Baseline models are not “finishline” models: A sympathetic critique of Mayhew's strategy

A rationalist view of Relative Deprivation is possible if it is represented with extended preference. In the social movements studies, the concept of relative deprivation has been treated as an intervening variable, which is determined by the interpersonal comparisons and causes the social movements. The most important problem is whether a relatively deprived individual has an incentive for social movements or not. On the one hand he has different reference persons to whom he experiences relative deprivation and a sense of his subjective welfare, which make him behave in respective ways. But on the other hand he can behave in only one way at one time. We formalize the concept of the relative deprivation and construct the model that the relative deprivation and his preference in the ordinary sense are both the factors determining his behavior. Then it is deduced that there's no effect of the feeling relative deprivation for each individual to decide his way under some adequate conditions. So it should be concluded that the concept of the relative deprivation is not effective to explain social movements or social change in collectivities.     

The generation of a social welfare function under ordinal preferences

Against the background of recent impossibility theorems, the paper establishes a number of rules for the formation of social preferences to ensure the generation of a Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function of the desired ‘individualistic’ form. It demonstrates that such welfare functions can indeed exist under conditions of simply ordinality of individual preferences and a lack of interpersonal comparability, for the general n-person case with only weak restrictions upon individual preferences. A valuable tool of social welfare theory for the single-profile case is therefore restored under a wide set of conditions. By examining Kemp and Ng's justification for their A3 condition in this context, we are able also to highlight a number of key differences between the conditions satisfied by many political constitutions and the requirements for achieving the positive existence of a Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function. In particular the paper focusses here on the weighting systems on individual preferences that are consistent with generating an individualistic welfare function and examines the information content of individual ordinal preferences which must be utilized if the desired welfare function is to result.     

阿罗不可能性定理的几个等价形式

在这篇短中。给出了关于社会福利函数F的防止策略性操纵的概念,并且证明了如果备选对象至少有三个。则下面结论是相互等价的：(1)F满足Pareto与IIA性质;(2)F满足Pareto与RID性质;(3)F是独裁的;(4)F是满的、正向响应的;(5)F是防止策略操纵的且F是满的。     

社会福利函数独裁的特征

在这篇短文中,给出了关于社会福利函数F的半严格正向响应的概念,并且证明了如果备选对象至少有三个,则弱帕累托性质与半严格正向响应性质是独裁的充分必要条件.作为应用,我们给出了社会选择函数防止策略性操纵的一个等价描述,并对社会福利函数引进了防止局部策略性操纵的概念,得到了一个类似于Gibbard—Satterthwaite定理的结论.     

基于FDI收益分成视角的FTA网络演化

本文假定双边自由贸易协定(bilateral free trade agreement,简称FTA)包含着无限制对外直接投资(foreign direct investment,简称FDI),并且通过FDI销售到非FTA伙伴国的收益按照一定比例在母国和东道国之间进行分配。基于Goyal和Joshi^[1],本文构建了FTA网络形成博弈模型。本文发现,FTA网络演化过程分为两个阶段:第一阶段,从空FTA网络到星状FTA网络,存在一条路径使得个体国家福利、世界总福利均改善,在此过程中,国家福利存在不对称性;第二阶段,从星状FTA网络到全连接FTA网络,存在一条路径使得个体国家福利改善,在此过程中,世界总福利不变,国家福利不对称性逐步消除。     

Restricted domains,arrow-social welfare functions and noncorruptible and non-manipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private alternatives

An n-person social choice problem is considered in which the alternatives are n dimensional vectors, with the ith component of such a vector being the part of the alternatives affecting individual i alone. Assuming that individuals are selfish (individual i must be indifferent between any two alternatives with the same components), that they may be indifferent among alternatives and that each individual may choose his preferences out of a different set of permissible preferences, we prove that any set of restricted domains of preferences admits an n person non-dictatorial Arrow-type social welfare function if and only if it admits a two-person Arrow-type social welfare function: we characterize all the sets of restricted domains of preferences which admit two-person Arrow-type social welfare functions (and therefore also admit n-person Arrow-type social welfare functions) and then we prove that we also characterized all the sets of restricted domains of preferences which admit nondictatorial, nonmanipulable, noncorruptible and rational social choice correspondences.     

