Supply chain performance assessment and supplier and component importance identification in a general competitive multitiered supply chain network model

In this paper, we develop a multitiered competitive supply chain network game theory model, which includes the supplier tier. The firms are differentiated by brands and can produce their own components, as reflected by their capacities, and/or obtain components from one or more suppliers, who also are capacitated. The firms compete in a Cournot–Nash fashion, whereas the suppliers compete a la Bertrand since firms are sensitive to prices. All decision-makers seek to maximize their profits with consumers reflecting their preferences through the demand price functions associated with the demand markets for the firms’ products. We construct supply chain network performance measures for the full supply chain and the individual firm levels that assess the efficiency of the supply chain or firm, respectively, and also allow for the identification and ranking of the importance of suppliers as well as the components of suppliers with respect to the full supply chain or individual firm. The framework is illustrated through a series of numerical supply chain network examples.     

An auction model arising from an Internet search service provider

Most search service providers such as Lycos and Google either produce irrelevant search results or unstructured company listings to the consumers. To overcome these two shortcomings, search service providers such as GoTo.com have developed mechanisms for firms to advertise their services and for consumers to search for the right services. To provide relevant search results, each firm who wishes to advertise at the GoTo site must specify a set of keywords. To develop structured company listings, each firm bids for priority listing in the search results that appear on the GoTo site. Since the search results appear in descending order of bid price, each firm has some control over the order in which the firm appears on the list resulting from the search. In this paper, we present a one-stage game for two firms that captures the advertising mechanism of a search service provider (such as GoTo). This model enables us to examine the firm’s optimal bidding strategy and evaluate the impact of various parameters on the firm’s strategy. Moreover, we analyze the conditions under which all firms would increase their bids at the equilibrium. These conditions could be helpful to the service provider when developing mechanisms to entice firms to submit higher bids.     

医药产学研联盟创新决策、创新危机与利润分配

以我国医药行业产学研合作创新为现实背景,构建两家相互竞争的制药企业与学研机构的双边纳什议价模型,分析企业的创新价值和议价能力对联盟成员绩效的影响,探讨合作创新对药品价格、企业市场份额、经营绩效和社会福利的影响,研究制药企业创新战略的选择决策及创新对企业可能的危险。通过模型分析,得到如下结论:产学研合作创新能够提高社会总福利,但不一定提高制药企业的绩效和药品的价格;议价能力强的制药企业不一定总是获得高利润,企业最终的利润受到企业自身及竞争者的议价能力、创新价值的共同影响;虽然产品创新能够提高消费者的购买意愿,但盲目跟风创新可能会带来双输的结果。本研究对促进医药行业的产学研合作,提高产学研合作的有效性具有现实意义。     

基于演化博弈的发电侧电力市场长期均衡模型

研究包含生产同质电力产品的两组 (种群 )企业——低成本发电企业和高成本发电企业的发电侧电力市场的长期均衡问题 .应用演化博弈论的有限种群演化稳定战略概念 ,证明了有限种群的演化稳定战略产量分别等于两组 (种群 )企业的竞争产量 .通过建立基于企业战略模仿和试验的随机演化模型 ,分析了发电侧电力市场长期均衡的演化过程 .     

Supply chain network equilibrium with strategic financial hedging using futures

In this paper, we develop a network equilibrium model for supply chain networks with strategic financial hedging. We consider multiple competing firms that purchase multiple materials and parts to manufacture their products. The supply chain firms’ procurement activities are exposed to commodity price risk and exchange rate risk. The firms can use futures contracts to hedge the risks. Our research studies the equilibrium of the entire network where each firm optimizes its own operation and hedging decisions. We use variational inequality theory to formulate the equilibrium model, and provide qualitative properties. We provide analytical results for a special case with duopolistic competition, and use simulations to study an oligopolistic case. The analytical and simulation studies reveals interesting managerial insights.     

