A simple logic for reasoning about incomplete knowledge

The semantics of modal logics for reasoning about belief or knowledge is often described in terms of accessibility relations, which is too expressive to account for mere epistemic states of an agent. This paper proposes a simple logic whose atoms express epistemic attitudes about formulae expressed in another basic propositional language, and that allows for conjunctions, disjunctions and negations of belief or knowledge statements. It allows an agent to reason about what is known about the beliefs held by another agent. This simple epistemic logic borrows its syntax and axioms from the modal logic KD. It uses only a fragment of the S5 language, which makes it a two-tiered propositional logic rather than as an extension thereof. Its semantics is given in terms of epistemic states understood as subsets of mutually exclusive propositional interpretations. Our approach offers a logical grounding to uncertainty theories like possibility theory and belief functions. In fact, we define the most basic logic for possibility theory as shown by a completeness proof that does not rely on accessibility relations.     

A Sahlqvist theorem for distributive modal logic

In this paper we consider distributive modal logic, a setting in which we may add modalities, such as classical types of modalities as well as weak forms of negation, to the fragment of classical propositional logic given by conjunction, disjunction, true, and false. For these logics we define both algebraic semantics, in the form of distributive modal algebras, and relational semantics, in the form of ordered Kripke structures. The main contributions of this paper lie in extending the notion of Sahlqvist axioms to our generalized setting and proving both a correspondence and a canonicity result for distributive modal logics axiomatized by Sahlqvist axioms. Our proof of the correspondence result relies on a reduction to the classical case, but our canonicity proof departs from the traditional style and uses the newly extended algebraic theory of canonical extensions.     

Tractability frontiers in probabilistic team semantics and existential second-order logic over the reals

Probabilistic team semantics is a framework for logical analysis of probabilistic dependencies. Our focus is on the axiomatizability, complexity, and expressivity of probabilistic inclusion logic and its extensions. We identify a natural fragment of existential second-order logic with additive real arithmetic that captures exactly the expressivity of probabilistic inclusion logic. We furthermore relate these formalisms to linear programming, and doing so obtain PTIME data complexity for the logics. Moreover, on finite structures, we show that the full existential second-order logic with additive real arithmetic can only express NP properties. Lastly, we present a sound and complete axiomatization for probabilistic inclusion logic at the atomic level.     

The distribution semantics for normal programs with function symbols

The distribution semantics integrates logic programming and probability theory using a possible worlds approach. Its intuitiveness and simplicity have made it the most widely used semantics for probabilistic logic programming, with successful applications in many domains. When the program has function symbols, the semantics was defined for special cases: either the program has to be definite or the queries must have a finite number of finite explanations. In this paper we show that it is possible to define the semantics for all programs. We also show that this definition coincides with that of Sato and Kameya on positive programs. Moreover, we highlight possible approaches for inference, both exact and approximate.     

Bilattice logic of epistemic actions and knowledge

Baltag, Moss, and Solecki proposed an expansion of classical modal logic, called logic of epistemic actions and knowledge (EAK), in which one can reason about knowledge and change of knowledge. Kurz and Palmigiano showed how duality theory provides a flexible framework for modeling such epistemic changes, allowing one to develop dynamic epistemic logics on a weaker propositional basis than classical logic (for example an intuitionistic basis). In this paper we show how the techniques of Kurz and Palmigiano can be further extended to define and axiomatize a bilattice logic of epistemic actions and knowledge (BEAK). Our propositional basis is a modal expansion of the well-known four-valued logic of Belnap and Dunn, which is a system designed for handling inconsistent as well as potentially conflicting information. These features, we believe, make our framework particularly promising from a computer science perspective.     

