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1.
Almost all results referring to the problem of the existence of a value in differential games concern games without restricted phase coordinates. In this paper, we introduce a concept of value for differential games of pursuit and evasion and prove, under some general assumption, the existence of it. The players are required to satisfy some general phase constraints. The arguments employed in this paper are based on some extent on Krasovskii's method of extremal construction. We also show that the lower value in the Friedman sense is a generalization of our value. In a special linear case, the equivalence between pursuit differential games and time-optimal control problems is established.  相似文献   

2.
Pontryagin’s first and second (direct) methods and the so-called third pursuit method are the basic methods of the theory of differential games. We present various modifications of these methods. We analyze linear differential pursuit games for a delay equation under distinct constraints on the players’ control parameters. We give sufficient conditions for the solvability of the pursuit problem in finite time.  相似文献   

3.
In this paper we study linear differential games described by a systemof linear differential equations with delay subject to certain geometric constraints on the control parameters of the players. We obtain sufficient conditions for terminating the pursuit in a finite time.  相似文献   

4.
Russian Mathematics - We study linear differential games described by a system of linear differential equations with delay subject to certain integral constraints imposed on players’...  相似文献   

5.
Mixed strategy solutions are given for two-person, zero-sum games with payoff functions consisting of quadratic, bilinear, and linear terms, and strategy spaces consisting of closed balls in a Hilbert space. The results are applied to linear-quadratic differential games with no information, and with quadratic integral constraints on the control functions.  相似文献   

6.
The concept of a linear constraint on the controls of the players in a differential game of pursuit, which, in a certain sense, generalizes both integral and geometrical constraints, is introduced. The optimal parallel pursuit strategy (Π-strategy) is constructed for the corresponding problem.  相似文献   

7.
We formulate the problems of capture and avoidance as differential games with terminal cost, thus avoiding some difficulties arising from choosing the terminal time or the closest distance as the cost. This puts capture and avoidance in the context of differential games, in the sense of Isaacs. The results are illustrated via linear differential games with hard control constraints.  相似文献   

8.
Ibragimov  G. I. 《Mathematical Notes》2001,70(1-2):181-191
We consider a linear multiperson differential game with integral constraints on the control of the players. The pursuit is assumed terminated if the solution of at least one of the equations describing the game reaches the origin at some instant of time.In the case of one pursuer, we obtain a necessary and sufficient condition for terminating pursuit from all points of space. In the case of many pursuers, we obtain a sufficient condition for terminating pursuit from all points of space.  相似文献   

9.
A generalization of L.S.Pontryagin’s test example from the theory of differential games is considered. The study is based on Pontryagin’s first direct method, which was developed for the constructive solution of linear pursuit–evasion differential games of kind.  相似文献   

10.
Mixed strategy -equilibrium points are given forN-person games with cost functions consisting of quadratic, bilinear, and linear terms and strategy spaces consisting of closed balls in Hilbert spaces. The results are applied to linear-quadratic differential games with no information and quadratic integral constraints on the control functions.This work was supported by a Commonwealth of Australia, Postgraduate Research Award.  相似文献   

11.
It is shown that linear differential pursuit games with linear targets, if player controls are required to be piecewise constant or if player controls areL 1-functions (but pursuer control is bang-bang whenever quarry control is), are equivalent to a linear, autonomous control problem. As a byproduct, a sufficient condition for terminating the game, in Pontryagin's sense, is obtained.The present paper has been influenced by Prof. O. Hajek's work in differential games; the converse parts of the proofs presented here are very similar to those in Ref. 5. The author wishes to thank Dr. Hajek for his suggestions, comments, and critique. The Brasilian Government BNDE provided partial financial support.  相似文献   

12.
The game problem for an input-output system governed by a Volterra integral equation with respect to a quadratic performance functional is an untouched open problem. In this paper, it is studied by a new approach called projection causality. The main result is the causal synthesis which provides a causal feedback implementation of the optimal strategies in the saddle point sense. The linear feedback operator is determined by the solution of a Fredholm integral operator equation, which is independent of data functions and control functions. Two application examples are included. The first one is quadratic differential games of a linear system with arbitrary finite delays in the state variable and control variables. The second is the standard linear-quadratic differential games, for which it is proved that the causal synthesis can be reduced to a known result where the feedback operator is determined by the solution of a differential Riccati operator equation.