A Computational Model of Technological Innovation at the Firm Level

The factors which speed and slow technological innovation have been of interest to policy makers since at least the mid 1960's. Since that time, many theoretical models of innovation at the firm level and at the industry level have been proposed. Due to limitations in computational complexity, nearly all of these models have assumed a single, representative firm type. Very few have systematically investigated the implications of markets with a variety of firm types. With increases in computing power and the advent of agent-based modeling, interactions between agent types can now be explored. In this paper, a computational model of innovative firms in competitive markets is presented. Firms devote resources to R&D which can lead to new, improved products allowing firms to steal market share from their competitors. Two types of firms, differentiated by the strategies they use in pursuing new innovations, are allowed to coexist. One type pursues exclusively radical innovations, while the other pursues exclusively incremental innovations. It will be demonstrated that under certain conditions, a synergy exists between firms of different types which allows heterogeneous populations of firms to earn more than homogeneous ones.     

Price competition in the Hotelling model with uncertainty on costs

For the linear Hotelling model with firms located at the boundaries of the segment line, we study the price competition in a scenario of incomplete information in the production costs of both firms. We introduce the bounded uncertain costs (BUC) condition in the production costs and we prove that there is a local optimum price strategy if and only if the BUC condition holds. We compute explicitly the local optimum price strategy and we prove that it does not depend upon the distributions of the production costs of the firms, except on their first moments. We prove that the ex-post profit of a firm is smaller than its ex-ante profit if and only if the production cost of the other firm is greater than its expected cost.     

Dynamic strategic interaction between an innovating and a non-innovating incumbent

This paper analyzes the effects of product innovation on the firms’ investment behavior in a dynamic duopoly framework. A differential game setting is considered where initially two firms are active on a homogeneous product market. One of the firms has an option to introduce a new product that is horizontally and vertically differentiated from the established product. The resulting differential game has three states corresponding to three capital stocks: one for each firm to produce the established product, and one for the innovating firm to produce the new product. We numerically derive Markov perfect equilibria. One of the most remarkable results is that in most cases the non-innovating firm benefits when the other firm carries out the innovation option. The intuition is that, to increase demand for the innovative product, the innovative firm reduces capacity on the established market, which increases the price of the established product and thus the payoff of the non-innovating firm.     

Prescriptive analytics for human resource planning in the professional services industry

In this paper, we examine human resource planning decisions made at firms that sell contract-based consulting projects. High levels of uncertainty in deals and revenue forecasts make it challenging for consulting firms to hire the right people to staff their projects. We present a human resource planning model using concepts from robust optimization to allow companies to dynamically make hiring decisions that maximize profit while remaining as flexible as possible, and demonstrate potential profit improvements through simulation on real data.     

Post-merger cultural integration from a social network perspective: a computational modeling approach

Although cultural integration, or sharing a common corporate culture, is crucial for the success of mergers, previous studies have been limited to firm-level analyses. From a social network perspective, this study explores how cultural integration emerges from the patterns of social interactions among individuals. Using an agent-based model, we investigate the impact of network structures within and between two merging firms on post-merger cultural integration and organizational dysfunctions—individual turnover, interpersonal conflict and organizational communication ineffectiveness—that arise from insufficient cultural integration. The simulation results demonstrate that the highest level of cultural integration is achieved when social ties are more centralized within each merging firm and the social ties between the merging firms are less concentrated on central individuals. Additionally, the results show that within-firm and between-firm network structures significantly affect individual turnover, interpersonal conflict and organizational communication ineffectiveness, and that these three outcome measurements do not vary in tandem.     

Dissecting income segregation: Impacts of concentrated affluence on segregation of poverty

This article investigates how income inequality shapes residential segregation by income. Using agent-based modeling, it develops a residential preferences model that is capable of generating results mimicking empirical income segregation patterns. Simulation analysis shows how varying income inequality produces differential residential mobility outcomes that alter income segregation profiles. The model is used to capture the distinct impacts of households’ moves into richer or poorer neighborhoods, and how these impacts are further differentiated with respect to the moving household’s income. The article demonstrates how aggregating such diverse outcomes of micro-level interactions at a meso-level can help us to better understand the changes in macro-level income segregation patterns. Analyzing residential mobility patterns carefully, the article suggests that i) segregation of affluence and of poverty can trigger each other via initiating cascades of residential mobility and housing prices, and ii) increasing income inequality can disrupt housing market and lead to shortages in affordable housing, which can yield high residential instability and eviction rates among the poorest stratum.     

