An empirical study on the Lanchester model of combat for competitive advertising decisions

This paper presents an empirical study on the Lanchester model of combat for competitive advertising decisions. Three issues are evaluated: (i) the specification of the market share response model; (ii) the effect of inflation on the estimation of the response model; and (iii) the performance of competitive strategies. It is shown that (a) the square root function that is used in previous studies is often inappropriate to characterize the market share response model; (b) market share variations are more responsive to current advertising expenditures; (c) closed-loop Nash equilibrium strategies are better competitive advertising strategies for firms to maximize profits than open-loop Nash equilibrium strategies; and (d), finally, general perfect equilibria Nash equilibrium strategies developed by Case are usually not good competitive advertising strategies for firms to maximize profits.     

A dynamic model for advertising and pricing competition between national and store brands

We study the relationship between the pricing and advertising decisions in a channel where a national brand is competing with a private label. We consider a differential game that incorporates the carryover effects of brand advertising over time for both the manufacturer and the retailer and we account for the complementary and competitive roles of advertising. Analysis of the obtained equilibrium Markov strategies shows that the relationship between advertising and pricing decisions in the channel depends mainly on the nature of the advertising effects. In particular, the manufacturer reacts to higher competitive retailer’s advertising levels by offering price concessions and limiting his advertising expenditures. The retailer’s optimal reaction to competitive advertising effects in the channel depends on two factors: (1) the price competition level between the store and the national brands and (2) the strength of the competitive advertising effects. For example, in case of intense price competition between the two brands combined with a strong manufacturer’s competitive advertising effect, the retailer should lower both the store and the national brands’ prices as a reaction to higher manufacturer’s advertising levels. For the retailer, the main advantage from boosting his competitive advertising investments seems to be driven by increased revenues from the private label. The retailer should however limit his investments in advertising if the latter generates considerable competitive effects on the national brand’s sales.     

A network equilibrium framework for Internet advertising: Models,qualitative analysis,and algorithms

In this paper, we develop a network equilibrium framework for the modeling and analysis of competitive firms engaged in Internet advertising among multiple websites. The model allows for the determination of both the equilibrium online advertising budget as well as the advertising expenditures on the different websites. We then specialize the model to the case of fixed online budgets for the firms. The governing equilibrium conditions of both models are shown to satisfy finite-dimensional variational inequalities. We present qualitative properties of the solution patterns as well as computational procedures that exploit the underlying abstract network structure of these problems. The models and algorithms are illustrated with numerical examples. This paper adds to the growing literature of the application of network-based techniques derived from operations research to the advertising/marketing arena.     

A duopolistic model of dynamic competitive advertising

This paper proposes a differential game model of competitive advertising decisions for non-durable products by extending the Lanchester model and the Deal model of competitive advertising in the literature. The proposed model is compared empirically with the Lanchester model for model fitting and forecast accuracy. It is shown that the model is suitable for an actual market and out-performs the Lanchester model in forecast accuracy. The model provides a sensible modeling alternative to the Lanchester model for the study of dynamic competitive advertising decisions. Necessary and sufficient conditions for open-loop and closed-loop Nash equilibrium solutions to the model are discussed. A numerical algorithm for open-loop and closed-loop Nash strategies to the model is developed.     

Dynamical analysis of a nonlinear competitive model with generic and brand advertising efforts

In this paper, a new four-dimensional map is proposed to model the dynamical advertising efforts, where both the generic and brand effects for advertisement are taken into account in the model. The marginal profit adapting strategy is used to reflect the interaction among the firms that strive for the optimal profit. When the generic advertising bears a large effectiveness coefficient, the generic advertising efforts will exhibit chaos, which leads to a chaotic dynamics for brand advertising efforts. In this case, we analyze the some properties of steady trajectories that imply rough profiles of the advertising strategies evolution. Furthermore, by rigorous dynamical analysis and numerical simulations, we obtain the feasible set outlining the influence of initial conditions on the global dynamic properties. We first deal with the symmetric system, and then extend the obtained results to more general case, namely, the asymmetric model. For the symmetric model, two firms’ brand advertising expenditures behave synchronization, but the dynamics of generic advertising efforts are dependent upon initial conditions. Meanwhile, for the heterogeneous case, the domain firm in the market needs to contribute all generic advertising expenditures. Our results can have a practical impact on the market evolution, and are therefore beneficial to decision maker.     

Cooperative advertising models in supply chain management: A review

This paper reviews articles on cooperative advertising, a topic which has gained substantial interest in the recent years. Thereby, we first briefly distinguish five different definitions of cooperative advertising which can be found in operations research literature. After that, we concentrate on vertical cooperative advertising, which is the most common object of investigation and is understood as a financial agreement where a manufacturer offers to pay a certain share of his retailer’s advertising expenditures. In total, we identified 58 scientific papers considering mathematical modeling of vertical cooperative advertising. These articles are then analyzed with regard to their general model setting (e.g., the underlying supply chain structure and design of the cooperative advertising program). After that, we explain the different demand and cost functions that are employed, whereupon we distinguish between static and dynamic models. The last dimension of our review is dedicated to the game-theoretic concepts which are mostly used to reflect different forms of distribution of power within the channel.     