Sémantique de type Kripke d'un système logique basé sur un ensemble ordonné fini

In order to modelize the reasoning of intelligent agents represented by a poset T, H. Rasiowa introduced logic systems called “Approximation Logics”. In these systems the use of a set of constants constitutes a fundamental tool. We have introduced in [8] a logic system called without this kind of constants but limited to the case that T is a finite poset. We have proved a completeness result for this system w.r.t. an algebraic semantics. We introduce in this paper a Kripke‐style semantics for a subsystem of for which there existes a deduction theorem. The set of “possible worldsr is enriched by a family of functions indexed by the elements of T and satisfying some conditions. We prove a completeness result for system with respect to this Kripke semantics and define a finite Kripke structure that characterizes the propositional fragment of logic . We introduce a reational semantics (found by E. Orlowska) which has the advantage to allow an interpretation of the propositionnal logic using only binary relations. We treat also the computational complexity of the satisfiability problem of the propositional fragment of logic .     

Evidence and plausibility in neighborhood structures

The intuitive notion of evidence has both semantic and syntactic features. In this paper, we develop an evidence logic for epistemic agents faced with possibly contradictory evidence from different sources. The logic is based on a neighborhood semantics, where a neighborhood N indicates that the agent has reason to believe that the true state of the world lies in N. Further notions of relative plausibility between worlds and beliefs based on the latter ordering are then defined in terms of this evidence structure, yielding our intended models for evidence-based beliefs. In addition, we also consider a second more general flavor, where belief and plausibility are modeled using additional primitive relations, and we prove a representation theorem showing that each such general model is a p-morphic image of an intended one. This semantics invites a number of natural special cases, depending on how uniform we make the evidence sets, and how coherent their total structure. We give a structural study of the resulting ‘uniform’ and ‘flat’ models. Our main result are sound and complete axiomatizations for the logics of all four major model classes with respect to the modal language of evidence, belief and safe belief. We conclude with an outlook toward logics for the dynamics of changing evidence, and the resulting language extensions and connections with logics of plausibility change.     

On elementary logics for quantitative dependencies

We define and study logics in the framework of probabilistic team semantics and over metafinite structures. Our work is paralleled by the recent development of novel axiomatizable and tractable logics in team semantics that are closed under the Boolean negation. Our logics employ new probabilistic atoms that resemble so-called extended atoms from the team semantics literature. We also define counterparts of our logics over metafinite structures and show that all of our logics can be translated into functional fixed point logic implying a polynomial time upper bound for data complexity with respect to BSS-computations.     

Bisimulations and bisimulation games between Verbrugge models

Interpretability logic is a modal formalization of relative interpretability between first-order arithmetical theories. Verbrugge semantics is a generalization of Veltman semantics, the basic semantics for interpretability logic. Bisimulation is the basic equivalence between models for modal logic. We study various notions of bisimulation between Verbrugge models and develop a new one, which we call w-bisimulation. We show that the new notion, while keeping the basic property that bisimilarity implies modal equivalence, is weak enough to allow the converse to hold in the finitary case. To do this, we develop and use an appropriate notion of bisimulation games between Verbrugge models.     

Quantifier-free epistemic term-modal logic with assignment operator

In standard epistemic logic, the names and the existence of agents are usually assumed to be common knowledge implicitly. This is unreasonable for various applications in computer science and philosophy. Inspired by term-modal logic and assignment operators in dynamic logic, we introduce a lightweight modal predicate logic where names can be non-rigid, and the existence of agents can be uncertain. The language can handle various de dicto/de re distinctions in a natural way. We characterize the expressive power of our language, obtain complete axiomatisations of the logics over several classes of varying-domain/constant-domain epistemic models, and show their (un)decidability.     

Probabilization of Logics: Completeness and Decidability

The probabilization of a logic system consists of enriching the language (the formulas) and the semantics (the models) with probabilistic features. Such an operation is said to be exogenous if the enrichment is done on top, without internal changes to the structure, and is called endogenous otherwise. These two different enrichments can be applied simultaneously to the language and semantics of a same logic. We address the problem of studying the transference of metaproperties, such as completeness and decidability, to the exogenous probabilization of an abstract logic system. First, we setup the necessary framework to handle the probabilization of a satisfaction system by proving transference results within a more general context. In this setup, we define a combination mechanism of logics through morphisms and prove sufficient condition to guarantee completeness and decidability. Then, we demonstrate that probabilization is a special case of this exogenous combination method, and that it fulfills the general conditions to obtain transference of completeness and decidability. Finally, we motivate the applicability of our technique by analyzing the probabilization of the linear temporal logic over Markov chains, which constitutes an endogenous probabilization. The results are obtained first by studying the exogenous semantics, and then by establishing an equivalence with the original probabilization given by Markov chains.     