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13.
Numerical methods are proposed for constructing Nash and Stackelberg solutions in a two-player linear non-zero-sum positional differential game with terminal cost functionals and geometric constraints on the players’ controls. The formalization of the players’ strategies and of the motions generated by them is based on the formalization and results from the theory of positional zero-sum differential games developed by N.N. Krasovskii and his school. It is assumed that the game is reduced to a planar game and the constraints on the players’ controls are given in the form of convex polygons. The problem of finding solutions of the game may be reduced to solving nonstandard optimal control problems. Several computational geometry algorithms are used to construct approximate trajectories in these problems, in particular, algorithms for constructing the convex hull as well as the union, intersection, and algebraic sum of polygons.  相似文献   

14.
A class of antagonistic linear differential games (DGs) in a fixed time interval with ellipsoidal payoff functional is considered. This class of DGs includes problems which assume both rigid constraints on the players' controls and requirements to minimize control expenses. Other known classes of differential games, such as linear DGs with a quadratic performance index and linear DGs with ellipsoidal terminal sets and admissible sets of controls for the players, considered in Kurzhanskii's ellipsoidal technique, are limiting cases of DGs of this class. The concept of a u-strategic function, which expresses the property of u-stability for ellipsoidal functions, is introduced. An effective algorithm is presented for computing a u-strategic function, based on Kurzhanskii's ellipsoidal technique. The main result of this paper is that a guaranteed positional strategy for player u is defined by a certain explicit formula in terms of a u-strategic function. The proof of this result is based on a viability theorem for differential equations.  相似文献   

15.
The uniqueness of Nash equilibria is shown for a class of stochastic differential games where the dynamic constraints are linear in the control variables. The result is applied to an oligopoly.This paper benefitted from comments by two anonymous referees and by L. Blume and C. Simon.  相似文献   

16.
This paper gives an overview of linear programming methods for solving standard and nonstandard Markovian control problems. Standard problems are problems with the usual criteria such as expected total (discounted) rewards and average expected rewards; we also discuss a particular class of stochastic games. In nonstandard problems there are additional considerations as side constraints, multiple criteria or mean-variance tradeoffs. In a second companion paper efficient linear programing algorithms are discussed for some applications.  相似文献   

17.
The optimal game problem reduced to an infinite system of differential equations with integral constraints on the players’ controls is considered. The goal of the pursuer is to bring the system into the zeroth state, while the evader strives to prevent this. It is shown that Krasovskii's alternative is realized: the space of states is divided into two parts so that if the initial state lies in one part, completion of the pursuit is possible, and if it lies in the other part, evasion is possible. Constructive schemes for devising the optimal strategies of the players are proposed, and an explicit formula for the optimal pursuit time is derived.  相似文献   

18.
In this paper we study a class of linear programming problems having fuzzy goals/constraints that can be described by (Atanassov’s) I-fuzzy sets. Duality theory is developed for this class of problems in the I-fuzzy sense which is subsequently applied to define a new solution concept for two persons zero-sum matrix games with I-fuzzy goals.  相似文献   

19.
In this article, we consider max-min controllability in linear pursuit games with norm-bounded controls. Our approach is based on the separation theorem of disjoint compact convex sets in Euclidean space. Necessary and sufficient conditions for max-min controllability are given in terms of an explicit relative controllability expression which, in a sense, is a comparison between the control capabilities of the competing parties. Minimal time and optimal norm problems are investigated.  相似文献   

20.
The present paper deals with a class of nonzero-sum, two-person games with finite strategies when there are constraints on the strategies selected by the players. The constraints arise due to the subjective difficulty that each player often has in assigning to the states probabilities with which he is completely satisfied, and the model specifies how much each player must perturb his initial probability estimate in order to change his maximum utility alternative from the alternative originally best under the initial estimate. It is shown that the Nash-equilibrium solution of this class of nonzero-sum games can be characterized by an equivalent nonlinear program which leads in some cases to a pair of complementary eigenvalue problems. Applications to normal or approximate solutions of linear programming problems are also indicated.  相似文献   

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