Environmental considerations on the optimal product mix

Several types of regulations limit the amount of different emissions that a firm may create from its production processes. Depending on the emission, these regulations could include threshold values, penalties and taxes, and/or emission allowances that can be traded. However, many firms try to comply with these regulations without a systematic plan, often leading not only to emission violations and high penalties, but also to high costs. In this paper, we present two mathematical models that can be used by firms to determine their optimal product mix and production quantities in the presence of several different types of environmental constraints, in addition to typical production constraints. Both models are comprehensive and incorporate several diverse production and environmental issues. The first model, which assumes that each product has just one operating procedure, is a linear program while the second model, which assumes that the firm has the option of producing each product using more than one operating procedure, is a mixed integer linear program. The solutions of both models identify the products that the firm should produce along with their production quantities. These models can be used by firms to quickly analyze several “what if” scenarios such as the impact of changes in emission threshold values, emission taxes, trading allowances, and trading transaction costs.     

Probabilistic prediction of credit ratings: a filtering approach

In a financial market, to analyze the credit quality of firms, this note proposes a dynamical model. The population of firms is divided into a finite number of classes, depending on their credit status. The cardinality of the population can increase during the time, since new firms can enter in the market. Due to changes in credit quality and to the defaults, each firm can move from a class to another, or can go to the class of the defaulted firms. Different rating agencies are considered, each of them defines its own partition of the population. Aim of this note is to find the probabilistic prediction of the actual partition of the population, and of the conditional distribution of the distance to defaults. In a partial observing setting, this topic is discussed using stochastic filtering techniques.     

Efficient partner search: Embedded firms seeking co‐operative partners

This article analyses firms’ efforts to find a suitable partner for a technology cooperation. Although more theoretical studies acknowledge that search costs are an essential part of transaction costs, empirical research on interfirm co‐operation neglects searching. This paper explicitly addresses this lacuna. Hypotheses on the search behavior of firms are derived by applying considerations of transaction cost economics and arguments concerning the social embeddedness of firms to a search model widely used in economics. It is argued that on the one hand the problem potential of co‐operation, which is determined by the co‐operation's volume and the involved relation‐specific investments and uncertainty, affects the benefits a firm can gain from searching. On the other hand, the social embeddedness of a firm influences the costs of searching. Further, I consider the size and homogeneity of the pool of potential partners in the analysis. The derived hypotheses are tested on a dataset of 94 technology cooperations within five Dutch multinationals. The results clearly show that transaction cost economics does explain the search efforts of firms. In addition, I find evidence that the social embeddedness also affects searching.     

Knowledge exchange processes in Industrial Districts and the emergence of networks

This paper aims at exploring conditions under which the need for knowledge exchange within a small firms?? cluster generates a structure of links between firms. We focus in particular on small firms?? clusters called Industrial Districts (IDs). Specifically, we analyze IDs with flexible specialization, in which knowledge exchange is driven by the search for complementary knowledge assets. Previous works of the authors proposed an agent-based model of IDs to explore the properties of networks emerging from the interaction of firms prompted by the search and exchange of complementary specialized knowledge. This model showed that limited relational capability, due to the small size, and an exchange mechanism solely based on the barter of complementary knowledge are structural conditions that limit individual firms?? growth in IDs with flexible specialization. This paper presents a new version of this model to analyze the role of embeddedness of relationships among IDs firms in shaping the emergent network structures. The aim of the paper is to answer to the following research questions: Can knowledge complementariness explain the emergence of a stable network of firms within a small firms?? cluster? What are the structural properties of these networks? Which role does the embeddedness of relationships among firms play in shaping the structure of emerging networks?     

