimal to remain or exit the industry. Among other things, it is shown that, if both players are “strong”, then the unique Nash equilibrium is the same that one would obtain in the absence of interference from competitor’s advertising. Research supported by Ministry of University and Research of Italy, University of Padua and NSERC, Canada.     

Study on “double dawn”

The ancient record, “During the first year of King Yi, the day dawned twice at Zheng”, has provided important clues to early Chinese chronicles. The astronomical conditions and visible area distributions related to such a “double dawn” event are discussed, and the precision and current problems in the calculations of ancient astronomical phenomena are shown. On such a basis, all the solar eclipses from 1000 BC to 840 BC are calculated and their associated “double dawn” features investigated. The conclusion that the “double dawn” was a solar eclipse occurring on April 21st, 899 BC is corfirmed to be the most reasonable. Project supported by the Xia-Shang-Zhou Chronology Project and Director Foundation of the Chinese Academy of Sciences.