Social evaluation with variable population size: an alternative concept

This paper deals with some consequences of certain population changes on social welfare considerations. In particular, a general concept for expressing value judgments about how the addition of 1 further agent to some given society should affect social welfare and a replication invariance condition are introduced and discussed. An axiomatic framework for welfare orderings based on a generalized averaging procedure applied to individual utilities is provided.     

A goal programming model for incomplete interval multiplicative preference relations and its application in group decision-making

In decision making problems, there may be the cases where the decision makers express their judgements by using preference relations with incomplete information. Then one of the key issues is how to estimate the missing preference values. In this paper, we introduce an incomplete interval multiplicative preference relation and give the definitions of consistent and acceptable incomplete ones, respectively. Based on the consistency property of interval multiplicative preference relations, a goal programming model is proposed to complement the acceptable incomplete one. A new algorithm of obtaining the priority vector from incomplete interval multiplicative preference relations is given. The goal programming model is further applied to group decision-making (GDM) where the experts evaluate their preferences as acceptable incomplete interval multiplicative preference relations. An interval weighted geometric averaging (IWGA) operator is proposed to aggregate individual preference relations into a social one. Furthermore, the social interval multiplicative preference relation owns acceptable consistency when every individual one is acceptably consistent. Two numerical examples are carried out to show the efficiency of the proposed goal programming model and the algorithms.     

Application of multi-attribute utility theory to measure social preferences for health states

A four-attribute health state classification system designed to uniquely categorize the health status of all individuals two years of age and over is presented. A social preference function defined over the health state classification system is required. Standard multi-attribute utility theory is investigated for the task, problems are identified and modifications to the standard method are proposed. The modified methods is field tested in a survey research project involving 112 home interviews. Results are presented and discussed in detail for both the social preference function and the performance of the modified method. A recommended social preference function is presented, complete with a range of uncertainty. The modified method is found to be applicable to the task--no insurmountable difficulties are encountered. Recommendations are presented, based on our experience, for other investigators who may be interested in reapplying the method in other studies.     

包含双边投资规范的自由贸易协定网络

当今国际经济趋势表明,包含投资规范的双边自由贸易协定(bilateral FTAs)受到了越来越多国家的欢迎。通过假定双边自由贸易协定包含着无限制对外直接投资规范,基于Goyal和Joshi(2006)^[1],本文构建了相应FTA网络形成博弈模型。本文发现:(1)星状FTA网络是两两稳定的;(2)从空FTA网络到星状FTA网络存在一条个体国家福利和世界福利都严格改善的路径。     

Economic planning based on social preference functions

We argue that the most desirable social welfare functions for practical use (here sometimes called social preference functions) are those determined by Σ_ilog(u_i(x)?α) where u_i(x) is the utility of alternative x to individual i and α is the minimum standard of living decided upon by the society.     

On the probability of a rational outcome for generalized social welfare functions on three alternatives

In Kalai (2002) [10], Kalai investigated the probability of a rational outcome for a generalized social welfare function (GSWF) on three alternatives, when the individual preferences are uniform and independent. In this paper we generalize Kalai's results to a broader class of distributions of the individual preferences, and obtain new lower bounds on the probability of a rational outcome in several classes of GSWFs. In particular, we show that if the GSWF is monotone and balanced and the distribution of the preferences is uniform, then the probability of a rational outcome is at least 3/4, proving a conjecture raised by Kalai. The tools used in the paper are analytic: the Fourier-Walsh expansion of Boolean functions on the discrete cube, properties of the Bonamie-Beckner noise operator, and the FKG inequality.     

Fuzzy preference orderings in group decision making

In this paper, some use of fuzzy preference orderings in group decision making is discussed. First, fuzzy preference orderings are defined as fuzzy binary relations satisfying reciprocity and max-min transitivity. Then, particularly in the case where individual preferences are represented by utility functions (utility values), group fuzzy preference orderings of which fuzziness is caused by differences or diversity of individual opinions are defined. Those orderings might be useful for proceeding the group decision making process smoothly, in the same manner as the extended contributive rule method.     