Coalgebraic logic

We present a generalization of modal logic to logics which are interpreted on coalgebras of functors on sets. The leading idea is that infinitary modal logic contains characterizing formulas. That is, every model-world pair is characterized up to bisimulation by an infinitary formula. The point of our generalization is to understand this on a deeper level. We do this by studying a fragment of infinitary modal logic which contains the characterizing formulas and is closed under infinitary conjunction and an operation called Δ. This fragment generalizes to a wide range of coalgebraic logics. Each coalgebraic logic is determined by a functor on sets satisfying a few properties, and the formulas of each logic are interpreted on coalgebras of that functor. Among the logics obtained are the fragment of infinitary modal logic mentioned above as well as versions of natural logics associated with various classes of transition systems, including probabilistic transition systems. For most of the interesting cases, there is a characterization result for the coalgebraic logic determined by a given functor. We then apply the characterization result to get representation theorems for final coalgebras in terms of maximal elements of ordered algebras. The end result is that the formulas of coalgebraic logics can be viewed as approximations to the elements of a final coalgebra.     

Inquisitive logic as an epistemic logic of knowing how

In this paper, we present an alternative interpretation of propositional inquisitive logic as an epistemic logic of knowing how. In our setting, an inquisitive logic formula α being supported by a state is formalized as knowing how to resolve α (more colloquially, knowing how α is true) holds on the S5 epistemic model corresponding to the state. Based on this epistemic interpretation, we use a dynamic epistemic logic with both know-how and know-that operators to capture the epistemic information behind the innocent-looking connectives in inquisitive logic. We show that the set of valid know-how formulas corresponds precisely to the inquisitive logic. The main result is a complete axiomatization with intuitive axioms using the full dynamic epistemic language. Moreover, we show that the know-how operator and the dynamic operator can both be eliminated without changing the expressivity over models, which is consistent with the modal translation of inquisitive logic existing in the literature. We hope our framework can give an intuitive alternative interpretation to various concepts and technical results in inquisitive logic, and also provide a powerful and flexible tool to handle both the inquisitive reasoning and declarative reasoning in an epistemic context.     

Actualism and Modal Semantics

According to actualism, modal reality is constructed out of valuations (combinations of truth values for all propositions). According to possibilism, modal reality consists in a set of possible worlds, conceived as independent objects that assign truth values to propositions. According to possibilism, accounts of modal reality can intelligibly disagree with each other even if they agree on which valuations are contained in modal reality. According to actualism, these disagreements (possibilist disagreements) are completely unintelligible. An essentially actualist semantics for modal propositional logic specifies which sets of valuations are compatible with the meanings of the truth-functional connectives and modal operators without drawing on formal resources that would enable us to represent possibilist disagreements. The paper discusses the availability of an essentially actualist semantics for modal propositional logic. I argue that the standard Kripkean semantics is not essentially actualist and that other extant approaches also fail to provide a satisfactory essentially actualist semantics. I end by describing an essentialist actualist semantics for modal propositional logic.     

A probabilistic logic based on the acceptability of gambles

This article presents a probabilistic logic whose sentences can be interpreted as asserting the acceptability of gambles described in terms of an underlying logic. This probabilistic logic has a concrete syntax and a complete inference procedure, and it handles conditional as well as unconditional probabilities. It synthesizes Nilsson’s probabilistic logic and Frisch and Haddawy’s anytime inference procedure with Wilson and Moral’s logic of gambles.Two distinct semantics can be used for our probabilistic logic: (1) the measure–theoretic semantics used by the prior logics already mentioned and also by the more expressive logic of Fagin, Halpern, and Meggido and (2) a behavioral semantics. Under the measure–theoretic semantics, sentences of our probabilistic logic are interpreted as assertions about a probability distribution over interpretations of the underlying logic. Under the behavioral semantics, these sentences are interpreted only as asserting the acceptability of gambles, and this suggests different directions for generalization.     