Meritocratic and monopoly inequality: A computer simulation of income distribution

This paper explores the properties of a model of the distribution of income in which individual income is proportional to a multiplicative function of previous income, ability, chance, a ceiling factor determined by competition among members of an income class for resources held by members of other classes, and an additive factor summarizing effects of altruism and minimal subsistence. The behavior of the model is investigated by computer simulation for combinations of values of three model parameters representing the tendency of income to grow exponentially (the Monopoly effect), the weight of the ability factor (the meritocracy effect), and the weight of the ceiling factor resulting from competitive interactions. Steady state income distributions generated by the model are characterized by measures of income inequality, exchange mobility, elite stability, and meritocracy. Results suggest that for constant Monopoly effect, the effect of the meritocracy parameter on various aggregate outcomes is nonlinear, with a range over which greater returns to ability produce lower inequality, lower exchange mobility, greater elite stability and meritocracy, for constant returns to ability, a greater Monopoly effect generally produces greater inequality, more exchange mobility, less stability of the elite, and lower meritocracy. Results also reveal a nonlinear relationship between exchange mobility and inequality, with mobility decreasing to a minimum and then increasing again as inequality increases; a nonlinear but monotonic negative relationship between elite stability and inequality, with greater inequality, associated with less stability, and a nonlinear relationship between meritocracy and inequality, with meritocracy increasing at first with inequality at low inequality levels, reaching a maximum and then decreasing as inequality increases further. These findings are interpreted in relation to major stratification trends in the course of sociocultural evolution.     

Real options in strategic investment games between two asymmetric firms

This paper examines strategic investment games between two firms that compete for optimal entry in a project that generates uncertain revenue flows. Under asymmetry on both the sunk cost of investment and revenue flows of the two competing firms, we investigate the value of real investment options and strategic interaction of investment decisions. Compared to earlier models that only allow for asymmetry on sunk cost, our model demonstrates a richer set of strategic interactions of entry decisions. We provide a complete characterization of pre-emptive, dominant and simultaneous equilibriums by analyzing the relative value of leader’s and follower’s optimal investment thresholds. In a duopoly market with negative externalities, a firm may reduce loss of real options value by selecting appropriate pre-emptive entry. When one firm has a dominant advantage over its competitor, both the dominant firm and dominated firm enter at their respective leader’s and follower’s optimal thresholds. When the pre-emptive thresholds of both firms happen to coincide, the two firms enter simultaneously. Under positive externalities, firms do not compete to lead.     

A leader-follower model and analysis for a two-stage network of oligopolies

This paper is concerned with the existence, uniqueness and computation of leader-follower equilibrium solutions for an industry involved with two major stages of production. We assume that there exists one set of firms performing the first stage of production, which produces a semi-finished product. This semi-finished product is converted to a final good by a second set of firms performing the second stage of production. Furthermore, also competing in the final product market is a third set of firms, which are vertically integrated through the two stages of production and which are assumed to lead the second set of firms by explicitly considering the reaction or response of these latter firms to their own outputs. We model such an industry as a two-stage network of oligopolies, and define equilibrium solutions based on assumed market structures. Our analysis examines the existence and uniqueness of such equilibrium solutions, characterizes the nature of the production strategies of the various firms at an equilibrium, and prescribes algorithms to compute such solutions. This provides the machinery required to perform sensitivity analyses for studying the effects of various mergers or integrations on individual firm profits, and on the industry outputs and prices at equilibrium. The presentation is self-contained, and does not necessarily require any significant prior preparation in economic theory on the part of the reader.This paper is based on work done for the Minerals and Mining Resources Research Institute, under the sponsorship of the Bureau of Mines, Department of the Interior.     

A supply chain network economic model with time-based competition

This paper presents an integrated model for time-cost competition between supply chains with heterogeneous customers. The firms in our model can offer various time options for their production/service to time-sensitive customers. This gives rise of a new concept of time-based supply chain, which we call T-chain, to be the basic element in the competition and extends the inter supply chain competition to a new dimension of time. Assuming the customers are heterogeneous in time-cost bi-criteria decision making, we integrate the discrete choice theory into supply chain network competition and formulate the equilibrium conditions as a multinomial logit based variational inequality problem. Numerical examples are presented for model illustration and managerial insights such as profit maximization for a firm who participates in this supply chain network.     

Designing a referral reward program in freemium: The role of network externalities

We develop a model to explore firms’ decisions on designing referral reward programs in freemium. We find two indices that firms could compare against value discrepancy to choose their strategy. The optimal price and referral reward rate are obtained. We find that the absence of network externality relating to product quality makes referral dysfunctional, and we conduct sensitivity analysis. This study contributes to theories that incorporate a referral reward program into the freemium model and provides practitioners with viable takeaways.