The natural environment and optimal population growth

This paper investigates the optimal growth of a population when resources conserved for recreation (or the natural environment) enter the social welfare function. If the CES welfare function and the Cobb-Douglass production function are assumed, the growth rate of a population should be determined as a weighted average of the growth rates of per capita income and of conserved resources per capita. In the long run, there should be a limit to the growth of a population. Examples of numerical solutions for optimal time paths of a population are also presented.     

市场化改革背景下养老机构服务供给博弈研究

考虑政府补贴、市场化程度、养老机构服务成本、老年人偏好等因素,构建了完全国有化、公私并存的半市场化和完全市场化三种情形下公办和民办养老机构之间的两阶段博弈模型,比较分析了市场化程度对养老机构服务价格制定和服务水平选择的影响,实证讨论了各参数变化对养老机构收益及社会福利的影响。研究表明:完全市场化机制会降低养老机构服务质量,完全国有化机制会陷入社会福利陷阱,探索公私并存的最佳市场化水平才能更好地提高社会福利;适度推进市场化改革,提高养老机构服务水平,降低民办养老机构服务成本,适度提高对民办养老机构的补贴,将有效缓解公办和民办养老机构的不公平竞争;提高老年人支付能力,推进养老机构供给侧结构性改革,将保障机构养老服务的有效供给,促进养老服务业的健康有序发展。     

Fair allocation using a fast smart market auction

Allocation of network resources may be formulated as an optimization problem seeking to maximize the sum of the utility function of each flow. Individual flows collectively achieve social welfare with a constraint that global fairness must be provided by a congestion control scheme using congestion indication feedback signals. However, in the reality, non-cooperative flows without employing any congestion control scheme do not respond to congestion indication feedback signals. In this paper, we analyze fairness of congestion control with cooperative and non-cooperative flows for communication networks. Furthermore, we propose a fast smart-market auction (FSMA) approach to achieve social welfare in the environment that cooperative and non-cooperative flows coexist. Through detailed simulations, the proposed approach is proven to be effective in providing fairness.     

群体多指标决策的偏好集结方法

研究多个指标条件下,利用个体决策结果形成群体一致偏好的方法、假设个体有加性效用函数,将个体多指标效用函数表示成单个指标评价函数的加权和,群体指标评价函数表示成个体指标评价函数的加权和.通过协商指标权重、指标评价函数、支付意愿三个参数,成对个体达成双方一致.提出了(n-1)对个体之间达成双方一致,从而得出群体效用函数的决策方法,这种分析框架同样可以扩展到联盟协商一致中.     

Computational methods for income transfer analysis

The analysis of transfer systems that include both social benefit and taxation programs is complicated by the fact that the component programs comprising those systems interact. This paper develops a mathematical framework for the analysis of such systems at the micro‐level, i.e., using an individual or family as the unit of analysis. The first section describes the importance of income transfer issues and identifies criteria for evaluating proposed methodologies. Subsequent sections address the foundations for appropriate methods from two perspectives. The first perspective examines transfer systems using elementary concepts drawn from set theory, real analysis, and welfare economics; the assumptions and theorems presented allow the derivation of relevant system properties and serve to ensure that the systems discussed are well‐defined. The second perspective concentrates on the numerical methods required to execute income transfer analyses. The final section describes an implementation of this framework and briefly discusses the associated software.     

区间二型模糊集效用函数和熵在风险决策中的应用

针对以区间二型模糊集(IT2FS)为信息环境的多属性决策(MADM)问题,引入IT2FS效用函数,并提出基于IT2FS效用函数,熵和风险因子的风险决策模型。首先基于截集思想提出两种IT2FS效用函数公式,有效提取了IT2FS全部信息,比以往的序值型公式更加科学有效。其次基于已提出的IT2FS三种不确定度量存在的问题提出三种新型不确定度量,并基于此三种不确定度量提出IT2FS熵公式弥补原有熵度量的不足。再次引入风险偏好因子反映决策者不同的风险态度,并改进风险偏好因子范围。构造基于效用函数,熵和风险偏好因子的风险决策模型。最后利用一个实例分析结果表明,该风险决策模型中决策者风险偏好对属性权重以及方案的排序存在影响,该决策思想对风险投资决策和风险管理决策均有一定的参考作用。