A Competitive Advertising Model: Some Theoretical and Empirical Results

Using a modified Lanchester model, this article demonstrates that the policy of constant advertising spending is superior to a cyclic counterpart, provided that the advertising response functions of competing firms are concave. The competitive model is estimated using filter and non-filter cigarette data. The empirical results suggest the presence of over-advertising and that the relative effectiveness and elasticity of filter cigarette advertising are both higher than those of non-filter cigarette advertising.     

Hybrid subgames and copycat games in a pulsing model of advertising competition

Two recent papers,^6,7 introduced the game of pulsing competition (PC) in advertising together with its related subgames of alternating pulsing competition (APC) and matching pulsing competition (MPC) for a duopoly. Following a game theoretic approach in conjunction with a continuous Lanchester model, the above authors basically concluded that when at least one of the response functions is convex, generalising monopolistic advertising pulsation results to a competitive setting might not be adequate. This paper expands the scope of the PC game by incorporating in its structure for the first time in the literature, two versions of a hybrid pulsing competition (HPC) subgame. The article compares the payoffs of the four alternative subgames and provides an analytical solution of a special case of the PC game. In addition, the article also introduces for the first time a variant of the PC game designated by ‘the copycat advertising game’ and shows analytically that for such a game the policy of constant advertising spending over time is optimal for both firms irrespective of the shape of their advertising response functions. The paper illustrates at its end how to solve numerically the expanded PC game in its general form using linear programming and how to derive a solution for a copycat advertising game.     

Modeling industry structure and economic performance

This paper presents a simultaneous equations model of profitability, concentration, advertising expenditures and research and development outlays. The data are subjected to regression diagnostics in an effort to ascertain the importance to the estimation results of a subset of the data that can have a disproportionate influence. The estimation results, especially for the advertising expenditures relationship and the research and development outlays equation, do change when a truncated data sample (based on the omission of the outliers) is used. This serves partially to explain why there is some disagreement in the literature on market structure and economic performance.     

Vertical cooperative advertising and pricing decisions in a manufacturer–retailer supply chain: A game-theoretic approach

Manufacturers can increase the advertising expenditures of their retailers by bearing a fraction of the occurring costs within the framework of a vertical cooperative advertising program. We expand the existing research which deals with advertising and pricing decisions in a manufacturer–retailer supply chain contemporaneously. By means of game theory, four different relationships between the channel members are considered: Firstly, three non-cooperative games with either symmetrical distribution of power or asymmetrical distribution with one player being the leader in each case, and one cooperative game where both players tend to maximize the total profit. The latter is complemented by a bargaining model, which proposes a fair split of profit on the basis of the players’ risk attitude and bargaining power. Our main findings are as follows: (a) In contrast to previous analyses, we do not limit the ratio between manufacturer’s and retailer’s margin, which provides more general insights into the effects of the underlying distribution of power within the channel. (b) The highest total profit is gained when both players cooperate. This behavior puts also the customers in a better position, as it produces the lowest retail price as well as the highest advertising expenditures compared to the other configurations.     

On the superiority of pulsing under a concave advertising market potential function

The authors study the superiority of advertising pulsing policy (turning advertising on and off in a cyclic fashion) over its uniform (constant spending) counterpart that costs the same under the assumption that sales dynamics follow a modified Vidale–Wolfe aggregate advertising model. The authors show that pulsing can be superior if the product of the concave market potential function and the linear or concave advertising response function is convex in advertising. Similar to previous studies in the literature, the average undiscounted profit over the infinite planning horizon is considered as a performance measure according to which alternative advertising pulsation policies are compared.     

Coordinating advertising and pricing in a manufacturer–retailer channel

Cooperative advertising is a practice that a manufacturer pays retailers a portion of the local advertising cost in order to induce sales. Cooperative advertising plays a significant role in marketing programs of channel members. Nevertheless, most studies to date on cooperative advertising have assumed that the market demand is only influenced by advertising expenditures but not by retail price. This paper addresses channel coordination by seeking optimal cooperative advertising strategies and equilibrium pricing in a two-member distribution channel. We establish and compare two models: a non-cooperative, leader–follower game and a cooperative game. We develop propositions and insights from the comparison of these models. The cooperative model achieves better coordination by generating higher channel-wide profits than the non-cooperative model with these features: (a) the retailer price is lower to consumers; and (b) the advertising efforts are higher for all channel members. We identify the feasible solutions to a bargaining problem where the channel members can determine how to divide the extra profits.     