An epistemic model of an agent who does not reflect on reasoning processes

This paper introduces an epistemic model of a boundedly rational agent under the two assumptions that (i) the agent’s reasoning process is in accordance with the model but (ii) the agent does not reflect on these reasoning processes. For such a concept of bounded rationality a semantic interpretation by the possible world semantics of the Kripke (1963) type is no longer available because the definition of knowledge in these possible world semantics implies that the agent knows all valid statements of the model. The key to my alternative semantic approach is the extension of the method of truth tables, first introduced for the propositional logic by Wittgenstein (1922), to an epistemic logic so that I can determine the truth value of epistemic statements for all relevant truth conditions. In my syntactic approach I define an epistemic logic–consisting of the classical calculus of propositional logic plus two knowledge axioms–that does not include the inference rule of necessitation, which claims that an agent knows all theorems of the logic. As my main formal result I derive a determination theorem linking my semantic with my syntactic approach. The difference between my approach and existing knowledge models is illustrated in a game-theoretic application concerning the epistemic justification of iterative solution concepts.     

On the Presburger fragment of logics with multiteam semantics

In team semantics, which is the basis of modern logics of dependence and independence, formulae are evaluated on sets of assignments, called teams. Multiteam semantics instead takes mulitplicities of data into account and is based on multisets of assignments, called multiteams. Logics with multiteam semantics can be embedded into a two-sorted variant of existential second-order logics, with arithmetic operations on multiplicities. Here we study the Presburger fragment of such logics, permitting only addition, but not multiplication on multiplicities. It can be shown that this fragment corresponds to inclusion-exclusion logic in multiteam semantics, but, in contrast to the situation in team semantics, that it is strictly contained in independence logic. We give different characterisations of this fragment by various atomic dependency notions.     

Some Connections between Topological and Modal Logic

We study modal logics based on neighbourhood semantics using methods and theorems having their origin in topological model theory. We thus obtain general results concerning completeness of modal logics based on neighbourhood semantics as well as the relationship between neighbourhood and Kripke semantics. We also give a new proof for a known interpolation result of modal logic using an interpolation theorem of topological model theory.     

An epistemic model of an agent who does not reflect on reasoning processes

This paper introduces an epistemic model of a boundedly rational agent under the two assumptions that (i) the agent’s reasoning process is in accordance with the model but (ii) the agent does not reflect on these reasoning processes. For such a concept of bounded rationality a semantic interpretation by the possible world semantics of the Kripke (1963) type is no longer available because the definition of knowledge in these possible world semantics implies that the agent knows all valid statements of the model. The key to my alternative semantic approach is the extension of the method of truth tables, first introduced for the propositional logic by Wittgenstein (1922), to an epistemic logic so that I can determine the truth value of epistemic statements for all relevant truth conditions. In my syntactic approach I define an epistemic logic–consisting of the classical calculus of propositional logic plus two knowledge axioms–that does not include the inference rule of necessitation, which claims that an agent knows all theorems of the logic. As my main formal result I derive a determination theorem linking my semantic with my syntactic approach. The difference between my approach and existing knowledge models is illustrated in a game-theoretic application concerning the epistemic justification of iterative solution concepts.     

A semantic hierarchy for intuitionistic logic

Brouwer’s views on the foundations of mathematics have inspired the study of intuitionistic logic, including the study of the intuitionistic propositional calculus and its extensions. The theory of these systems has become an independent branch of logic with connections to lattice theory, topology, modal logic, and other areas. This paper aims to present a modern account of semantics for intuitionistic propositional systems. The guiding idea is that of a hierarchy of semantics, organized by increasing generality: from the least general Kripke semantics on through Beth semantics, topological semantics, Dragalin semantics, and finally to the most general algebraic semantics. While the Kripke, topological, and algebraic semantics have been extensively studied, the Beth and Dragalin semantics have received less attention. We bring Beth and Dragalin semantics to the fore, relating them to the concept of a nucleus from pointfree topology, which provides a unifying perspective on the semantic hierarchy.