Optimum advertising policy over time for subscriber service innovations in the presence of service cost learning and customers’ disadoption

On the theoretical side, this paper characterizes qualitatively optimal advertising policy for new subscriber services. A monopolistic market is analyzed first for which customers’ disadoption, discounting of future profits streams and a service cost learning curve are allowed. After characterizing the optimal policy for a general diffusion model, the results pertaining to a specific diffusion model for which advertising affects the coefficient of innovation that incorporates the disadoption rate are reported. The results of the theoretical research show that the advertising policy of the service firm in the presence of customers’ disadoption could be very different from the same when disadoption is ignored.On the empirical side, four alternative diffusion models are estimated and their predictive powers using a one-step-ahead forecasting procedure compared. The diffusion data analyzed are related to the Canadian cable TV industry. Empirical research findings suggest that the specific diffusion model considered above is not only of theoretical appeal but also of major empirical relevance.The analytical findings of the study are documented in six theoretical propositions for which proofs are provided in a separate Appendix. The results of a related numerical experiment together with the analytical findings pertaining to the competitive role of advertising are included. Managerial implications of the study together with directions for future research are also discussed.     

Delayed effects of cooperative advertising in goodwill dynamics

This paper proposes a tool to control cooperative advertising which increases the goodwill of companies operating in a competitive market. We introduce the lag between advertising exposure and customer reaction in the goodwill dynamics evolved à la Nerlove–Arrow. As a result, we obtain a cooperative differential game with immediate and delayed effects of control variables for which we investigate the optimal solution. We examine the role the pre-coalition programmes and the length of delayed response in generating goodwill.     

Competitive Advertising Under Uncertainty: A Stochastic Differential Game Approach

We analyze optimal advertising spending in a duopolistic market where each firm's market share depends on its own and its competitor's advertising decisions, and is also subject to stochastic disturbances. We develop a differential game model of advertising in which the dynamic behavior is based on the Sethi stochastic advertising model and the Lanchester model of combat. Particularly important to note is the morphing of the sales decay term in the Sethi model into decay caused by competitive advertising and noncompetitive churn that acts to equalize market shares in the absence of advertising. We derive closed-loop Nash equilibria for symmetric as well as asymmetric competitors. For all cases, explicit solutions and comparative statics are presented.     

Stochastic diffusion models with advertising and word-of-mouth effects

This paper presents a stochastic diffusion model which incorporates advertising word-of-mouth effects. The model defines a 3 variate stochastic process based on explicit assumptions regarding consumer behavior and consumers' response to advertising. The model generalizes a wide variety of advertising models and in addition includes several classes of consumers, interaction effects between these consumers and, of course, a stochastic framework that may be used for assessing the risk implications of advertising policies and for empirical analyses purposes.     

On the generalizability of advertising pulsation monopoly results to an oligopoly

This paper introduces, for the first time, an analytical framework for modeling and analyzing sales response to advertising pulsation for competitive markets of mature products in continuous time for discrete, piecewise policies that allow unequal cycle lengths. Employing a Nash equilibrium solution concept, this study supported with numerical analysis demonstrates that there is an oligopolistic, as opposed to a monopolistic, justification for advertising at a constant rate in the presence of concave response functions or advertising according to a pulsing policy in the presence of S-shaped response functions. The article employs a modeling framework whereby each of a set of competitors' responses to advertising spending is governed mainly by Lanchester type response is used to analyze the game resulting from cyclical advertising policies that are strictly adhered to by all players. A non-discounted averaged performance is used to assess the purported optimality of different variants of piecewise-constant policies.     

Optimal dynamic advertising policies in the presence of continuously distributed time lags

The Nerlove-Arrow model of optimal dynamic advertising policies is generalized by incorporating a continuously distributed lag between advertising expenditures and increases in the stock of goodwill. This leads to a control problem where the equation of motion is given by an integro-differential equation. The transitory and steady-state properties of the optimal policies are examined, both for a general lag function and for a gamma distributed lag. The dependence of the steady-state solution on the parameters of the gamma distribution is also investigated. An example is given using specific demand and cost functions.     

Assessing the effect of advertising expenditures upon sales: A Bayesian structural time series model

We propose a robust implementation of the Nerlove‐Arrow model using a Bayesian structural time series model to explain the relationship between advertising expenditures of a countrywide fast‐food franchise network with its weekly sales. Due to the flexibility and modularity of the model, it is well suited to generalization to other markets or situations. Its Bayesian nature facilitates incorporating a priori information reflecting the manager's views, which can be updated with relevant data. This aspect of the model will be used to support the decision of the manager on the budget scheduling of the advertising firm across time and channels.     

National and store brand advertising strategies

As the propensity of premium store brands (SBs) increases, retailers must consider different ways to drive sales besides promotional strategies. With this in mind, we consider a national brand (NB) and a (premium) SB co-existing in a market. Each brand has to decide the amount to invest in advertising its product and the prices to charge its customers, which can be determined separately or in unison. When either advertising expenditures or pricing decisions are set, each brand must keep in mind that the advertising efforts and revenue may spillover between the two brands, customers who intend to purchase the NB may end up purchasing the SB and vice versa. We derive an analytical model of the situations described and characterize equilibrium advertising decisions. We find that the characteristics of a premium SB may depend on which marketing/promoting instrument (advertising or pricing) is the primary method for driving demand; and in some situations an NB may be better off to not advertise at all and instead let the premium SB carry out all of the advertising.